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PART I: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]-1 PREFACE 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to this manuscript. Section 1 is a preface, 
and sets out some basic administrative and editorial information. Section 2 is aims 
at ‘breaking the ice’ on the topic by providing a casual background on the 
motivations behind this study, particularly in the context of how discussions on 
intellectual property are framed. Section 3 provides some broad operational 
definitions for key concepts discussed in this manuscript. Section 4 then sets out 
the main objectives and research questions of this project, and provides some 
notes that are useful for understanding this manuscript’s content and structure. 
Section 5 then provides a literature review on the topic, leading into the short 
concluding comments set out in Section 6.  
 
 
[1]-1.1  Administrative Background  
 
This manuscript was written pursuant to the European Doctorate in Law and 
Economics Programme (EDLE).  
 
The EDLE is a joint-programme co-hosted by the Università di Bologna (UNIBO, 
Bologna, IT), Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam (EUR, Rotterdam, NL), and 
Universität Hamburg (UHH, Hamburg, DE).  
 
Funding for this research project was provided by the German Academic Exchange 
Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, DAAD), and the European 
Union’s Erasmus Mundus programme.  
 
The primary promoter for this research project is Prof. Dr. Hans-Heinrich Trute of 
Universität Hamburg. The second promoter is Prof. Dr. Louis Visscher, and the co-
promoter is Dr. Kees van Noortwijk, both of the Erasmus School of Law.  
 
 
[1]-1.2 Acknowledgements 
 
The author wishes to thank everyone, everywhere, for everything.  
 
 
[1]-1.3 The Discipline of Law and Economics 
 
This manuscript was prepared pursuant to the academic discipline of ‘Law and 
Economics’. The essence of the field is the use the tools of economic theory to 
analyse subject areas which are traditionally seen as legal in nature.  
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A consequence of this construction is that the analytical methodologies used are 
necessarily those that dominate economic thinking itself. This is to say that the 
discipline largely relies on the tools of neo-classical economics, and that the 
primary analytical concern is with economic efficiency.  
 
While this approach is designed to provide an objective methodology for analysing 
the mechanisms of economic activity, economics (and legal analysis) are not 
value-free sciences. This is of course not to say that neoclassical economics is 
without value; its conclusions are indeed part of the building blocks of our 
understanding of social, economic, and legal institutions. However, it cannot – and 
should not – be the exclusive building blocks of such an understanding. 
 
As such, to the extent that this manuscript attempts to fit within the framework of 
the discipline of law and economics, these discussions should be understood as an 
academic exercise within this specific research field. There are of course many 
other perspectives, which should be considered when applying research 
conclusions to policy prescriptions. 
 
The above being said, the discipline of law and economics provides the general 
boundaries for the analysis in this manuscript. As such, the explicit goal is always 
welfare maximisation, and the lenses through which the topic is analysed are 
mainly the notions of transaction costs, public goods, and externalities.  
 
There are of course other law and economics perspectives that can be used to 
analyse the topics in this research project. For example, the proposed legal 
instruments discussed in Chapter 2 (WIPO Treaty) and Chapter 9 (EU Regulation) 
can be analysed from a Public Choice Theory Perspective. The regional 
harmonization instruments discussed in Chapters 8 and 9 (EU Legal Framework) 
can also be analysed in terms of the economics of federalism. However, such 
analysis is not the intended scope of this research project. 
 
 
[1]-2 SHAPING DISCOURSE THROUGH LANGUAGE 
 
One of the major motivations for this research project was filling a perceived 
literature gap on the topic. Furthermore, it aims to bring nuance and detail to 
discussions on copyright law, which seem to lack such, particularly in terms of 
treatment of the intellectual property rights of broadcasting organisations. To 
understand this problem, it is useful to first take a look at the language on which 
these discussions are based.  
 
To the confused reader - while the sections below may seem strange, rest assured 
that they do conclude with a salient point.  
 
 
[1]-2.1 Protection of Cookies  
 
“Try one of my cookies!” said Aunt Margaret.  
“They are fresh out of the oven, and are so good, I copyrighted them!” 
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Obviously Aunt Margaret did not mean that she literally copyrighted the cookies; 
she just means to say that her cookies are so good and well known amongst the 
family that they deserve some sort of recognition, protection even - lest some 
other less culinary inclined party attendee take credit for them. 
 
Firstly, the idea of ‘copyrighting’ something as an active decision is a misnomer. 
International copyright law explicitly provides that the enjoyment and exercise of 
copyright is not to be subject to any formality that would require any sort of active 
decision1; rather, once the subject matter is copyrightable and meets the relevant 
qualification of originality, copyright arises automatically upon creation.  
 
Secondly, the word ‘copyrighted’ in this context seems quite odd. Maybe Aunt 
Margaret should have used the word ‘patented’. Perhaps she wishes to protect a 
special process or technology that she uses to make the cookies - some unique 
method of baking at different phases of temperature and pressure perhaps.  
Alternatively, she may have invented a special baking pan that optimizes the 
distribution of the degree to which the insides and outsides of the cookies are 
baked – leaving a nice crunchy outside but a chewy delicate inside – that is often 
a hit or miss for less experienced bakers. In these cases, one would need to analyse 
whether the invention or process meets the patent criteria of novelty, 
inventiveness, and utility. Most certainly, Aunt Margret would also need a good 
patent agent to help her through the process, and some funds to cover the 
associated administrative costs of patent application. If it were that she did go 
through this application procedure, we would assume that she would have at least 
used the right terminology in her initial comments. 
 
Another possibility is that she should have used the word ‘trademarked’. Indeed, 
Aunt Margret’s cookies are so well known that her brand has value, and we all 
need to make sure that her cookies are properly identified. Without such branding 
(enabled by a trademark), not only might she not get credit, but someone else 
might pass off their lesser cookies for hers. Still, she would need to establish that 
her mark is indeed distinctive and does not conflict with any other existing mark, 
and she would also need a good trademark agent (and funding for the 
administrative costs). Furthermore, let’s hope that the agent is experienced 
enough to know that the application should specifically be made in Class ‘300016’ 
(biscuits/cookies) of the Nice regime2 for classification of goods and services for 
the purposes of trademark filing.  
 
So if ‘patented’ and ‘trademarked’ do not make much sense, then perhaps it is 
indeed the case that ‘copyrighted’ was the correct word. This would however 
involve a proposition that the cookies themselves are artistic works, and hence 
eligible for copyright protection – an argument with several layers of analytical 
complexity. Another possibility is that she is not talking about the actual cookies 
                                                        
1 Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works provides 
that copyright protection cannot be subject to any formalities. 
2 The Nice regime is an international intellectual property agreement, harmonizing the system of 
classifying goods and services for the purposes of trademark law. 
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themselves, but the recipe used to make the cookies. However, the notion of 
protecting a recipe by copyright is a nuanced area. On one hand, a mere listing of 
ingredients is not copyright eligible. 3  Conversely, the literary expansions and 
illustrations that often supplement ingredient listings, do meet the copyright 
eligibility criteria.  
 
If a particular recipe really is ground breaking in that it is innovative and solves 
some known culinary problem, then maybe that recipe really is patentable. And 
so, the analysis circles back to patents. For completeness of discussion, it is noted 
here that in most cases, family recipes are protected by yet another different form 
of intellectual property – the trade secret. 
 
The point of this example is that in common everyday communication, non-
experts often erroneously use the terms ‘patent’, ‘trademark’, and ‘copyright’ 
somewhat interchangeably. While these forms of intellectual property rights all 
have very different public policy bases, economic functions, and legal mechanisms, 
one should not find fault with such casual linguistic errors. After all, the purpose 
of language is to communicate information, and the technical differences between 
different forms of intellectual property are irrelevant in this context. All that needs 
to be communicated is the cookies are somehow ‘owned’ by the creator, in an 
intangible sense that goes beyond the individual units of the physical baked goods; 
indeed, the words ‘patented’, ‘trademarked’, and ‘copyright’ all adequately 
succeed at communicating that sentiment.  
 
While one might excuse such terminology misuse by casual commenters, there is 
an expectation of precision from policy-makers, legal practitioners, and academics 
– professions in which accuracy and nuance of communication is critical.  
 
It might be assumed that as one digs deeper into the field, the language used in 
discussions on intellectual property matters becomes more precise. However, the 
issue of intellectual property rights nomenclature is a not-so-obvious problem in 
field of copyright law, even for those who claim to be experts in the field. The 
nature of this problem is captured in the literary device known as a ‘metonym’.  
 
 
[1]-2.2 Shakespearian Metonyms 
   
“Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears; I come to bury Caesar, not to 
praise him.” famously said the character Mark Antony in William Shakespeare’s 
Julius Caesar.   
 
Obviously, Antony did not literally wish to borrow the physical ‘ears’ of those 
present at Caesar’s funeral. The statement was meant to be a request for the 
audience’s attention, and the reference to ‘ears’ was meant to represent the call 
for attention. That representation is a literary device known as a ‘metonymy’ - the 
                                                        
3 Generally, simple objective information (devoid of artistic character) is not copyright eligible. In 
the specific case of recipes, there is case law that explicitly suggests that lists of ingredients are not 
copyright eligible (e.g. see Schleifer v. Berns, US District Court, Eastern District of NY 2017) 
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substitution of a direct reference to something with a reference to some part or 
attribute associated with it (i.e. ‘ears’ are associated with ‘attention’).  
 
A specific case of metonyms is the synecdoche – where part of something is used 
to reference the whole (or vice versa). For example, in American English parlance, 
to say that one just acquired a ‘new set of wheels’ would mean that one bought a 
new car (or bicycle). Part of the vehicle (the wheels) is used as a literary device to 
represent the entire car (or bicycle). Most certainly, to someone not familiar with 
this expression, hearing this statement without proper context can lead to a great 
misunderstanding; after all, wheels are quite useless without the rest of the car 
(or bicycle). 
 
So what does this have to do with copyright law?  The problem with discussions 
on copyright law is that the term ‘copyright’ itself is often used as a synecdoche 
for wider branches of the intellectual property system.  
 
 
[1]-2.3 The Synecdoche of Copyright 
  
Copyright is a form of intellectual property that confers certain rights onto the 
creators and authors of original literary and artistic works. There are of course 
many different types of creators (sculptors, music composers, poets, painters, 
architects, etc.), and many different types of works (sculptures, songs, poems, 
paintings, buildings, etc.). This vast array of creative activity is all captured under 
the umbrella of ‘copyright’.  
 
However, this is not where the problem lies. The problem lies in a separate form 
of intellectual property known as ‘related rights’. Related rights confer certain 
rights onto agents who are themselves not necessarily engaged in creating literary 
and artistic works, but whose activities are necessary for facilitating those works 
to be expressed and conveyed. These agents include performers – actors and 
musicians without whom a screenwriters’ play or a composer’s composition 
cannot be brought to life – and producers who make the arrangements for fixation 
(documentation and recording) of performed works.  
 
Another group of related right beneficiaries are broadcasters – agents who 
themselves do not necessarily produce original works, but are an important 
mechanism to distribute works to the public. After all, the social value of the fruits 
of creative endeavour is at least partially related to extent to which those fruits 
are shared. The intellectual property rights of these broadcasting organisations 
are the central focus of this manuscript.  
 
It is clear that copyright and related rights do have some sort of fundamental 
relationship, as the activities associated with related rights support the activities 
associated with copyright. Nevertheless, copyright and related rights are two 
distinct forms of intellectual property, with separate public policy goals and 
economic functions. Furthermore, the different types of related rights themselves 
are also very divergent in their theoretical bases and economic functions – a theme 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this manuscript; it would appear that these are 
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merely grouped together under the umbrella of ‘related rights’ as a matter of 
convenience. 
 
Hence, if one were to describe the intellectual property system as having three 
main branches – (i) Patent, (ii) Trademark, and (iii) Copyright, the last term 
becomes troublesome. The proper nomenclature should describe that third 
branch as ‘Copyright and Related Rights’. As such, since ‘Copyright’ is a part of the 
larger concept of ‘Copyright and Related Rights’, the term copyright is used as a 
synecdoche. 
 
The ability to engage in meaningful discussion is made even more complicated by 
the fact that different jurisdictions take different approaches to protecting the 
rights of broadcasting organisations. While some grant an explicit related right, 
others protect broadcasts under copyright.4  
 
A particular frustrating case can be found in the legislation of Canada. Section 21 
of the Canadian Copyright Act provides that “…a broadcaster has a copyright in the 
communication signals that it broadcasts…”.5 That Section then goes on to set out 
rights which would be otherwise understood as elements of broadcasters’ related 
rights. Furthermore, these rights are very different and separate from the rights 
of copyright owners set out in Section 3 of the legislation. The overall effect is that, 
Canadian law grants to broadcasters, certain special rights – which would in any 
other context be called related rights – but refers to it as copyright. There simply 
could be no better example of how confusing terminology can make meaningful 
discussion on this topic challenging. 
 
The effect of the ‘copyright synecdoche’ is that the concept of related rights are 
often relegated to the status of a mere technicality in the structure of the overall 
intellectual property system. This relegation is not inconsequential. Unlike the 
case of light-heartedly describing the proprietary nature of cookie recipes, the 
language of copyright has real consequences in terms of policy debate, the 
formulation of legal rules, and the overall understanding of the theoretical nature 
of creative activities and the agents that support them.  
 
To assume that the entire body of knowledge on the nature and theory of the 
subject matter of copyright equally applies to the subject matter of related rights 
can therefore lead to uninformed policy-making.  
 
It is needless to say the academic literature on copyright law is extensive. There is 
a huge body of work analysing a plethora of sub-issues within the copyright 
system. However, the literature on related rights is certainly much less developed. 
In the case of the related rights of broadcasting organisations, the literature is 
particularly sparse.  It would hence appear that there is very little cumulative 
knowledge concerning the nature, theory, and dynamics of the rights of 
broadcasting organisations. This manuscript aims at filling this literature gap. 
                                                        
4 WIPO SCCR/1/3, paragraphs 34-35 
5 Canada Copyright Act R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42 / Loi sur le droit d’auteur, L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-42; 
Section 21 - Copyright in communication signals / Droit d’auteur sur le signal de communication 
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[1]-2.4 Technology and Literature Gaps 
 
An obvious but perhaps incomplete explanation for this literature gap might be 
that in the timeline of the history of modern legal systems, broadcasting 
technology is relatively new. Extensive commercial radio services were 
introduced in the industrial world in the 1920s, and commercial television 
services did not emerge in a significant way until the 1930s. In contrast, modern 
copyright law finds its roots in the Statute of Anne, which was enacted in 1710 in 
Great Britain. It is therefore to be expected that analysis on relatively modern 
issues like ‘broadcasting copyright’ is much less developed relative to the long-
standing history of the legal concept of ‘traditional copyright’. 
 
A similar example of relatively ‘modern copyright issues’ might be found in the 
field of computer software. While there are certainly more recent technologies 
that are still uncertain territory for the intellectual property system (e.g. artificial 
intelligence or 3-D printing), software has at least been in use long enough to have 
an explicitly established position in the legal system.  
 
The concept of computer software, very broadly speaking (and for the purposes 
of discussions on copyright law), emerged in the 1950s. However, there is most 
certainly a large body of literature analysing the issue of how computer software 
fits into the overall intellectual property system.  
 
The comparison of the attention paid to broadcasting versus computer software 
may however be somewhat unfair, as software did indeed pose a very interesting 
question – should it be protected under patents or copyright law? The scope and 
perceived consequences of this question prompted extensive analysis on software 
and intellectual property, resulting in a wealth of literature on the topic. For 
completeness, the modern answer to this question is that computer programmes 
(whether source or object code) are protected under copyright law, akin to a 
literary works6; nevertheless the debate over the notion of software patentability 
continues.7   
 
Aside from the policy dimensions of the copyright-patent debate, the literature on 
software copyright still goes quite deep. Part of this literature is a theoretical 
analysis into the very nature of programming code, how it relates to the concepts 
of creativity and innovation, and what that means for our collective understanding 
of intellectual property law. Indeed, there are entire books that consolidate 
various perspectives on this topic, and the result is a very developed theoretical 
understanding of computer software and its context in the intellectual property 
system.8 
 
                                                        
6 In international law, copyright eligibility for computer software is provided for by Article 10 of 
the World Trade Organisation TRIPs Agreement, and Article 4 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty.  
7 For example, see the US Supreme Court Case ‘Alice Corp’ of 2014.  
8  For example, for an overall assessment of intellectual property and computer software, see 
Bainbridge (1992). 
8 
As such, the example of computer software suggests that the literature gap on 
broadcasters’ related rights is not a function of how recent broadcasting 
technology is, as the two fields are roughly equal in age. Rather, it suggests that 
broadcasters’ related rights have largely been relegated to a footnote in academic 
discussions on intellectual property law.  
 
This is not to say that the topic has been completely overlooked due to perceived 
unimportance. This might be the case if the issue otherwise found no attention in 
any other forum outside of academia. This however is not the case. As discussed 
in detail in Chapter 2, the area has been a major topic of debate in the international 
intellectual property community, and remains a major unsettled point of 
international copyright law.  
 
There is therefore a very stark and surprising contrast between the levels of 
attention paid to this topic by academics and by international policymakers. It is 
in this context that this manuscript aims at contributing to the academic literature 
on broadcasters’ related rights.  
 
 
[1]-3 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
 
Before moving on to substantive discussion on the topic of broadcasters’ rights, it 
is useful to first establish some working definitions. Definitions of key concepts 
are necessary in order to properly contextualise the analysis in this manuscript, 
even if they are made in broad or even sometimes fluid terms.  
 
 
[1]-3.1 Defining ‘Broadcasting’ 
 
A natural prelude to an analysis of intellectual property and broadcasting would 
be to define the term ‘broadcasting’. However, a detailed discussion on the history 
and technological details of broadcasting is not necessary for the purposes of this 
manuscript.  
 
Generally, ‘broadcasting’ refers to a single communication of some set of 
information to an open group of recipients across some geographical space. A 
telephone call would not constitute ‘broadcasting’ as is it is a communication 
made to a single recipient, as opposed to a group of recipients. A letter sent by the 
State to every single household is also not a broadcast, as a separate (though 
identical) letter is sent to every household and it therefore not a single technical 
communication. 
 
Also, a presentation at a conference or seminar (even if using visual or audio aids) 
would not constitute broadcasting, as the communication is ‘face-to’-face’ rather 
over some relative geographical distance; furthermore, irrespective of distance, a 
private conference implies a finite audience and hence not an open group. The 
concept of the open group implies that any member of the public can access the 
communication, once the necessary technical requirements for reception are in 
place. This does not imply that the group of recipients is strictly unlimited and that 
 9
there is no excludability – it is just to say that any member of the public has the 
choice to become a recipient if they so desire; for example, cable television 
services might be limited to paying subscribers, but despite this excludability, the 
set of possible subscribers constitutes the entire public (within the technical range 
of service provision).  
 
The nature of the information contained in a communication is also not directly 
relevant to whether it constitutes a ‘broadcast’ or not. However, in practical terms, 
broadcasting – at least in its historic and current forms – is limited to information 
perceptible by only two of the five traditional human senses, i.e. sight and hearing. 
Broadcasting is therefore understood as information comprised of sounds and 
images (or both), although future developments might possibly push up against 
the boundaries of such a definition (e.g. through olfactory technology which might 
introduce the concept of broadcasting smells). In the conventional sense, 
broadcasting should therefore be understood and including – but not limited to – 
radio and television services.  
 
A major component of defining ‘broadcasting’ is the technology used to provide 
these services. Traditionally, radio and television services are provided through 
wireless transmissions on a defined electromagnetic frequency. This concept of 
traditional broadcasting is sometimes called ‘wireless’, ‘Hertzian’, ‘free-to-air’, or 
‘terrestrial’ broadcasting. However, there are other technologies used for 
broadcasting which were developed relatively more recently, including 
communications made via wired networks (wired broadcasting or ‘cablecasting’), 
satellite networks (satellite broadcasting), and through the internet 
(‘webcasting’).  
 
In the context of legal rules, ‘broadcasting’ may also take on different meanings in 
the context of different bodies of law. For example, broadcasting – as a technical 
act, particularly where electromagnetic frequencies are used – is subject to 
telecommunications law and regulatory policy.  
 
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 9  defines a ‘broadcasting 
services as “A radiocommunication service in which the transmissions are intended 
for direct reception by the general public. This service may include sound 
transmissions, television transmissions or other types of transmission”. 10 
Furthermore, it defines ‘radiocommunication’ as “Telecommunication by means of 
radio waves” 11, and radio waves (or ‘hertzian waves’) as “Electromagnetic waves 
of frequencies arbitrarily lower than 3 000 GHz, propagated in space without 
artificial guide”12. In the context of telecommunications law, broadcasting services 
                                                        
9  The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is the specialised agency of the United 
Nations, which deals with issues relating to information and communications technology. The 
Radio Regulations (RR) as one of the main treaties administered by the ITU, and deals with the 
issue of allocation of electromagnetic spectrum resources.   
10 ITU Radio Regulations, Article 1, Definition 1.38 
11 ITU Radio Regulations, Article 1, Definition 1.6 
12 ITU Radio Regulations, Article 1, Definition 1.5 
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can therefore be understood as a subset of telecommunications services that are 
based on the use of electromagnetic spectrum.  
 
Another body of law which might apply to broadcasting is public law. This body of 
law would set out the regulations which apply to broadcasters in terms of the 
content which they broadcast. This would include policy areas such regulations 
on local content, advertising, and protection of minors. In this body of law, 
individual jurisdictions would set out relevant definitions for regulated services.  
 
However, the definition of broadcasting relevant to this manuscript relates to 
intellectual property law. In this regard, the main feature of such a definition is the 
technology used for transmission. Generally, broadcasting is understood as 
referring specifically to wireless terrestrial broadcasting. Other forms of 
broadcast-like transmission are often referred to by technology specific names 
such as ‘cablecasting’ and ‘webcasting’, as previously mentioned.  
 
Chapter 2 on the International Framework for Broadcasters’ Rights discusses the 
definition of ‘broadcasting’ in international intellectual property treaties, and the 
coverage (or lack thereof) of different transmission technologies. 
 
For the purposes of the analysis of broadcasters’ rights in this manuscript, the 
term ‘broadcaster’ should hence be understood to refer to traditional 
broadcasting, with the subtext of an explicit intention to generalise the relevant 
discussions to other technologies.13  Where the analysis requires more explicit 
differentiation, the discussions will use more technology-specific language. 
 
Furthermore, within this manuscript, the intention is to treat broadcasting 
services in general terms. While television services are often used for illustrative 
purposes, the analysis is meant to be equally applicable to other forms of 
broadcasting. 
 
 
[1]-3.2 Definition of ‘Broadcasting Organisation’ 
 
Since the provision of broadcasting services to the public falls under 
telecommunications and public law, service providers usually need public 
authorisation to provide services. Such authorisation should be understood as 
separate from the authorisation required to use a specifically allocated frequency.  
 
Hence, the term ‘broadcasting organisation’ should be understood as being 
restricted to only those entities undertaking the activity of broadcasting where 
such activity is legitimately authorised under the regulatory framework of the 
relevant jurisdiction.  
 
Furthermore, the technical act of broadcasting is often very complex, and might 
involve several different parties. For example, sometimes the infrastructure used 
for signal transmission might not be owned by the entity that compiles the 
                                                        
13 The concept of the synecdoche strikes again! 
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communication that is to be transmitted. In this example, the ‘broadcasting 
organisation’ can be understood to be (i) the party with ‘editorial responsibility’ 
for the communication,  (ii) the party which undertakes the technical act of signal 
transmission, or (iii) both in conjunction. This question, while very important in 
terms of application of the law, is not relevant for the analyses in this manuscript. 
Therefore, it is sufficient to very generally define the ‘broadcasting organisation’ 
as the party responsible for undertaking the activity of providing a broadcasting 
service to the public.  
 
 
[1]-3.3 Definition of ‘Broadcaster’s Rights’ 
 
The term ‘broadcaster’s rights’ should be understood as being identical in 
meaning to ‘the rights of broadcasting organisations’. Furthermore, it is important 
to understand that ‘broadcaster’s rights’ are separate from – though easily 
confused with – the similar sounding term ‘broadcasting rights’. ‘Broadcasters’ 
rights’ are certain rights enjoyed by broadcasting organisations. In contrast, 
‘broadcasting rights’ are certain rights enjoyed by copyright owners, particularly 
to control communication to the public of their protected works through 
broadcasting.  To properly understand the analyses in this manuscript, it will be 
critical to continuously and actively acknowledge this difference.  
 
Given the different bodies of applicable law, the concept of some ‘rights’ as enjoyed 
by broadcasting organisations can have different connotations in different 
context. For instance, in a telecommunications law context, the broadcasters’ 
rights might be interpreted to mean the authorisation given to provide service to 
the public; it might also mean the right use a certain allocated frequency for the 
provision of such services.  
 
In the context of public law, the concept of the rights of the broadcaster might be 
interpreted to refer to some exercise of the principles of freedom of speech, 
freedom of the press, or freedom to conduct business.  
 
However, in the context of this manuscript, ‘broadcasters’ rights’ should be 
explicitly interpreted in the context of intellectual property law. The term 
therefore refers to the rights granted to broadcasting organisations under 
intellectual property law, which relate to protection of a broadcast signal 
transmission. However, it is noted that the term may still more widely include 
other forms of protection which do not take the form of intellectual property (e.g. 
criminal liability for piracy of broadcast).  
 
The specific scope and nature of these rights are discussed Chapter 2. However, 
for completeness, it should be stated that broadcaster’s rights – like copyright - 
are generally bundles of different rights. The typical components of such a bundle 
are rights to control (i) fixation of a broadcast, (ii) retransmission of a broadcast, 
and (iii) communication to the public of a broadcast.  
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In this manuscript, the concept of ‘broadcasters’ rights’ will be referred to as a 
general concept. Where necessary, specific rights – particularly the right of 
retransmission (which is the focus of Part IV) – will be referred to.  
 
A final important note is that choice of intellectual property tool is not relevant to 
how the term broadcasters’ rights is to be understood in the context of this 
manuscript. While some jurisdictions grant protection to broadcasting 
organisations through copyright, some grant protection through a related right. 
However, this designation generally has no material impact on the exact nature 
and scope of the rights granted, and should be seen as a peculiar technicality of 
individual jurisdictions’ legal systems. Accordingly, the term ‘the related rights of 
broadcasting organisations’ is used in this manuscript as a generalised concept, 
even though in some cases, those rights might not be applied through a related 
rights system. 14  For completeness, it should also be noted that the term 
‘neighbouring right’ should be understood as identical to ‘related right’.  
 
[1]-3.3.1 Independence of Rights 
 
A very important theme in this manuscript is the independence of copyright and 
the related rights of broadcasting organisations. The two are legally distinct 
concepts, and have different functions.  
 
In practice, it is noted that a broadcasting organisation would often produce some 
of its own material, and hence also be a copyright holder. Hence, the two different 
rights often co-exist simultaneously (and are held by the same entity) in relation 
to the transmission of certain content.  This however is not always the case, and 
the nature, function, and scope of these rights are different. Hence, the analysis 
stresses this ‘dichotomy’ of copyright and related rights. 
 
To draw an analogy, it is no different from analysing the behaviour of a firm 
producing a good, where the good is protected by both a patent and a trademark. 
Both forms of intellectual property (i.e. the patent and the trademark) have 
different functions and scopes, although there may be overlap in the resulting 
effective protection from certain actions of competitors. In such a case, analysis of 
the firm in its capacity as a patent holder would not be affected from the fact that 
firm also enjoys trademark protection.  
 
 
[1]-3.4 Definition of Specific Rights 
 
Two specific elements of the broadcaster’s ‘bundle of rights’ require some up front 
clarification. The first is the concept of ‘fixation’. Because a broadcast is a transient 
communication, it exists only in the instance in which is transmitted. It therefore 
has no temporal permanence in a material sense. A broadcast may however be 
recorded in some way, resulting in some material permanence. This process of 
                                                        
14 Interestingly, this suggests a sort of reversal of the ‘synecdoche’ concept discussed in Section 2. 
The term ‘related right’ is used to include broadcasters right both when expressed through related 
rights, and copyright.  
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recording is known as ‘fixation’ in copyright and related rights law. The right to 
control fixation is one of the core elements of a broadcaster’s related rights. 
 
The second element is the concept of retransmission. When a broadcast is first 
communicated to the public, it is said that a broadcast signal is transmitted. That 
signal may then be received by an entity other than the original broadcaster, and 
again transmitted. This process of receiving a transmission and engaging in a 
secondary transmission is called ‘retransmission’. A retransmission can be carried 
out through various technical means including by another broadcaster, a cable 
network, a satellite operator, or over the internet. In some contexts, (mostly in 
older legal writings), retransmission is called ‘re-diffusion’ or ‘re-broadcasting’; 
the terms should be understood as having the same meaning.  
 
 
[1]-4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES  
 
With the above general definitions set out, this section gives an overview of the 
general structure of this manuscript, its chapters, and their underlying research 
questions.  
 
 
[1]-4.1 Overall Research Question 
 
This dissertation manuscript is titled ‘An Economic Analysis of the Intellectual 
Property Rights of Broadcasting Organisations’.  
 
The overall goal of is to lay the theoretical foundations for an understanding of the 
nature, economic function, and legal mechanisms of the intellectual property 
rights of broadcasting organisations. The fundamental overarching research 
question in this regard is: 
 
Q0: “What are the theoretical bases and economic mechanisms of the related 
rights of broadcasting organisations?”  
 
 
[1]-4.2 Overview of Part I 
 
Part I of this manuscript (‘Introduction and Research Background’) provides 
background information and the motivation for the research analysis in the rest 
of the manuscript. It consists of two chapters. Chapter 1 (the current chapter) 
provides general introductory information including the motivating factors for the 
research project. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the international framework 
for the protection of broadcaster’s rights. 
 
It is important to note that the discussions in Chapter 2 relate to current policy 
debates, and therefore provide an understanding of the relevant issues as of July 
2018. It is possible – and indeed quite likely – that at the time of reading this 
manuscript the status of the international debate of protection of broadcasting 
organisations has changed.  
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[1]-4.3 Overview of Part II 
 
Part II is titled ‘Broadcasting as Unique Subject Matter’, and contains two chapters. 
It provides the theoretical background to the topic – both in terms of legal and 
economic theory (as opposed to ‘Law and Economic’ theory) – and sets the context 
for the subject matter. 
 
Chapter 3 is the first substantive analytical chapter, and is titled ‘Broadcast Signals 
as IP Subject Matter’. It analyses the theoretical foundations of intellectual 
property law, and how they apply to broadcasting signals. The underlying 
research question in this chapter is as follows: 
 
Q1: “How do existing theories of intellectual property rights apply to the case 
of broadcast signals?” 
 
The broad conclusion of this chapter is that broadcasters’ rights have a very 
uneasy fit within the framework of the traditional theories of intellectual property.  
 
Chapter 4 (‘The Economics of Broadcasting Markets’) moves on to provide an 
overview of the economic context of broadcasting markets. Its underlying 
research question is as follows: 
 
Q2: “What are the key features of the markets in which the related rights of 
broadcasting organisations exist?” 
 
The general conclusion is that broadcasters’ rights are just one element of a very 
complex system of policy issues and legal rules that characterise broadcasting 
markets.  
 
The analysis in Part II contributes to answering the overall research question as 
Chapter 3 concludes that understanding the theoretical bases of broadcasters’ 
rights cannot be accomplished by deference to existing analyses of other branches 
of intellectual property. Chapter 4 build on this conclusion by noting the unique 
context of broadcasting markets, and hence why broadcasters’ rights are indeed a 
specific case for the intellectual property system.  
 
 
[1]-4.4 Overview of Part III 
 
Part III is titled ‘Modelling Broadcasters’ Rights’. This Part contains three chapters, 
two of which are mathematical in nature. The purpose of this   is to analyse the 
specific issue of the scope and strength of broadcaster’s rights, particularly in 
terms of its relationship to more general copyright. 
 
This Part of the manuscript is the most explicit part in terms of its use of the 
methodology of Law and Economics. 
 
Chapter 5 is titled ‘Incentive-Access Model of Copyright’. This chapter focuses on 
the issue of scope of protection. It analyses the key features of building an 
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economic model for the ‘scope’ of protection granted under copyright. The chapter 
then attempts to see how such a model can apply to the case of broadcasters’ 
rights, further to the idea established in the previous chapter that broadcasters’ 
rights really are a unique subject matter case in the intellectual property system. 
The underlying research question is therefore as follows: 
 
Q3: “What is the optimal scope of rights for the related rights of broadcasting 
organisations?”  
 
The broad conclusion of this chapter is that the scope of rights for broadcasting 
organisations should be less than that which is constructed for general copyright.  
While Chapter 5 takes a very abstract and theoretical view of the concept of ‘scope 
of protection’, Chapter 6 gives a practical discussion on the various policy 
dimensions that affect such scope. This chapter is titled ‘Policy Levers for Breadth 
of Protection’, and analyses the various aspects of the concept of ‘breadth of 
protection’, and how such apply differently for general copyright and for 
broadcasters’ rights. The underlying research question is therefore as follows: 
 
Q4: “What are the practical policy dimensions that affect the scope of 
protection for the related rights of broadcasting organisations?”  
 
The general conclusion is that the policy levers for broadcaster’s rights are much 
more limited than that for patent protection and general copyright.  
 
Chapter 7 is titled ‘Enforcement in Broadcasting Markets’. This chapter focuses on 
the specific issue of enforcement, specifically where both copyright and the rights 
of broadcasting organisations have interests in addressing infringements.  
 
The basis of this analysis is that broadcasting markets are unique settings in terms 
of infringement and enforcement activities, given that two different sets of 
intellectual property are involved. This discussion builds on a notion of anti-
commons effects, which was previously briefly discussed in Chapter 4. The 
underlying research question in this chapter is: 
 
Q5: “What are the dynamics of intellectual property enforcement activities in 
broadcasting markets?”  
 
The broad conclusion of this chapter is that there are various possible outcomes 
regarding enforcement of intellectual property rights in broadcasting markets, 
and these outcomes largely depend on the specifics of market and infringement 
characteristics. 
 
The chapter also concludes with a suggestion that as an alternative to granting 
exclusive intellectual property rights to broadcasting organisations, such 
organisations can be allowed to undertake enforcement actions on behalf of the 
copyright owners with whom they hold licencing agreements.  
 
This specific concluding proposition indirectly corresponds to the conclusion of 
Chapter 5; the notion of giving the broadcaster enforcement standing on behalf of 
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copyright holders results in constructing a scope of protection from the 
broadcaster that is less than that for the copyright holder.   
 
Part III contributes to answering the overall research question by concluding that 
even though broadcasters’ rights are a legally and theoretically independent 
concept from copyright, understanding the theoretical relationship between the 
two is necessary to understand the theoretical bases of broadcaster’s rights. More 
specifically, in addressing the question of scope of protection, the process of 
designing optimal protection for broadcasting organisations requires some 
consideration of the scope of protection given to authors of copyright protected 
works.  
 
 
[1]-4.5 Overview of Part IV 
 
Part IV is titled ‘Analysis of Retransmission Rights’.  Unlike all previous Parts, which 
focus on broadcasters’ rights in general terms, this Part specifically focuses on 
retransmission rights. It consists of three chapters. However, unlike the preceding 
chapters which focus explicitly only on broadcasting organisations, these chapters 
analyse retransmission rights for copyright holders. This is significant because 
while the retransmission right is one aspect of a broadcaster’s related rights, its 
exercise in inseparable from the corresponding retransmission right of the 
copyright holder.  
 
Chapters 8 and 9 are inherently connected, and are separated only for editorial 
management. These chapters focus on the European Union legal framework for 
broadcasting and broadcast retransmissions. Chapter 8 is a positive analysis of the 
existing legal framework for broadcasting, and is titled ‘The EU Legal Framework 
for Retransmission”. It addresses the following research question: 
 
Q6: “What are the key features of the current European Union legal 
framework for regulating retransmission activities?”  
 
The general conclusion of Chapter 8 is that the European legal framework for 
retransmission is comprised of a complex network of multiple legal instruments. 
The key features of this system are the country-of-origin principle for cross-
border broadcasts, and mandatory collective management for retransmission 
rights. However, it appears that this framework has some internal inconsistencies 
and gaps in logic.  
 
 
Building on Chapter 8, Chapter 9 analyses goes into further detail analysing the 
new proposed EU legal instrument on retransmission, and is titled ‘The EU 
Proposal on Online Transmissions’. It addresses the following research question: 
 
Q7: “Does the Proposed European Union Regulation on Online Transmissions 
succeed in adequately updating the legal framework for retransmissions?” 
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The general conclusion of Chapter 9 is that while the new Proposed Regulation 
supposedly aims at updating the legal framework and filling the gaps identified in 
Chapter 8, it appears to fall short of these objectives. It concludes with a general 
recommendation for a technology neutral policy approach to regulating 
retransmissions – an approach that the EU Proposal does not adopt. 
 
Like Chapter 2, it is important to note that Chapter 9 addresses a current event. 
The analysis of the content in this chapter is based on an understanding of the 
relevant developments as of July 2018. It is very likely that at the point in time that 
the reader peruses this work, the relevant facts would have substantially changed.  
For example, a new legal instrument may or may not have been adopted by the 
European Union, which may or may not bare any resemblance at all to the 
Proposal analysed in this chapter. However, the analysis is still relevant as a case 
study and a basis for articulating certain theoretical arguments, which should in 
principle retain some relevance irrespective of subsequent developments.   
 
 
Chapter 10 is titled ‘Theories of Retransmission Rights’. This chapter builds on the 
case study in Chapters 8 and 9 and attempts to construct a basic understanding of 
the theoretical foundations of retransmission rights. It analyses the foundations 
for both copyright authors’ and broadcasters’ retransmission rights, and how they 
relate to each other. The underlying research questions of this chapter is therefore 
as follows: 
 
Q8: “What are the theoretical bases and economic mechanisms of 
retransmission rights?” 
 
The general conclusion of this chapter is that the retransmission rights of the 
copyright holder and of the broadcaster are strongly linked. As the right of the 
broadcaster comes into existence, a constraint on the rights of copyright holders 
simultaneously emerges. This constraint takes the form of a limitation to exclusive 
copyright, and its purpose is to offset the high transaction costs that characterise 
the retransmission market. Furthermore, the way in which this constraint is 
constructed depends on policy choice, but is dictated by a general trade-off 
between freedom of contract and legal certainty. These policies can also be 
explained as having a theoretical resemblance to the concepts of default 
contractual rules, copyright exhaustion, and the conversion of property rules into 
liability rules.  
 
In addition to these limitations to copyright and policy choices, the concept of 
retransmission itself also involves various technical and doctrinal legal challenges, 
which are only likely to increase with increased technological innovation. 
 
Part IV contributes to answering the overall research question by building some 
theoretical understanding of the retransmission rights of broadcasters, and how 
these relate to the retransmission rights of copyright-holders.  
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[1]-4.6 Overview of Part V 
 
Part V of this manuscript is the concluding part. It contains a short concluding 
chapter that summarises the main research findings of this manuscript, most of 
which have been articulated in the discussions above. It also provides some 
general comments on how these conclusions can be used to inform the 
international policy debates described in Chapter 2. 
 
The final parts consist of a bibliography for the entire manuscript, and Annexes to 
the various chapters.  
 
 
[1]-4.7 Notes on Structure 
 
The general arrangement of the chapters in this manuscript follows a certain 
organisational logic. The general idea is to begin with a very wide discussion that 
tends to get narrower in scope with each chapter. 
 
[1]-4.7.1 Progression of Analytical Scope 
 
The content of Part I is mainly introductory, where Chapter 1 contains editorial 
information, and Chapter 2 provides practical policy context on the topic. The 
main analysis begins in Part 2. 
 
In Part II, the discussions in Chapter 3 and 4 are intentionally very wide. While the 
focus is on broadcasters’ rights, the frame of discussion in Chapter 3 is a broad 
analysis of the overall intellectual property system, and the theories on which that 
system is based. Similarly, Chapter 4 gives a very broad discussion of the overall 
landscape of the broadcasting sector, in which broadcasters’ rights are just one 
element. 
 
Part III then focuses in on the question of scope of protection. While the frame of 
discussion in Chapter 5 is therefore narrower than that of Part 2, it looks at the 
question of scope – the fundamental character of the nature and structure of a 
given right – in very abstract and hence broad terms. Chapter 6 then brings some 
specificity and tactility to the broad concept of ‘scope’ discussed in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 7 then focuses away from the notion of the nature of structure of rights, 
and focuses on the issue of enforcement of said rights. This is hence a further 
narrowing of scope. 
 
Chapters 8 and 9 then go even narrower by focussing on one specific jurisdiction 
(the European Union), and the entire Part IV focuses one specific aspect of 
broadcasters’ rights – the retransmission right. However, in order to undertake 
this analysis, the scope is also widened in that Part IV focuses much attention on 
the retransmission aspect of copyright (as opposed to strictly focussing on 
broadcasters’ related rights). Nevertheless, this is still structurally consistent with 
Part II, which frames the analysis of broadcasters’ rights as relative to general 
copyright.  
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In a break from the trend of progressively narrowing scope, Chapter 10 then 
becomes more general as it sets out a general theoretical discussion on 
retransmission rights. This structure is necessary as Chapter 10 necessarily builds 
on the content in Chapters 8 and 9.  
 
The reason the retransmission right is given such dedicated attention in this 
manuscript (as opposed to fixation rights for example) is because it a very 
analytically interesting area. In terms of policy, retransmission is the individual 
right for which there are the most complex legal rules (as discussed in Part IV). 
Furthermore, in economic terms, since retransmission involves another second 
party besides users (i.e. the retransmitting broadcaster), retransmission rules 
have a different economic context. Broadcaster’s rights generally exist to solve a 
public good market failure (as discussed in Chapter 4). However, where a signal is 
retransmitted, new market issues come into play – high transaction costs and 
information asymmetries due to legal uncertainty (discussed in Chapter 8). 
Regulation of retransmission rights is therefore a task in balancing the trade-offs 
between different issues. The result is that retransmission is an extremely 
interesting area for academic analysis, and Law and Economic analysis in 
particular.  
 
[1]-4.7.2 Separability of Chapters 
 
Generally speaking, this manuscript is designed to be read as a single cohesive 
work. However, it is drafted such that each individual chapter can be read as a 
separate piece (with the exception of Chapter 9, which only makes sense if read 
after Chapter 8). As such, individual chapters often contain some basic content 
repeated from previous chapters, mostly in the form of prompts to the reader to 
‘recall’ certain core principles that would have been previously established.  
 
Such repetition has generally been kept to a minimum, and used only where 
fundamentally necessary to set the stage for the analysis that follows. 
 
[1]-4.7.3 Methodology and Chapter Contents 
 
While this manuscript was prepared in the context of Law and Economics, certain 
chapters deviate from this and present mainly historic and legal information in 
order to provide a complete overview of the topic.  
 
This specifically refers to Chapters 2, 8, and 9, which give detailed information on 
the international legal framework and the European Union respectively.  
 
In Part I, Chapter 1 is merely introductory, while Chapter 2 gives historical 
background on the international legal framework. Chapter 2 is therefore mostly 
descriptive.  
 
While Chapters 3 and 4 do not follow a Law and Economic methodology per se, 
they do frame the entire analysis by discussing the topic from a legal and economic 
perspective respectively. As noted above, Part III (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) of this 
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manuscript is the main part in terms of applying the methodology of Law and 
Economics.  
 
Chapter 8 focuses on the European Union, and like Chapter 2, gives a detailed 
account of legal rules. Chapter 9, does contain an analytical contribution, but as it 
builds on Chapter 8, is also mostly legal. The purpose of these chapters is to 
provide the basis for Chapter 10 which does contain Law and Economic analysis.  
 
Furthermore, given that the legal descriptive chapters in this manuscript focus on 
the given state of current legal frameworks, they might lend themselves to 
analysis from a Public Choice Theory perspective. However, such analysis is 
expressly outside of the scope of this research project; the overall goal of this 
project is to develop a theoretical perspective on broadcasters’ rights, and not to 
account for the current legal state.  
 
Consequently, readers exclusively interested in Law and Economics would 
wish to skip Chapters 2, 8 and 9.  
 
[1]-4.7.4 Applicable Body of Law 
 
The analysis in this manuscript is intentionally jurisdictionally non-specific. With 
the exception of Part IV, which explicitly focuses on the European Union, the 
majority of this manuscript discusses issues in a manner that can be theoretically 
applied to any jurisdiction. However, there are of course several points at which 
individual pieces of legislation or case law from specific countries are used as 
references; such references are generally for mere illustrative purposes, and are 
not meant to narrow the focus onto any specific jurisdiction. 
 
As such, references to legal principles and rules in this manuscript are 
intentionally based on the international intellectual property law, as defined by 
various multilateral treaties.  
 
For the sake of clarity, international law in this sense explicitly refers to the body 
of international treaties administered by the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO). Most commonly, references are made to the Berne 
Convention (…for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886), and the Rome 
Convention (International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, 1961).  
 
In addition to the treaties administered by WIPO, in the context of this manuscript, 
‘international intellectual property law’ also includes the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement), to which all 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Member States are bound.  
 
Chapter 2 contains a detailed discussion of all the relevant provisions of 
international law as they relate to broadcasters’ rights. This chapter can therefore 
be used as reference material in this regard.  
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However, parts of this manuscript (mainly Chapter 10) also rely on various 
international legal provisions on copyright (and related rights besides 
broadcasters’ rights). These provisions are summarized in Annex 4. 
 
 
[1]-5 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Academic readers are likely to peruse this manuscript and have a frank (and very 
valid) criticism – the apparent deficiency of citations and references to academic 
sources. Indeed, part of the motivation for this study is the apparent lack of 
academic literature on the specific niche topic of broadcasters’ rights. However, 
this research does attempt to make good use of existing documents on this topic, 
such as industry reports, government policy papers, and documents from WIPO. 
 
The general sentiment however is that broadcasters’ rights is an extreme niche 
subject area. For example one can have a look at Cornish et al (2013)15, which is 
used as the go-to reference text for intellectual property law courses in many 
Commonwealth law schools. This text dedicates nothing more than a few 
paragraphs, simply mentioning the fact that broadcasters’ related rights exist.  
 
In the field of law and economics, discussions on intellectual property law almost 
always begin with Posner and Landes (2009)16, the seminal text on the economics 
of intellectual property rights. However, this text does not make any explicit 
reference to broadcasters’ rights, besides in broad discussions about (i) copyright 
over facts in the context of sports broadcasts, and (ii) the principle of fair use and 
time-shifting in the famous Betamax case.17  
 
The topic therefore does not even appear in general reference texts. Accordingly, 
the section below aims at providing an overview of the existing literature that is 
specifically dedicated to broadcasting organisations and intellectual property. 
Generally speaking, the literature can be categorised into six streams. 
 
 
[1]-5.1 General Literature on Broadcasting and Copyright 
 
The first stream consists of general literature on the issue of intellectual property 
in the broadcasting sector. Literature in this stream is not necessarily focused on 
broadcasters’ related rights, but more generally on intellectual property in the 
broadcasting markets.  
 
                                                        
15 Cornish, W., Llewelyn, D., & Aplin, T. (2013). Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade 
Marks and Allied Rights, 8th, London, Sweet & Maxwell. Proof of the massive popularity of this text 
lies in the fact that the 2013 Edition is the eighth edition since the book was first published in 1980. 
16  Landes, W. M., & Posner, R. A. (2009). The economic structure of intellectual property law. 
Harvard University Press. 
17 Posner and Landes (2009) at pgs. 106 and 118 respectively.  
22 
A good example of this is stream is Vaish (2008) – ‘Intellectual Property Rights and 
Broadcasting Rights’. 18  This stream of literature does not provide any major 
analysis of broadcasters’ rights as a specific form of intellectual property, but more 
general discusses licencing audiovisual works for communication to the public via 
broadcasting.  It therefore focuses on ‘broadcasting rights’ as opposed to 
‘broadcasters’ rights’. To the extent that broadcasters’ rights are discussed, 
discussions are generally superficial.  
 
While this stream strongly dominates literature searches, it is of little relevance to 
the specific scope of this research project. 
 
 
[1]-5.2 General Literature on Related Rights 
 
The second stream of literature is the body of works that focus generally on 
related rights (also known as ‘neighbouring rights’). The works in this stream 
collectively discuss various related rights, usually the rights of performers, 
producers, and broadcasting organisations; an example would be Jehoram 
(1991).19 
 
This is normally in the context of discussing the main international treaties on 
related rights – the Rome Convention, and the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty.20 An example of such literature is Davies (2012).21 
 
As a general note, works that discuss related rights as a class of intellectual 
property tend to focus on performers’ rights. Since this stream places little focus 
on the specifics of broadcasting, this body of literature is of very little relevance to 
building a theoretical understanding of broadcasters’ rights. However, in terms of 
understanding the theoretical foundations of related rights, this literature is 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
 
[1]-5.3 WIPO Specific Literature 
 
By far the largest stream of literature on the topic of broadcasters’ rights is that 
associated with discussions at the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) regarding the possibility of a new international agreement on the issue. 
This body of literature can further be broken down into two subsets – articles and 
commentaries on the Proposed WIPO Treaty, and documents published by WIPO 
itself.  
 
                                                        
18 Vaish, A. (2008). IPR and Broadcasting Rights. Shree Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi 
19Cohan Jehoram, H. (1991) – The Nature of Neighboring Rights of Performing Artists, Phonogram 
Producers and Broadcasting Organizations, 15 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 75 
20 These treaties are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
21 Davies, G. (2012) - The 50th Anniversary of the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, 
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations: Reflections of the Background and 
Importance of the Convention, 2 Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property 206  
 23
While there is a lot of material in this stream, it is not from peer-reviewed 
academic sources. The works in this stream mainly consist of policy briefs and 
technical documents. The documents from WIPO are the main basis for the 
analysis in Chapter 2.  
 
In terms of WIPO publications, one set of documents appears quite useful – a 
series of studies on the ‘Socioeconomic Dimension of Unauthorized Use of Signals’. 
Part I of the Study analyses market and technological trends 22, with the general 
conclusion that service availability and new technological platforms have greater 
penetration in developed markets. Part II analyses the causes and effects of signal 
piracy 23, and generally identifies various technical mechanisms for unauthorised 
access to signals, and notes that such access reduces incentives for investment. 
Part III analyses the effects of the Proposed WIPO Broadcasting Treaty 24, and 
reads more like an explanatory document of the Treaty’s proposals rather than a 
firm economic analysis. In terms of the intended scope of this research project, 
none of the documents provide any real theoretical background on the nature of 
broadcasters’ rights. 
 
In terms of non-WIPO publications, there are several policy briefs and 
commentaries published by various stakeholder groups, civil society 
organisations, and think thanks. However, these publications all focus explicitly 
on the WIPO Treaty, its progress and its issues, rather than on broadcasters’ rights 
as a theoretical concept.  
 
For example, Akester (2006) 25  and CDT (2011) 26  both discuss the possible 
negative effects of the proposed treaty on freedom of expression, while 
Rumphorst (2006) 27  critically explains some of the key features of the treaty. 
South Centre (2007)28, analyses the treaty and opines that it fails to legitimately 
balance the interests of all stakeholders from a development perspective.   
 
There are several other policy briefs and commentaries by various authors and 
institutions, which all generally follow the same theme – scepticism on the 
proposed WIPO Broadcasting Treaty. One would also note that the majority of 
these works were published between 2006-2008, when the WIPO Treaty achieved 
                                                        
22 WIPO SCCR/19/12 - Study on the Socioeconomic Dimension of the Unauthorized Use of Signals - 
Part I: Current Market and Technology Trends in the Broadcasting Sector 
23 WIPO SCCR/20/2 REV - Study on the Socioeconomic Dimension of the Unauthorized Use of Signals 
- Part II: Unauthorized Access to Broadcast Content - Cause and Effects: A Global Overview 
24 WIPO SCCR/21/2 - Study on the Socioeconomic Dimension of the Unauthorized Use of Signals - 
Part III: Study on the Social and Economic Effects of the Proposed Treaty on the Protection of 
Broadcasting Organizations 
25 Akester, P. (2006) - The Draft WIPO Broadcasting Treaty and its Impact on Freedom of Expression, 
UNESCO Copyright Bulletin April – June 2006   
26 CDT (2001) – WIPO Considering Broadcasting Protection Treaty That Could Undermine Online 
Free Expression – Center for Democracy and Technology, December 2011 
27  Rumphorst, W. (2006) - The broadcasters’ neighbouring right: impossible to understand?, 
UNESCO Copyright Bulletin July – September 2006   
28  South Centre (2007) - The Proposed WIPO Treaty on the Protection of Broadcasting and 
Cablecasting Organizations, South Centre Policy Brief, June 2007 No, 8  
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peak stakeholder interest (the observation that the Treaty achieved peak 
momentum in this time is established in Chapter 2). 
 
In terms of academic research, Rafiei (2015)29 – a PhD thesis manuscript in law – 
provides a detailed historical account of the WIPO Treaty. However, it does not 
critically assess the basis of broadcasters’ rights and does little to establish a firm 
understanding of the subject matter from a theoretical perspective.  
 
 
[1]-5.4 Jurisdiction Specific Literature 
 
The fourth stream of literature is comprised of articles that relate to broadcasters’ 
rights in specific jurisdictions. This can of course relate to the Proposed WIPO 
Treaty and resulting issues in specific jurisdictions.  For example, CRS (2008) is a 
US Congressional Research Report that discusses the WIPO Treaty as it relates to 
the USA.30 
  
In a similar vein, some analyses focus on jurisdiction-specific legislative proposals 
(often triggered by the WIPO Treaty debates), such as Kumar and Paul (2007) who 
discuss broadcast rights reform in India.31 
 
Some of this literature however focuses on jurisdiction-specific legal frameworks. 
Notably, there is a sub-set of literature such as Rumphorst (1994) 32  and 
Hugenholtz (2012) 33  that analyses issues in the European legal framework – 
specifically the ‘Satellite-Cable Directive’. This analysis is explored in detail in 
Chapter 8. 
 
Another major sub-set of jurisdiction-specific literature is the literature on the US 
system of ‘Retransmission Consent’. Examples of this literature include Chae 
(1998)34 , Clements and Abramowitz (2006) 35 , and Burton (2012)36 . Although 
there is indeed a very large body of literature on this topic, it has restricted 
relevance to this research project. This is partially because the US legal framework 
                                                        
29 Rafiei, G. (2015), The Possibility of granting new legal protection and IP rights to broadcasting 
organizations against the unauthorized exploitation of their broadcasts, Doctoral Thesis, Université 
de Neuchâtel, Faculty of Law, 2015 
30  CRS (2008) – WIPO Treaty on the Protection of Broadcasting Organizations, Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress RS22585 
31  Kumar and Paul (2007) – Rights of Broadcasting Organisations: Do We Need Legal Reform?, 
Indian Law Institute, New Delhi  
32 Rumphorst, W. (1994) – Satellite and Cable, Managing Intellectual Property, April 1994 ; 3, 38 
33 Hugenholtz, P. (2012) - SatCab Revisited: The Past, Present and Future of the Satellite and Cable 
Directive, Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2012-42, University of Amsterdam, Institute 
for InformationLaw (IViR) 
34 Chae, S. (1998) - A bargaining model of retransmission consent and must-carry rule, Information 
Economics and Policy 10 (1998) 369-387 
35 Clements, M. and Abramowitz, A. (2006) - Retransmission Consent, Network Ownership, and the 
Programming Decisions of Cable Operators, Journal of Media Economics, 19:4, 221-240 
36 Burton, M. (2012) - Reforming Retransmission Consent, Federal Communications Law Journal; 
May 2012; 64, 3 
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is a case that is hard to generalise due to its complexity and extreme specificity. In 
this system, protection of broadcasts is afforded under the regime for 
telecommunications regulation by the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), rather than through the intellectual property system. Indeed, as will be 
noted in Chapter 2, explicit broadcasters’ rights do not even exist in the USA. 
Furthermore, the US market is unique in that it is subdivided into various local 
markets, with a major role for national networks that act as brokers and 
intermediaries between local broadcasters, advertisers, and content owners. As 
these studies are concerned with the very specific structure of that system, and 
the dynamics of how regulatory policy is made in the US communications sector, 
this literature does not provide much guidance in terms of developing a 
theoretical understanding of broadcasters’ rights. Nevertheless, key elements of 
this system are noted in Chapter 10.  
 
 
[1]-5.5 Issue Specific Literature 
 
The fifth stream of literature concerns the matter of broadcasting and issues that 
are specific to certain types of content. For example, this would include literature 
that analyses issues of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in terms of 
broadcasting activities.  In that context, the term ‘broadcasters’ rights’ has a very 
different connotation, and does not relate to the concept of intellectual property 
at all, as noted in the sub-section above on ‘Defining Broadcasters’ Rights’. 
  
A more relevant sub-set of this literature is the set of articles that relate 
specifically to the issue of sports. Policy discussions on intellectual property and 
broadcasting almost always bring up the topic of sports broadcasting, as this is a 
multi-billion-dollar global industry. However, the issue often operates on different 
levels, as there are sports events that have international relevance, while there are 
those with only local or national relevance (in terms of audience demand). 
Nevertheless, there is a large body of literature on sports broadcasting, its 
economic significance, and its associated legal issues. Examples of literature in this 
stream include Garrett and Hochberg (1983)37, Cave and Crandall (2001)38, and 
Gratton and Solberg (2007)39. 
 
For completeness, it is also noted that news broadcasts are also a specific area 
with its own literature. However, while this area is very useful to understanding 
the dynamics and economic functions of broadcasters’ rights, this stream of 
literature is generally focussed on practical legal and regulatory issues, rather 
than constructing a theoretical framework. Furthermore, in terms of intellectual 
property protection and broadcasting, sports and news should be seen as a special 
                                                        
37 Garrett, R. and Hochberg, P. (1984) - Sports Broadcasting and the Law, Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 
59, No. 2 
38  Cave, M. and Crandall, R. (2001) - Sports Rights and the Broadcast Industry, The Economic 
Journal, 111: 4-26 
39 Gratton, C. and Solberg, H. (2007) – The Economics of Sports Broadcasting, Routledge, ISBN 0-
203-00385-3 
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case. These broadcasts are not explicitly addressed in detail in this manuscript, 
although their nature as a special case is discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
 
[1]-5.6 Literature Explicitly on Broadcasters’ Rights  
 
The final stream of literature is the one most relevant to this research project – 
material explicitly on theoretical perspectives on broadcasters’ rights. In this 
regard, there are only two works that are relevant and useful to review.  The first 
is the only relevant published book that explicitly focuses on the rights of 
broadcasting organisations – Ogawa (2006)40.  The second is one of the only truly 
useful academic papers that explores the theoretical basic of broadcasters’ rights 
– Balganesh (2007)41.  
 
[1]-5.6.1 Protection of Broadcasters’ Rights 
 
Perhaps the only substantial monograph explicitly dedicated to the issue of 
broadcasters’ rights is the 2006 book by Megumi Ogawa titled ‘Protection of 
Broadcasters’ Right’.  
 
This main thrust of this book is that it attempts to trace the rationale for 
broadcaster’s rights. Its general theme is that there are two distinct approaches to 
broadcasters’ rights – a ‘creator-oriented’ rationale and a ‘social-oriented’ 
rationale. The creator-oriented rationale is understood as based on natural rights 
theory, characteristic of civil law traditions, and leads to protection of 
broadcasting organisations’ interests through copyright. The social-oriented 
rationale is understood as based on a consideration of wider social welfare, is 
characteristic of common law traditions, and leads to protection through related 
rights. Ogawa then undertakes two case studies – Australia and Japan, which 
represent legal systems that follow a common law and civil law tradition 
respectively. The author’s general conclusion is that regardless of the initial 
rational for broadcasters’ rights, the evolutions of the law, particularly as a 
response to digital technology, has moved towards a more creator-oriented 
rationale.  
 
On the international level, updating the legal framework of the Rome Convention, 
as envisioned by a new WIPO Treaty, cannot be explained as merely adapting the 
existing provisions of the Rome Convention to the digital context. However, due 
to the Rome Convention’s apparent social-oriented rationale, comprehensive 
protection was not given in the first place, and technological progress has done 
nothing more than add to the list of problems by creating new varieties of 
broadcasting outside of the scope of the Rome Convention. Hence, the social-
oriented rational is insufficient to explain the proposals for the new Treaty, and 
the rational for broadcasters rights has therefore been shifting to a more creator-
                                                        
40 Ogawa, M. (2006). Protection of Broadcasters' Rights. M. Nijhoff. 
41  Balganesh, S. (2007). The Social Costs of Property Rights in Broadcast (and Cable) 
Signals. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 22(4), 1303-1387. 
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oriented one. 42  A conclusion of the book is therefore that the common 
understanding for the rationale for broadcasters’ rights in common law and civil 
law systems is therefore inaccurate.43 
 
This text is useful as a historical background on the development of international 
rules on broadcaster’s rights, particularly in terms of the development of the Rome 
Convention; for this reason, Chapter 2 of this manuscript does not attempt to 
reproduce such an account.   
 
However, the text’s contribution is limited to only a purely positive (as opposed to 
normative) analysis. Firstly, its ascription of ‘social-oriented’ and ‘creator-
oriented’ rationales stem from textual analysis of the various reports on which the 
analysed legal instruments were based. It is indeed sometimes the case that the 
explicitly stated justifications for legal rules do not fully reflect the circumstances 
within which they are adopted. However, explanations for the adoption of legal 
rules on the rights of broadcasting organisations, from a public choice theory 
perspective, is neither the focus of Ogawa, nor this manuscript.  
 
Furthermore, the concepts of the social-oriented rational and the creator-oriented 
rational generally parallel the incentive and natural rights theories of intellectual 
property. However, no attempt is made by Ogawa to evaluate the appropriateness 
of these theories, as a foundation for broadcasters’ rights (as is done in Chapter 3 
of this manuscript).  
 
Additionally, the necessarily positive analysis means that the entire discussion in 
the book assumes some implied necessity for broadcasters’ rights in the first 
place. Any normative evaluation of the existence of these rights, their theoretical 
foundations, or their scope, is not undertaken. 
 
[1]-5.6.2 The Social Costs of Property Rights in Signals 
 
At more than 80 pages, Balganesh’s 2007 article titled ‘The Social Costs of Property 
Rights in Broadcast (and Cable) Signals’ is a very lengthy article. Like most of the 
writing on this topic, including Ogawa (2006), this article seems inspired by the 
debates over the WIPO Broadcasting Treaty. The vast majority of the article is 
dedicated to analysing the US system for broadcast regulation. However unlike 
other works on the US retransmission consent regime, this article uses a more 
theoretical analytical lens.  
 
It begins – as most works on the topic do – by discussing the origin of broadcasters’ 
rights in the Rome Convention and discussing the debates over the WIPO 
Broadcasting Treaty. It then goes on to two interesting perspectives which are 
relevant for this research project. The first is the notion that property rights in 
broadcast signals can be seen as a mechanism to reduce transaction costs 
associated with contacting into certain rights.  This perspective is discussed in 
Chapter 7 of this manuscript.  
                                                        
42 Ogawa (2006), pg. 176 
43 Ogawa (2006), pg. 177 
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The second interesting perspective is an analysis of the ‘investment protection 
and piracy prevention rationale’ for broadcast signal protection. Balganesh’s 
position is that in the context of piracy, a distinction should be made between 
losses of existing revenue streams, and losses of potential revenue stream. While 
only the former should really be considered when evaluating property rights as a 
justification to prevent piracy, debates on the topic have tended to claim both 
categories of losses.  Balganesh claims that to the extent that broadcasters’ 
arguments for property rights do have any merit, they derive from the principle 
of ‘unjust enrichment’.   
 
The article then goes on to give a historic overview of the US television industry, 
and the various regulatory mechanisms for exclusionary rights. Balganesh 
describes the US system as being one of ‘attenuated exclusionary rights’, rather 
than one of exclusive property rights.  The article then provides arguments that 
moving from such a system to one of ‘open-ended property rights’ would result in 
various negative social consequences, particularly in terms of harming users, 
hampering innovation, and limiting the development of new markets.  The general 
conclusion is that the regime proposed by the WIPO Treaty does not have readily 
identifiable gains and is likely to have significant costs.  
 
Balganesh proposes that to address the issue of online retransmission, the current 
system administered by the FCC can be adapted in and implemented in a phased 
approach.  The First phase would involve remunerating copyright holders though 
compulsory licencing for retransmitted content. The second phase would involve 
a similar compulsory authorisation rule to remunerate the broadcasters whose 
signals are retransmitted online.  
 
These recommendations are similar to recommendations made in Chapter 9 of 
this manuscript in terms of adopting a technologically neutral approach to 
retransmission. However, Balganesh’s proposals are even stronger (i.e. a greater 
limitation on rightsholders) for two reasons. Firstly, Chapter 9’s 
recommendations are based on the existing European legal framework (discussed 
in Chapter 8). In the EU framework, mandatory collective management is used for 
copyright administration instead of the compulsory licences used in the US; as 
noted in Chapter 10, the compulsory licence is a stronger (more restrictive) policy 
tool than mandatory collective management. Secondly, Balganesh’s proposal also 
places a compulsory licence mechanism on broadcast transmissions themselves; 
the broadcaster therefore does not have any capacity to prohibit retransmission 
of their signal under this model.  
 
The purpose of the phased approach of Balganesh’s proposal is that the rights of 
all parties are balanced, while creating a mechanism for the online broadcasting 
market to grow (under limited liability, just as the cable market in the US was able 
to), before being subject to additional liability for broadcast signal compensation.  
The idea is that once the market is sufficiently mature, the additional 
compensation for broadcasters will incentivise online broadcasters to broadcast 
their own schedules and content rather than merely retransmitting the offline 
signals of traditional broadcasters.   
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[1]-5.7 Overall Assessment of Literature 
  
Based on the above description of the literature on broadcasting and intellectual 
property, it is clear that there is a general deficiency of academic literature on the 
topic. Furthermore, the literature that does exist is largely motivated by 
international policy debates; the general trend is that this literature expresses 
scepticism about the proposed WIPO Broadcasting Treaty, which will be analysed 
in the next chapter. There is very little existing material on which one can build 
some sort of theoretical understanding of broadcaster’s related rights, as a unique 
form of intellectual property. Various elements of the literature are however 
useful when analysing specific elements of the overall environment in which 
broadcasters’ rights exist.  
 
In the context of the discipline of Law and Economics, the only element of the 
literature that seems particularly insightful is Balganesh (2007). Indeed, this is the 
only paper that seems to explicitly discuss the issue with reference to concepts 
such as transaction costs and property rules. It can therefore be said with some 
certainty, that there exists a literature gap in terms of the economics of 
broadcasters’ related rights. This manuscript aims to fill that gap.  
 
 
[1]-6 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
This chapter aimed at giving general introductory content for this manuscript. 
Furthermore, it aimed at stressing that the topic of broadcasters’ rights deserves 
analytical attention because of the divergence between the attention given to the 
topic in academia and that given in international policy debates.  
 
The literature review in this chapter underscored that there is a need to develop 
academic literature on the topic.  The next chapter of this manuscript aims at 
establishing that the topic has indeed attracted a lot of attention at the 
international level. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
 
This chapter is mostly legal-descriptive, which readers exclusively interested 
in Law and Economics analysis may wish to bypass. 
 
[2]-1 INTRODUCTION  
 
A major motivating factor for this research project is how much attention the topic 
of broadcasters’ rights attracts at the international level. As the debate on the 
rights of broadcasting organisations is a major component of international 
copyright law, a dissertation on the topic would therefore be very much 
incomplete without dedicating at least some part of the manuscript to outlining 
these events and issues.  
 
This chapter therefore aims at providing an overview of the international legal 
instruments dealing with the rights of broadcasting organisations. In this regard, 
the focus is explicitly on international instruments – mainly those administered 
by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) – a specialised United 
Nations agency, and main international forum for intellectual property policy. In 
particular, the focus will be on the debates regarding a new proposed WIPO Treaty 
on Protection of Broadcasting Organisations.  
 
This chapter has two purposes. Firstly, it will establish an account of the relevant 
international legal provisions on broadcasters’ rights, which provides the basis for 
the analysis in subsequent chapters. Secondly, it provides the grounds for the 
claim that the issue of broadcasters’ is indeed a major international policy issue.  
 
 
[2]-2 THE ROME CONVENTION 
 
The natural starting point for any discussion on the intellectual property rights of 
broadcasting organisations is the International Convention for the Protection of 
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (‘Rome 
Convention’) of 1961.  
 
The Rome Convention can perhaps be seen as the second major international 
treaty in the field of Copyright and Related Rights; the first is of course the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention), 
originally adopted in 1886.44  
 
For the purposes of the analysis in this manuscript, this is the international legal 
instrument that first coordinated the concept of related rights. The Convention 
provides for three categories of rights and beneficiaries: (i) the rights of 
                                                        
44  For completeness, it is however noted that between the dates of the Berne and Rome 
Conventions, the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) was developed and adopted in 1952. The 
UCC was largely framed as an alternative to the Berne Convention, and has generally lost its 
significance, except as a note in the history of international intellectual property law.  
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performers, (ii) the rights of phonogram producers, and (iii) the rights of 
broadcasting organisations.  
 
Article 1 sets out that the rights provided for in no way affect copyright. This is in 
important feature, as it underscores the idea of the ‘dichotomy of copyrights and 
related rights’, mentioned in Chapter 1. Article 2 then sets out the principle of 
National Treatment (a standard feature of modern multilateral treaties).  
 
Article 3(f) defines ‘broadcasting’ as “the transmission by wireless means for public 
reception of sounds or of images and sounds”. There are few things worth noting 
about this definition. Firstly, it is limited to ‘wireless’ broadcasting, and hence is 
centred on traditional terrestrial transmission technology.45 Secondly, it is limited 
to signals intended for ‘public reception’, so that it excludes closed network point-
to-point communications. Lastly, the reference to ‘sounds’ or ‘images and 
sounds’46 explicitly includes both radio and television services; for completeness 
it is noted that the question of copyright protection is irrelevant to the notion of 
‘sounds or images and sounds’.   
 
Article 3(g) then defines ‘rebroadcasting’ as the “simultaneous broadcasting by one 
broadcasting organisation of the broadcast of another broadcasting organisation.” 
The Convention therefore limits the scope of rebroadcasting (retransmission) to 
simultaneous retransmission. However, this does not mean that non-
simultaneous retransmissions are excluded, as in order to undertake a deferred 
retransmission, the broadcast would first have to be fixed (recorded), which is 
covered under a separate element of the broadcasters’ rights. 47 Article 6 then 
defines the basis on which to determine the point of attachment for a broadcasting 
organisation, for the purpose of national treatment.  
 
For the purposes of this manuscript, the most important Article of the Convention 
is Article 13, which sets out the minimum rights for broadcasting organisations, 
and states as follows:  
 
Broadcasting organisations shall enjoy the right to authorize or prohibit:  
(a) the rebroadcasting of their broadcasts; 
(b) the fixation of their broadcasts; 
(c) the reproduction: 
(i) of fixations, made without their consent, of their broadcasts; 
(ii) of fixations, made in accordance with the provisions of Article 15, of their 
broadcasts, if the reproduction is made for purposes different from those 
referred to in those provisions; 
                                                        
45 Accounts suggest that some proposals for the Rome Convention did indeed also extend to wired 
broadcasting. However, this was possibly excluded due to the fact that too strong protection might 
reduce the number of participants who wish to adopt the treaty. (Ogawa, 2007, pg 42).  
46 ‘Images and sounds’ has come to be understood as including ‘images only’ (e.g. silent films). 
47 This is confirmed by WIPO (1981) comment 3.19.   
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(d) the communication to the public of their television broadcasts if such 
communication is made in places accessible to the public against payment of an 
entrance fee; it shall be a matter for the domestic law of the State where 
protection of this right is claimed to determine the conditions under which it 
may be exercised.  
 
Article 14  then stipulates that the minimum duration of protection is twenty years 
from the initial broadcast.  
 
Of importance to note, Article 15 provides for certain possible limitations and 
exceptions. Article 15(1) lists possible exemptions as private use, reporting on 
current events, ephemeral fixation48, and use for teaching and scientific research. 
These permitted uses bear broad resemblance to the limitations and exception for 
copyright set out in Articles 10, 10bis, and 11bis of the Berne Convention. 
However, Article 15(2) provides more broadly for limitations and exemptions to 
related rights that are in line with the same limitations, and exemptions provided 
for copyright. Furthermore, it should be noted that Article 16(1)(b) allows for a 
reservation in applying Article 13(d) (on public communications of television 
broadcasts). 
 
Therefore, under the Rome Convention, the rights of the broadcasting 
organisation can be described as a ‘bundle of rights’ (in the same sense that 
copyright is a bundle of rights), with the following constituent elements: (i) a 
wireless retransmission right, (ii) a fixation right49, (iii) a reproduction right, and 
(iv) a possible (but limited) public communication right. These rights last for 
twenty years, and are generally subject to the same limitations as copyright. 
 
As a final point – which is important for historical context on the issue – the Rome 
Convention currently has 93 Contracting Parties.50 In discussions on intellectual 
property treaties, there is a perception that the Rome Convention does not have 
very widespread acceptance. 51  For contrast, the Berne Convention has 176 
Contracting Parties.52 
 
                                                        
48 In the process of broadcast transmission, a transient temporary reproduction of the content 
being broadcast is often made for technical purposes. This is the concept of ‘ephemeral fixation’. 
Without an exception to copyright and related rights for such activities, broadcasting 
organizations would need to obtain permission from rightsholders for reproduction, even though 
such reproduction is only a mere technicality and pursuant only to the ultimate act of 
communication to the public.  
49 While it is agreed that fixation applies to the embodiment of only a part of a broadcast, there is 
no similarly agreed position as to whether a single photograph falls within the scope of a protected 
fixation requiring authorization (WIPO SCCR/8/INF/1, paragraph 27).  
50  WIPO-Administered Treaties Online Portal – Rome Convention 
(www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/rome/) 
51 Interestingly, all OECD Members with the exception of New Zealand and the United States of 
America are Contracting Parties to the Rome Convention. This suggests that the Convention has 
greater acceptance in the industrialised world than in the developing world.  
52  WIPO-Administered Treaties Online Portal – Berne Convention 
(www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/) 
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[2]-3 OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
With respect the rights of broadcasting organisations, there are two international 
legal instruments that are relevant – the Brussels Satellite Convention, and the 
TRIPs Agreement.  
 
 
[2]-3.1 Brussels Satellite Convention 
 
The Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme–Carrying Signals 
Transmitted by Satellite (Brussels Satellite Convention) was established in 1974.  
 
The need for such an instrument appears to have been driven by the fact that the 
Rome Convention seemed inadequate at the time; the Rome Convention neither 
covered satellite transmissions (which were not an issue when it was negotiated 
in 1961), nor did it have widespread acceptance53. 
 
 The core of the Brussels Convention is Article 2(1), which states that “Each 
Contracting State undertakes to take adequate measures to prevent the distribution 
on or from its territory of any programme–carrying signal by any distributor for 
whom the signal emitted to or passing through the satellite is not intended…” 
 
Furthermore, Article 2(3) states that these protective measures “…shall not apply 
to the distribution of derived signals taken from signals which have already been 
distributed by a distributor for whom the emitted signals were intended.” 
Additionally, Article 3 states that the Convention “…shall not apply where the 
signals emitted by or on behalf of the originating organization are intended for 
reception from the satellite by the general public.” 
 
The cumulative effect of Article 2(1) and the limitations of Articles 2(3) and 3 
creates a very specific scope for protection. To understand this scope, it is useful 
to first make some technical definitions. For the purpose of this discussion, a 
satellite can provide either a ‘fixed-satellite service’ (FSS)54, or a ‘direct-to-home 
broadcasting service’ (DBS)55. FSS is where a satellite serves as an intermediate 
relay between two fixed terrestrial stations, such as where a broadcaster uplinks 
                                                        
53 A review of the Contracting Parties to the Rome Convention shows that as of the end of 1974 
(the year in which the Brussels Convention was accepted), the Rome Convention had only 14 
Contracting Parties, even though 26 states were signatories. 
54 Article 1.21 of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Radio Regulations defines 
‘fixed-satellite service’ as “a radiocommunication service between earth stations at given positions, 
when one or more satellites are used; the given position may be a specified fixed point or any fixed 
point within specified areas; in some cases this service includes satellite-to-satellite links, which may 
also be operated in the inter-satellite service; the fixed-satellite service may also include feeder links 
for other space radiocommunication services” 
55  Under the ITU’s Radio Regulations, the technical regulatory name for such services is 
‘broadcasting-satellite service’. Article 1.39 of the Regulations defines this as “A 
radiocommunication service in which signals transmitted or retransmitted by space stations are 
intended for direct reception by the general public. That article further notes, “In the broadcasting-
satellite service, the term ‘direct reception’ shall encompass both individual reception and community 
reception.” 
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a signal to a satellite in order for that signal to be relayed to another fixed service 
provider (distributor) in distant location, who then (re)transmits the signal of the 
uplinking broadcaster. DBS services however are where a satellite broadcasts 
directly to the final consumer audience, and are explicitly excluded by Article 3 of 
the Convention.  
 
While the Convention is designed to cover FSS services, it only covers the aspect 
of the communication chain concerning the satellite as an intermediary relay. 
Once the signal is received by the indented distributor, the Convention does not 
cover the further distribution of the signal. In the terminology of the Convention, 
protection is accorded to ‘emitted signal’ and not the ‘derived signal’. Protection 
is therefore focussed on the uplink and downlink segments of the communication 
chain, rather than the redistribution segment. Annex 1 provides an illustrative 
summary on of these various distribution scenarios.  
 
The scope of the Convention as described above gives the Brussels Convention a 
very technical flavour that the Rome Convention does not have. However, 
comparing the two legal instruments gives rise to one very obvious and significant 
difference – unlike the Rome Convention, the Brussels Convention does not 
stipulate the nature of the protection to be granted.  
 
While protection can be granted through private property rights, it can also take 
the form of provisions relating to telecommunications regulation (or even some 
other body of law); the point is that the form of protection is in the discretion of 
the implementing state. Therefore, unlike the Rome Convention which is explicitly 
an intellectual property agreement, the Brussels Convention is actually an 
instrument of public international law.  
 
Interestingly there are accounts that an early draft of the convention did provide 
a private right (similar to copyright or related rights) for broadcasting 
organisations. However, this concept was opposed by authors (copyright owners) 
and performers, and thus the final proposal took a very different form.56 If this 
claim is indeed true, this provides a precedent for the perception of other 
rightsholders that intellectual property rights for broadcasters might encroach on 
their interests.  
 
This model of a discretionary mechanism of protection seems consistent with the 
fact that the scope of the signals under the Brussels Convention are not limited to 
those which are intended for public reception. Under the Rome Convention, the 
definition of broadcasting explicitly excludes closed network or point-to-point 
communication (as transmissions must be intended for public reception). In 
contrast, the programme-carrying signals under the Brussels Convention do not 
need to be intended for public reception, and hence covers a wider range of 
possible transmissions. Therefore, the Brussels Convention can be seen as having 
some relevance to broader telecommunications law, and can be used as a basis for 
prevention of unauthorised interception of more general radiocommunication 
services.  
                                                        
56 Ogawa (2007), pg. 48 
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As a final note, the Brussels Convention falls quite short of creating an 
international framework for protecting broadcast transmissions, as it has even 
less wide acceptance than the Rome Convention. The Brussels Convention has 37 
Contracting Parties57, compared to 93 for the Rome Convention.58  
 
 
[2]-3.2 TRIPs Agreement 
 
Perhaps the most significant international legal instrument on intellectual 
property is the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement)59. 
 
The relevant provision of the TRIPs Agreement that addresses the rights of 
broadcasting organisations is Article 14(3), which states as follows: 
 
“Broadcasting organizations shall have the right to prohibit the following acts when 
undertaken without their authorization: the fixation, the reproduction of fixations, 
and the rebroadcasting by wireless means of broadcasts, as well as the 
communication to the public of television broadcasts of the same. Where Members 
do not grant such rights to broadcasting organizations, they shall provide owners of 
copyright in the subject matter of broadcasts with the possibility of preventing the 
above acts, subject to the provisions of the Berne Convention (1971).” 
 
Ostensible comparison of TRIPS Article 14(3) and Rome Convention Article 15 
suggest that the two are very similar in scope. They both provide for a fixation 
right, a reproduction of fixations right, a wireless retransmission right, and a 
limited public communication right. Furthermore, like the Rome Convention, 
TRIPs Article 14(5) stipulates a minimum length of twenty years for such 
protection. 
 
One difference however is that the public communication is stronger under TRIPs. 
While both instruments limit this right to television broadcasts, TRIPs does not 
limit the right only to communications in ‘places accessible to the public against 
payment of an entrance fee’ (as is the case under Rome Article 13(d)). 
Furthermore, this right is mandatory under TRIPs, unlike the Rome Convention 
where a reservation to its application is possible.  
 
Aside from this superficial similarity in scope, TRIPs Article 14(3) is very 
interesting for its second sentence which states that “Where Members do not grant 
such rights to broadcasting organizations, they shall provide owners of copyright in 
                                                        
57  WIPO-Administered Treaties Online Portal – Brussels Convention 
(www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/brussels/) 
58  An interesting observation is that the United States is a Contracting Party to the Brussels 
Convention, but not to the Rome Convention.  
59 The Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights is Annex 1C of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
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the subject matter of broadcasts with the possibility of preventing the above acts, 
subject to the provisions of the Berne Convention.” 
 
This suggests that Member States have a choice between granting specific rights 
to broadcasting organizations, or covering the relevant acts under the provisions 
of the Berne Convention. However, irrespective of this choice, WTO Member 
States are in any case bound by TRIPs Article 6, which requires compliance with 
Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention – the substantive legal provisions 
on copyright – with the notable exclusion of Berne Article 6bis (which provides 
for certain ‘moral rights’ independent of ‘economic rights’). Compliance with 
TRIPs would hence imply compliance with the Berne Convention, and that the 
copyright holders of literary and artistic works contained in broadcasts have the 
protection required by the second sentence of TRIPs Article 14(3).60  
 
In terms of this second sentence of TRIPs Article 14(3), the curious use of the 
phrase “provide …the possibility of preventing…” warrants some attention. Insight 
into the significance of this phrasing can be gained by returning to the Rome 
Convention.  
 
Articles 10 and 13 of the Rome Convention provide property rights to phonogram 
producers and broadcasting organisations respectively. Property rights arise 
because of the fact that those articles take the structure of “(beneficiary) shall enjoy 
the right to authorize or prohibit (certain act(s))”. Article 7 on performer’s rights 
however takes a different structure, and reads “The protection provided for 
performers by this Convention shall include the possibility of preventing…”. The 
WIPO Guide to the Rome Convention gives comments on the significance of this 
language, and explains that: 
 
“The reason for the wording in this paragraph is to leave complete freedom of choice 
as to the means used to implement the Convention, and to choose those which 
member countries think most appropriate and best. They may be based on any one 
or more of a number of legal theories: law of employment, of personality, of unfair 
competition or unjust enrichment, etc. - and of course, if they wish, an exclusive right. 
The important thing is that those means achieve the purpose of this Article, namely 
that the performer has the possibility of preventing the acts enumerated.”61 
 
Returning to the protection of broadcasts under TRIPs Article 14(3), it would 
appear a choice of legal approach (akin to that for implementing Rome Convention 
Article 7) does not exist. The choice is only between (i) an exclusive right for 
broadcasters, and (ii) deference to the Berne Convention, which in itself provides 
                                                        
60  Commenting on the second sentence of TRIPS Article 14(3), WIPO (1996) gives a possible 
explanation for the significance of the language used. It states: “The purpose and meaning of this 
provision is obviously not a mere repetition of that clear obligation. It rather seems to refer to the 
well-known differences between the national laws in respect of the actual coverage of the concept of 
works, and seems to state that only those Members may deny specific rights to broadcasting 
organizations in the copyright laws of which the concept of works is sufficiently broad to grant 
efficient protection to broadcasting organizations in respect of their broadcast programs” – WIPO 
(1996), paragraph 67 
61 WIPO (1981), comment 7.4  
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for only one possible solution – an exclusive right for authors of literary and 
artistic works – which is already mandatory under TRIPs Article 6.  
 
Given the construction and language of Article 14(3), it is clear that the TRIPs 
Agreement really does not go beyond the Berne Convention, and actually falls 
short of the Rome Convention in terms of a mandate for rights of broadcasting 
organisations. In fact, the Article even seems to create a false sense of policy-
flexibility on this issue.  
 
Despite the fact that it does not necessarily provide for broadcasters’ rights, the 
TRIPs Agreement remains the most wide-reaching international legal instrument 
in this area, having 164 contracting parties62. Additionally, it should be noted for 
completeness that one major contribution of the TRIPs Agreement is its very 
comprehensive framework for intellectual property enforcement – something not 
contained in any other treaty.63  
 
 
[2]-4 MODERNISING COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
The last amendments to the Berne Convention were made in 1979, and the Rome 
Convention has not been amended since being first adopted in 1961. Obviously, 
the landscape of culture and technology has dramatically changed since then, 
resulting in a need to update international laws on copyright and related rights for 
the modern digital environment.  
 
For completeness, it can be noted that WIPO published a set of principles in 1984 
for the application of copyright and related rights law to cable distribution. 64 
However, these were just principles for interpreting existing law and not a new 
legal instrument in itself. Their publication is however important as it exemplifies 
how, even at that time, technological changes in broadcasting were posing serious 
challenges to intellectual property law.  
 
 
[2]-4.1 WIPO Internet Treaties 
 
As a result of the rapid technological changes brought about by digital technology, 
two new international legal agreements were adopted in 1996 – (i) the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (‘WCT’), and (ii) the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty (‘WPPT’). The WCT and WPPT are seen us updating the Berne and Rome 
conventions respectively, to account for new challenges brought on by the 
internet era. 
 
                                                        
62 There are currently 164 Member States of the WTO, and all Member States are automatically 
contracting parties to the TRIPs Agreement 
(www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm) 
63 TRIPs Agreement Part III (Articles 41-64). 
64  WIPO (1984) - Annotated Principles of Protection of Authors, Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations in Connection with Distribution of Programs by Cable.   
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In terms of related rights, while the Rome Convention covered three areas – 
performers, phonogram producers, and broadcasters – the WPPT covers only 
performers and phonogram producers. The WIPO Internet Treaties therefore do 
not address the issue of the rights of broadcasting organisations. 
 
One relevant contribution of the WPPT is however it’s updating of the definition 
of ‘broadcasting’ in the context of copyright and related rights law. Under Article 
3(f) of the Rome Convention, ‘broadcasting’ is defined as “transmission by wireless 
means for public reception of sounds or of images and sounds”. The WPPT however, 
in Article 2(f) states that: 
 
“’broadcasting’ means the transmission by wireless means for public reception of 
sounds or of images and sounds or of the representations thereof; such transmission 
by satellite is also ‘broadcasting’; transmission of encrypted signals is ‘broadcasting’ 
where the means for decrypting are provided to the public by the broadcasting 
organization or with its consent; 
 
This definition can be seen as combining the definitions in the Rome Convention 
and the Brussels Convention.65 The updating of this definition is significant for two 
reasons. Firstly, it clarifies explicitly that satellite broadcasting is included in the 
definition of wireless broadcasting. While the Rome Convention’s definition does 
not explicitly exclude satellite transmission (as such can be considered as 
‘wireless’), greater legal certainty results from the WPPT’s explicit inclusion of 
satellite transmissions. 66  Secondly, it explicitly notes that a broadcast 
transmission can be encrypted.  However, it should be noted the WPPT definition 
is still limited to wireless transmissions, and hence excludes broadcasts 
originating on cable networks (‘cablecasting’).67  
 
Aside from the new definition of broadcasting, the other relevant contribution of 
the Internet Treaties is the introduction of legal provisions on ‘Technological 
Protection Measures’. These provisions are discussed briefly in a later section, and 
in more detail in Chapter 4.  
 
 
[2]-4.2 SCCR Agendas  
 
In 1998, WIPO set up four ‘standing committees’ to coordinate and streamline the 
organisation’s activities in key areas of intellectual property. 68  One of these 
committees was the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR).69 
 
                                                        
65 WIPO SCCR/8/INF/1, paragraph 5 
66 WIPO SCCR 7/8, paragraph 28 
67 For completeness, it is noted that in the domestic legislation of some jurisdictions, cablecasters 
are offered protection analogous to that of traditional broadcasters (WIPO SCCR/8/INF/1, 
paragraph 11) 
68 WIPO WO/GA/23/1, paragraphs 1 and 2. 
69 It should be noted that the SCCR was formed after the adoption of the WIPO Internet Treaties.  
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The SCCR is therefore the main forum for international discussions on technical 
copyright policy issues. The SCCR has the mandate to make recommendations to 
be considered by the WIPO General Assemblies, and also to convene a Diplomatic 
Conference on new proposed international instruments when appropriate. The 
Committee holds regular sessions to consider various matters, as well as ad hoc 
special session on specific individual matters, and preparatory meetings for 
diplomatic conferences.  
 
In order to ascertain the main priorities of international copyright policymakers, 
one can therefore look to the SCCR and its agenda. Review of the meeting agendas 
of all sessions of the SCCR shows that the Committee has been focused on a limited 
number of key issues since its inception. Annex 2 summarises the issues 
considered at these sessions.  
 
The main issues have been: (i) the protection of broadcasting organisations, (ii) 
the rights of audiovisual performers, and (iii) limitations and exceptions to 
copyright. Tracking the Committee’s agenda shows that discussions on limitations 
and exceptions in general evolved into discussions on limitations and exceptions 
in three specific areas: (i) for ‘visually-impaired persons and persons with print 
disabilities’, (ii) for ‘libraries and archives’, and (iii) for ‘educational and research 
institutions and for persons with other disabilities’.  
 
Other issues have been discussed such as (i) database protection, (ii) recordation 
systems, and (iii) artist resale right, which did not attract significant attention to 
be further pursued.   
 
The work of the SCCR has resulted in two new international legal instruments to 
date. The first is the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, which was 
concluded at a diplomatic conference in 2012, after an earlier diplomatic 
conference in 2000 failed to produce an agreement. The second is the ‘Marrakesh 
Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually 
Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled’ which was concluded at a diplomatic 
conference in 2013.  
 
The main drive for initiating talks on a new treaty for broadcasting organisations 
came from broadcasting associations themselves, and their claim that the Rome 
Convention was no longer sufficient given technological progress.70 There is even 
an assertion that the discussions were a result of bargaining between 
broadcasting associations and WIPO itself; in exchange for collaboration on the 
WCT and WPPT, WIPO promised broadcasters that it would initiate discussions 
on protection of broadcasting.71    
 
In contrast with the areas of audiovisual performances and visually-impaired 
persons, progress on an instrument for the protection of broadcasting 
organisations has been notoriously negative. Several different drafts of possible 
                                                        
70 Generally, see Ogawa (2006), Chapter 5 
71 Ogawa (2006), pg. 2 
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legal instrument have been circulated by the Committee over the years, but 
discussions seem to be extremely protracted.  
 
At one point, completion of an instrument seemed close, and the SCCR planned to 
convene a Diplomatic Conference on the Protection of Broadcasting Organisations 
in July 2007 in Geneva.72 However, the eventual June 2007 preparatory meeting73 
for such a Conference was cancelled, due to the inability of reaching ‘an agreement 
on the objectives, specific scope and object of protection’. 74  Consequently, no 
diplomatic conference was even convened.75 
 
Pursuant to that particular development, it is useful to define these specific areas 
of supposed disagreement. In terms of objectives, the SCCR advocates that:  
 
“The main objective of the new treaty is to provide a stable legal framework for the 
activities of broadcasting organizations. Its focus is on the ‘anti-piracy’ function, and 
against signal-theft, but it provides also protection against competitors and against 
unfair exploitation, and against free-riding. The rationale of the legal protection is 
twofold: the investment required for providing program content to the public; and 
the easiness of exploitation by others of the result of this investment in the new 
technological environment.”76 
 
In terms of the treaty’s scope, this refers to the actual level and nature of 
protection granted to the relevant beneficiaries. It is noted that ‘scope’ in this 
context does not refer to ‘scope’ as normally used in discussions on international 
treaties, where it refers to the field of application.77  In terms of the issue of ‘object 
of protection’, this refers to the exact activities which are covered and are to be 
protected (and the relevant beneficiaries) – which is what the term ‘scope’ in 
normal treaty parlance might actually refer to.  
 
Nevertheless, after the failed drive toward a 2007 diplomatic conference the topic 
of broadcasting remained on the SCCR agenda. In fact, broadcasting is the only 
topic that appears on practically every single SCCR Meeting Agenda (and various 
special sessions), since the First Session in November 199878, to the Thirty-sixth 
Session in May 201879. Along with the relatively newer issues of limitations and 
exceptions for (i) libraries and archives, and (ii) teaching and research, the issue 
of broadcasting organisations remains on the current agenda of the SCCR.   
 
It can therefore be said that not only has the issue of broadcasters’ rights attracted 
significant attention in the forum for international copyright law discussions, but 
that issue has notoriously resulted in an impasse. 
                                                        
72 WIPO WO/GA/33/4 
73 WIPO SCCR/PM/1 
74 WIPO WO/GA/34/8  
75 WIPO SCCR/S2/WWW[79838] 
76 WIPO SCCR/17/INF/1, paragraph 41   
77 WIPO SCCR/17/INF/1, paragraph 42 
78 WIPO SCCR/1/1 
79 WIPO SCCR/36/1 
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[2]-5 WIPO TREATY: CORE ISSUES 
 
The difference in views regarding a new WIPO broadcasting Treaty can be 
generalised to the overall approach taken; in this regard there have two 
competing overarching concepts – (i) a signal-based approach, and (ii) a rights-
based approach. 
 
 
[2]-5.1 Signal-based Vs. Rights-Based Approach 
 
The fundamental difference between these two approaches is that a signal-based 
approach seeks to limit protection to what is necessary to address the core 
objective of the proposed treaty – signal piracy. In contrast, a right-based 
approach applies a broader scope of protection, and includes rights that go beyond 
mere signal protection, and include some protection for the content contained in 
broadcast transmissions. 
 
This is not to say that a signals-based approach does not involve granting rights, 
but that the ‘bundle of rights’ foreseen is much more limited.  It should therefore 
be stressed that the signal versus rights-based debate and the question as to 
whether protection is granted through rights or some other legal mechanism are 
conceptually different issues.80 
 
At the core of the difference in approaches is the sub-set of rights sometimes 
referred to as ‘post-fixation rights’. While a signal-based approach might include 
provisions on unauthorised fixation (recording) of a broadcast transmission, a 
rights-based approach would also contain provisions on the unauthorized use 
(e.g. reproduction and subsequent distribution) of such a fixation.  
  
It is important to recall that a broadcast transmission is a transient set of 
information; in the case of traditional terrestrial broadcasting, it is an 
electromagnetic pulse at a given frequency that ceases to exist once the 
transmission is complete.  
 
Fixations of such a transmission however, would be fixations of the content 
contained in that transmission, and hence the fixation would continue to exist long 
after the signal from which it was derived ceases to be. Therefore, provisions 
regarding use of fixations amount to going beyond the scope of protecting signals, 
and enter into the scope of protecting content – a role traditionally reserved for 
the ‘primary’ copyright system.   
 
 
[2]-5.2 Objects and Beneficiaries of Protection 
 
In addition to the question of overall approach and scope of rights, there are 
different views of who the beneficiaries of protection should be. This is a major 
                                                        
80 WIPO SCCR/17/INF/1, paragraph 40 
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issue in a changing technological environment in which new innovate services – 
which are sometimes hard to fit into traditional definitions – rapidly emerge.  
 
However, discussions on the proposed treaty recognise three possible categories 
of potential beneficiaries. The first category is obviously traditional wireless 
broadcasters – as defined in the Rome Convention and the WPPT. The second 
category would be ‘cablecasters’ – organisations whose activities are analogous to 
traditional broadcasters, but whose transmissions originate on wired networks as 
opposed to traditional terrestrial or satellite transmission. 
 
The third category is ‘webcasters’ – organisations whose transmissions are 
delivered over the internet. The concept of webcasting can be further sub-
categorised into two separate components. Webcasting can take place when a 
traditional broadcaster (or cablecaster) also simultaneously transmits the 
broadcast content online; such simultaneous online transmission is referred to as 
simulcasting.  
 
Webcasting can also take place where the online transmission is not associated 
with any ‘primary’ offline broadcast, i.e. the transmission originates on, and is 
communicated via solely the internet. This is the type of activity is more generally 
referred to by the term ‘webcasting’81.  
 
In terms of beneficiaries and scope of protection, there is also one more critical 
concept – the concept of the ‘pre-broadcast signal’.   
 
The technical act of broadcasting is often complicated and involves 
communicating information across large geographical distances. Therefore, signal 
transmission activities can take place even before a broadcast transmission is 
communicated to the general public. Consider the example of a sports broadcast 
or live news coverage. Cameras and microphones collect images and sounds at a 
remote location (the relevant event being covered), but before the coverage can 
be broadcast to the public, the information must be sent to the central location of 
the broadcasting organisation. Often, this is done via an ‘outside broadcasting’ 
station, which transmits the raw footage to the broadcasting studios, where it 
might then be edited in real time, or subject to some other technical modification 
in order to be subsequently transmitted to the general public. The signal sent 
between the ‘outside station’ and the central station is an internal communication 
within the broadcasting organisation, and is known as a ‘pre-broadcasting signal’. 
Another example might be a broadcasting organisation sending content to its 
various local affiliates, for subsequent public transmission.  
 
As this signal is not meant for reception by the general public, it does not 
constitute ‘broadcasting’ within the context of copyright and related rights law. 
Nevertheless, the pre-broadcast signal might be subject to piracy by a party 
seeking unauthorised access to the content being communicated. Hence, one of 
the issues for debate regarding a legal instrument on broadcasters’ rights, is 
whether protection should be afforded to pre-broadcasting signals. For 
                                                        
81 Yet another synecdoche. 
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completeness, it is noted that protection of pre-broadcast signals is covered by the 
Brussels Satellite Convention, specifically when a satellite is used as the 
intermediary link for communication of such a signal.  
 
The table below summarises the various possible objects of protection and 
possible restricted acts that might be covered under a new legal instrument on the 
protection of broadcasting organisations.82  
 
Object of Protection: Specific Rights/Restricted Acts: 
1. ‘Traditional’ transmission over the air 
for direct reception by the general public 
 
2. Cable originated transmissions of 
program-carrying signals 
 
3. Pre-broadcast signals 
 
4. Simultaneous real-time streaming of 1 
and/or 2 
 
5. Internet originated real-time streaming 
 
1. Fixation 
2. Reproduction of fixations 
3. Distribution of fixations 
4. Decryption of encrypted broadcasts 
5. Rebroadcasting 
6. Cable retransmission 
7. Retransmission over the Internet 
8. Making available of fixed broadcasts 
9. Rental of fixations 
10. Communication to the public (in 
places accessible to the public) 
 
Table 2.1: Summary of Objects of Protection and Restricted Acts 
 
In terms of substantive policy, the issue of treatment of webcasting remains one 
of the main contentions. However, in order to make progress, the SCCR resolved 
in 2006 that work should focus on protection of traditional broadcasting and 
cablecasting. 83  Any possibility of protection of webcasting would therefore be 
deferred to future discussions. This compromise was not meant to dismiss the 
issue of webcasting, but rather to narrow the proposed treaty’s scope in order to 
facilitate progress on negotiations.  
 
Nevertheless, the main concerns brought by civil society organisations however 
remain. These are that a treaty might represent a new intellectual property right 
over broadcast content, which would likely harm consumers, lock up public 
domain content, and stifle technological innovation.84 
 
 
[2]-6 REVIEW OF CURRENT WORKING DRAFT 
 
The following section provides an overview of the key articles of the current 
working document on which the proposed WIPO Broadcasting Treaty is intended 
                                                        
82 Based on WIPO SCCR/8/INF/1, Annex 
83 WIPO SCCR/17/INF/1, paragraph 3 
84 WIPO SCCR/17/INF/1, paragraph 21 
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to be based (SCCR/27/2 REV). 85  This working document is understood to 
incorporate the current agreed positions of WIPO Member States and the SCCR, 
and gives various alternative drafts of key provisions on matters where there is 
not yet agreement.86 
 
The purpose of this section is to take stock of the current contested policy issues 
in order to see how the analysis in this manuscript can provide possible insights. 
 
 
[2]-6.1 Relationship to General Public Policy 
 
The first interesting observation is that the Working Document sets out three 
general articles on the context of the Proposed Treaty’s intended objectives.  
 
Article 2 explicitly states that the Treaty is not meant to limit a Contracting Party’s 
freedom to promote access to knowledge, pursue national scientific and 
educational objectives, or take actions for public interest including technological 
development. Article 3 makes a similar pronouncement on the freedom of 
Contracting Parties to protect and promote cultural diversity. Article 4 then 
provides for national measures on competition regulation, specifically in terms of 
‘practices, which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international 
transfer and dissemination of technology’. 
 
While it is quite normal for international treaties to contain language referencing 
broader related public policy areas, such an approach is quite atypical for an 
intellectual property rights treaty. Firstly, such references are usually made in a 
treaty’s preamble or recitals; dedicating a substantive article gives the issue much 
more significance. Hence, having more than one article on the Proposed Treaty’s 
relationship with other broader related policy areas is of major consequence. In 
fact, no existing WIPO-administered treaty contains such provisions.  
 
Furthermore, these articles set out provisions in the form of ‘Nothing in this Treaty 
shall prevent/limit the freedom of a Contracting Party to…’. This hence means that 
where the provisions of the Proposed Treaty come into potential conflict with 
some other set of legal rules or public policies, the Treaty positions itself as 
subordinate.  
 
The effect of these articles is therefore that it gives the Proposed Treaty a 
somewhat ‘defensive’ tone that is uncharacteristic of a treaty on intellectual 
property law. It would appear that the Proposed Treaty attempts to be very 
sensitive to its main criticisms, particularly as it relates to technological 
innovation, access to information, and cultural diversity. 
 
                                                        
85  WIPO SCCR/27/2 REV – Working Document for a Treaty on the Protection of Broadcasting 
Organisations – Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, Secretariat, March 25th 2014 
86  It is however noted there are more recent documents, such as the Consolidated Text on 
Definitions, Object of Protection, Rights to be Granted and Other Issues (WIPO SCCR/35/12). 
However such documents are meant to consolidate the main areas that have been informally 
agreed on, and hence is not the ideal basis for analysing the underlying debates.  
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[2]-6.2 Qualification for Protection  
 
In addition to the above discussion, and aside from the core debate on scope of 
rights and beneficiaries, the Working Document contains several interesting 
provisions.  
 
Two such provisions are on details that are already implied (or generally 
understood) within the existing legal framework for broadcaster’s rights. Firstly, 
Article 6 (Alternative A)(2) clarifies that the provisions of the Treaty ‘shall not 
provide any protection in respect of mere retransmissions by any means’. This is to 
mean that while a transmission is protected by broadcasters’ rights, a 
retransmission of the same is not. Secondly, Article 15 clarifies that ‘The enjoyment 
and exercise of the rights provided for in this Treaty shall not be subject to any 
formality.’  Both of these Articles are interesting to note, as they are principles that 
are implied by the existing legal framework, but were never previously explicitly 
stated within the legal instruments.  
 
 
[2]-6.3 Proposed Rights 
 
In terms of the actual rights set out in the Proposed Treaty, these are contained in 
Article 9. The working Document contains two alternatives for Article 9. 
Alternative A provides for (i) a retransmission right, (ii) a public performance 
right, and (iii) a pre-broadcast signal use right.  
 
In contrast, Alternative B provides for (i) a fixation right, (ii) a reproduction of 
fixations right, (iii) a retransmission right, (iv) a public communication right, (v) a 
‘making available’ right for fixations, (vi) a transmission of fixations right, and (vii) 
a sale and transfer right for fixations.  
 
These alternatives are very different in scope in several ways. It is clear that 
Alternative A is founded on a signal-based approach, while Alternative B is founded 
on a rights-based approach.  
 
Both alternatives are similar in the retransmission right – they both provide for a 
technology-neutral retransmission right (i.e. a right that covers retransmission 
over any platform or medium).  Alternative B obviously also covers many more 
rights, and is wider in scope of protection. However, Alternative B does not provide 
for a pre-broadcasting right, while Alternative A does. This suggests that 
Alternative B is not just opting for more rights, but there is truly a conceptual 
difference between the signal-based and rights-based approaches.  
 
Another observation is that the public performance and public communication 
rights in the two alternatives are very different. While Alternative A is specific and 
covers a ‘performance of their broadcast signal in places accessible to the public, for 
commercial advantage or using very large screens’, Alternative B is much broader 
in scope and covers ‘the communication to the public of their broadcasts’. Both of 
these proposals give more rights than Article 13(d) of the Rome Convention, 
which is limited to ‘the communication to the public of their television broadcasts if 
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such communication is made in places accessible to the public against payment of 
an entrance fee’. 
 
First of all, even the relatively narrower Alternative A, applies to all forms of 
broadcasting (i.e. both radio and television), while the corresponding Rome 
Convention provision was limited to television. Furthermore, it is not limited to 
situations where there is an entrance fee, but rather where there is the broader 
concept of ‘commercial advantage’, which can obviously be indirect in nature (e.g. 
a bar showing a sports game on a large television to attract customers who do not 
pay an entry fee, but who then stay and buy drinks).  
 
 
[2]-6.4 Post-Fixation Rights 
 
Turning to the issue of post-fixation rights, the construction of Alternative B is 
interesting. In addition to a fixation right, it proposes certain rights that loosely 
correspond to similar rights under copyright.  
 
The reproduction of fixations right (ii) corresponds to the reproduction right of 
Berne Convention Article 6. Additionally, the sale and transfer right (vii) 
corresponds to the sale and transfer rights of WCT Article 6.  
 
The making available of fixations right (v) corresponds to making available right 
of WCT Article 8 (this is the right which is relevant for ‘on-demand’ type services). 
However, it should be noted that the WTC Article 8 is much broader – covering 
any communication to the public, including both broadcasting and the making 
available at a time and place determined by a user.  
 
It is therefore very interesting to note that in this regard, this aspect of the 
proposed post-fixation rights is more limited than the corresponding rights under 
copyright. The concept of ‘broadcasting’ a fixation of a broadcast would come 
under the concept of retransmission (or rather deferred retransmission), and is 
hence not directly relevant. However, broadcasting and ‘making available to the 
public at a user-defined time and place’ are not the only possible forms of 
communication to the public. Other communications would not be covered under 
Article 9 Alternative B, although they would be covered under WCT Article 8. It can 
be surmised therefore, that once a fixation of some broadcast content is 
authorised, a subsequent public communication or performance of that content 
might be permissible, once it does not involve a reproduction, on-demand-type 
service, retransmission, or sale.  
 
In terms of the proposed ‘transmission of fixations’ right (vi) it might be initially 
inferred that corresponds to the public communication and public performance 
rights of Berne Convention Article 11 or WCT Article 8. However, the intention of 
this right is almost certainly to serve as a right regarding deferred retransmission, 
to compliment the ‘standard’ right of retransmission, which is normally defined as 
a simultaneous activity.  
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Regarding these post-fixation rights, a very interesting aspect of Alternative B is 
how the exclusivity of these rights is to be construed.  
 
The standard language of both the Berne Convention and the WCT is that the 
copyright holder has the “exclusive right of authorising” a certain activity. In the 
case of the Rome Convention, the language of Article 13 is that “Broadcasting 
organisations shall enjoy the right to authorize or prohibit…”.  TRIPs Article 14(3) 
however, uses the language “Broadcasting organizations shall have the right to 
prohibit…”.  
 
Both Alternatives to Article 9 of the Proposed Treaty use the language 
“Broadcasting organizations shall enjoy the exclusive right to authorize…”. 
Alternative B however, contains a provision 9(3) which allows for Contracting 
Parties to establish protection using a ‘right to prohibit’ rather than a ‘right to 
authorise’, for the specific rights described above as post-fixation rights.   
 
In theoretical terms, the ‘right to prohibit’ is necessarily a weaker right than the 
‘right to authorise’. 87  Therefore, presenting post-fixation rights as ‘rights to 
prohibit’ is therefore some conceptual middle ground between a full rights-based 
approach and a signal-based approach. This would explain why this option is 
presented as a sort of reservation to the proposed provisions on post-fixation 
rights.  
 
 
[2]-6.5 Limitations and Exceptions 
 
Like all WIPO-administered treaties on copyright and related rights, the Proposed 
Treaty contains provisions on limitations and exceptions. These provisions are 
contained in Article 10.  
 
In international instruments on copyright law, the standard approach is to use the 
‘three-step-test’. The three-step-test originates from Article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention, which allows for exceptions to exclusive reproduction rights “in 
certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the author.” The essence of the tree-step-test is reproduced in TRIPs 
Article 13, and WCT Article 10. 
 
It is however noted that the Berne Convention also contains provisions on specific 
limitations and exceptions, as set out in Article 10 (quotation), Article 10bis (use 
for reporting of current events), and Article 14bis(2)(b) (limits to contributors of 
cinematographic works).  
 
In the field of related rights, there is often a different type of provision – one that 
stipulates that the same limitations and exceptions that apply to copyright may 
apply to related rights (the concept of ‘equivalency’). 
 
                                                        
87 An analysis of why this is necessarily so is presented in Chapter 6.  
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Rome Convention Article 15 uses a combination of two approaches. While Article 
15(1) enumerates a list of explicitly permitted exceptions (private use, reporting 
of current event, ephemeral fixation, and teaching and research), Article 15(2) 
provides for equivalency with copyright.  The WPPT also used two approaches - 
Article 16(1), and provides for limitations and exceptions based on equivalency to 
copyright, while Article 16(2) limits those limitations and exemptions to the 
criteria of the three-step-test.   
 
The way in which limitations and exemptions for broadcasters’ related rights 
would be set out in a new instrument therefore depends on whether the Draft 
Treaty takes the approach of the Rome Convention or that of the WPPT. 
 
Article 10 of the Proposed Treaty has three different alternatives. Alternative A 
uses a combination of an enumerated list and the equivalency principle. The 
permitted uses in this list are the same as those in Article 15(1) of the Rome 
Convention - private use, reporting current events, teaching and research, and 
ephemeral fixations). Alternative B also sets out a combined approach, but uses 
the equivalency principle as well as the three-step-test. 
 
Alternative C is the most interesting, and uses the equivalency principle, an 
enumerated list, and the three-step-test. This proposal therefore takes the 
strongest stance on limitations and exceptions.  Furthermore, the permitted uses 
in the enumerated list go beyond the uses already contained in the Rome 
Convention. It includes exceptions for (i) use to promote access by visually-
impaired persons, and (ii) use by libraries and archives. It is noted that these are 
two of the areas that have attracted attention on the SCCR agenda (in addition to 
exceptions for teaching and research, which is already included in the Rome 
Convention). This proposed version of the article also contains language which 
explicitly clarifies that the uses on the enumerated list are assumed to comply with 
the requirements of the three-step-test. 
 
Most interestingly, the list also contains a final broad exception for “any use of any 
kind in any manner or form of any part of a broadcast where the program, or any 
part of it, which is the subject of the transmission is not protected by copyright or 
any related right thereto”. This proposed limitation is very significant as it strikes 
to the heart of one of the major criticisms of the Proposed Treaty – that it would 
result in enclosing the existing public domain by apply a new right to content that 
is currently outside of copyright protection.  
 
These competing approaches to the drafting of the limitation and exceptions 
provision of the new treaty is significant for the reason that it shows the intensity 
of the debate on broadcasters’ rights. It shows that in the eyes of some 
stakeholders, the current approach of the Internet Treaties is insufficient to 
ensure that legal certainty regarding the limits to the scope of certain rights.   
 
The area of limitations and exceptions is expectedly a major issue for civil society 
stakeholders. They contend for both mandatory and permission exceptions, along 
with the non-prohibition of compulsory licences, stressing that the exceptions for 
broadcasting rights should not be less enabling for users than those that apply to 
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copyright.88 Furthermore, civil society stakeholders stress that broadcaster post-
fixation rights should not even apply for works that are in the public domain or 
are openly licenced.89 
 
 
[2]-6.6 Technological Protection Measures 
 
One of the most significant contributions of the Internet Treaties was the 
introduction of new provisions on Technological Protection Measures (TPMs) and 
Rights Management Information (RMI).  
 
TPMs are technical measures that rightsholders use to restrict what activities can 
be undertaken by a user. Broadly speaking, there are two types of TPMs – access 
controls and copyright controls. Access controls limit the ability of users to access 
a work, for example through password protection or encryption of data. Copyright 
control limit the ability of a use to undertake copyright restricted actions; an 
example would be a file that has restrictions on the number of times copies of it 
can be made. 
 
RMI is a form of metadata (data about data), and included information about a 
work such as the author, other contributing rightsholders, and the terms and 
conditions for use of a work. RMI and TPMs are related, as the RMI data can 
sometimes be the basis on which TMPs are made operational. 
  
Both Internet Treaties introduce the concept of TPMs into international copyright 
and related rights law. WCT Article 11 and WPPT Article 18 both contain almost 
identical language, and require Contracting Parties to provide “adequate legal 
protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective 
technological measures”. 
  
Regarding RMI, WCT Article 12 and WPPT Article 19 also have almost similar 
language. These articles provide for remedies against unauthorised removal of 
RMI, or distribution of protected subject matter with RMI removed.  
 
The Working Document for the Proposed Treaty contains four different 
formulations for proposed Articles 12 and 13 on TPMs and RMI, all of which 
require Contracting Parties to “provide adequate and effective legal protection” 
against stipulated unauthorised acts.  
 
Article 12 Alternative A1 stipulates the unauthorised acts of (i) decryption of 
encrypted signals or circumvention of TMPs similar to encryption, (ii) 
manufacturing, selling, or importing devices for decryption, and (iii) removal of 
RMI. Alternative A2 stipulates only the unauthorised acts of (i) decryption 
(without any reference to other TPMs), and (ii) removal of RMI.  
  
                                                        
88 Joint NGO letter on the proposed WIPO treaty on broadcasting (May 28th 2018); Item 2 
89 Joint NGO letter on the proposed WIPO treaty on broadcasting (May 28th 2018); Item 3 
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Alternative B1 takes a form almost identical to that of the WCT and WPPT, with a 
proposed Article 12 on a general anti-circumvention provision, and a proposed 
Article 13 on RMI, both of which mirror the language used in the Internet Treaties. 
Alternative B2 is different only in that is considers a sub-article explicitly on 
unauthorized decryption. 
 
Aside from general drafting structure, there appear to be two main ideas for 
debate. The first is whether a general provision on TPMs is sufficient, or whether 
it is necessary to explicitly have a provision on encryption. While encryption might 
generally be understood as a type of TPM, the desire to have a specific provision 
reflects that the signal protection objectives of the Treaty are quite well 
established and specific.  
 
The second contested issue is the inclusion of a provision on manufacturing, sale, 
or import of devices used for unauthorised signal decryption. Such provisions are 
not features of the international legal framework for copyright and related rights, 
and are neither included in the WIPO Internet Treaties, nor the TRIPs Agreement. 
They can therefore be seen as particularly ‘strong’ provisions that greatly extend 
the scope of intellectual property law. However, these provisions are features of 
the copyright laws of many developed jurisdictions, including the United States90 
and the European Union91. 
 
 
[2]-6.7 Term of Protection 
 
The current status quo regarding the term of broadcasters’ rights is twenty years. 
This is stipulated in both Rome Convention Article 14 and TRIPs Article 14(5). 
However, some jurisdictions provide for longer terms of protection, notably the 
European Union, which provides for a term of fifty years.92  
 
The Proposed Treaty has three alternatives in terms of protection term, which is 
addressed in Article 11. Alternative A provides for a term of either twenty years or 
fifty years.  Alternative B provides for a flexible term determined by individual 
Contracting Parties, subject to the condition that the terms is not “in conflict with 
the normal exploitation of the broadcast signal and shall not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate rights of the broadcasting organizations nor the rights holders”. It 
should be noted that this language reflects the same wording of two of the criteria 
of the three-step-test. 
 
Alternative C is that there is no such provision on term of protection at all. Such a 
stipulation (or rather lack thereof) would be in line with a very strict 
interpretation of the signal-based approach.  
 
Recall that under signal-based approach, protection should be limited to the signal 
only, and not the content contained with a signal transmission. Since a signal 
                                                        
90 US DMCA (Digital Millennium Copyright Act); 17 U.S. Code §1201  
91 Article 6 of Directive 2001/29/EC (‘Information Society Directive’) 
92 Article 3(4) of EU Directive 2006/116/EC (‘Term Directive’) 
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transmission is transient by definition, it is not possible (or at least not necessary) 
to stipulate a term of protection beyond the instantaneous protection that applies 
during the transmission itself. Hence, defining a term of protection necessarily 
implies a rights-based approach as a time-bound term of protection can logically 
only apply to fixations whose existence persist beyond the signal from which they 
were derived. A joint letter sent by various NGOs to the SCCR had very strong 
words to say about the palpable contradictions between a signal-based approach 
and a long term of protection, stating that:  
 
“A 50 year term of protection makes a mockery of the notion that this is a signal 
based treaty or is only concerned with signal piracy, as it effectively extends the 
protection beyond the term of copyright, and is a recipe for disaster as regards 
orphan works (just as individual countries are in the process of trying to solve the 
orphan works problem). To protect against signal piracy, a short term of 24 hours 
would make more sense than 5 decades from the date of every broadcast.”93 
 
For completeness, a not-insignificant point of debate is the matter of the 
calculation of the term of protection. Specifically, the possibility for protection to 
be extended – even perpetually – if the content of a broadcast is broadcast again 
before the term of the initial broadcast expires, hence triggering a new term.94 
 
 
[2]-7 REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 
 
Notwithstanding the intended focus on international legal instruments in this sub-
chapter, it is noted for completeness that there are some regional agreements in 
place that have provisions relevant to broadcasters’ rights. While these will not be 
discussed in detail, there are three agreements that are worthy of at least noting. 
 
 
[2]-7.1 NAFTA 
 
The first is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994. Article 
1707 of NAFTA (Protection of Encrypted Program Carrying Satellite Signals) 
makes provisions on devices and systems that might be used to decode encrypted 
broadcasting signals. The Agreement provides for criminal offences for the 
manufacture, importation, sale or lease of such devices, as well as civil offences for 
receiving or distributing signals that have been decrypted on an unauthorised 
basis. It is noted that this provision draws similarities to one of the proposed 
provisions on TPMs in the Proposed WIPO Treaty Working Document.  
 
 
[2]-7.2 Cartagena Agreement 
 
The second agreement to note is the Cartagena Agreement – the basis of the 
Andean Community of South American States. More specifically, broadcasters’ 
                                                        
93 Joint NGO letter on the proposed WIPO treaty on broadcasting (May 28th 2018); Item 1 
94 WIPO SCCR/17/INF/1, paragraph 31 
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rights are provided for by The Andean Community’s ‘Decision 351 establishing the 
Common Regime on Copyright and Neighboring Rights’, of 1993.95  Article 39 of this 
decision provides for exclusive broadcasters’ rights regarding retransmission (by 
any means, not just wireless), fixation of broadcasts, and reproduction of fixations. 
Article 40 build on these rights by clarifying that they also apply to pre-broadcast 
signals (‘program-carrying signals intended for a broadcasting or 
telecommunication satellite’). Finally, Article 41 stipulates a minimum protection 
term of fifty years for the rights set out in Article 39.  
 
 
[2]-7.3 European Television Agreement  
 
The last agreement to note is the European Agreement on the Protection of 
Television Broadcasts, of 1960. Article 1 of this Agreement sets out certain 
exclusive rights of broadcasting organisations, including (a) a re-broadcasting 
right (retransmission right), (b) a diffusion by wire right (cable retransmission 
right), (c) a communication to the public right, (d) a fixation right (including of 
photographs) and a reproduction of fixations right, and (e) a deferred re-
broadcasting or wire diffusion right (deferred retransmission right).  
 
Interestingly, the deferred retransmission right of Article 1(e) of the European 
Agreement does not apply when the broadcasting organisation has authorised the 
sale of the fixations or reproductions to the public.  Therefore, it can be said that 
once fixations (or reproductions of fixations) are authorised, there is an implied 
indivisible right to communicate those fixations – i.e. permission to sell the 
fixations automatically implies permission to re-broadcast the content on a 
deferred basis.  
 
The European Agreement is wider in scope than the Rome Convention in a few 
notable ways. First of all, it recognised wired diffusion, which the Rome 
Convention does not. This recognition can be seen as a possible response to the 
perception that even at the time of its negotiation, the Rome Convention was not 
sufficient to address current technologies.96 Secondly, it explicitly states that a 
photograph constitutes a fixation of a broadcast. Thirdly, the communication to 
the public right is not limited to situations where there is an entry fee. However, 
the Agreement does converge back to the scope of the Rome Convention, in that 
Article 3 allows for reservations to the rights of fixation of photographs, and public 
communication where such is not to a paying audience.  
 
The rights in the European Agreement are subject to a minimum term of twenty 
years (Article 2). Furthermore, Article 5 clarifies that the provisions of the 
agreement apply only to television broadcasting and not radio (hence making it in 
this way narrower in scope than the Rome Convention).  
                                                        
95 Decision No. 351 (Decisión N° 351 que establece el Régimen Común sobre Derecho de Autor y 
Derechos Conexos) was issued by the Commission of the Andean Community (also called the 
‘Commission of Cartagena’) on December 17, 1993, and published in the Official Gazette of the 
Cartagena Agreement No. 145 of December 21, 1993, in Lima, Peru. 
96 Ogawa (2007), pg. 60 
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For completeness, it is noted that the European Agreement is no longer relevant 
as it has been superseded by more modern legal instruments of the European 
Union. Most notably, the Rental Directive97 sets out the modern provisions for 
broadcasters’ rights in the EU. This Directive, along with other relevant 
instruments specific to the European legal framework are analysed in detail in 
Chapter 8 of this manuscript.  
 
 
[2]-8 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
This chapter aimed at giving an overview of the international legal framework for 
the intellectual property rights of broadcasting organisations.  
 
The main existing international instrument for broadcasters’ rights is the Rome 
Convention. However, this convention has not been updated since its initial 
adoption in 1961, and there is much concern amongst the international 
community that protection for broadcasters needs to be updated, much in the 
same way that the WIPO Internet Treaties updated the framework copyright and 
other forms of related rights. 
 
This desire to update the international framework has attracted much of the 
attention of the WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights since 
its inception. However, while the Committee has been able to find solutions to 
other key policy issues, a new international instrument on the protection of 
broadcasting organisations has not yet been concluded. Furthermore, possible 
progress on such a new treaty on broadcasting is greatly hindered by the fact that 
there are still core differences in opinion on key policy issues. 
 
The Rome Convention therefore remains the main international reference point 
for broadcasters’ rights. However, that Convention remains as having a relatively 
low number of Contracting Parties. Furthermore, the main international 
agreement on intellectual property – the TRIPs Agreement – does little to provide 
a coherent framework for broadcasters’ rights.  
 
The status quo is therefore that there is little explicit harmonisation on the 
international level for broadcasters’ rights. This is however not to say that 
individual jurisdictions do not protect broadcaster’s rights, or that where they do, 
there is necessarily extensive divergence in the approach taken. It just means that 
there is not much coordination of the issue through a single international 
instrument, and that individual jurisdictions use different approaches. 
 
Aside from the extreme circumstance of not offering any protection at all to 
broadcasting though the intellectual property law system, there are generally 
three different approaches taken by individual jurisdictions. The first is to offer an 
explicit related right to broadcasting organisations, which is the general focus of 
the analysis in this manuscript. The second is to protect broadcasts as a category 
                                                        
97 EU Directive 2006/115/EC (‘Rental Directive’) 
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of works under the copyright system, as is done in the United Kingdom and some 
other jurisdictions.98  
 
The third approach is where broadcasts are not explicitly included as a category 
of works, but are protected through a more general interpretation of ‘works’ 
eligible for copyright protection. A notable example of such protection is the 
United States, where copyright is interpreted – and clarified in case law – to cover 
broadcasts once a simultaneous fixation of the broadcast transmission is made.99 
Furthermore, various regulatory principles of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) provide for some limited protection for broadcasters, though 
not in the form of an exclusive property right. Therefore, although the United 
States technically does not provide for a related right for broadcasting 
organisations, despite being the world’s leading exporter of audiovisual 
services100, and historically the leader in pushing to liberalise that sector101.  
 
Furthermore the case of the US is made even more peculiar given that it was very 
active in the negotiations that led up to the Rome Convention, but ultimately chose 
not to become a contracting party. 102  Additionally – and almost counter-
intuitively – the US appears to be one of the major proponents of the WIPO 
Broadcasting Treaty.103 
 
Taking a broad look at the international framework, the overall impression is that 
although broadcasters’ rights might appear on the surface to be a simple niche 
area of intellectual property law, its context – at least in terms of international law 
– is complex. This complexity will likely remain, even if a new WIPO-administered 
Treaty on Broadcasting Organisations is adopted.  
 
Whether such an instrument will actually be adopted in the near future remains 
to be seen.  Nevertheless, even if a new treaty is eventually adopted, the fact 
remains that work on theoretical understanding of broadcasters’ rights is sparse. 
 
 While the analysis in this manuscript does not explicitly aim at answering the key 
policy questions concerning a proposed treaty, it will use Law and Economic 
analysis to provide a systematic theoretical context for the debates. The analysis 
in this manuscript will therefore hopefully remain relevant, no matter the 
outcomes at WIPO in this area.  
 
  
                                                        
98 WIPO SCCR/1/3, paragraph 35  
99 WIPO SCCR/1/3, paragraph 36 
100 World Trade Organisation (WTO) Document S/C/W/310 – Audiovisual Services, Background 
Note by Secretariat, Council for Trade in Services, January 2010  
101  See Pauwels and Loisen (2003) for a history of the development of international trade in 
audiovisual services, specifically in the context of liberalisation under the WTO General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) 
102 Balganesh (2007), pgs. 1311-1312 
103 Balganesh (2007), pg. 1306 
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PART II: BROADCASTING AS UNIQUE SUBJECT MATTER 
 
CHAPTER 3: BROADCAST SIGNALS AS IP SUBJECT MATTER 
 
This chapter is the first substantial research chapter in this manuscript, and one 
of two chapters in Part II. It aims at analysing the concept of broadcasting signals 
as unique subject matter in the intellectual property system. While this chapter 
does not employ a Law and Economics methodology per se, it justifies why the 
topic of broadcasters’ rights is best understood through a Law and Economics 
perspective, and it is important for setting the context of the subject matter 
analysis in the rest of the manuscript.  
 
 
[3]-1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to address the overall research question of the theoretical bases of 
broadcasters’ rights, a good starting point is to explore how the general theories 
of intellectual property apply to this subject matter. As such, the research question 
addressed by this chapter is “How do existing theories of intellectual property rights 
apply to the case of broadcast signals?”  
 
This will set a context for the analysis of broadcasting signals as unique subject 
matter for intellectual property (IP) protection. Firstly, the chapter recalls various 
traditional theories of intellectual property law and analyses how they relate the 
unique subject matter at hand. Secondly, a brief analysis of the generally 
understood taxonomy of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is presented, in order 
to contextualise the position that this form of IP holds and its relationship with 
other forms of IP. The relationship between these two objectives is that the 
chapter looks at how IP theory applies to the field of related rights itself, of which 
broadcasters’ rights are of course one sub-component.  
 
In the wider context of this manuscript, the purpose of this chapter is to 
demonstrate that the most viable theoretical perspective on broadcasters’ rights 
is welfare theory – the branch of IP theory that naturally lends to Law and 
Economic analysis. In fact, this chapter argues that other non-utilitarian 
perspectives do not even apply well to such subject matter, and are hence of 
limited use in answering the overarching research question. 
 
Additionally, by discussing the taxonomy of the intellectual property system, this 
chapter will argue that broadcasters’ rights are a very unique subject matter for 
IP protection. As such, addressing the overall research question means that 
broadcasters’ rights themselves need to be analysed specifically, rather than 
adopting broader perspectives on various branches of the IP system. In particular, 
not only is a general view of theories of copyright and related rights not viable, but 
this chapter will argue that the very concept of ‘related rights’ has little coherence 
as a branch of the system itself. Consequently, analysis of other forms of related 
rights, while instructive, do not provide sufficient insight into the rights of 
broadcasting organisations. 
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[3]-2 JUSTIFICATION FOR BROADCASTERS’ RIGHTS 
 
Before delving into discussions on the various theories of intellectual property 
rights, it is useful to first note the claimed basis of these rights in various 
international legal instruments. However, it is surprisingly difficult to find an 
explicit justification for broadcasters’ rights in such instruments.  
 
While an explicit justification is surprisingly absent from the Rome Convention in 
its final form, a justification for broadcasters’ rights can be found in the 
Explanatory Statement accompanying the 1957 Draft Agreement on Protection of 
Certain Rights Called Neighbouring on Copyrights (‘Monaco Draft’), which was a 
precursor and an input into to the Rome Convention.104 This statement was that 
the agreement was to ‘encourage creative activity and the dissemination of artistic 
works in the public interest’.105  
 
Furthermore, key clues can be observed in various statements documents from 
the WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR). One such 
statement is that “Broadcasting organizations have been granted protection for the 
result of their investment, their entrepreneurial efforts and their contribution to the 
diffusion of culture and their public information service. Broadcasting organizations 
are entities that take the financial and editorial responsibility for the selection and 
arrangement of, and investment in, the transmitted content.”106  
 
In terms of the recent proposed WIPO Broadcasting Treaty (discussed in Chapter 
2), the SCCR advocates that: “The main objective of the new treaty is to provide a 
stable legal framework for the activities of broadcasting organizations. Its focus is 
on the ‘anti-piracy’ function, and against signal-theft, but it provides also protection 
against competitors and against unfair exploitation, and against free-riding. The 
rationale of the legal protection is twofold: the investment required for providing 
program content to the public; and the easiness of exploitation by others of the result 
of this investment in the new technological environment.”107 
 
Therefore, based on these statements, the main justification for broadcasters’ 
rights appear to be to protect against signal piracy, encourage investment, and 
reward broadcasters’ for their role in distributing creative and artistic works.  
With this claim established, attention can now be placed on the topic of theories 
of intellectual property.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
104 There were three overlapping origins of the Rome Convention. One was a proposal from the 
ILO in 1956, one was a proposal from the Berne Union (of the Berne Convention) and UNESCO in 
1957 (the Monaco Draft), and the third was a proposal from the ILO, UNESCO and the Berne Union 
in 1960 (the Hague Draft). 
105 Ogawa (2007); pg. 36. 
106 WIPO SCCR/8/INF/1; Para. 58, and also WIPO SCCR/7/8; Para. 5. 
107 WIPO SCCR/17/INF/1, paragraph 41. 
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[3]-3 THEORIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY    
 
There is a very rich tradition of academic accounts of intellectual property from 
various perspectives, each with its own philosophical roots and policy 
implications. The following section summarises the main theories of IP, and 
attempts to relate these theories to the subject matter of broadcasting signals, and 
related rights more generally. Generally, theories of intellectual property can be 
placed within two groups: Utilitarian Theories and Non-Utilitarian Theories.108 
 
While the summary below also focuses mainly on normative perspectives it is 
acknowledged that there is also a stream of literature on the historical evolution 
of intellectual property law and other positive perspectives. For example, Olsen 
(1989) builds on the traditions of public choice theory, and suggests that 
legislators may deviate from ‘good copyright policy’ due to political influences of 
overrepresented interest groups. Furthermore, Merges (1995) tracks the 
evolution of intellectual property law, and notes a ‘shifting baseline’ from a 
presumption of open competition and an absence of property rights, towards a 
presumption of protection, due to political economy concerns of legislators.  
 
As an editorial note, the discussions that follow focus on the three main 
(traditional) branches of intellectual property law: copyright, patents, and 
trademarks. It fully acknowledged that various other forms of intellectual 
property exist (e.g. trade secrets, publicity rights, sui generis rights, etc.). 
However, the theoretical underpinnings of these forms of Intellectual Property 
general parallel those relating to the main branches.   
 
 
[3]-3.1 Utilitarian Theories 
 
Utilitarian theories of intellectual property are primarily concerned with social 
welfare issues, and hence provide the underlying stream of thought for the 
economic analysis of intellectual property law. Generally, utilitarian theories 
attempt to balance the conflicting goals of incentivising the production of creative 
works, inventions, and innovations with the market power granted via virtue of 
property rights. Indeed, this the branch of theory most directly consistent with the 
discipline of Law and Economics.  
 
A welfare economics framework for analysis of Intellectual Property Rights can be 
traced to Pigou (1924), who articulated an appropriability problem facing 
inventors. Arrow (1962) was further instrumental in formalising the notion that 
information can generally be reproduced at zero marginal cost, hence leading to a 
public good problem. Building on the foundations laid by Coase (1960) on 
property rights and market failures, Demsetz (1970) propositioned that strong 
property rights are necessary for intellectual creations, where efficient resource 
allocation can then be facilitated through Coasean bargaining processes.  
 
                                                        
108 For a detailed discussion on the various theories of intellectual property, see Menell (2000), on 
which this section is largely based.  
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Building on utilitarian and welfare frameworks, much economic analysis has been 
conducted on the optimal structure of intellectual property law. In the field of 
patent law, Nordhaus (1969) provides a seminal model of patent protection in 
which it was demonstrated that an optimal length of protection could balance 
incentives for investment in innovative activities with the deadweight loss 
resulting from market power. Gilbert and Shipiro (1990) expand on the Nordhaus 
approach by allowing for variation in not only patent length, but also patent 
breadth (scope of protection).  
 
There has subsequently been a rich body of research following from this tradition, 
evolving into its own research niche of ‘innovation economics’. Common themes 
in this niche are institutional studies (for example analysis stemming from 
Schumpeter‘s (1942) concept of ‘creative destruction’), the implications of patent 
races (stemming from Barzel’s (1968) work on innovation rivalry), the 
implications of cumulative innovation (stemming from Scotchmer’s (1991) work 
on spillover effects in innovation markets), the implications of network 
externalities (for example stemming from Katz and Shapiro (1985) on innovation 
and product standards), and alternative mechanisms to property rights (example 
Wright (1983) on prizes and research contracts as alternatives to patent rights). 
 
While the vein of literature known as innovation economics discussed above 
mainly deals with modes of economic production whose outputs are utilitarian in 
nature (i.e. inventions and innovations that are subject to patent protection), the 
same philosophical and theoretical foundations apply to production of goods 
which are creative in nature (i.e. literary and artistic works that are the subject of 
copyright protection). This is evident as Arrow’s notion of information as a public 
good also equally applies to information in the form of creative outputs, leading to 
the need for a utilitarian and welfare-based framework to analyse the structure of 
inventive systems in such markets.  
 
Despite the intuitive appeal of a utilitarian framework, welfare-based analysis has 
always had an uneasy relationship with copyright law. Hurt and Schuchman 
(1966) discussed the uncertainty of the welfare effects of copyright protection. 
Breyer (1970) also famously shines a light of scepticism on copyright protection, 
noting that while copyright may be justified on economic reasoning of 
encouraging production of works, existing evidence suggests that the effect of 
exclusive rights is marginal at best.  
 
Johnson (1985) as well as Novos and Waldman (1984) develop the tradition of 
formal economic modelling of copyright issues, and demonstrate that limitations 
on copying lead to increases in social welfare. Subsequently, Landes and Posner 
(1989) can be considered as the seminal work in economic analysis of copyright 
law. 
  
While the notions of a public good problem and incentivisation though property 
rights are common threads in both theories of patent law and copyright law, 
application of a utilitarian framework to trademark law takes quite a different 
form. The principal economic problem at play in the sphere of trademark law is 
one of information asymmetry. Economides (1988) sets out the discussion on the 
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economic mechanism of trademarks, and notes how marks facilitate the efficiency 
of consumers’ choices, especially in cases of experience or infrequently used 
goods. Furthermore, Landes and Posner (1987) suggest that trademarks enhance 
social welfare through the key economic function of reducing consumer search 
costs. 
 
 
[3]-3.2 Non-Utilitarian Theories 
 
Non-utilitarian theories are particularly significant for literary and artistic works, 
which are generally the subject matter of copyright protection. In particular, non-
utilitarian philosophical perspectives have had a particularly pronounced 
influence on the evolution of intellectual property systems in continental 
Europe.109 Generally, non-utilitarian theories find their basis in the foundations of 
general property rights laid by classical philosophy. More generally, Becker 
(1993) discussed the various moral grounds on which people deserve to claim 
ownership over intellectual property, as compared to rights in tangible property. 
 
Perhaps the most dominant non-utilitarian theory is that of Locke’s labour-centric 
notion of natural rights. For Locke, the central theme is that ownership of one’s 
labour gives rise to a natural entitlement to property rights over outputs that are 
a product of such labour.110 While a large body of literature has developed which 
applies Lockean natural rights theory to intellectual property generally, the 
literature is certainly not in consensus about this basis. For example, while 
Denicola (1981) and Ginsburg (1990) argue for expansionary interpretations of 
copyright law pursuant to a Lockean tradition, Hettinger (1989) and Nozick 
(1984) are critical of such liberal interpretations. 
 
Aside from Lockean natural rights theory, the other major strain of non-utilitarian 
theory is a perspective of personhood, as grounded in the philosophies of Kant 
and Hegel. In the case of Hegel, property rights are central to one’s personality and 
expressions of personhood. In Kant’s account, the notion of individual autonomy 
is the central justification for property rights. Radin (1982) gives a seminal 
account for the role personhood in modern legal discourse generally. 
 
Accoding to Mennel (2000), in the case of personhood theories, the justification of 
property rights appears to be more convincing in circumstances where an object 
or idea is closely intertwined with an individual’s personal identity. 111  This 
concept is well summarised by Hughes (1988) in the following statement: “The 
more a creative process is subject to external constraints, the less apparent 
personality is in the creation. At some point, these constraints on a particular form 
                                                        
109 “This difference in philosophical perspective is reflected in part in the ways in which intellectual 
property systems are designated. Whereas protection for literary and artistic expression in the United 
States comes within the ‘copyright’ law - the title of which emphasizes limits on the public’s right to 
make copies - the analogous bodies of law in Europe are labelled ‘author’s rights’: droit d’auteur in 
France, Urheberrecht in Germany and derecho de autor in Spain.” – Menell (2000), pg156.  
110 For an account of the role of Lockean natural rights theory in the evolution of copyright law, see 
Hughes (1988).  
111 For a general critique of this theory, see Simmons (1992). 
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of intellectual property may be too great to permit meaningful expressions of 
personality. We may determine that the personality justification should apply only 
to some genres of intellectual property or that the personality generally present in a 
particular genre warrants only limited protection.” 
 
In terms of the evolution of intellectual property law, it is interesting to note the 
extent of influence of non-utilitarian theories. While the US copyright system 
appears to be almost solely built on a Lockean labour perspective112, Continental 
European law, with its rich tradition of a strong focus on moral rights, generally 
traces its philosophical foundations to personhood theories113.  
 
While the term ‘natural rights’ is typically associated with Lockean perspectives, 
for the purposes of the analysis at hand, personhood theories can also be grouped 
into a broader classification of ‘natural rights theories’. This can be done as the 
types of rights pursuant to both theoretical branches are ‘natural’ in the sense that 
their existence is intrinsic and connected to the very nature of the human 
condition, i.e. outside of any externally imposed legal system.  
 
It is further useful to note that there also exists a perspective which sharply 
contrasts these natural rights based frameworks, based on the foundations of the 
deconstructionist school of thought in literary criticism. This perspective rejects 
the classic romantic concepts of the ‘author’ (or the ‘inventor’) as an artificial 
social construction that may lead to unwarranted and unconstructive associations 
between creative works and their authors.114 
 
Aside from the above-discussed perspectives on property rights based on classical 
philosophical foundations, there are several other themes in perspectives on 
intellectual property rights which can be loosely described as non-utilitarian in 
nature. For example, there is certainly a growing trend of ‘libertarian’ 
perspectives, which criticise the dominant philosophical perspectives on 
intellectual property.115 More recently, authors such as Barlow (1994) discuss 
how intellectual property rights undermine free expression and participation in 
cultural and political affairs, particularly in the modern digital age.  
 
These libertarian perspectives are very much related to strains of literature which 
set out a sort of ‘democratic theory’ perspective. For example, Kaplan (1967) notes 
that intellectual property has a strong historical basis in notions of political 
patronage, which are no longer applicable in the modern era116. Goldstein (1970) 
discusses how various doctrines within copyright law are unified with 
constitutional notions of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.  Further to 
this tradition, there is certainly a growing body of literature that is critical of 
                                                        
112 See Hughes (1988) 
113 See Netanel (1993) 
114 For an overview and critique of this deconstructionist view, see Lemley (1997). 
115 For example, see Palmer(1989) 
116 Copyright law in the UK traces its origins to policies used by the Crown to regulate the press via 
granting special royal grants of privileges.  For a discussion on the history of copyright in the UK, 
and the role of the copying privileges, see Rose (2009). 
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expansionary trends in intellectual property, and the implications for democratic 
participation and free expression. 117  Similarly, Netanel (1996) stresses the 
importance of copyright policies in facilitating free speech in the modern era of 
digital communication networks.  
 
 
[3]-4 TAXONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
Before proceeding to discuss the extent to which these various theories are 
applicable to broadcasters’ rights as unique subject matter for intellectual 
property protection, it is first useful to present a broad discussion of the overall 
landscape of the intellectual property system in terms of the different forms of 
rights and types of subject matter covered. 
 
While the above overview of the various theoretical perspectives on IP is only 
rudimentary, it illustrates there is no single unified theory or philosophy on which 
the intellectual property system in its entirety is based. Rather, the applicable 
theoretical and philosophical perspective largely depends on the type of subject 
matter under consideration.  
 
This following section will briefly set out a broad taxonomy for the IP system, in 
order to build a sense of how different theories map onto different subject matter 
areas. 
 
[3]-4.1 General Taxonomy of IPRs 
 
Standard accounts of intellectual property in non-academic settings tend to define 
two distinct branches of the intellectual property system: (i) Copyright and 
Related Rights, and (ii) Industrial Property118. As is evident from its name, the 
former branch deals with two sub-branches (copyright and related rights), while 
the latter deals with patents, trademarks, and other forms of property normally 
associated with commercial endeavours. This distinction is largely based on a 
notion that the subject matter of copyright are outputs pursuant to artistic and 
creative activities, while the subject matter of industrial property deals with 
outputs pursuant to commercial activities. Indeed, it would therefore be implied 
that at least superficially, copyright is founded in non-utilitarian theoretical 
perspectives, at least to a greater extent than industrial property, which may be 
strictly founded in utilitarian perspectives.119 
 
The above distinction is not particularly useful in an academic context, and in 
particular, the very notion of industrial property itself is not particularly 
                                                        
117 For example, see Coombe (1991) 
118 For example, see WIPO (2008) paras 1.4 – 1.9.  
119 Support for the notion that copyright and industrial property evolved out of separate streams 
of intellectual thought and policy issues is found in the fact that industrial property issues were 
first addressed at the international level in the Paris Convention (1883), which considered 
trademark as well as patent issues. However, copyright issues were independently considered in 
a separate instrument – the Berne Convention (1886). 
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constructive. From an economic viewpoint, the starting point for analysing 
property rights is an identification of the market failures that may prevail in the 
absence of such rights. As alluded to in the previous section, the non-rivalrous and 
non-excludable nature of information leads to potential underproduction of 
information goods due to free-rider problems. Furthermore, information may be 
associated with various positive externalities, which again suggests a state of 
underproduction in the absence of market intervention. As such, solving a public 
good market failure is the basis for justifying the existence of patents and 
copyrights as specific forms of property rights. Trademarks on the other hand are 
justified on a completely different form of market failure - information 
asymmetries and the resulting search costs.  
 
This distinction is certainly based on a purely utilitarian perspective, but at least 
provides for a less arbitrary framework than that provided for under the notion 
of ‘industrial property’. There appears to be a general consensus that the patent 
system has evolved almost purely on a utilitarian based philosophy. 120 
Furthermore, the dominant view is that the trademark system is also founded on 
utilitarian perspectives.121 
 
The result is that non-utilitarian philosophical perspectives on intellectual 
property tend to be generally limited to the copyright system. This is indeed 
intuitive on the same grounds that the copyright/industrial property distinction 
is made, i.e. that the former are inherently the result of artistic and creative 
endeavours, while the latter are generally commercially oriented.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the copyright system is often used as a synecdoche for 
the broader classification of ‘copyright and related rights’. In order to present a 
basis for theoretical discussion of broadcasters’ rights (which is the focus of this 
research project), the following section discusses the distinction between 
‘primary copyright’ and related rights.    
 
The above discussion on the general taxonomy is presented in order to bring 
context to the main discussion of broadcasters’ rights. Firstly, it suggests that it is 
useful to examine such rights (and related rights in general) in the broader context 
of the copyright branch of the intellectual property system. Secondly, it establishes 
that although the patent system is a distinct branch, the copyright and patent 
systems are based on similar theoretical foundations, and hence insights from 
patent law may be useful for technical analysis of particular copyright issues.122 
Thirdly, it  establishes that insights from the third major branch of intellectual 
property – trademark law – may be of little relevance. 
 
                                                        
120 See Menell (2000). However, in contrast with this view, Oddin (1996) provides an interesting 
perspective on the application of natural rights theories to patent law. 
121  For discussions on the applicability of natural rights theory to trademark law, see Hughes 
(1988) and Port (1994). 
122 This is the partial basis for Chapters 5 and 6, which will aim to see how models of patent 
protection (as well as copyright protection) can be adapted to the subject matter of broadcasters’ 
rights.  
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[3]-4.2 Dichotomy of Copyright and Related Rights 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, an important theme running through the entirety of this 
manuscript is that there exists a strict dichotomy between copyright and related 
rights. In reality, many broadcasting organisations both licence works from third 
party media producers, and also produce their own content in-house. However in 
the latter case, this activity is carried out in the capacity as content producers 
themselves - in the scope of the discussion at hand, broadcasting shall hence solely 
refer to the act of content distribution.123 It is therefore important to understand 
that the two form sufficiently independent domains of property rights.  
 
For example, the existing policy framework for related rights provides that the 
existence of any related right does not undermine any existing copyright in the 
underlying work being performed, produced or broadcasted.124 Furthermore, the 
existence of a related right does not necessarily have to be predicated on any 
assumption that the underlying work being performed, produced, or broadcast 
was subject to copyright protection in the first instance.125 
 
 
[3]-5 RELATED RIGHTS AS A CONCEPT 
 
This section focuses on the concept of Related Rights as a specific branch of the 
intellectual property system. The purpose of this discussion is to arrive at the 
conclusion that broadcasters’ rights are indeed a unique form of IP which must be 
analysed specifically, and that even though it is considered a form of ‘related right’, 
that very concept has little theoretical coherence.  
 
 
[3]-5.1 Domain of Copyright and Related Rights 
 
Interesting insights can be gained from a preliminary review of the historical 
evolution of related rights (in the wider context of the historical evolution of 
copyright). 126 Generally, copyright law evolved in the framework of a somewhat 
                                                        
123 Even quasi-authoritative sources seem to conflate the concepts of copyright and related rights 
in relation to broadcasting organisations. For example, WIPO (2008) refers to the need to protect 
the rights of broadcasters in relation to ‘their own programs’ (paras 8.51 and 8.71). 
124 Article 1 of the Rome Convention (‘Safeguard of Copyright Proper’) states as follows: “Protection 
granted under this Convention shall leave intact and shall in no way affect the protection of copyright 
in literary and artistic works. Consequently, no provision of this Convention may be interpreted as 
prejudicing such protection.” 
125 For example, the Rome Convention states that “’performers’ means actors, singers, musicians, 
dancers, and other persons who act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in, or otherwise perform literary or 
artistic works”. However, further to the definitions set out in the Berne Convention, the term 
‘works’ includes literary and artistic productions that may or may not be protected by copyright. 
As such, a performer’s related right does not depend on any pre-existing copyright in the 
underlying work being performed. This notion has very important implications, as it extends 
protection to performers of works that are already in the public domain (such as traditional 
cultural expression and folklore). 
126 The historical background of related rights in the international intellectual property system 
was discussed in Chapter 2.  
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‘subject-matter-neutral’ paradigm – i.e. copyright protection was meant to be 
conferred upon various subject matter with fall within the general category of 
‘literary and artistic works’. Although international treaties (and in most cases 
national legislation) sometimes set out enumerated lists of copyright eligible 
subject matter, such listings are designed to be generally illustrative and non-
exclusive.127 However, changes in technology and cultural institutions over the 
years have led to an accumulation of case law and statutory amendments in many 
jurisdictions, to expand the domain of copyright eligible subject matter.128  
 
In some instances, case law has also contributed to policy frameworks that aim to 
resolve conflicts or overlaps between different forms of intellectual property; as 
noted in Chapter 1, the debate over the appropriate mode of protection for 
software is a primary example in this regard.129 Furthermore, case law and policy 
frameworks have also lead to particular developments in relation to gaps and 
tensions over specific subject matter relative to overall copyright system; the 
emergence of sui generis database rights is a primary example of such gaps.130 
 
Notwithstanding the peculiarities of a few special cases, it can be said that the 
international copyright system largely evolved in a somewhat subject-matter-
neutral paradigm, where the specifics of implementation of copyright policies in 
relation to specific economic sectors or subject matters have been left up to 
individual national legislatures.  
 
In contrast, the evolution of related rights seems to have been much more 
significantly concerned with individual sectoral and subject-matter-specific policy 
issues. This is certainly reflected in the fact that there exist three fundamentally 
discreet forms of related rights under the general rubric of related rights: (i) the 
rights of performers, (ii) the rights of producers, and (iii) the rights of 
broadcasting organisations.131  
 
It is interesting to note that these three classes of related rights are generally 
sector specific, unlike the case of copyright, which applies to a vast range of 
possible literary and artistic works. There are therefore conceivable 
circumstances in which market agents, who serve roles akin to those of related 
rights holders, are not beneficiaries of any form of intellectual property rights, as 
their interests are outside of the existing domain of the related rights system.  
 
                                                        
127 The Berne Convention states that “The expression ‘literary and artistic works’ shall include every 
production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its 
expression, such as…”, and proceeds with a non-exclusive and illustrative list of possible classes of 
works. 
128 For a discussion on this matter, see Boyle (2003). 
129 For a discussion on the debate between copyright and patent protection for software, see Hall 
(2003). 
130 Database rights, and more particularly, the relationship between database rights and copyright, 
are discussed in more detail in a subsequent section of this chapter.  
131 See WIPO (2008) paras 1.12 and 8.55. 
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For illustration, consider the case of works of architecture, which are subject to 
copyright protection.132 An architect may draft blueprints for a building project, 
but still needs the talents of construction professionals to execute the plan, and 
embody the work in a form that is perceptible by the general public. For such 
works of architecture, construction professionals indeed serve the role of market 
intermediaries, but do not benefit from any type of property right in the final 
produced work.  
 
Hence, ultimately, the domain of copyright protection can be said to be generally 
unbound, while the domain of related rights is strictly limited to three distinct and 
discrete classes (at least in terms of the international legal system). This can be 
taken as evidence of the fact that evolution of related rights was indeed driven by 
sector-specific interests. 
 
The following section explores the concepts of ‘market intermediaries’ and 
‘embodiment of works in perceptible forms’ more closely. 
 
 
[3]-5.2 Intermediary Market Agents 
 
In order to set out a meaningful analysis on how the various theories of intellectual 
property apply to the field of related rights, it is first necessary to focus on the role 
that thee three classes of related rights holders play in the copyright value chain. 
 
[3]-5.2.1 Expression and Fixation 
 
Arguments relating to the justification of related rights may be best analysed in 
context of the rights of performers of works. While such rights may be conferred 
in principle upon the performers of any class of works (whether copyright 
protected or not), in practical terms they generally relate to performers of musical, 
dramatic or audiovisual works. 
 
The most traditional form of copyright works is the case of literary works, and 
such works have historically and generally been used as the base case for 
analysing copyright arguments. However, literary works do not need an 
intermediary in order to be embodied in form that is communicable to the public; 
suffice it to say that is, that once a book is written, it is in a form that can be enjoyed 
by the public by mere virtue of the author’s fixation of their expressions.  
 
This contrasts sharply with the case of works that need to be communicated to the 
public in an auditory or visual format. For example, a playwright may draft a 
dramatic work that is subject to copyright protection by virtue of original 
authorship, but still needs the talents of actors to interpret the work and to 
embody it in a form that is communicable to the public. Such actors are hence the 
potential beneficiaries of performers’ rights; the same case holds for audiovisual 
works (such as film and television programmes). In the case of musical works, a 
                                                        
132 The illustrative list of classes of works set out in the definitions section of the Berne Convention 
includes works of architecture.   
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composer may not only need the talents of performers to embody the work in 
communicable form, but also in the case of fixation, the composer needs the 
capacity of a producer to facilitate the process of sound recording. In this case, 
related rights not only arise in the form of the hired musicians’ performers’ rights, 
but also in the related rights of the phonogram producer.  
 
The above examples are presented in order to establish an argument that in 
contrast with copyright law, the emergence and evolution of related rights has 
been driven by sector-specific and subject-matter specific interests, i.e. 
commercial and artistic interests in the performing and recording arts sectors 
(music, audiovisual, film and drama). In any instance, the underlying theme seems 
to be that the beneficiaries of the related rights are agents who facilitate the 
process of embodying the underlying work in a form that is ultimately perceptible 
and communicable to the public.133 
 
[3]-5.2.2 Distribution 
 
This above conception of related rights therefore provides for a very interesting 
benchmark to compare the case of broadcasting rights. Unlike performers and 
producers, broadcasters do not add value by facilitating the process of embodying 
a work in a communicable form; rather, they facilitate the distribution and 
dissemination to the public of works that are generally already embodied in 
communicable forms and subsequently fixed. As such, the position of a 
broadcaster within the creative economy is undoubtedly outside of the sphere of 
production, and inside of the sphere of distribution. It is therefore 
counterproductive to automatically accept that the arguments used to justify 
performers’ and producers’ rights – irrespective of theoretical and philosophical 
foundation – are equally applicable to the case of broadcasting organisations as 
beneficiaries of some form of related right.  
  
In this regard, a critical contextual aspect of this entire topic is the observation 
that unlike all other forms of intellectual property (which are generally concerned 
with economic issues of production), broadcasters’ rights are concerned with 
economic issues of distribution. Whether or not this distinction is consequential 
for the design of an optimal intellectual property system remains to be 
determined.  
 
As alluded to above, literary works traditionally form the default subject matter 
for traditional discussions on copyright policy. Furthermore, as stated above, 
literary works such as books do not necessarily require an intermediary agent 
                                                        
133  It is noted that a legitimate argument can be made that the copyright-holder’s work is 
perceptible to a particular sub-group of the general public once fixed in its primary form. For 
example, a composer’s work may be perceptible by a person with the ability to read and perceive 
sheet music, without the aid of actual musical performers to interpret the work in an auditory 
form. Likewise, the work of a playwright or screenwriter may be perceptible by a counterpart 
within their artistic field without the aid of performance interpretations by actors. However, by 
‘communicable to the public’, reference is made in this context to the wider public outside of a 
closed artistic community, whose ‘consumption’ is central to the notion of economic exploitation 
of a copyright protected work. 
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akin to a performer in order to embody the work in a form communicable to the 
public. However, like audio and audiovisual works, intermediaries in the 
distribution level of the supply chain still play an important role in the overall 
process of economic exploitation of copyright. As such, it is interesting to analyse 
the market characteristics that place distribution intermediaries in audiovisual 
markets in such particular circumstances.  
 
In this regard, it may be noted that very specific market institutions have evolved 
within various sectors of the creative industries in order to facilitate the process 
of distributing works once they have been produced. For example, book 
publishers play an important role in reaping the economies of scale that exist in 
physical reproduction (printing), marketing, and access to final consumer 
markets. Similarly, in the music industry, music publishers play an important role 
of serving as a market intermediary between composers and authors of works and 
potential users of the copyright (such as record labels who wish to licence the 
songs for performance and subsequent fixation via sound recording).  
 
However, while publishers play an intermediary role in these markets, such 
activities are facilitated through copyright-based market transactions rather than 
a unique form of intellectual property itself – i.e. through contract law and 
licencing agreements. 134  Furthermore, the role of publishers and publishing 
agreements as market institutions do not serve as an appropriate benchmark for 
analysing the role of broadcasters for two reasons. Firstly, publishers generally 
operate in different space in the economic value chain of copyright exploitation, 
as compared to broadcasters who strictly operate in the distribution sphere.135 
Secondly, the broadcasting market is such that very specific market 
characteristics and possible market failures prevail, which are instructive in 
analysing the basis for the existence of a unique form of intellectual property to 
protect the interests of broadcasting organisations. Therefore, while broadcasters 
are indeed market intermediaries, they form a special case that may require 
sector-specific policy tools. These market characteristics are discussed in Chapter 
4. 
 
                                                        
134 An interesting example is that of the notion of publisher’s rights in the music industry. It is 
established industry practice that an author or composer transfers partial copyright ownership to 
a publisher in exchange for the publisher’s administrative services and market access to licensing 
and distribution markets. Publishers are hence said to claim ‘publisher’s rights’ in addition to the 
copyright that is held by the original author/composer. However, ‘publishers’ rights’ do not 
generally exist as a distinct form of intellectual property in statute, and are merely a result of 
contractual agreements for joint-copyright ownership. This illustrates how in these sectors, 
market institutions have evolved to facilitate the economic exploitation of copyright without the 
creation of a new legally distinct form of intellectual property right.  
135 Publishers generally serve as a market intermediary between authors and potential licensees 
(who themselves then undertake some form of economic exploitation or distribution). In some 
cases, the publisher may serve the role of being the intermediary between the author and the final 
marketplace (e.g. in book publishing). Broadcasters however, strictly serve the role of being a 
distribution intermediary - i.e. an intermediary between rightsholders (which may be authors as 
well as publishers) and the final market place (‘consumers’ or end-users). In some instances, this 
relationship is even further intermediated by another market institution such as a collective 
copyright management organisation, whose role is to reap the economies of scale that exist in 
copyright administration. 
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[3]-5.3 Evolution of Related Rights 
 
Given the previous discussion on the closed domain of related rights, it is 
interesting to consider how these particular rights evolved in the first instance.136 
 
According to WIPO performers sought protection for their performances at the 
international level due to perceived erosion of their incomes from live 
performances due to increased popularity of recorded performances. 137  The 
perception was that they would be placed in the ‘awkward position’ of competing 
with their own recordings, and would not derive any secondary revenues from 
such usage. The development of neighbouring rights hence seems to have been a 
function of the creative industry’s response to technological changes.138 
 
Furthermore, producers sought protection due to similar technological trends. 
The recording industry used to depend partially on the concept of ‘needle-time’ – 
a fixed amount of use (usually hours per week) that may be made of a commercial 
recording for broadcasting purpose.139 The purpose of such was to limit the use of 
sound recordings in order to promote use of live performances. It appears that 
while these issues were open for debate, broadcasters were similarly able to lobby 
for protection of their commercial interests through property rights.  
 
The above observations are presented to support the proposition that the closed 
domain of related rights was driven by sector-specific interests, which contrasts 
sharply with the open domain of copyright. Such a proposition is intuitive from a 
public choice perspective given that the recording arts industry at the time may 
have had very strong lobbying power, unlike many other market intermediaries 
who may have had similar grounds for being included in the domain of related 
rights. Rather than adapt business models to changing technology, or submit to 
the process of ‘Schumpeterian Creative Destruction’, these interests were able to 
obtain new property rights to preserve their market presence.  
 
 
[3]-6 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RELATED RIGHTS 
 
The above sections have established a thematic context on the domain of 
copyright and related rights, and the role that related rightsholders play as 
intermediary market agents. With this context established, it is now possible to 
return to the question of applying the various theories of intellectual property to 
the domain of related rights. 
 
 
                                                        
136 This section only gives a brief discussion on the emergence of related rights, to support the idea 
that the closed domain of related rights has been driven by sector-specific interests. An overview 
of the relevant historical developments in the international copyright system was given in Chapter 
2. 
137 WIPO (2008), para. 8.53 
138 WIPO (2008), para 8.55 
139 WIPO (2008), para 8.63 
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[3]-6.1 Performers 
 
Generally, discussions on related rights tend to primarily focus on the rights of 
performers. Performers are agents who generally act as intermediaries between 
authors and audiences by interpreting and expressing works, ultimately 
facilitating the process of transforming a work into a medium which is 
communicable and perceptible by the public.   
 
In general, performers are natural persons whose artistic and creative inputs 
influence the ultimate expression of an underlying work. As such, to the extent 
that non-utilitarian theories are applicable to the copyright in general, they are 
certainly equally appealing in the case of performers’ rights. In other words, a 
performer’s performance can be seen as an intimate expression of personhood, 
creativity, and/or labour, hence giving rise to moral entitlement to some form of 
ownership in the tradition of classical philosophical views on property and natural 
rights (natural rights theory). 
 
However, consideration must be made for the extent to which a performer’s own 
talents and interpretations are manifested in a particular performance. On one 
hand, a performer may be bound by strict boundaries in terms of the instructions 
set out by the original work. In such a case, a performer may merely be a technical 
agent who gives literal expression to an underlying work.140 On the other hand, a 
performer’s expression of a work may involve considerable interpretation and 
unique creative talent, such that performances by different performers exhibit 
substantive variances. There are therefore varying degrees to which a 
performance can be deemed as intimately linked with the concept of personhood 
hence giving rise to a natural right. Clearly, which case applies would depend on 
the class of the work, the nature of the work, and the approach of the individual 
performer. 141  In the case of performances that exhibit a very high degree of 
creativity (and hence personhood), a performer may even theoretically have 
grounds to claim that the performance is sufficiently transformative to constitute 
a derivative work, which is in itself copyright eligible. 142  In this case, such 
transformative performances may justify property rights on the same basis as the 
concept of originality in general copyright. Performers rights in this regard, can 
even be considered as a weak form of ‘pseudo-copyright’.   
 
The case of extending utilitarian theory from copyright to performers rights is 
hence nuanced. In order to explore the incentives of performers, it is useful to 
distinguish between performers who are hired by creators, and performers that 
                                                        
140  This would likely be the case of the construction worker giving expression to a work of 
architecture as previously discussed. 
141 For example, a lead actor in a cinematographic work will likely enjoy more creative scope and 
hence potential to manifest personhood, than a triangle player in an orchestra playing a 
composition in which the triangle has a very minor role.  
142 Article 2(3) of the Berne Convention states that “Translations, adaptations, arrangements of 
music and other alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as original works without 
prejudice to the copyright in the original work”. Such works are commonly known as ‘derivative 
works’.  
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perform for their own purposes (or are coordinated by agents other than 
creators). 
 
[3]-6.1.1 Performers hired by creators 
 
It is intuitive to understand how property rights serve to incentivise creators to 
produce literary and artistic works. However, this may contrast with other 
incentive systems, such as direct payments. In this regard, we may consider the 
concept of ‘work for hire’ in which a creator is engaged by another party to create 
a work, and exchanges rights in the produced work for a fixed payment. This is the 
principle that underscores much of the creative endeavours that takes place in the 
modern activities, where creators produce works in the course of their 
employment, resulting in copyright ownership being vested in their respective 
employers.  
 
In evaluating how utilitarian theory may apply to the case of performers, we 
therefore need to consider these agents’ motivations, incentives and relationships 
with copyright owners. As previously noted, traditionally, performers are seen as 
market agents who facilitate the creative endeavours of copyright holders. In this 
regard, the typical motivating factor for performers can be seen as akin to a ‘work 
for hire’ model, where one-time fixed payments are the dominant method of 
compensation, as opposed to property rights (which are assets that can 
potentially generate future earnings). As such, granting such performers a 
property right over their performances may have little effect on incentive 
structures, as these property rights may be transferred to the copyright holders 
who hired them as is the case for work-for-hire agreements in copyright. It is 
however noted this in theory does represent an exaggerated case (where the 
performer has an almost absolute preference for immediate payment over 
property rights).  
 
The actual case may however not actually be that far from this extreme example. 
This proposition is supported by the observation that related rights are a much 
more modern concept than general copyright, and market institutions to facilitate 
economic exploitation are significantly underdeveloped (if existing at all), as 
compared with those that have evolved over time in the sphere of copyright. The 
main institutions referred to here are collective copyright management 
organisations that evolved to minimise the transaction costs that prevail between 
diffused groups of rights-owners and rights-users. In the case of copyright, 
particular for public performances of musical works, there are strong 
international networks that facilitate the collection and distribution of copyright-
derived royalties. For performers’ rights however, these networks are generally 
not as developed.143 
                                                        
143  This development gap between networks for collective administration for copyright and 
related rights is supported by two observations. Firstly, related rights are generally subject to a 
much lower extent of international harmonisation than copyright – this is evidenced by the fact 
there are currently 168 Contracting Parties to the Berne Convention, but only 92 to the Rome 
Convention. In many jurisdictions, the collection of related rights is delegated to the collection 
agency for copyright (see Ficsor, 2002). Furthermore, the dynamics of related right exploitation 
depends both on national legislation (which is more divergent than copyright) and specific market 
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The above point on (a lack of market institutions to maximise the potential for 
exploiting performers’ rights) is further stressed by the observation that complete 
transfer of rights is still a very common form of contractual agreement between 
performers and the agents that employ their services.144 The result in economic 
terms, is that the ‘elasticity of supply of performances with respect to the scope of 
protection offered’ (for performers), is intuitively lower than the corresponding 
elasticity of supply of creative works (for copyright owner). While there is no way 
to empirically test this hypothesis coherently, if the intuition is true, it implies that 
utilitarian perspectives may actually have limited application to performers’ 
rights. 
 
Based on the above discussion, it would appear that non-utilitarian theories seem 
to be a more appealing basis to explain the evolution of related rights. 145  
Interestingly however, this statement seems to be at odds with factual accounts of 
the arguments that led to the introduction of performers’ rights, as previously 
noted. This is possibly because the interests that historically lobbied for 
performers’ rights were performers of works generally in the public domain, 
rather than performers hired by composers for the purpose of fixation of new 
works.  
 
[3]-6.1.2 Self-employed Performers 
 
The above discussion focussed on performers who are hired by creators to bring 
expression to their works. However traditionally, many performers perform 
works on their own accord – often works from the public domain. This was 
particularly the case for musicians before proliferation of recorded music 
platforms. For example, consider the performers in an orchestra playing works of 
classical composers whose compositions have long entered into the public 
domain.  
 
These types of performers more fit the template of those whose interests were 
described in the previous section on the evolution of related rights. Furthermore, 
it is recalled that the arguments put forward by such performers was that 
recording and distribution technology was possibly eroding income streams from 
live performances. As such, performers’ rights secure these income streams by 
allowing performers to control fixation and subsequent distribution of the 
performances. This hence increases the incentives of performers to perform 
works, by securing their ability to capture the value they create. 
 
It is interesting to now consider how these increased incentives for performers 
interact with the incentives for creators (i.e. authors and composers). It can be 
                                                        
characteristics. As a result, not all forms of related-right holders rely on collective management 
systems (EC-SWD, 2012). 
144 See EC-SWD (2012) generally, as well as Sand (2012) for the case of the audiovisual sector. 
145 It is useful to recall the deconstructionist view (discussed in Section 2.2), which suggests even 
where natural rights may be argued to exist, such rights may be unconstructive in terms of artistic 
critique implications.  
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considered that to some extent, the technical skill-sets of performers and creators 
overlap; however, the extent of this overlap would certainly vary between creative 
fields.146 This overlap can be interpreted as the performer’s ‘cross-elasticity of 
supply’ between the alternative activities of performance of and creation of works. 
When incentives for one activity increase (e.g. by granting performance rights), 
the propensity to engage in that activity increases, and the propensity to engage 
in the alternative activity (i.e. create new works) decreases.  Depending on how 
this cross-elasticity works in practice, the overall creation and performance of 
total works might either increase or decrease. The result is a conundrum whose 
interpretation is uncertain, and depends on ideological interpretations of the 
goals of the copyright system; i.e. ‘…how should the copyright system seek to 
balance the apparently conflicting goals of incentivising distribution of existing 
works, and creation of new works?’ 
 
 
[3]-6.2 Producers 
 
The case of producers of phonograms follows much of the same logic as the case 
of performers set out above. However, there is one key difference – producers do 
not serve a creative role in their capacity as a market intermediary.147 Rather, they 
facilitate the technical process of fixation of performances in sound recordings.148  
 
As such, there is little appeal for non-utilitarian arguments (particularly the 
personhood variant thereof) in the case of producers of phonograms, as their 
contribution to the copyright value chain is purely technical and not expressive in 
nature.  
 
However, as is the case of performers, the role of the producer was traditionally 
one whose services were part of a more complex commercial relationship. Unlike 
performers who may not or may not have significant bargaining power relative to 
the agents who hire them, producers are normally agents of large institutional 
players such as record labels. This position, combined with the historical trend of 
oligopolistic structures in major sound recording markets suggests that 
phonograph producers may have generally had greater bargaining power than 
                                                        
146 For example, music composers and music performers may both have the similar skillset of 
being able to read and interpret sheet music. However, actors may not necessarily have the skills 
to author a screenplay. 
147 This term ‘producer’ often creates confusion due its different connotation depending on the 
context and industry being discussed. In this regard, it may be useful to make an informal 
distinction between ‘executive producer’ and ‘creative producer’. An executive producer is the 
agent who facilitates the logistical and business arrangements for sound recordings, while a 
creative producer assists performers in the process of artistic interpretation and performance. For 
the purposes of related rights, beneficiaries are ‘executive producers’. On the other hand, if a 
creative producer’s inputs are substantial, they may have actual stake in the copyright of particular 
version of the recorded work (which is distinct from copyright in the underlying work being 
performed). The Rome Convention states that “’producer of phonograms’ means the person who, or 
the legal entity which, first fixes the sounds of a performance or other sound”. 
148 The discussion here is limited to producers of phonograms (music), as such rights are provided 
for in international intellectual property law. In practice, many jurisdictions also provide for 
related rights for film producers.  
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copyright owners and performers (at least during period when related rights 
came into being as distinct legal concepts). Furthermore, the dominant 
contractual practice in the music industry has always been one where record 
labels assert copyright ownership over sound recordings through ‘work-for-hire’ 
clauses in the agreements made with both copyright owners and performers. As 
such, there is little intuitive appeal to suggest that even a utilitarian approach is 
applicable, in terms of a need to create distinct incentives for the activities of 
phonogram producers.  
 
Producers’ rights hence seem to have evolved as a mechanism for owners of sound 
recordings to secure increased rents in music distribution markets.  
 
 
[3]-6.3 Broadcasters 
 
Applying perspectives of intellectual property theory to broadcasters’ rights – the 
form of related rights on which is the focus of this manuscript – largely leads to a 
line of reasoning which is the same as the case of producers discussed above.  
 
Broadcasters, like producers, serve a strictly technical role in copyright 
exploitation, and do not add value in any artistic or creative capacity. Therefore, 
there is little appeal for application of natural rights theories. As alluded to above, 
producers are often agents of larger commercial institutions, and hence the 
producer may not necessarily be  conceived as a natural person. However, in the 
case of broadcasters, it is certain that the beneficiary of the related right is a legal 
entity and not a natural person. This observation strengthens the argument that 
natural rights (or at least personhood) theories are not applicable to the case of 
broadcasters’ rights.  
 
As such, utilitarian theory is certainly the appropriate frame in which 
broadcaster’s rights should be analysed. This is grounded on the fact that there 
are unique market characteristics that define the broadcasting sector, which lead 
to certain market failures, and the supposed need for incentives. These specific 
market characteristics are discussed in Chapter 4.   
 
 
[3]-7 CHANNELLING AMONG MODES  
 
The above sections aimed to discuss how related rights in general connect with 
the overall intellectual property system, in terms of theoretical perspectives, 
taxonomy, and the role of the market agents. To further the analysis, and in order 
to contextualise the position in which broadcasters’ rights sit within the broader 
framework of the intellectual property system, it is useful to analyse the 
interrelationships between various form of rights, and the general functioning of 
the system as a whole. 
 
Menell (2000) states that “…the overall efficacy of the intellectual property 
protection regime depends significantly upon the ability of the system to properly 
channel innovation among the various modes”. In this regard, Menell identifies four 
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doctrines that developed to ensure that the overall system functions coherently: 
(i) election, (ii) functionality, (iii) pre-emption, and (iv) misuse.  
 
Analysing how these doctrines apply to the rights of broadcasting organisations 
can help in building an understanding of the theoretical bases of such rights, and 
their functioning within the wider intellectual property system. 
 
 
[3]-7.1 Doctrine of Election 
 
The doctrine of election suggests that creators actively make a choice of the 
preferred form of intellectual property pursuant to their particular objectives. 
This notion is generally mostly applicable to fact that in the field of innovation, 
patent protection and trade secret protection are two mutually exclusive options 
for inventors.149  
 
In the case of broadcasting organisations (or more generally copyright as a 
whole), there is generally no alterative choice of property rights.150 As protection 
is automatic, there is no election on the part of the rightsholder. However it is duly 
noted that this statement does not consider the possible interrelationships 
between copyright and other legal instruments outside of the intellectual property 
system, such as particular doctrines of unfair competition law.151  
 
This lack of applicable alternatives is particularly the case when one considers the 
notion of broadcasting rights in isolation from the underlying copyright in the 
works being broadcast. As such, the doctrine of election has very limited 
applicability to the subject matter under analysis. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, it is possible to conceive of a possible relationship 
with the subject matter of broadcasters’ rights, and copyright in compilations, or 
even the form of intellectual property known as ‘database rights’ (which are 
related to, but distinct from copyright). Article 2(5) of the Berne convention 
provides for protection of collections that express some element of originality by 
virtue of selection and arrangement.152 However, several jurisdictions go further 
                                                        
149 See Freidman, Landes, and Posner (1991) 
150 This is not to say however that there is no overlap between copyright and other forms of 
intellectual property. For example, there exist possible circumstances where a particular subject 
matter may be subject to both copyright and trademark protection, though the scope of applicable 
rights may diverge.  
151 Notwithstanding this comment, it is noted that many accounts of the international development 
of intellectual property law, include unfair competition as a mechanism inside of the industrial 
property regime. This is mainly due to the inclusion of protection from unfair competition in 
Article 10bis(2) of the Paris Convention.  
152  Berne Article 2(5) states as follows: “Collections of literary or artistic works such as 
encyclopaedias and anthologies which, by reason of the selection and arrangement of their contents, 
constitute intellectual creations shall be protected as such, without prejudice to the copyright in each 
of the works forming part of such collections.” 
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by providing for sui generis153 rights for databases, which would not otherwise 
meet the originality criteria to qualify for standard copyright protection as 
collections or compilations. Database rights can be generally considered as 
particularly strong in Europe, and are provided for via the EU ‘Database 
Directive’.154 
 
The first objective of the Database Directive is to harmonise the originality 
standard to applied for copyright to apply.155 Secondly, the Directive provides for 
sui generis rights for databases that may not otherwise meet the originality criteria 
for copyright. The applicable standard for sui generis protection directly relates to 
the investment made in creating the database.156 As such, the applicable standards 
for database copyright and sui generis rights are fundamentally different, as the 
former applies a standard based on a notion of creativity (an application of the 
originality doctrine in copyright general), while the latter is based purely on 
economic considerations.157  
 
It is therefore conceivable that broadcasters’ interests may be protected, if their 
broadcasts are considered as eligible for either database copyright, or sui generis 
database protection. This is based on the fact that an essential market activity of 
broadcasters is the ‘bundling’ of content into a package (usually with some 
coherent theme or dedicated demographic target) 158 . Hence, broadcasting 
schedules are essentially actually databases of elements that are selected and 
arranged by the broadcasting organisation, where said elements are themselves 
works (that may or may not enjoy independent copyright protection). The 
question then arises as to whether a particular broadcasting schedule meets the 
originality criteria to constitute a copyright protectable compilation, or 
                                                        
153 ‘Sui Generis’ is a Latin term meaning ‘of its own kind’ and implies that something has its own 
unique characteristics. In the context of intellectual property law, the term is used to describe 
forms of rights that do not fit within the traditional branches of copyright, patent and trademark, 
and hence constitute a unique and narrow class of intellectual property in themselves.  
154 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union of 11 
March 1996 on the legal protection of databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77/20). 
155 This is done via Article 3, which reflects almost identical language to Berne Article 2(5) – i.e. the 
standard to qualify for copyright protection relates to works that are intellectual creations by 
virtue of selection and arrangement. However, the Article explicitly provides that no other 
eligibility criteria may be applied, hence preventing any possible heightening of legal standard for 
originality.   
156 Article 7 provides that Member States must provide for a property right in a database, where 
“…there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, 
verification or presentation of the contents to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole 
or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that 
database”. 
157 Paragraph 6 of the Preamble of the Database Directive partially justifies the need for sui generis 
database rights based on the un-harmonised nature of legislation and prevailing case law in unfair 
competition amongst EU Member States. Interestingly, this again reiterates the possibility of 
overlaps between the intellectual property system and the unfair competition system as alluded 
to above.  
158 This notion of content bundling is discussed in further detail in Chapter 4. 
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alternatively meets the economic criteria to attract possible sui generis database 
protection (in jurisdictions where such a right does exist).159  
 
While this will certainly depend on the particular schedule under consideration, it 
does suggest that there may indeed be some applicability of the concept of election 
to the subject matter of broadcasting. However, this will still not be a true 
application of the election doctrine, as the choice between alternative forms of 
rights is not opt-in in nature (as is the case for patent and trade secret protection) 
where the options to the beneficiary are mutually exclusive. Rather, the various 
forms of rights would be conferred on automatically by virtue of the very nature 
of copyright law, and its institutionalised lack of formalities. The implications of 
the lack of formalities in copyright law are discussed below in the commentary on 
the doctrine of functionality. 
 
In any instance however, any right over broadcasting schedules would relate to 
subject matter which is distinctly separate from the technical broadcast signal 
transmission itself, and hence such a right would not be a true form of the doctrine 
of election. 
 
[3]-7.2 Doctrine of Functionality 
 
The doctrine of functionality refers to the principle that functional elements of 
innovations or creative works should not be subject to property rights. According 
to Menell (2000), “Functionality doctrines serve to ensure that the exacting 
standards of patent law are not undermined by the bestowing of effective protection 
for the functional features of a work through other, less exacting, forms of 
intellectual property protection.”  
 
This is somewhat embodied in the principle of novelty and non-obviousness in 
patent law 160 . The novelty criterion precludes from patent protection, any 
innovation that is understood to already be disclosed to the public (i.e. forms part 
of the ‘prior art’ of the relevant technological field). The non-obvious criterion 
further precludes from protection, any innovation that would be obvious to a 
‘person skilled in the art’ of the relevant technological field. In the field of 
trademark law, prohibitions on registration of ‘generic’ trademarks can also be 
seen as an application of the doctrine of functionality. Furthermore, in trademark 
law, the ‘doctrine of functionally’ refers to the principle that functional elements 
(characteristic elements of products not specifically used to identify a particular 
producer) cannot be subject to trademark protection.  
 
                                                        
159 Copyright ownership over programme schedules was a central premise of the famous ‘Magil’ 
Case (Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd. (ITP), appellants, v. 
Commission of the European Communities; Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P). 
 
160 There are typically three criteria for patent protection: (i) novelty, (ii) non-obviousness (or 
‘inventive step’), and (iii) utility (or in some jurisdictions – ‘industrial application’). Patent 
applications are evaluated by national patent authorities to determine whether an 
invention/innovation meets these three criteria, assuming that the invention/innovation belongs 
to the domain of patentable subject matter in the first instance.  
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In the field of copyright law, the functionality doctrine is embodied in the concept 
of an ‘originality threshold’ for copyright eligibility. Furthermore, Landes and 
Posner (1989) note that the idea-expression dichotomy excludes functions 
features from protection under copyright law. 161  Additionally, there are also 
various doctrines in copyright law, such as the  ‘scènes à faire doctrine’, which are 
less harmonised and institutionalised, but still serve a role in applying the wider 
principle of functionality.162  
 
The main purpose of these various embodiments of the functionality doctrine is 
to achieve the goals that are at the heart of the intellectual property system – to 
strike a balance between the competing interests of the general public and 
creators. In this regard, the functionality doctrine serves to ensure that only those 
elements that are deserving of protection are subject to private property rights. 
This ensures that the public has access to a commons in the form of a public 
domain that is rich enough to facilitate further creative activity without undue 
restrictions from unjustified property rights over functional elements or abstract 
ideas.  
 
As alluded to above, functionality is hence generally embodied in ‘eligibility 
criteria’ that govern the application of the relevant form of intellectual property 
right. Such eligibility criteria are however only one element of the structure of 
intellectual property law which serves to balance the goals of the intellectual 
property system. Other elements include defined domains of protectable subject 
matter (or rather un-protectable subject matter), statutory exemptions and 
limitations to property rights, and an appropriate scope of protection.163 
 
In terms of the field of copyright and related rights in general, protection is 
automatic (i.e. property rights are conferred without any formalities or 
administrative registration), which is a sharp contrast with the case of patent and 
trademark rights.164 This is certainly also the case with broadcasters’ rights, which 
are generally conferred on broadcasting organisations by mere virtue of 
transmission.  
 
However, it is not to say that copyright protection is devoid of eligibility criteria. 
Indeed, as alluded to above, copyright eligibility is conditioned by various 
embodiments of the functionality doctrine, and in particular there are often 
                                                        
161 The ‘idea-expression dichotomy/divide’ is a central pillar of copyright law. It provides that 
abstract ideas cannot be subject to copyright protection, and that protection is limited to only 
specific expressions of such ideas. 
162  The ‘scènes à faire doctrine’’ refers to the principle that elements which are necessary of 
customary for expressions in a particular genre are not subject to copyright protection.  For 
discussion on the scènes à faire doctrine’, see Maxwell, Bolger and Zeggane (2009). Also worthy of 
note is the more stringent (though controversial) ‘merger doctrine’, which stipulates that where 
an idea can only be expressed in one particular expression (i.e. the idea and expression are 
‘merged’), that expression is not copyright eligible. 
163 The concept of ‘scope of protection’ generally refers to a combination of ‘length of protection’ 
and ‘breadth of protection’. These concepts are explored in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6.  
164 Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention states that for copyright, “The enjoyment and the exercise 
of these rights shall not be subject to any formality;…” 
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complex legal tests employed to determine whether a particular work meets a 
respective ‘threshold of originality’.  
 
Interestingly, while this notion of ‘originality as a fundamental aspect of eligibility 
criteria’ is central to general copyright law, it appears not to extend to broadcast 
signals as unique subject matter. This is because, as stated above, broadcasting 
organisations enjoy protection of their broadcasts by virtue of the mere technical 
act of transmission, without any application of de facto eligibility criteria.  
 
The result is therefore that there is no form of filter akin to an originality threshold 
or idea-expression dichotomy that prevents some broadcasts from being 
protected pursuant to balancing the goals of the intellectual property system. As 
such, it appears that broadcasters’ rights hold a very unique place in the overall 
intellectual property landscape, as it is perhaps the only form of right in which 
there is no explicit and coherent application of the doctrine of functionality.  
 
More interestingly, the question arises as to whether the concept of functionality 
even exists at all in relation to broadcast signals, i.e. whether the subject matter 
contains functional elements in the first place. This is likely not the case as 
broadcasting signals are technical manifestations, and do not necessarily draw on 
any elements of an ‘information commons’. However, it certainly is the case that 
underlying copyright protected works, and possibly even database protected 
programming schedules do draw on some ‘information commons’, and hence 
exhibit functionality.    
 
Further evidence of a lack of functionality, and an implication of the lack of 
eligibility criteria, is that it is completely possible to consider a situation where a 
broadcast schedule is independently replicable by two different broadcasting 
organisations.165 This is possible since a second party broadcaster can in principle 
acquire the exact same broadcasting rights for all of the copyright protected works 
in the programme schedule of the first broadcaster, and hence independently 
replicate the initial transmission without infringing on the related rights of the 
initial broadcaster.  
 
The above comment on the possibility of independent replication underscores a 
fundamental premise – the object of protection in the case of broadcasters’ rights 
is the broadcasting signal transmission itself, and not the embedded schedule of 
programming or audiovisual works (which may or may not be subject to standard 
copyright protection themselves).  
 
For the sake of discussion, it is interesting to continue consideration of the 
interface with database rights as presented in the preceding section on the 
election doctrine. If a broadcasting organisation is able to meet the applicable 
criteria for database protection (whether in the form of copyright or a sui generis 
right), such protection will cover the schedule of programming as opposed to the 
                                                        
165 The concept of ‘independent replication’, and its relevance to copyright and patent law are 
analyzed in further detail in Chapter 6’s discussion on the various elements under the notion of 
‘breadth of protection’.  
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technical signal transmission itself. In fact, the existence of such eligibility criteria 
suggests that the doctrine of functionality is indeed strongly present in the case of 
database rights. Once again, it is important to conceive that the technical 
transmission therefore forms a distinct subject matter area, separate from the 
embedded schedule, which is in itself a (possible) compilation of independent 
works.  
 
The above commentary on the application of functionality doctrine (or lack 
thereof), as well as the elaboration on the theme that signal transmissions, 
programming schedules, and embedded audiovisual works all form distinct 
subject matter (which are subject to distinct forms of IP rights), establishes an 
important conclusion.. This is that unlike policy basis for other forms of 
intellectual property, broadcasters’ rights seem to fundamentally be a technical 
solution to a technical problem.166  
 
 
[3]-7.3 Pre-Emption  
 
Pre-emption is a construct of US constitutional law that provides for the 
supremacy of federal law over State law.167 Similarly, it is also reflected in the 
principle of ‘supremacy’ in EU law. This doctrine is hence of little relevance to the 
discussion at hand.168 
 
 
[3]-7.4 Misuse  
 
The essence of the misuse doctrine is that there is often a need to balance the 
outcomes of intellectual property law (which is based on notions of temporary 
market power as forms of incentives), with the outcomes of antitrust law (which 
is based on notions of preventing restrictions of open competition and the 
regulation of monopoly power). There is certainly a large body of literature on the 
interface between intellectual property and competition law, and this issue has 
indeed attracted significant recent attention from both academics and 
policymakers.169 
 
Generally, antitrust concerns in intellectual property are based on the licencing 
practices adopted by rights holders – this is the case for both copyright and patent 
law. Hence, misuse doctrines are particularly applicable where the IP right is not 
an output which is consumed by the final market itself, but is an input into some 
other productive process for another producer/firm.  An analysis of how doctrines 
of misuse apply to the case of broadcasters’ rights must be hence contextualised 
                                                        
166 The technical problem referred to here is the public good problem that arises in the case of 
broadcasting markets. This issue is discussed in Chapter 4.  
167 See Article 6, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (the ‘Supremacy Clause’). 
168  This is not relevant because the research framework of this manuscript is meant to be 
theoretical and generally ‘jurisdiction neutral’. 
169 For a general overview of the interface between intellectual property and competition law, see 
Gilbert and Shapio (1997) or Kallay (2004). 
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by the market structures and licencing practices that define broadcasting value 
chains.  
 
Antitrust concerns may hence arise where a broadcast signal is used by another 
commercial entity, at a downstream position in the value chain of copyright 
exploitation. The most typical instance of such an entity would be a 
communications service operator, who engages in retransmission of the original 
broadcaster’s signal.170 While broadcasters essentially bundle content licenced 
from various sources into a single programming schedule, retransmitters 
generally bundle various broadcasting channels (each with its own respective 
programming schedule) into a multi-channel service package.  
 
Competition issues may hence arise where a communications market is 
characterised by a high degree of vertical integration and concentrated market 
power. If such characteristics prevail, a broadcaster whose transmissions are in 
high demand may engage in anti-competitive licencing agreements and provide 
preferential treatment to an affiliated communications network operator and 
retransmitter.  
 
It is useful to briefly note here that concerns over such market power issues in 
terms of broadcasters’ rights are somewhat diluted by the popularity of policy 
tools such as must-carry provisions in broadcast regulation.171  Furthermore, it is 
necessary to consider that such provisions exist within a wider set of policy tools 
leveraged by broadcast regulators. One such tool is the regulation of media 
ownership, which is based on fundamentally different policy concerns than 
general competition law. In this regard, policy goals in media markets are not 
solely economic, and include issues such as promotion of freedom of the press, 
cultural diversity, plurality of information sources, and democratic 
participation172. As such, it would be disingenuous to say that regulation of media 
ownership is a manifestation of misuse doctrine in intellectual property law. 
 
Returning to the analysis of licencing practices, the fundamental principles of 
competition regulation that apply to intellectual property law in general would 
generally equally apply to the case of broadcasters’ rights. As such, the doctrine of 
misuse does not necessarily have any unique application or mechanism in this 
case. Rather, it is a notion that refers to the interface between the entire body of 
intellectual property law and the body of competition/antitrust law, as opposed 
to a doctrine that facilitates coherence within the body of intellectual property law 
itself. 
                                                        
170 The entire Part IV of this manuscript (Chapters 9-11) is dedicated to discussing issues relating 
to retransmission activities. 
171 These provisions are discussed and analyzed in Chapter 10.  
172  Media ownership regulation and the various policy goals in the broadcasting sector are 
discussed in Chapter 4. It is important to draw a distinction between competition issues where 
broadcasters are harmed, and competition issues arising from the behaviour of broadcasters that 
harm others. In this regard, the doctrine of misuse deals only with the latter in relation to the 
exploitation of intellectual property rights.  
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[3]-8 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter aimed at establishing a legal context for the theoretical bases of 
broadcasters’ rights. It gave an account of the major theories of intellectual 
property, and the overall taxonomy of the system. It then sought to see how these 
theories apply to the field of related rights, and the related rights of broadcasting 
organisations in particular. Lastly, it summarised key doctrines which bring 
coherence to the larger IPR system itself, and discussed how these doctrines apply 
to broadcasters’ rights. 
 
These discussions can be summarised in a few key thematic points. Firstly, the 
nature and structure of broadcasters’ rights suggest that it is appropriate to adopt 
a strictly utilitarian perspective for analysis. Broadcasters, as purely commercial 
and/or corporate entities, do not engage in activities that invoke notions of 
classical natural rights. 
 
Furthermore, broadcasters serve a capacity as market intermediaries for the 
distribution of content, and unlike various other forms of intellectual property, 
such rights are designed to facilitate distribution rather that production (or 
expression) activities. Additionally, broadcasters’ rights can be seen as evolving 
from sector specific interests, and hence belong to the closed domain of related 
rights, as opposed to the relatively unbound domain of copyright.  
 
In fact, the discussions in this chapter stress that broadcasters’ rights are indeed 
a very unique IP subject matter area in general, and have little in common with 
other forms of related rights. As such, in attempting to distil the theoretical bases 
for broadcasters’ rights, very little can be gained by looking towards the existing 
bases of the other branches of the IPR system.  
 
Lastly, unlike almost all other forms of intellectual property, there appears to be 
no application of the doctrine of functionality for broadcasters’ rights. These 
observations all underscore the notion that broadcasters’ rights are a technical 
solution to a technical problem. This technical problem arises out of the unique 
market characteristics of the broadcasting sector, and is discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
In any instance, what is clear from this analysis is that the concept of broadcasters’ 
rights certainly does occupy a unique space within the wider intellectual property 
system, though its place does seem generally incongruous. Generally, the 
purported functions of broadcasters’ related rights as mechanisms to reward 
investment and prevent piracy seem to sit oddly in the context of the wider 
intellectual property system.  
 
The most similar parallel between broadcasters’ rights and any other form of IPR 
is with certain forms of database rights (particularly those not subject to 
copyright-eligibility). Such database rights and broadcasters’ rights do share a 
common foundation – they are justified in terms of a rationale to incentive 
investment (a purely welfare-based/utilitarian consideration) in subject matter 
on the periphery of the copyright system. As such, it would seem to make more 
sense to view broadcasters’ rights as a form of sui generis right (as is the case for 
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database rights), as opposed to a related right. In this regard, it must be stressed 
that sui generis rights by their very nature are constructed as anomalies of the 
intellectual property system, rather than manifestations of its core principles.  
 
In the case of both broadcasters’ and database rights, the question is whether such 
rights, are the best means to incentivise the activity in question. In other words, 
the issue is whether these rights are the policy option which solves the public good 
problem of underproduction with the least social cost.  
 
The next chapter - Chapter 4 - discusses some of the characteristics of 
broadcasting markets, and notes that there are several existing solutions which 
promote the provision of broadcasting services, even without private property 
rights. Furthermore, that chapter will set out various characteristics of 
broadcasting markets which suggest that if content distribution is restricted 
through private property rights, this can have high social costs.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE ECONOMICS OF BROADCASTING MARKETS 
 
Chapter 4 is the second component of Part II of this manuscript. While Chapter 3 
focussed on legal theories of intellectual property and how they apply to the 
related rights of broadcasters, this chapter focuses on the economic context of 
broadcasting markets themselves. It focuses on the various market characteristics 
– and market failures – which supposedly characterise the broadcasting sector, 
and aims at framing how intellectual property rights interface with this context. 
In this regard, the underlying research question in this Chapter is “What are the 
key features of the markets in which the related rights of broadcasting organisations 
exist?” 
 
 
[4]-1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Wireless broadcasting revolutionised the way in which information was 
disseminated to the public in the early 20th century, and was instrumental in the 
development of various modern social and cultural institutions. As such, the 
broadcasting sector also sits in a very important position within the framework of 
the overall creative economy, serving an important role as a supply chain 
intermediary between producers of creative works and end-users. 
 
Media markets are generally defined by complicated value chains where 
intermediaries are needed to facilitate the distribution of content between 
producers and consumers. Commercial broadcasting organisations are such 
supply intermediaries, which may generally either be based on (i) advertising 
revenues (two-sided markets), or (ii) subscription revenues; in television 
markets, traditional terrestrial channels and cable television channels 
respectively would exemplify this.173 
 
In the case of non-terrestrial broadcasting, it is important to make a distinction 
between the network operator and the broadcaster. The former represents the 
service provider who owns transmission infrastructure (or leases infrastructure 
from an upstream communications firm). The broadcaster on the other hand 
engages in the activity of ‘bundling’ audiovisual content into a single programming 
schedule for transmission (i.e. a broadcasting channel), while a subscription 
service provider ‘bundles’ several broadcasting channels into a single service 
package which is offered to consumers (end-users). 
 
In order to answer the underlying research question regarding the economic 
context of broadcasting markets, this chapter is divided in to three main sections. 
Firstly, a discussion is presented on the various market characteristics of the 
broadcasting sector, and its associated market failures and public policy goals. 
                                                        
173 This is not to say that these two financing models are exclusive – they merely represent the 
typical business models employed in the commercial broadcasting sector. Alternative business 
models may include support through public financing, with or without supplementary revenues 
from commercial sources (advertising or subscription revenues). The notion of public financing is 
central to the concept of Public Broadcasting Service, which is discussed later in this chapter. 
86 
Secondly, a discussion is presented on the role of intellectual property as a policy 
tool to address public good market failures. Thirdly, a short analysis is undertaken 
on the types of content distributed by broadcasting transmissions, and how they 
interface with the incentives created by the copyright and related rights system.  
 
 
[4]-2 PUBLIC POLICY GOALS AND MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 
 
The following section focuses of the key policy and market characteristic of the 
broadcasting sector in general. 
 
[4]-2.1 Broadcast Regulation and Public Policy 
 
In order to provide context to the discussion, it is useful here to recognise the 
various public policy goals that the broadcasting sector is meant to achieve. In 
general, communications sectors have been historically subject to a higher degree 
of regulatory oversight than other industries.174 Generally, regulatory issues in the 
broadcasting sector may be divided into economic issues (competition related) 
and non-economic issues (public policy).175 Non-Economic issues can be further 
separated into issues relating to content and access.  
 
In all spheres of economic activity, policymakers seek to facilitate market 
institutions that provide consumers with a wide range of high quality goods (or in 
this case services), at competitively efficient prices. In this regard, the obvious 
economic goal is to promote variety in services that align with prevailing 
consumer preferences. Furthermore, policymakers and regulators seek to 
mitigate the effects of monopolistic market power that undermines economic 
efficiency. However, due to various unique market characteristics, competition 
regulation in media markets often takes a different form than in other sectors, i.e. 
such markets are often subject to sector-specific competition regulation regimes.  
 
Furthermore, building on the distinction stressed in this manuscript between 
content production and distribution, it should be recalled that broadcasting 
markets are intrinsically linked to upstream production markets. Therefore, 
competition concerns in broadcasting markets are not only related to issues of 
horizontal market structure, but also to the effects that market structures have on 
upstream production activities. 176  This relationship essentially provides the 
linkage between the economics of copyright and the economics of broadcasting 
markets.  
 
                                                        
174  Rowart (2007) cites that the communication sector (including its respective aspects of 
competition regulation) is on average more heavily regulated than other sectors in the OECD, 
though there is a higher variance.  
175 Rowart (2007) further observes that the degree of international consensus on an appropriate 
normative framework is lower for non-economic policy issues in the broadcasting sector, as it is 
for economic policy issues in other sectors.  
176 The effect of the state of competition in communications markets on upstream production 
markets has attracted significant attention in recent regulatory debates, such as discussions on the 
issue of Net Neutrality and Intermediary Liability.  
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Non-economic policy issues which deal with content are typically related to the 
notion that information goods are often associated with various externalities. In 
this regard, policy goals include objectives such as the promotion of cultural 
values, the protection of minors, and the regulation of advertising. In terms of 
‘access issues’, the policy goal is to promote ubiquitous access to information 
services, pursuant to the notion that access to information can be seen as a 
fundamental right of the entire citizenry. Such access goals are usually referred to 
as ‘universality’ goals.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that policy issues in media markets in general 
are linked to issues of fundamental freedoms and democratic ideals. As such, 
broadcasting markets should serve the role of facilitating free speech, freedom of 
the press, and effective democratic and civic participation; these concepts are 
embodied in the principle of ‘media pluralism’177.  
 
  
[4]-2.2 Market Characteristics and Regulatory Tools 
  
Based on the above distinction between economic and non-economic goals, the 
following section discusses key characteristics of the broadcasting sector, and 
briefly discusses the regulatory tools used to mitigate such problems. However, 
Armstrong and Weeds (2007) suggest that although there are several prevalent 
market failures in the broadcasting sector, the majority of these issues (with the 
notable exception of externalities) are mitigated by trends in digitisation and the 
consequent shifts in business models. 
 
[4]-2.2.1 Public Good Problem 
 
Broadcasters are understood to incur significant costs in (i) market research into 
consumer preferences, (ii) negotiating content licences with copyright holders (a 
form of transaction costs), (iii) actual royalty payments to copyright holders, (iv) 
capital investment in distribution infrastructure, and (v) operational costs of 
commercial activities and network maintenance. It is however duly noted that the 
extent to which items (iv) and (v) enter into the production function depend on 
whether the broadcaster is an integrated network operator, or a facilities leaser. 
Furthermore, like all other information industries, broadcasting has a distinct cost 
function characterized by high fixed costs and zero (or negligible) marginal costs 
(Seabright and Weeds, 2007). 
 
Once these costs are incurred, it is easy for a second party to free-ride off of a 
broadcaster’s investments by using the already transmitted signal (e.g. by 
retransmitting the signal with replaced ads, or by inclusion of the signal on a 
subscription network). Hence, in the absence of the ability to exert some control 
over the use of their signal, it is argued that broadcasters will not have sufficient 
incentives to distribute content, to the detriment of social welfare. Broadcaster’s 
                                                        
177 Polo (2007) makes a distinction between ‘external pluralism’ – a diversified supply of different 
political opinions in each media market, and ‘internal pluralism’ – fair, balanced and complete 
representation of the political spectrum within each media outlet itself.  
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rights are hence argued as necessary to recoup costs and incentivise content 
distribution. 
 
As such, the essential market failure that characterises the broadcasting sector is 
a public good problem in content distribution. This is the principle market failure 
that relates to the analysis of broadcasters’ rights, and hence the most important 
in the context of this manuscript.  
 
Before analysing the public good problem in more detail in the next section, the 
following sub-sections briefly discuss other relevant market characteristics. 
 
[4]-2.2.2 Information Good Externalities 
 
Distribution of information goods is often associated with various externalities, 
which may either be positive or negative. Positive externalities may be present 
when the information under consideration is of an educational nature and hence 
promotes the social goals of investing in human capital. Similarly, content which 
is journalistic in nature may facilitate the social goal of strengthening civic 
participation and democratic ideals.  
 
Armstrong and Weeds (2007) identify that positive externalities of broadcast 
content include (i) educational benefits, (ii) network externalities, and (iii) social 
or ‘citizenship’ benefits. However, the authors note that network externalities are 
generally internalised by coordination between consumers, and the incentives of 
broadcasters, and any remaining externalised effects are unlikely to be significant. 
 
Another interesting example of content that may have strong positive 
externalities is information relating to emergency situations (for example during 
natural disasters). For this reason, a common feature of many broadcast 
regulation regimes is the ability of the government to commandeer broadcasting 
airtime for public service in times of national emergencies.  
 
Content on broadcasting networks may also exhibit negative externalities. This is 
the case that is often argued as the basis for codes of practice in broadcasting 
regulation. The purpose of such codes and regulations is to mitigate the effects of 
content that is alleged to have negative social externalities, such as programmes 
that are perceived to be violent, pornographic, or profane in nature. However, it is 
noted that such regulation necessarily sets against each other, the competing 
policy goals of protection of minors and the promotion of free speech. Certainly, 
attitudes toward this conflict depend on the socio-cultural context of a particular 
jurisdiction. 
 
Additionally, some forms of advertising may be deemed also have negative 
externalities, particularly in the context of influencing minors. As such, 
broadcasting codes may also have particular restrictions on advertising during 
children’s programming, or during time periods where children are likely to be 
part of the general audience. Advertising restrictions are often also employed for 
goods deemed as ‘demerit goods’ – although such restrictions are not necessarily 
unique to the broadcasting sector as an advertising platform (e.g. limitations on 
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the advertising of alcohol and tobacco products). Broadcast content regulations 
may also make provisions on ‘truth in advertising’ requirements, which prevent 
the negative externalities of misleading information; however such requirements 
are also not necessarily unique to the broadcast media, and more generally belong 
to the domain of consumer protection law.178   
 
Conceptually, broadcast content may also have externalities that affect 
community solidarity and social cohesion. On one hand, the network externalities 
associated with content may suggest that such externalities are positive. On the 
other hand however, there are popular perceptions that consumption of media 
services such as television results in reduced social activity, and hence these 
externalities are negative. However, these debates appear to be more appropriate 
for sociological study rather than economic analysis.179 
 
[4]-2.2.3 Local Content and Cultural Diversity 
 
Another aspect of information externalities – particularly in terms of locally 
produced programming - is the importance of broadcasting for cultural diversity. 
 
Broadcasting markets are a subset of the media industry, which is in itself a subset 
of the wider creative economy. However, as a primary distribution platform for 
creative works, broadcasters are institutions which play an important role in 
defining trends in the consumption of creative works – particularly for audiovisual 
and musical works. In the case of music works in particular, broadcasting markets 
generate significant revenues in the form of performance royalties for copyright 
holders, which are then remitted back to rightsholders whose works were 
broadcast. The composition of programming on broadcasting networks therefore 
plays a major role in the functioning of the overall creative economy. In this 
regard180 As such, local content requirements for broadcasting networks are often 
utilised as a form of industrial policy to promote economic growth in the wider 
creative economy.   
 
Furthermore, creative works are often viewed as more than economic goods – 
they can be seen as vectors of value systems and ideals. As such, some 
policymakers see promotion of local production of creative works as a critical 
element of building institutions of national identity and preservation of cultural 
heritage.181 This is particularly true in jurisdictions where natural market forces 
lead to net importation of creative works, which can be detrimental to the goal of 
                                                        
178 These comments on advertising externalities (distinct from the disutility of advertising) are 
particularly relevant when noting the possibility of a market equilibrium characterized by over-
advertising (briefly discussed in a sub-section below). 
179 See Armstrong and Weeds (2007) for a brief discussion on this issue. 
180 For example, some collective copyright management organisations base royalty distributions 
for non-broadcasting revenue streams using data on the use of works in broadcasting.  
High levels of local content in broadcasting can therefore increase remittances to copyright owners 
and artists in all revenue streams. Local content on broadcast media therefore create a sort of 
‘information externality’ which drives income in other sectors of the creative economy. 
181  For a general overview of local content regulation policies in the broadcasting sector, see 
(Mendel, 2001). 
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preserving cultural diversity in the media. Pursuant to these goals, local content 
requirements can sometimes be seen as complimentary to media ownership 
regulation, where limits are placed on ownership of media assets by non-
nationals. 
 
[4]-2.2.4 Media Market Power 
 
Like all economic sectors, media sectors are characterised by some prevailing 
level of competition both vertically and horizontally. Given the large capital costs 
needed for rollout of infrastructure, communications markets in general are 
characterised by significant economies of scale. This can lead to possible 
monopolistic structures in communication markets, both vertically (integrated 
operators) and horizontally (media ownership consolidation). 
 
While market power is a market failure in all industries, it takes on additional 
dimensions in media markets due to the existence of the externalities of 
information distribution. 
 
As noted above, the media sectors are considered to have public policy goals 
beyond economic efficiency, and hence are generally subject to some form of 
sector-specific regulation. Hope (2007) discusses the conflict between 
competition policy and sector-specific economic media regulation, and notes that 
this conflict arises due to two factors: (i) general media regulation goals (freedom 
of expression, diversity, independence, cultural identity, language, and technical 
issues such and spectrum), and (ii) sector-specific economic issues such as 
technological convergence and the nuances of two-sided markets.  
 
 Buigues and Rabassa (2007) note that the media industries may have 
characteristics that make vertical foreclosure issues more likely. Such issues may 
arise from leveraging market power from traditional markets onto new media 
markets, or situations where a dominant firm (i) denies access to premium 
content or to scarce distribution network needed by a potential entrant or current 
competitor, or (ii) grants long-term exclusive licences for premium content to a 
single operator. The interdependencies of the players in the value chain are 
exemplified by the fact that while premium contents are by definition scarce 
inputs for media businesses, access to scarce downstream technical platforms is 
also of high importance to upstream media operators.182  
 
In addition to exclusive licencing agreements, joint-selling of media content (a 
form of potentially anti-competitive bundling 183 ) may also raise competition 
concerns. Furthermore, competition concerns may arise due to joint-selling or 
joint-purchasing of content, even when such rights are non-exclusive. In the case 
                                                        
182 Generally, vertical concentration in communications markets is limited through regulation of 
platform and network infrastructure access provisions (such as those provided for in the EU 
Access and Framework Directives). However, Seabright and Weeds (2007), argue that diminishing 
scarcity of transmission platforms combined with competition between platforms reduces the 
need for regulation over platform access. 
183 In this context, ‘content licensing bundling’ should not be confused with content distribution 
bundling, which is discussed in a sub-section below. 
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of joint-buying, the practice may legitimately be based on economies of scale, but 
may result in exclusionary behaviour and restrictions of competition.  
 
On the horizontal level, media ownership regulation may exist in two tiers: (i) 
regulation within a particular market, and (ii) regulation between media markets 
(i.e. cross-ownership). In terms of economic policy goals however, it is noted that 
these two tiers are inter-related and there may be both substitutability and 
complementarity between various media platforms. For purpose of competition 
law, it is notably difficult to analyse issues of potential dominance in the media 
sector, particularly due to the nature of two-sided markets.184  
 
Building on insights from industrial organisation literature, Polo (2007) suggests 
that although market mechanisms may promote differentiation in programming 
contents, this heterogeneity does not necessarily extend to political views. 
Furthermore, competition for content can inflate fixed costs and preserve 
concentrated structures, hence reducing the likelihood that the market will 
naturally facilitate external pluralism. As such, general competition regulation in 
media markets can also indirectly promote the non-economic goal of pluralism in 
addition to the primary economic goal of competitive market structures.185 
 
As a consequence of these non-economic goals, media markets are generally 
subject to a stronger degree of ownership regulation, as concentration of 
ownership (both within and across markets) may have negative implications for 
external plurality, cultural diversity, and fairness in political representation. 
Hence, many jurisdictions place explicit restrictions on media ownership within 
markets (e.g. caps on the number of stations a single corporate entity can own), 
and between horizontal markets (e.g. limits on cross-ownership of television, 
radio and newspapers). 
 
[4]-2.2.5 Spectrum Scarcity  
 
Another important characteristic of broadcasting markets is spectrum scarcity. 
This is a market failure of market power in the sense than an essential upstream 
input can be monopolised creating restrictions in downstream service provision.  
 
Traditional terrestrial broadcasting is based on transmissions via the technical 
platform of dedicated electromagnetic frequencies. However, the laws of physics 
limit the quantity of these frequencies that is available for use in communication 
applications; i.e. electromagnetic spectrum is a scarce resource.  
 
As such, traditional terrestrial broadcasting markets exhibit a unique barrier to 
entry – there is a maximum number of competing firms which can be facilitated 
by the technological platform itself. Once the number of firms operating in the 
                                                        
184 See Argentesi and Ivaldi (2007) 
185 Intuitively, competition in media markets would generally lead to specialized programming 
formats, specialized targeted demographics (depending on the extent of heterogeneity of 
consumer preferences) and specific media outlets will hence general have little private incentives 
for internal plurality. Hence, external plurality can be seen as the policy goal more complimentary 
to economic policy goals. 
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market reaches this limit, there is therefore an absolute barrier to entry that can 
undermine effective competition.  
 
Furthermore, traditional views on broadcast regulation frame the 
electromagnetic spectrum as a public resource, and suggest that as a consequence, 
licensees of spectrum frequencies should promote general public policy goals.  
 
However, technological progress has introduced new platforms on which 
broadcasting activities can be facilitated, and new protocols for more efficient use 
of existing platforms. Most notably, digital protocols provide for much more 
efficient use of scarce spectrum resources, and hence migration to digital 
transmission somewhat alleviates the barriers to entry issues which arise from 
traditional analogue transmission platforms.186   
 
In the case of television broadcasting, individual jurisdictions are in various stages 
of switching from analogue transmission to digital transmission. The result of such 
transition is not only a dissolution of the barriers to entry caused by spectrum 
scarcity, but also a release of certain frequency bands which would no longer be 
needed for broadcasting services. This released spectrum (the ‘digital dividend’) 
can subsequently be allocated to other uses in the communications sector, and 
ultimately be invested in new technological innovation. Digital switchover can 
hence itself create positive externalities for the entire communications sector.  
 
[4]-2.2.6 Transaction Costs and Bundling 
 
Market failures of an information asymmetry nature also exist in broadcasting 
markets. One case is where there is asymmetry between content producers (and 
distributors) and end-users in terms of a priori information on the characteristics 
of a programme. 
 
Creative goods and services in general are good examples of ‘experience goods’ – 
goods for which the consumer is unable to evaluate the utility of consumption a 
priori.187 Therefore, consumption of goods such as audiovisual and musical works 
necessarily involves some form of transaction costs, or more particularly a search 
cost, in order to collect consumption-related information.  
 
Additionally, a central premise of broadcasting services is the concept of bundling. 
(Seabright and Weeds, 2007) note that such bundling is the source of much of the 
                                                        
186 Many commentators suggest that falls in the cost of reproducing and transmitting information 
have greatly reduced barriers to entry in broadcasting markets. In particular, Seabright and Weeds 
(2007) analyze the hypothesis that given trends in the sector, rents in broadcasting markets 
increasingly come from control of scarce resources rather than control over means of 
transmission. As such, content rights are replacing transmission bottlenecks as sources of market 
power.  
187  Armstrong and Weeds (2007) note that in addition to being experience goods, broadcast 
programming may be a ‘merit good’ – i.e. one in which even if the characteristics are known in 
advance of consumption (not an experience good), but the consumer’s utility function is not fixed, 
and changes after consumption of the previous untried good. Since the market may under-produce 
such goods, this may be an argument for public service broadcasters to invest in productions of 
new types of content. 
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value added in the broadcasting sector, and describe that “…different scenes are 
bundled into one programme, different programmes are bundled into one series, 
different series are bundled into one channel, and different channels are bundled into 
one subscription”.188  
 
In order to analyse the dynamics of consumer behaviour in broadcasting markets, 
it is necessary to analyse how the concepts of search costs and programme 
bundling interact. In order to minimise search costs, consumers often develop 
behavioural heuristics to help optimise their consumption decisions (e.g. 
partiality for a certain genre of music). Broadcasters are hence able to engage in a 
sort of ‘preference grouping’ – i.e. the act of targeting their services to consumer 
demographics which quasi-homogenous preferences, or at least similar heuristics. 
As such, broadcasters can be seen as agents that facilitate market efficiency by 
minimising consumer search costs through bundling of works into a single 
product. Simply put, consumers are able to maximise their utility by supporting 
their preferred broadcaster (e.g. favourite radio station), even when the utility of 
each embedded work is uncertain, since it is perceived that the respective 
broadcaster’s programming format is consistent with the consumer’s personal 
preferences and heuristics.  
 
Furthermore, bundling in the broadcasting sector not only reduces search costs, 
but also the ‘cost of making mistakes’ (presumably the opportunity costs 
associated with consuming programmes which are misaligned with personal 
preferences). Such benefits arise due to the reputation of the broadcaster (which 
is subject to economies of scale) or from the presence of positively correlated 
preferences for the elements of the bundle (Seabright and Weeds, 2007). 
 
This line of reasoning is particularly interesting in debates over the future of the 
broadcasting industry given new technological developments. Even if consumers 
migrate from ‘content-push’ (i.e. where content is selected by the service provider 
and distributed to the consumer) to ‘content-pull’ models (i.e. where the 
consumer actively searches for specific content), there may still be an important 
role for broadcasting organisations as agents to reduce search costs, and develop 
consumer behavioural heuristics.  
 
For completeness of discussion however, it is beneficial to note that the concept 
of content bundling may also have competition implications. Seabright and Weeds 
(2007), note that bundling implies a zero or near zero price for additional 
components of a bundle for a consumer who is already consuming the rest of the 
bundle. While this may be efficient, it can be difficult for new content to enter into 
the market, and hence may result in monopolistic or oligopolistic market 
structures. However, because detailed accounts of consumer preferences are not 
typically known to competition regulators, it is extremely difficult to track any 
distinction between efficient and exclusionary bundling practices. Similarly, 
Armstrong and Weeds (2007) also note that where audience evaluations are 
                                                        
188 However, the analysis in this Chapter is concerned only with the latter two processes (bundling 
of content (series) into channels, and bundling of channels into subscriptions), as these two 
processes are issues of distribution, while the former are issues of production.  
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heterogeneous, bundling can be used as a tool to promote allocate efficiency 
though price discrimination.  
 
[4]-2.2.7 Advertising and Two-Sided Market Equilibrium 
 
Another form of information asymmetry in media markets stems from the nature 
of two-sided markets. The issue of equilibrium in two-sided markets arises where 
broadcasting organisations are funded through commercial advertising. In such 
cases, the service is provided ‘free’ to consumers, and a portion of airtime is sold 
to advertisers.189 Such advertising airtime has commercial value to advertisers by 
virtue of the fact that it provides a captured audience (whose homogeneity of 
demographic composition depends on the programming format of the particular 
broadcasting network) for the messages of advertisers. The commercial value of 
airtime is hence a positive function of the size of the captured audience, and the 
preference structure of the audience demographic.  
 
Such a market is called two sided, because there are two sets of consumers – the 
audience who consume the supply of broadcast programming, and the advertisers 
who consumes the supply of captured audience attention.190  
 
In such cases, a market failure can arise due to a conflict between the utility 
function of the audience and the profit functions of the advertiser and the 
broadcaster. The broadcaster seeks to maximise the profits from the sale of 
advertising airtime, while the advertiser wants access to the optimal composition 
of the audience’s size and willingness to pay for the advertised product. 
Consumers on the other hand, want to maximise the utility by consuming 
programming which is most in-line with their preferences and heuristics.  
The information asymmetry that exists is therefore between broadcasters and 
advertisers, and consumers in terms of audience preferences. Additionally, since 
the broadcaster is merely a medium of exchange between the two groups 
(advertisers and audiences), there may be a problem of information loss as 
information is transmitted between the parties. This issue is exacerbated by the 
fact that since the broadcasting service is ‘free’ to the end-user, there is no true 
mechanism to track market consumption trends. For this reason, media 
organisations often rely on industry reports and studies which track consumption 
and demographic trends based on ‘ratings systems’. However, such industry 
studies are subject to the limitations that are standard to any sampling 
methodology, such as questions of the representativeness of the selected sample, 
time-dependencies of the observed trends, and divergences between artificial 
choices and actual consumption behaviour.   
 
Notwithstanding the explanatory power of the information asymmetry described 
above, market failures may arise in more fundamental ways in advertising-funded 
broadcasting markets. This is due to the fact that the goal is to maximise audience 
                                                        
189 Disutility from advertising may be regarded at the implicit ‘price’ paid for free-to-air broadcasts 
(Armstrong and Weeds, 2007). However, the total effect of advertising is ambiguous, as it depends 
on the extent to which advertisers are included in the social welfare function. 
190 For a discussion on the economics of two-sided markets, see Rysman (2009)  
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reach (and hence the value of advertising space), as opposed to genuine 
satisfaction of consumer preferences. As such, advertising-funded markets may 
lead to overproduction of ‘mass-market’ content, and underproduction of niche 
interest content (Armstrong and Weeds, 2007) 
 
In addition to possible mismatches between preferences and programme supply, 
a two-sided market may exhibit market equilibrium that is not efficient in terms 
of advertising prevalence. Anderson (2007) suggests that broadcaster’s calculus 
do not fully internalise the net social costs of advertising, which is viewer disutility 
minus advertisers’ surplus.  As such, the market equilibrium may involve either 
too little or too much advertising relative to the socially optimal level.191 Hence, 
regulation of advertising length may be necessary if there is over-advertising, but 
socially harmful if there is under-advertising. 192  Furthermore, considerations 
must be made for the externalities caused by advertising (e.g. increasing 
consumer information which promotes economic efficiency in other unrelated 
consumer markets). 
 
 
[4]-2.3 Public Broadcasting Service 
 
Given the various public policy goals and market failures set out in the sections 
above, many jurisdictions implement a Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) 
provider. Betzel and Ward (2004) suggest that the key remit of the public 
broadcaster is to (i) contribute to a democratic and/or pluralistic society, (ii) 
contribute to national culture and language, (iii) provide high quality 
programming, (iv) meet high journalistic standards, and (v) provide universal 
service.193 
 
The purpose of PBS is to address not only the public good market failure, but also 
the information externality aspects. Hence, the PBS aims to distribute content that 
is under-produced by the free market (relative to the socially optimal quantity) 
due to the existence of positive externalities. With reference to the above 
discussed market characteristics, a PBS would focus on distribution of content 
that is locally produced, exhibits positive externalities, is unbiased or reflects a 
wide range of political opinions (internal plurality), and of niche genres. 
Furthermore, the PBS should be insulated from undue political and commercial 
                                                        
191 Using a two-sided market model, Anderson (2007) shows that if quality, number and types of 
programmes are treated as a constant, the market equilibrium is over-advertising for high 
nuisance costs to consumers, and under-advertising for low nuisance costs to consumers. As with 
the case of content that exhibits externalities, the problems of over-advertising or under-
advertising can compound the problems associated with demerit goods and merit goods 
respectively. 
192 An example of advertising length regulation can be found in the EU Television Without Frontiers’ 
Directive (89/552/EEC), which sets out that commercial advertising should not exceed 15% of total 
daily transmission time (average of nine minutes per hour), with a 20% maximum (twelve 
minutes) in a given one-hour period. 
193 For a general analysis of best practices in public service broadcasting, see UNESCO (2005). 
96 
influence. In terms of funding, a PBS is usually financed by public funds, possibly 
with additional sources of commercial revenues.194  
 
In general, public broadcasters are usually involved in both content production 
and distribution. This is of particular relevance where lack of access to 
downstream broadcasting markets leads to upstream underproduction of certain 
types of content; i.e. the market failures in broadcasting transfer to market failures 
in content production (particularly for niche content and programmes exhibiting 
positive externalities). Separating the processes of content production and 
distribution, an alternative of PBS may be to directly subsidise the production of 
programming which the free market tends to under-produce or under-distribute. 
This will allow for such content to be available at lower licensing costs to 
commercial broadcasters, and possibly lead to programme substitution towards 
the subsidised content. Such direct subsidisation of content can incentivise the 
dissemination of content with positive externalities, without direct intervention 
at the distribution level.  
 
 
[4]-3 PUBLIC GOODS AND ALTERNATIVES TO IPRS 
 
As discussed in the above section, the broadcasting sector is subject to a public 
good market failure. This is due to the non-rivalrous and non-excludable nature of 
broadcast transmissions. The general paradigm of intellectual property law is that 
exclusive property rights are a policy tool that can be used to solve this market 
failure. However, literature on the economics of intellectual property rights often 
places great emphasis on the fact that property rights are only one possible 
solution to public good problems. This section shall discuss other alternatives and 
general market circumstances that can be used to solve public good failures. 
 
Additionally, it is useful to first note that there may exist various conditions that 
either mitigate or exacerbate public good problems. The section above discussed 
how broadcasting content (and information goods more generally) could exhibit 
various externalities. Where negative externalities exist, there is usually over-
production, which can partially offset the under-production due to public good 
problems. Where there are positive externalities however, the public good 
problems of under-production are exacerbated.  
 
This section will briefly discuss various factors that affect the severity of public 
good problems, and how they apply to broadcasting services. This would allow for 
an understanding of the extent to which private property rights are needed over 
the signals of broadcasting organisations.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
194 Public funds for a PBS can either come from general budgetary allocations, or from a dedicated 
tax (usual in the form of levy imposed on households and places of business that have televisions).   
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[4]-3.1 State Provision and Subsidisation 
 
One of the most traditional solutions to public good market failures is the state 
provision of the good. In terms of content distribution, non-commercially oriented 
public broadcasting services would be the analogous example (as discussed 
above).  
 
A distinct solution from direct government provision of a public good is 
government subsidisation of private provision of the good. In the case of 
copyright, this takes the form of government grants to the arts, and in the case of 
patents this takes the form of innovation and research grants. For the 
broadcasting sector, the government can subsidize private broadcasters, or even 
subsidize the production (or acquisition) of particular content in order to 
effectively reduce the operational costs of private broadcasters (also alluded to in 
the above section on public broadcasting).  
 
In reality, however there are many instances where public broadcasting operators 
fit within an overlap between the alternative strategies of ‘direct state provision’ 
and ‘subsidisation of private provision’. This is because many public broadcasters 
are allowed to supplement their state provided funding with revenues from 
commercial advertising. As such, it is often debated that such dual-funding models 
create market distortions in advertising markets (and hence in broadcasting 
markets themselves), and may lead to unfair commercial practices.195 As such, 
these strategies may solve public good problems, but may also result in further 
welfare losses due to competition issues. Additionally, publically provided 
services are generally less able to efficiently adapt to consumers’ tastes and 
preferences. 
 
State provision of public broadcasting services is therefore a non-property rights 
factor which reduces the public good problem of broadcasting. Additionally, given 
the interconnectivity of the creative economy however, state investment in arts 
and culture has various spillover effects. Hence, state support of the arts in other 
areas also reduces the public good (and externality) problem by possibly reducing 
the costs of content production and licencing.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
195 OECD (1999) observes that “…public broadcasters may, in principle, offer “dumping” prices for 
their advertising space, thanks to the public financing received. Public broadcasters, although 
entitled to compete on this market (with some exceptions), receive from the State additional 
resources (e.g. licence fees, grants, etc.), which are refused to private operators. Public broadcasters 
do not need to compete to obtain these additional resources which provide them a safe cash flow that 
may be used to compete unfairly on the market.”. It is further discussed that “From the State aid 
point of view, the easiest solution would be to ban advertising from public broadcasters. Although it 
would not eliminate all State aid problems (e.g. the sale of programs), this solution would probably 
cut the legal grounds for most of the related complaints. However, such solution may also have some 
drawbacks: (i) it may damage seriously public broadcasters, as public resources available are lower 
than market ones (budget restrictions, difficulties to increase licence fees, etc.), and (ii) it may reduce 
the appeal of their programs, as they would not need to gain audience.”  - [pg 294] 
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[4]-3.2 Lead Time 
 
Lead-time generally refers to the time between the initiation and completion of a 
process. In the context of competitive markets, it is the time between the decision 
to enter into a market and production resulting in actual effective competition. 
Hence, lead-time refers to the fact that there is an inherent first mover advantage 
in most markets, which an innovator will enjoy. Even if competitors are able to 
freely copy an innovation and hence ‘free-ride’ off of the innovator’s investment, 
it would take time to set up production infrastructure and bring a product to the 
final market. During this time, the original innovator would be able to establish 
some degree of market power and brand loyalty, which effectively substitutes 
formal intellectual property protection, albeit to some limited extent. 
 
Consequently, the significance of lead-time as an alternative mechanism to IPRs is 
very much sector-specific, and is conditioned by prevailing production functions.  
In the case of the broadcasting sector, technical transmissions are by definition 
instantaneous, particularly in relation to the concept of retransmission. Assuming 
that a retransmitting broadcaster (such as a subscription service multi-channel 
operator) already has established infrastructure, it is possible to use the initial 
broadcaster’s signal immediately. Therefore, lead-time provides no protection 
and market power in the case of signal transmissions; it is not an effective 
alternative to property rights. 
 
 
[4]-3.3 Extra-legal Norms 
 
In many sectors, social norms and other systems of non-legal rules evolve so as to 
protect the interests of creators, in the absence of formal intellectual property 
protection. In the intellectual property literature, a commonly cited example is 
that of stand-up comedy. Due to the nature of the industry, the narrow scope of 
copyright protection (i.e. the idea-expression dichotomy and the notion of 
protection from literal substantive copying only), and in some instance a fixation 
requirement for copyright eligibility, the subject matter of stand-up comedy is 
often not protected by copyright. As such, stand-up comedians traditionally drew 
on a commons of jokes within an effective public domain. However, overtime a 
system of norms evolved which filled the gap in formal law, leading to more 
innovation, creativity, and overall investment in new jokes (Oliar and Sprigman, 
2008). 196  These social norms effectively regulate issues such as authorship, 
ownership, transfer of rights, exceptions to informal ownership claims and the 
imposition of sanctions on norms violators. 
 
Such social norms may also exist in other sectors. One such example is that of 
academic research, which is particular sensitive to the idea-expression dichotomy 
(and the non-copyright-eligibility of scientific theories), leading to a wide scope 
                                                        
196 Examples of these norms are ‘injunctions’ against comedians who appropriate jokes – such 
comedians lose standing amongst the community, and are barred from performing at certain 
venues. Other norms include the rejection of joint-ownership claims (even where one comedian 
helps another), rejection of attribution for ‘works-for-hire’, and general leniency for younger up-
and coming comedians.  
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for potential free-riding. However, social norms, network and reputation effects, 
and the varying standards associated with academic publishing may collectively 
constitute a system of non-legal-norms that protect the interests of academic 
researchers.  
 
In this context of academia and literary works, it is possible to distinguish between 
non-legal and quasi-legal forms of sanctions in the context of acts that constitute 
plagiarism. In terms of non-legal norms, Green (2002) notes that such sanctions 
are particularly effective when the sanction takes the form of the same social good 
that the initial activity is meant to produce (i.e. reputation and esteem). 197 
Furthermore, there appears to be great variance both within and across sub-
communities in relation to how copying may result in social sanctions. Within sub-
communities, sanctions tend to be greater on well-known authors and creators, 
while across sub-communities there are different attitudes in terms of what level 
of copying is socially acceptable. For example, the scientific community tends to 
have a very low tolerance for plagiarism, while the field of journalism is much 
more tolerant. In terms of quasi-legal norms, many fields (and in particular 
academic research) are further subject to formal codes of ethics and professional 
standards of conduct. Such codes almost always impose strict sanctions for acts of 
plagiarism, which can result in not only loss of esteem but also suspensions, 
dismissals and even revocation of professional licences. Interestingly in such 
professional codes, standards of plagiarism are almost always much stricter than 
standards of copyright – i.e. sanctions are imposed on acts of plagiarism even 
where such acts are not substantive enough to constitute copyright infringement.  
 
Another possible example is that of sports performances, particularly in fields 
with a strong performance and creative dimension. Generally, sports 
performances do not constitute copyright-eligible subject matter (discussed later 
in this chapter). However, in fields such as figure skating and gymnastics, 
particular performance techniques and innovative routines are often associated 
with a particular athlete. In these fields, it is very much possible that systems of 
social norms evolve to protect the interests of creative athletes, and hence 
promote investment in new techniques and routines. However, social norms in 
this sector tend to be more focused on assertion of attribution rights rather than 
prevention of unauthorized copying. Hence, rather than disincentivising free-
riders through social sanctions, the main norm is to name specific routines, 
techniques or skills after a specific athlete. In this regard, great prestige is derived 
to the performer, which incentivises investment in new skills and techniques.  
 
In the case of broadcasting signals, there is no reason to believe that any system 
of extra-legal norms would exist to supplement (or stand in for) formal intellectual 
property rights. This is likely because of two reasons. Firstly, the effectiveness of 
social norms is likely inversely proportional to the size of the market activity being 
undertaken – i.e. the disincentive effects of social sanctions are likely to decease 
                                                        
197 “A poet, scholar, historian, novelist, or filmmaker who is exposed as a plagiarist will suffer the 
disapprobation of precisely those colleagues whose opinion he most values. Such a sanction is 
particularly appropriate because the plagiarist is denied exactly the social good that his unattributed 
copying is intended to elicit—namely, the esteem of his peers and the benefits that flow from such 
esteem, such as academic credit, prestige, and financial reward.” – Green (2002), pg 198  
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with the scale of market activity. Given that broadcasting activities are necessarily 
undertaken on a very high commercial scale (due to high capital investment 
costs), it is unlikely that social sanctions (if existing at all) and reputation effects 
would effectively mitigate free-riding.  
 
Secondly, systems of social norms necessarily depend on the existence of strong 
network effects and hence reputation costs. Such effects are most common among 
networks that are comprised of natural persons, as in the case of the examples 
discussed above (stand-up comedy, academic research, and performance 
athletics). In this manner, it can be said that social norms - as quasi-substitutes for 
property rights – are strongly linked to natural rights theories of property rights. 
 
It is however noted that social sanctions and resulting reputation effects may also 
be applicable to corporate entities that are not natural persons. However, 
broadcasters are still likely to be quite insulated from direct reputation effects of 
social sanctions, both from the industry and consumer. In the case of the industry, 
a broadcaster who violates the rights of another broadcaster (e.g. through 
unauthorised retransmission) is by definition not engaging in active negotiations 
with rightsholders; therefore, social sanctions from the industry are likely to have 
little effect. In the case of consumers, the effectiveness of social sanctions on 
corporate entities likely depends on the area of commercial activity and the nature 
of the norm-violation. For example, consumers may have much greater sensitivity 
to environmental violations (which externalise social costs), than to intellectual 
property violations (which generally create only private costs for rightsholders). 
Furthermore, infringing broadcasters will necessarily have lower cost structures 
due the non-payment of royalties to rightsholders, hence leading to lower prices 
for consumers; on this basis, it is even likely that consumers would exhibit a 
preference for infringing broadcasters over IPR-compliant broadcasters.  
 
Hence, given the above discussion, it would appear that social norms would not 
be an effective mechanism for protecting the interests of broadcasting 
organisations, and solving public good problems.  
 
[4]-3.4 Inducing Excludability  
 
As previously established, public good problems arise due to the characteristics of 
‘non-excludability’ and ‘non-rivalrousness’. Therefore, producers have the  
natural incentive to transform their outputs into a form that is characterised by 
excludability.198 Furthermore, in some instances, legal rules may even reinforce 
such strategies to induce excludability. 
                                                        
198 For completeness of discussion, it is noted that it is also possible consider attempts to address 
the issue of rivalrousness - i.e. to induce artificial scarcity. This notion is problematic for various 
reasons. Firstly, the very nature of information goods is that they are non-rivalrous; while artificial 
means can be imposed to make goods excludable, very little can be done in practical terms to make 
goods rivalrous. However, even if a good is theoretically made rivalrous (but still non-excludable) 
is would still be subject to an inherent, albeit different market failure.  Such non-excludable and 
rivalrous goods are known as ‘common-pool goods’ (typically exemplified by common pool-
natural resources), which are subject to overexploitation, congestions, and the ‘tragedy of 
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Watermarks embedded by publishers on physical documents would be a 
traditional example of ‘excludability inducing’ strategies. While the document may 
still be copied, the quality of the copy may be diminished (and hence not be a 
perfect substitute for the original embodied work), or at the least, it would be 
clearly known to the end-user that the copy is not an original. 
 
[4]-3.4.1 Technological Protection Measures 
 
In the case of the creative industries, a common form of such ‘strategies to induce 
excludability’ are known as ‘technological protection measures’ (TPMs). The 
purpose of TPMs is to limit the ability of second parties (either users or 
competitors) to physically reproduce or otherwise use a work.  
 
TPMs have certainly come into much greater prominence in the era of embodying 
works in digital formats.  Digital technologies have significantly reduced the 
difficulty and cost of reproducing works, hence leading to greater propensities for 
infringement. Consequently, there have been thrusts by rightsholders to use these 
same opportunities of digital formats to counteract such infringement.199 These 
thrusts have taken the form of technological measures such as access restrictions 
or encryption protocols which either limit access to a work, or the scope of its 
possible use.  
 
However, trends in media and technology markets have demonstrated that 
consumers respond by bypassing such measures (e.g. through decryption, 
software cracking and other forms of reverse engineering). The result is hence, in 
theory, an ‘arms race’ between rightsholders and consumers regarding 
investment in successive technological protection and subsequent bypass 
techniques. On one hand, this protection/circumvention (encryption/ decryption) 
may be seen as an inefficient allocation of resources by both parties, resulting in 
deadweight losses and compounded transaction costs. On the other hand, this 
process generates significant positive externalities in the form of investment in 
new technologies, which ultimately catalyses overall technological development. 
As interesting as the issue may be, the overall welfare effects of this cycle are yet 
to be determined.  
 
[4]-3.4.2 Legal Reinforcement and Anti-Circumvention 
 
In order to facilitate the interests of rightsholder, intellectual property protection 
may be supplemented by provisions that prohibit the circumvention of TPMs.200 
                                                        
commons’. Therefore, the activities known as ‘self-help strategies’ in the intellectual property 
literature are generally focussed on inducing excludability rather than scarcity/rivalrousness.  
 
199 This theme is best captured by the famous phrase of renowned copyright commenter Charles 
Clark: "The answer to the machine is in the machine”. (Clark, 1996)  
200 The international treaty basis for implementation of anti-circumvention rules is largely Article 
11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT, 1996). However, it is interesting to note the controversial 
history of such provisions within the international intellectual property system. Herman and 
Gandy (2006) discuss the controversial legislative history of anti-circumvention provision in the 
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As a result of this, copyright owners may enjoy three cumulative layers of 
protection: (i) the basic legal protection of copyright law, (ii) the technical 
protection of the works achieved by TPMs201, and (iii) the legal protection against 
the circumvention of the TPMs. 202  In essence, layer (i) protects through the 
mechanism of property rights, layer (ii) via inducing exclusivity (or at least 
increasing transaction costs for consumers to bypass said exclusivity), and layer 
(iii) by legal re-enforcement of excludability inducing strategies.  
 
In terms of protection of broadcasting signals, the very nature of the subject 
matter is based on a technological platform by definition. As such, broadcasting 
signals are particularly appropriate subject matter for technological protection 
measures. Indeed, the notion of encryption is a central concept in the commercial 
broadcasting industry. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are currently various 
proposals to strengthen the rights of broadcasters in relation to control over 
unauthorised decryption of their encrypted signals. Therefore, in the case of 
property rights over broadcasting signals, there is not only legal reinforcement of 
‘exclusivity inducing’ strategies, but such legal reinforcement might actually take 
the form of a component of the property right itself.  
 
Alternatively, it may also be possible in principle to separate such legal 
reinforcement from the underlying property right. For example, there may be 
criminal provisions on decryption, perhaps under general computer fraud and 
abuse laws. More specifically, many jurisdictions have gone beyond statutory anti-
circumvention provisions in implementing the provisions on obligations 
regarding technological measures.203  In such jurisdictions, it is prohibited to even 
distribute ‘tools that can be used to facilitate circumvention of TPMs’, irrespective 
of whether the distributing party actually uses such tools for the purpose of 
copyright infringement. 204  The EU Conditional Access Directive is particularly 
relevant to this discussion, as it is specifically concerned with prohibiting 
circumvention of TPMs in the broadcasting sector, and provides for the 
prohibition of distribution of tools that can be used to facilitate unauthorised 
decryption of conditional access (encrypted) broadcasting signals. 
 
In terms of the above discussion on ‘cumulative layers of rights’ due to TPMs, the 
table below summarises the applicable case for broadcast signals.  
 
                                                        
US, and propose that such provisions came to be included in the international copyright system 
though deliberate policy laundering by US policy makers. 
201  It is even possible that the technological measures themselves may constitute ‘works of 
software’ in certain jurisdictions, and hence themselves enjoy primary copyright eligibility.   
202 See De Werra (2001) 
203 Article 11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty states as follows: “Contracting Parties shall provide 
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective 
technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under 
this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are not 
authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.” 
204  For example, see the relevant provision of the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(§1201(a)(2) of USC Title 17), and Article 4 of the EU Directive on Legal Protection of Conditional 
Access Services (98/84/ECC). 
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Layer of Rights Mechanism 
1. Broadcasters’ Related Rights 
Excludability through legally enforceable property 
rights 
2. 
Technological 
Protection 
Measures 
Technical excludability through encryption – 
increases transaction costs to end-user, hence dis-
incentivising unauthorised use 
3. Anti-Circumvention Provisions 
Legal reinforcement of exclusivity inducing 
strategy – prohibitions on unauthorised 
decryption, and distribution of decryption tools 
Table 4.1: Technological Protection Measures and Broadcaster’s Rights 
 
In terms of discussions on digital copyright issues, TPMs are often at the centre of 
the debate. Any discussion on TPMs is therefore incomplete without mentioning 
this debate. Many authors and commenters harshly criticise anti-circumvention 
provisions. The major criticism put forward is that such provisions add another 
layer of rights on top of primary copyright protection, and may limit the use of a 
work by making illegal, activities that would otherwise be legal under copyright 
law. For example, it may be necessary to circumvent technological protection 
measures in order to access a work in a way consistent with statutory limitations 
to copyright or the doctrine of fair use. 205  As such, the intellectual property 
system’s balancing act between public interests and private incentives is 
undermined. For discussion on this issue in the context of US copyright law, see 
Samuelson (1999) or Kern (2002). Many authors also go further to note that in the 
case of US law, such anti-circumventions provisions may not only undermine fair 
use, but may actually also be unconstitutional (e.g. Sheets, 2001). 
 
[4]-3.4.3 Investment in Technological Protection Measures 
 
Thus far, the above discussion on TPMs has focussed on excludability and the use 
of TPMs to restrict access, as if to imply that such measures are purely binary - i.e. 
whether access of absolutely open (non-excludable) or absolutely closed 
(excludable). In reality, producers of information goods may often be able to 
choose the degree of restrictions imposed by a TPM. Hence, there is conceivably a 
spectrum of goods ranging from TPM-free to highly-restricted, where there are 
varying levels of restrictions on the possible scope of use of end-users. For 
example, a CD or DVD may have copy-protection measure that attempt to 
physically limit the number of copies made from the original product. Other 
examples may include e-books that may limit activities such as printing, 
highlighting, format editing and text copying.  
 
In the case of broadcasting signals, TPMs may limit the terms on which users are 
able to use broadcast signals and hence the underlying audiovisual works 
embodied within. For example, broadcasts may attempt to limit end-users’ 
                                                        
205 For example, one may wish to extract a short excerpt of a programme for face-to-face teaching, 
or for news reporting. However, such extraction might be blocked by TPMs, which prevent 
recording. Circumvention of the TPM might hence be necessary to undertake the otherwise 
permissible use of the content.  
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abilities to undertake activities such as record a television programme for future 
viewing (‘time-shifting’) 206 , possibly viewing the programme at a place or on 
another device than that in/on which the original signal was received (‘place-
shifting’)207, or limiting the user’s ability to bypass advertisements.  
 
Such limits on usage are effected through the terms and conditions on which 
signals are made available to end-users. These terms and conditions (in addition 
to other metadata such as timestamps and information on the rightsholders) are 
known as ‘Rights Management Information’ (RMI)208. As such, legal provisions 
which prohibit the removal or manipulation of RMI embedded in broadcasting 
signals is another form of legal reinforcement of the rights of broadcasting 
organisations.  
 
An interesting question hence arises as to how firms generally invest in TPMs, and 
how such measures affect competition. According to Rothchild (2005), the 
inclusion of technological protection measures in information goods cannot be 
accurately modelled as either a price increase or an undesirable product 
characteristic. Furthermore, the impact on production is hence uncertain, and 
highly dependent on consumer preferences for TPMs (or rather for TPM-free 
goods) and the existing state of competition in the relevant market. 
 
In order to understand the behaviour of firms in the market in relation to TPMs, it 
is necessary to distinguish between (i) terrestrial (free-to-air) broadcasters who 
use spectrum as the distribution platform, and (ii) subscription network 
                                                        
206 As discussed above, TPMs may raise major concerns about technical limits on activities that 
would otherwise be permissible under standard copyright law. Time-shifting is a good example of 
this conflict, due to a trend in case law that suggests that time-shifting (e.g. by recording a 
programme for later viewing) does not constitute copyright infringement.  In Sony Corp. of America 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), ‘the Betamax case’, the US Supreme Court ruled 
that making of individual copies of complete television for the purposes of time-shifting is not 
copyright infringement, and is allowable pursuant to the principle of fair use. 
207 For example, consider a consumer who has a television set and cable connection in their living 
room, but wishes to set-up a router to stream the signal to their mobile phone or another television 
set in their bedroom. 
208  In addition to providing for the prohibition of anti-circumvention measures, the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (WCT) also provides for legal remedies against the removal or manipulation of 
Rights Management Information. Article 12 of the WCT (Obligations concerning Rights 
Management Information) states as follows: 
 “(1) Contracting Parties shall provide adequate and effective legal remedies against any person 
knowingly performing any of the following acts knowing, or with respect to civil remedies having 
reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement of any 
right covered by this Treaty or the Berne Convention: (i) to remove or alter any electronic rights 
management information without authority; (ii) to distribute, import for distribution, broadcast or 
communicate to the public, without authority, works or copies of works knowing that electronic 
rights management information has been removed or altered without authority. 
(2) As used in this Article, “rights management information” means information which identifies the 
work, the author of the work, the owner of any right in the work, or information about the terms and 
conditions of use of the work, and any numbers or codes that represent such information, when any 
of these items of information is attached to a copy of a work or appears in connection with the 
communication of a work to the public." 
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broadcasters (‘conditional access’ operators), who use ‘fixed infrastructure’ such 
as such as cable or satellite platforms.  
 
In the case of terrestrial broadcasting, the existence of multiple competing 
broadcasters may result in co-ordination problems in terms of the applicable 
encryption and TPM standards. Furthermore, terrestrial broadcasting stations, 
though substitutes, are generally simultaneously consumed by end-users 
(complementary) – i.e. when end-users watch television, they may have a 
tendency to switch between multiple channels during one sitting. Therefore, 
diverging standards means increased ‘fixed costs’ to consumers, as they would 
need to invest in multiple conversion devices to convert between digital and 
analogue signals (and hence switch channels). Additionally, switching between 
conversion and decryption devices necessarily means higher transaction costs (in 
the form of switching costs) to consumers when navigating through various 
broadcasting channels.  
 
To put this into proper context, it should be noted that TPMs and RMI embedding 
is a characteristic of digital transmission (and is not technically possible with 
analogue signals). Therefore, these issues form part of the regulatory and 
competitive dimension of the previously discussed process of digital switchover.  
 
Indeed, coordination of digital standards is hence an important policy issue. 
However, this process is not endogenously determined within the market, and is 
rather exogenously coordinated by the regulator. This is because the process of 
analogue to digital switchover is by definition an issue of spectrum allocation and 
management, which is typically coordinated by a central regulatory authority.209 
As such, the issue of competing digital standards generally does not arise. Even in 
the absence of such exogenous coordination, it is even likely that firms may have 
some incentive to coordinate amongst themselves, so as to maximise the collective 
value of consumer demand.  
 
In terms of protection of property rights, the issue thus becomes the extent to 
which TPM and RMI provisions are included in the prevailing digital standard, and 
in the general process of digital switchover. Such provisions are often referred to 
as ‘broadcast flags’, and provide for restrictions on the ability to produce and 
distribute equipment that would remove RMI and signal protection metadata, 
particularly in the process of digital to analogue signal conversion.210 Therefore, 
the issue of TMPs in terrestrial broadcasting is more of a regulatory policy issue, 
rather than a question of investment behaviour of industry firms. 
 
The case of subscription network broadcasting (whose business models are based 
on ‘conditional access’), the market dynamic is quite different. Generally, 
                                                        
209 For a discussion on regulatory issues in analogue to digital broadcasting transition, see ITU 
(2010) 
210 For a discussion on the history of Broadcast Flag debates in the US, in the context of digital 
television switchover, see Crawford (2003). Worthy of note is the observation that many 
commenters criticise anti-circumvention provisions on the grounds that they prohibit 
technological advancements and sequential innovation in communications markets. For a 
discussion on such possible effects from broadcast flag provisions, see Seltzer (2005). 
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communications markets tend to be oligopolistic in nature due to high fixed cost 
of network deployment. Following the findings of Rothchild (2005) summarised 
above, the presence of market power allows for operators to prevail with fairly 
restrictive TPMs. Furthermore, there is no need to coordinate standards between 
operators, for two reasons. Firstly, decryption devices are generally jointly-
supplied by service provides (i.e. a cable television subscription comes with the 
necessary ‘set-top box’). Secondly, subscription services exhibit little or no 
complementarity for consumers, and hence the issue of transaction/switching 
costs do not arise (i.e. consumers generally do not subscribe to two different cable 
television providers).  
 
As such, by virtue of prevailing market characteristics TPMs tend to be more 
prevalent in subscription broadcasting (‘conditional access’) markets. In any 
instance, it is clear from  the above discussion that strategies of ‘inducing 
exclusivity’ are a critical element of any discussion of intellectual property rights 
over broadcasting signals. The existence of such technical possibilities are a factor 
which suggest that strong private property rights in broadcast transmissions 
might not be necessary. 
 
 
[4]-3.5 Alternative Motivations 
 
A distinct theme put forward by many commentators is that in many fields of 
intellectual property, agents are motivated by non-commercial or ‘intrinsic’ 
factors (as compared to the standard assumption of the profit-maximising 
producer). In the field of arts and entertainment, artistic passion and creative 
expression may drive creators and authors to produce literary and artistic works, 
even where there is little opportunity for commercial gain through copyright 
protection. In field of science and technology, innovators and inventors may be 
motivated by the pursuit of scientific ideals, and the desire to push the boundaries 
of human knowledge, even without the opportunity of commercial gains through 
patent protection. In other cases, investments in arts or research may even come 
from sources purely motivated by philanthropy and patronage.  
 
In relation to the broadcasting sector, it was previously discussed that information 
goods may often have positive externalities. Hence dissemination of such 
information may be a motivation in itself, irrespective of any guarantee to 
underlying property rights. Such motivations are particularly relevant for the 
concept of ‘community broadcasting services’, as well as public broadcasting 
services. However, generally speaking, it can be said that commercial 
broadcasting is motivated largely by profit-maximisation, and hence the 
popularity of the advertising-funded model. Intrinsic motivation is hence not a 
likely factor that reduces the public good problems of broadcasting.  
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[4]-3.6 Prizes 
 
As mentioned briefly in Chapter 3, a large body of literature has developed in the 
niche of ‘innovation economics’, a sub-set of which examines the use of prizes as 
alternatives to patent rights.  
 
Furthermore, many critics of the intellectual property system observe that the 
patent system will not give adequate incentives for innovations which may have 
high social value, but low commercial value. Such under-investment may occur for 
innovations such as medical treatments and pharmaceuticals for diseases that 
tend to affect poorer demographic groups. Furthermore, given that patents are 
based on exclusivity and market power, pharmaceutical products that are in 
global demand may effectively be outside of the economic reach of poorer 
demographics, at least until patents expire and competition with generic drugs 
drives prices down to competitive levels. Additionally, market-power derived 
commercial incentives may lead to over-investment in more profitable lifestyle 
drugs211, and under-investment than less profitable lifesaving drugs. 
 
As such, various commentators advocate that prizes form a more appropriate 
incentive system for certain types of medical research.  Prizes would hence 
complement patents and form part of a larger portfolio of methods for 
encouraging and supporting research. As commented by Stiglitz (2007) “a prize 
fund would work well in areas in which needs are well known – the case for many 
diseases afflicting the poor – allowing clear goals to be set in advance. For 
innovations that solve problems or meet needs that have not previously been widely 
recognized, the patent system would still play a role.” 
 
The extent to which prizes may be an appropriate solution to public good 
problems is hence conditioned in part by the extent to which the exact desired 
outcome can be defined a priori. In this regard, the case of broadcasting content 
certainly diverges from the case of public health policy. In the case of medical 
research (and the subject matter of the patent system in general), rewards – 
whether patents or prizes – are granted for specific solutions to clearly defined 
specific technological problems. In the case of production and distribution of 
literary and artistic works, outputs are not pursuant to solving specific problems, 
but are rather products of artistic expression conditioned to some extent by 
prevailing consumer tastes. Therefore, prizes may not be an appropriate general 
alternative to copyright and related rights. 
 
However, it is noted that there is indeed some conceptual relationship between 
the strategies of subsidisation and prizes. Both take the form of direct monetary 
support; however, subsidies are ex ante in nature, while prizes are ex post in 
nature. For ex post prizes, there is further some element of uncertainty as to 
whether investment in the research process will actually pay off (and hence 
whether the prize will be won). Economic analysis of prizes must hence discount 
                                                        
211 ‘Lifestyle drugs' is not a precise term, but is generally used to refer to medications produced to 
satisfy non-medical or non-health related goals. Such drugs include those used for beauty 
enhancement, addressing hair loss, and aesthetic weight loss.  
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the prize offer to account for the probability of successful discovery, and arrive at 
the true expected value of research efforts.212  
 
In the case of broadcasting, transmissions are a technical act and are not 
associated with any uncertainty in terms of success probabilities. Furthermore, 
the act of technical transmission is instantaneous, as discussed in the discussion 
above on ‘lead time’. Therefore, ex post prizes effectively approximate to the case 
of ex ante subsidies in the case of broadcast transmissions. The possibility of 
prizes to solve the public good problems of broadcasting is therefore a moot point.  
 
 
[4]-3.7 Overall Assessment of the Broadcast Problem 
 
The above section shows that many of the non-property rights solutions for public 
good problems that exist in other sectors (e.g. lead time, social norms, intrinsic 
motivations) do not apply to broadcasting markets. However, state provision of 
services and funding has a major role to play. 
 
Certain solutions also evolve out of necessity, such as inducing excludability 
through technical means. Such technical exclusion is also a natural aspect of 
cablecasting. However, one specific market-based solution has always played a 
critical role in traditional broadcasting markets – advertising. As discussed 
previously, by splitting broadcast airtime between programming and advertising 
content, ‘traditional’ broadcasters are able to capture revenue from their services, 
while still providing a service ‘free’ to end-users. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, 
these two-sided markets may create certain market imperfections. Furthermore, 
advertising itself is also associated with possible negative externalities. 
 
The dominance of this approach suggests that – at least historically – broadcasting 
markets have been able to overcome the purported public good problem without 
a major role for private property rights. In fact, in an advertising-funded model, 
free-riding through unauthorised retransmission can actually favour the initial 
broadcaster by expanding the reach of their signals, and hence the value of their 
advertising space.  
 
In any instance, such retransmissions would still be subject to copyright liability 
from content owners, even without a related right for broadcasting organisations. 
If property rights are bypassed, then the risk to content owners is undermining 
their business models based on market segmentation. These issues are discussed 
in Chapter 9. 
 
It would hence appear that the true risk of free-riding (and resulting public good 
problems) are for content where there is an investment made by the broadcaster, 
but for which copyright does not apply. This would include content such as news 
                                                        
212 Prizes for innovation hence constitute what are known as ‘rent-seeking’ games. Such games are 
characterised by competing agents investing in efforts to increase the probability of winning (or 
share of) some fixed prize. Unlike traditional forms of competition, rent-seeking contests result in 
unproductive expenditures and hence allocative inefficiencies. The seminal work on rent-seeking 
games are Tullock (1967). 
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and sports broadcasts. Interestingly however, these are the exact types of content 
where value is very time-sensitive and hence an advantage akin to ‘lead-time’ 
actually might mitigate the public good problem.  
 
As a final comment, the role of technological progress in broadcasting cannot be 
understated. The large capital investments associated with traditional 
broadcasting have given way to lower cost engineering solutions which make 
more efficient use of spectrum and other resources. Practices of sharing 
infrastructure to reduce capital requirements – both led by market forces and 
regulatory policies – reap the economies of scale and scope in providing 
information services.  
 
The phenomenon of convergence also plays an important role. Information 
services such as telephony, broadband internet access, and digital broadcasting 
are now supplied via the same networks, and since cumulative demand for these 
services drives investment in infrastructure, modern broadcast platforms benefit 
from large economies of scope. As such, the general claim of public good problems 
in broadcasting are not only likely overstated, but actually reducing in intensity.  
 
 
[4]-4 FRAGMENTING THE BROADCASTING SECTOR  
 
The above sections summarised some of the key policy goals and market 
characteristics that prevail in the broadcasting sector. The following section 
returns to the analysis of broadcasters’ related rights, and focuses on how 
property rights relate to the public good problem of broadcast transmissions.  
 
The main idea of this section is that that the goal of promoting content distribution 
is conditioned by the type of content under consideration. Since broadcasting 
services are a form of distribution, it is necessary to take a step back and dissect 
the wider creative industries in which the initial content is produced in the first 
place.  
 
Generally, the discussions in this manuscript consider ‘commercial content’ in 
generic terms assuming that content is produced with the goal of profit-
maximisation and is subject to copyright protection. The following section sets out 
two special cases, which provide for an interesting analysis of how different types 
of content interface with the copyright and related rights regime.  
 
Before stating these two cases however, it should be recalled that in the base case 
(copyright protected market-based content) a broadcaster’s right would be a 
‘layer’ on top of the primary copyright that exists in the underlying work. As such, 
one of the core concerns with expansion of broadcasters’ rights is that the result 
may be a form of an anti-commons effect.213 An anti-commons effect arises when 
a property right over a resource is fragmented over multiple rightsholders, 
                                                        
213 For seminal works on anti-commons effects, see Michelman (1982), Heller (1998) and Yoon 
(2000). 
110 
leading to coordination problems, market inefficiencies, and reduced social 
welfare.214 
 
Furthermore, there is the major concern that broadcaster’s rights may result in a 
contraction of the public domain, as a result of a new right applying to content 
which would otherwise not fall within the scope of primary copyright protection. 
In any instance, given that the intellectual property system is designed to 
incentivise production (and distribution) of content, granting protection over 
content which would otherwise still be produced without incentives would result 
in inefficient market power without any corresponding/offsetting welfare 
creation. 
 
[4]-4.1 Special Cases of Audiovisual Content  
 
The first special case is that of parliamentary proceedings, political speeches, and 
judicial proceedings. Unlike commercially oriented content, there is no need to 
create economic incentives for parliamentary proceedings and as such, this 
content is not copyright eligible in many jurisdictions.215 
 
In principle, civic duty, political responsibility, and administrative accountability 
should be the driving forces of parliamentary proceedings, political speeches and 
judicial proceedings. In reality, income and prestige are also driving forces; in the 
case of parliamentarians and politicians, the desire to appeal to constituents and 
gain re-election are also relevant. In any case, in many jurisdictions, live or pre-
recorded broadcasts of parliamentary proceedings are available to the public.  
 
In the case of broadcasts of parliamentary proceedings therefore, a broadcaster’s 
right represents a new layer right over content that would otherwise be free from 
copyright protection; the result is effectively a restriction of the public domain, 
and hence a possible reduction of social welfare. This example is useful to support 
arguments that the scope of broadcasting rights (at least limitations and 
exemptions) should be at least as strict as those corresponding to primary 
copyright protection scope.216 
 
The second special case is that of sporting events. It is needless to say that the 
international sporting industry is a multi-billion-dollar sphere of commercial 
activity. In many cases, the vast majority of revenue in this sector is generated 
                                                        
214 For the sake of illustration, consider an end-user who wishes to use a copyright protected work 
by recording the work as received through a commercial broadcast, and using it for some 
subsequent purpose. In order to carry out this activity legally, the end-use may need to obtain 
authorisation from both the owner of the copyright in the underlying work, and the broadcaster 
whose transmission was used.  
215 Article 2bis(1) of the Berne Convention states that “It shall be a matter for legislation in the 
countries of the Union to exclude, wholly or in part, from the protection provided by the preceding 
Article political speeches and speeches delivered in the course of legal proceedings.” 
216 This is the central argument and conclusion of Chapter 5. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 2, 
Article 15(2) of the Rome Convention allows for Member States to legislate limitations and 
exemptions to related rights (including the rights of broadcasting organisations) which are 
equivalent to those provided for in statute in relation to copyright.  
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through the royalties from licencing of broadcasting rights. However, there is an 
interesting issue regarding whether live sporting events themselves constitute 
‘literary and artistic works’ and are hence copyright eligible.  
 
Highly influential case law in both the US and EU suggests that the general trend 
is that performances in sporting events do not constitute copyright protectable 
subject matter. 217  The rationale for this non-eligibility for protection is best 
summarised by the European Court of Justice, which ruled that “...sporting events 
cannot be regarded as intellectual creations classifiable as works within the 
meaning of the Copyright Directive. That applies in particular to football matches, 
which are subject to rules of the game, leaving no room for creative freedom for the 
purposes of copyright. Accordingly, those events cannot be protected under 
copyright. It is, moreover, undisputed that European Union law does not protect 
them on any other basis in the field of intellectual property”.218 
 
However, it is must be noted that there is also a trend in case law where some 
protection is offered to the organisers of sporting events, though the mechanism 
of such protection is generally though misappropriation doctrines of unfair 
competition.219  
 
It is also interesting to note that this trend in case law seems to have resulted in 
two corresponding trends in legislation. Firstly, some jurisdictions have 
introduced a sui generis intellectual property right (distinct from copyright) to 
protect the interests of organisers of sporting events. 220  Secondly, for major 
international sporting events, there is the trend of short-term ‘ad hoc legislation’ 
in event hosting countries.221  
 
Notwithstanding the above trends, for the purpose of theoretical discussions, 
there can be assumed non-eligibility for copyright protection over sporting 
events. Given this absence, it is actually the broadcaster’s right that serves as the 
incentive system to support the international sporting industry. This is especially 
true for major international events where broadcasting rights are the largest 
revenue source (as opposed to other sources such as sponsorships and physical 
ticket sales). Indeed, this special case provides for an interesting contrast with the 
                                                        
217 In the US, the important precedent is ‘NBA’ - (United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 
January 30, 1997, 105 F.3d 841, The National Basketball Association and NBA Properties, Inc. v. 
Motorola, Inc. and Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Systems, Inc.). 
In the EU, the important precedent is ‘Premier League’ and ‘Karen Murphy’  - (European Court of 
Justice 4 October 2011, joined cases (C-403/08) and (C-429/08), Football Association Premier 
League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others, and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services 
Ltd.). 
218 ECJ Karen Murphy and Premier League Judgement  
219 For discussion on this trend, see Hylton (2011) 
220 For example, see (i) Article L. 333-1-1 of the France Code du Sport, or (ii) Article 42 of Brazil’s 
Pele Law (Lei 9615/98). 
221 For example, see (i) Australia’s ‘Sydney 2000 Games (Indicia and Images) Protection Act 1996’, 
or (ii) South Africa’s ‘2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Special Measures Act, 2006’. For general 
discussion on such ‘ad hoc legislation’, see Andriychuk (2008).  
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base case of typical commercial content, as the broadcasters’ rights serves the dual 
purpose of incentivising both production and dissemination (distribution).  
 
The two special cases above are taken just as practical examples. In general, there 
are likely several other types of content that might not be protected by copyright 
at all might actually need no need some incentives for production. 
 
 
[4]-4.2 Incentive Structures and Market Outcomes 
 
As mentioned multiple times in the preceding sections, the purpose of copyright 
is to incentivise production of creative works. Conceptually, despite a possible 
public good problem, some works would still be produced in the absence of 
copyright protection (albeit at a sub-optimal quantity). Therefore, this economic 
basis can be used to define two conceptual categories of works: (i) works that 
would be produced even without incentives, and (ii) works that would only be 
produced with incentives. 
 
Furthermore, from the discussion above,)above, there are certain special cases in 
terms of what types of works qualify for copyright protection. This legal basis can 
also be used to separate works into two groups: (i) works that are copyright 
eligible, and (ii) works that are not copyright eligible.  Combining this legal 
distinction with the economic distinction made above, there are four possible 
classifications for works.  
 
For works that need incentives to be produced and are eligible for copyright 
protection, the intellectual property system successfully serves its role of 
incentivising production. For works that do not need incentives to be produced, 
but are still copyright eligible, the market outcome is one of a deadweight loss. 
This is because the welfare-reducing market power granted by virtue of the 
property right is not offset by any corresponding welfare-increasing production 
(as the work would have been produced even without the reward of market 
power).222 
 
The special cases identified above come into play during the analysis of non-
copyright-eligible subject matter. In the case where there is a need for incentives 
for production, there is a resulting market failure of a public good problem; i.e., 
there is underproduction of the good since the lack of copyright eligibility means 
that the necessary incentive system is not in place. This may be the special case of 
commercial sports programming.  
 
In the instance that there is no need for incentives, and the content under 
consideration is non-copyright-eligible, it can be said that there is ‘natural 
                                                        
222  It is useful to note the trend in artistic communities of using Creative Commons licensing 
schemes, in order to mitigate this issue of deadweight losses for works that do not need market 
incentives. For a discussion on Creative Commons, and new attitudes towards copyright, see Goss 
(2007).  
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efficiency’; that is to say, that the market comes to an efficient outcome outside of 
the intellectual property system. These themes are summarised in the table below. 
 
Copyright and Types of 
Audiovisual Content 
Economic Question 
Need Incentives No Need for Incentives 
Legal 
Question 
Protected 
Efficient IPR 
(Base case - effective solution of  
Public Good problem) 
Deadweight Loss 
(Due to Market Power) 
Not 
Protected 
Underproduction 
(Due to Public Good Problem) 
Natural Efficiency 
(Non-IP Solution: e.g.: Parliament, 
Public Broadcasting) 
Table 4.2: Copyright Protection and Market Outcomes 
 
In order to consider how broadcasters’ rights affect market outcomes, we consider 
the respective cases when the types of works discussed above are included in the 
programming schedule of a broadcasting organisation. Therefore, irrespective of 
whether the original work was copyright-eligible, the transmission is protected 
by a broadcaster’s related right. 
 
For the case of copyright-eligible works that do need incentives, the market 
outcome moves from ‘efficient’ to one in which there is a possible anti-commons 
effect. This is because an end-user that wishes to use the broadcast transmission 
must now seek authorisation from both the copyright holder and the related rights 
holder. The situation is even worse in the case of copyright-eligible works that do 
not need incentives, as this anti-commons effect now prevails alongside the 
previous existing deadweight loss.223 
For works that are non-copyright-eligible and need incentives to be produced, the 
market outcome goes from ‘underproduction’ to ‘efficient’. In this case, the 
broadcaster’s related right essentially serves as a substitute for initial copyright 
protection, and hence the needed incentives are provided, albeit through a 
different legal instrument.224 
 
In the case of works that do not need incentives to be produced, and are non-
copyright eligible, the market outcome goes from ‘natural efficiency’ to 
‘deadweight loss’, as works which would otherwise be in the public domain are 
                                                        
223 Note however that these anti-commons effects only truly exist if the broadcasting signal is the 
only means of accessing the embedded copyright-protected work. In principle, the end-user can 
alternatively go directly to the original copyright holder to obtain authorisation. This situation is 
briefly discussed  later in this chapter. 
224 This is a simplified case however, as it implicitly assumes that the organization producing the 
content to be broadcast is also engaging in the technical transmission itself. In reality, these 
practices may be a bit more complex. In the case of sporting events, the entities organizing events 
may control access to the event by physical limitations on which broadcasters are able to access 
the premises and install their transmission equipment. This controlled access essentially serves as 
a substitute for ‘broadcasting rights’ (within the copyright bundle of rights), where the content 
(sporting performance) under consideration is not copyright eligible.  
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now subject to private property rights. However, it should be noted that this 
would only be the case if there were neither a need for market-based incentives 
to produce nor distribute the content. This is likely the case for content where the 
positive externalities associated with information dissemination provide the basis 
for the state to engage in distribution activities. Indeed, this would adequately 
describe the situation for the special case of parliamentary proceedings, and more 
generally, the content associated with public broadcasting services. These themes 
are summarised in the table below.  
 
Copyright and Types of 
Audiovisual Content 
Economic Question 
Need Incentives No Need for Incentives 
Legal 
Question 
Protected Possible  Anti-commons effect 
Deadweight Loss and 
Possible Anti-commons effect 
Not 
Protected 
Efficient IPR 
(new layer of rights solve 
initial market failure) 
Possible Deadweight 
Loss 
Table 4.3: Related Rights Protection and Market Outcomes  
 
These negative outcomes, particularly those relating to anti-commons effects 
assume the extreme case where a user can only access a work through a broadcast 
transmission; i.e., there is no other option but to obtain authorisation from both 
rightsholders. It is therefore useful to analyse these notions of anti-commons 
effects in a less strict case. Such an analysis is presented in the following section. 
 
 
[4]-4.3 Competition with Fragmented Rights 
 
The literature on anti-commons effects suggest that total market price can actually 
increase where property rights are fragmented amongst multiple rightsholders. 
This is especially true when coordination problems arise due to sequential pricing. 
The essence of this effect is that underutilisation of a resource arises due to the 
ability of multiple rightsholders to withhold authorisation.  
 
However, the case being discussed is not a true anti-commons scenario, as access 
to a copyright protected work can be gained directly from the primary copyright 
holder, without necessary authorisation from the broadcaster. Therefore, in 
principle, there is competition between the copyright-holder (exercising sole 
exclusive rights), and the copyright-holder and broadcaster together (both 
possessing the complimentary rights). In such a case, competition drives the cost 
of access to a level that mitigates any possibility of an anti-commons effect.  
 
A rudimentary analysis of this competition is presented in Annex 3 of this 
manuscript. This analysis demonstrates two key points. Firstly, if the royalty rate 
charged by the copyright-holder is fixed, then the royalty rate charged by the 
broadcaster must be set lower than the transaction costs for the consumer to 
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unilaterally locate and negotiate with the copyright holder. Secondly, and more 
importantly, it demonstrates that the possibility of anti-commons effects (as 
induced by introduction of broadcasters’ rights as a layer on top of initial 
copyright) are limited to circumstances where the only way to access a work is 
through a broadcast. This may indeed be true for certain types of works where the 
copyright owner is not easily identifiable (‘orphan works’), or where the 
broadcaster is the only licensee with access to the content - either through an 
exclusive licence, or where the broadcaster is the agent who actually engaged in 
the initial fixation of the work (e.g. broadcast of a live event).  
  
 
[4]-5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter posed the research question of “What are the key features of the 
markets in which broadcasting organisations exist”. Firstly, these markets are 
defined by various unique characteristics, which lead to specific policy and 
regulatory issues. One of the key market failures in this regard are various 
dimensions of the externalities associated with broadcast programming.   
 
Another is the supposed prevalence of a public good problem in the provision of 
broadcasting services; this is the issue that the related rights of broadcasting 
organisations are meant to address. Due the complexity of the market 
environment however, it is important that intellectual property rights be seen as 
one element in a larger set of policy tools.  
 
In terms of this public good problem, it was discussed that there exist various 
solutions which mitigate the issue of underproduction without private property 
rights. These solutions range from interventionist (public broadcasting), technical 
(technological protection measures, and network protocols), to purely market 
based (advertising). Furthermore, it was noted that the role of digitisation and 
convergence further reduce the likelihood of suboptimal investment. As such, 
public good problems in the provision of broadcasting services are likely to be 
overstated. 
 
Further to the issue of public good problems, it can be recalled from Chapter 3 that 
even in the absence of broadcasters’ rights, it might be possible for a broadcaster’s 
programme schedule to be protected by some other property right such as a sui 
generis database right. Such a right can be seen as ‘protecting’ a broadcasters’ 
investment in assembling a unique programme schedule, and adding-value 
though the process of bundling. However, there is simply no reason to believe that 
any public good problem in unique programme bundles (akin to databases) exists. 
There is no evidence that large-scale appropriation of schedules occurs between 
broadcasters wishing to independently reproduce the programming schedules of 
their competitors. Hence, while the activity of content bundling by broadcasters 
does indeed create value, this in itself cannot be a basis for justifying unique 
related rights.   
 
This chapter also discussed that the effects of broadcasters’ rights depend on the 
type of broadcasting content contained in a transmission. In many cases, such 
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rights can result in welfare-reducing social costs due to anti-commons effects, 
unnecessary market power, and limiting access to the public domain.  
 
However, one major understated function of broadcasters’ rights is that they serve 
to close a gap in the intellectual property system for content such as sports 
performances, which are not copyright eligible. This however neither fits within 
the purported justifications for broadcasters’ rights discussed in Chapter 3, nor 
does it serve as a policy solution specifically formulated for this specific problem. 
Hence, this might suggest that the economic rationale for these rights are 
misplaced. This further reinforces the conclusions in Chapter 3 that these rights 
have a very uneasy fit within the overall intellectual property system.  
 
Like with all forms of intellectual property, the concern of the policy-maker is to 
strike the optimal balance between different competing interests. If broadcasters’ 
right do have some value in incentivising content production, these benefits must 
be balanced with the possible resulting socials costs.  
 
If broadcasting services are associated with positive externalities, then it is 
welfare generating to increase distribution and use of programming content. The 
question is whether related rights are necessary to incentivise this distribution 
and whether they do have such an intended effect. A lack of property rights might 
reduce some forms of content dissemination if the public good problem really 
does exist. However, overbroad rights might reduce content dissemination by 
restricting access and use of content by both consumers and other parties such as 
retransmitters. The natural question is therefore one of appropriate scope of these 
rights, and it is on this matter that next part of this manuscript focusses.  
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PART III: MODELLING BROADCASTERS’ RIGHTS 
 
CHAPTER 5: INCENTIVE-ACCESS MODEL OF COPYRIGHT 
 
Part III of this manuscript focuses on modelling approaches to the topic of 
broadcasters’ rights, and their relationship to copyright. This chapter specifically 
analyses the question of ‘optimal scope of protection’. While Chapter 5 provides 
the technical modelling background to how this manuscript approaches this 
question, it leaves some practical elements of the discussion for the subsequent 
Chapter 6. Chapter 7 also uses a modelling approach to analyse the issue of rights 
enforcement in broadcasting markets. This part is therefore the main part of this 
manuscript that explicitly employs a Law and Economics methodology. 
 
 
[5]-1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The underlying research question in this chapter is “What is the optimal scope of 
protection for the related rights of broadcasting organisations?” The approach used 
to answer this question is an attempt to analyse how existing models of optimal 
scope of copyrights and patents can apply to the unique subject matter of 
broadcast signals.  
 
However, it is observed that the industrial organisation based models which are 
prominent in the existing literature on optimal scope of intellectual property 
rights are not well suited for adaptation to the subject matter under analysis. As 
such, a more high-level welfare oriented approach is needed; in this regard, the 
model of Valkonen and White (2006) 225  is used. This chapter sketches the 
Valkonen and White model, and discusses how the key parameters apply in the 
case of specific characteristics of broadcasting signals as intellectual property 
subject matter.  
 
This analysis concludes with the general result that the optimal level of protection 
for broadcast signals should be set lower than that for general copyright. This 
general result is further applied to the case of anti-circumvention provisions, to 
discuss why liberal limitation and exemptions to the rights of broadcasting 
organisations are necessary.  
 
 
[5]-2 DOMINANT ANALYTICAL APPROACHES 
 
This section briefly discusses existing approaches to the question of modelling 
intellectual property protection, and the issues encountered in attempting to 
apply these approaches to the case of broadcasters’ related rights.  
 
 
                                                        
225 Valkonen and White (2006) - Economic Model for the Incentive/Access Paradigm of Copyright 
Propertization: An Argument in Support of the Orphan Works Act, An. Hastings Comm. & Ent. LJ, 29, 
359. 
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[5]-2.1 Literature on Welfare Approaches to IPRs 
 
The literature on intellectual property is very wide in terms of the various 
analytical approaches employed. As discussed in Chapter 3, theoretical 
perspectives on IPRs generally comprise of two main branches: utilitarian and 
non-utilitarian perspectives. Welfare based approaches, i.e. those whose roots are 
generally based on the tools of economic analysis, fall into the utilitarian branch, 
which would include the analysis of issues of ‘optimal scope’.   
 
As Chapter 3 already provided a literature review of theories of intellectual 
property, it is not necessary to repeat such here. However, what is important is to 
recall the foundations laid by the likes of Pigou (1924) who noted the 
appropriability problem for inventions, and Arrow (1962), who noted the zero 
marginal cost nature of information.  
 
In terms of actually modelling the scope of protection of intellectual property 
rights, Nordhaus (1967) provides the seminal model in the case of patent 
protection, which was later expanded on by Gilbert and Shipiro (1990). In the case 
of copyright protection, the seminal work in modelling remains Landes and 
Posner (1989).  
 
 
[5]-2.2 Applicability of Analytical Approaches 
 
Further to the literature mentioned above and discussed in Chapter 1, an attempt 
to apply existing models of optimal IPR scope would likely begin with an analysis 
of Nordhaus (1967) and Gilbert and Shipiro (1990) in the case of patents, and 
Landes and Posner (1989) in the case of copyright. While there are indeed several 
other models and authors that can be considered, these three papers serve well to 
capture the overall methodological approach used to address the question of 
optimal scope.  
 
The models set out by these authors (and those building upon their work) largely 
analyse the issue of scope of IPRs by considering industrial organisation and 
market structure issues. The property entitlement is seen as a form of market 
power that permits the rightsholder to charge a price above marginal cost by 
preventing competitors from using the protected technology or work. The main 
theme is therefore the trade-off between welfare-enhancing private gains from 
new works and technologies, and the welfare-decreasing deadweight losses 
induced by property-right-derived market power.   
 
Consequently, these models are generally focussed on ‘copying’ – in the case of 
patents, the ability of a competitor to appropriate a given technology, and in the 
case of copyright, the ability of a competitor to reproduce a given work. 
Unfortunately, these ‘copy-centric’ models do not lend themselves well for 
adaptation to the case of broadcast signals where the key issues are not akin to 
copying per se, but are rather rights regarding issues such as fixation and 
retransmission. This stems from the fact that unlike patents and copyrights that 
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are designed to incentivise production activities, broadcasters’ rights are designed 
to incentivise distribution activities.  
 
In essence, the main thrust of both copyright and patent law has come from the 
concept of unauthorised appropriation of ideas. As such, while the current 
structure of copyright law is that copyright is a ‘bundle’ of several different rights 
(e.g. reproduction, public performance, communication, rental, attribution, etc.), 
the analytical focus has always been based on the core issue of copying (i.e. the 
right of reproduction).  
 
In the case of broadcast signals however, this sense of emphasis on a ‘copying’ is 
not particularly instructive, even though the acts of fixation and retransmission 
can be considered as forms of ‘copying’. As such, the industrial organisation basis 
of the dominant analytical approaches is not particularly useful for analysis of 
broadcaster’s rights.  
 
Building on the framework of Landes and Posner (the ‘L-P Model’), Valkonen and 
White (2006) present a more generalised model for copyright that is not explicitly 
based on industrial organisation foundations. While the Valkonen and White 
model (‘V-W Model’) is certainly much less widely known than the L-P Model, it 
does provide a general framework that can be adapted to the cases of different 
respective subject matters. The next two sub-sections attempt to review the key 
premises of the L-P and V-W Models, and how the V-W framework can be adapted 
to the case of broadcasters’ rights.  
 
 
[5]-3 MODEL FOR INCENTIVE-ACCESS PARADIGM 
 
This section outlines the main technical elements of the Landes-Posner, and the 
Valkonen-White models. 
 
 
[5]-3.1 Degree of Propertisation 
   
The L-P Model conceives of a single parameter ‘z’ which captures all elements 
related to copyright protection, including issues of length and breadth. This 
parameter hence connotes the ‘degree of propertisation’ and ranges between zero 
and one; zero represents a complete absence of copyright, and one represents 
absolute propertisation without limits.  
 
0 ≤ z ≤ 1 
 
The simplicity of a single variable implies that it accounts for both statutory 
considerations (e.g. length of copyright entitlements as set out in legislation), and 
judicial considerations (e.g. the stringency of the standards and tests applied by 
courts when making determinations on potential infringements). Hence, z is 
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essentially a vector of various legal considerations that affect copyright scope (zi), 
and the optimal level z* is a weighted function of the elements zi*.226 
 
Obviously, the optimal level of protection (and hence each element itself) is case 
specific – both in terms of the type of work and author, and the type of use under 
consideration. For example, a novelist and an architect may have very different 
production functions, and hence the incentives needed to stimulate production of 
works (e.g. copyright length) are different for both.  Similarly, a literature 
professor who wishes to quote the author’s novel and a visual artist who wishes 
to reproduce the architect’s building as a sculpture certainly have different utility 
functions in terms of using the respective copyright protected works. However, 
the L-P model considers the ‘average case’ of copyright works, and is hence an 
overall generalisation of the various subject matters, beneficiaries, and types of 
users within the domain of the copyright system. 
 
For completeness of discussion, it is noted here that in general, intellectual 
property rights are a second best solution by construction. This stems from the 
fact alluded to above that different agents would require different incentives to 
produce different outputs, depending on their particular preferences, non-
property right incentives, and production functions. As such, the first best solution 
would always be to grant an ad-hoc property right that is specifically tailored on 
an individual case-by-case basis that creates no more deadweight loss than that 
which is necessary to push the creator over the margin of indifference between 
production and non-production. However, there are many obvious problems with 
such a notion, where the core issues would include the following: 
 
(i) The massive information asymmetries which would exist between the 
potential creator and the property right granting entity; 
(ii) The significant decision costs which would be incurred in attempting to 
tailor a unique property grant for every single case of potential 
creation; and  
(iii) The unintended consequence of a counterbalancing disincentivisation 
effect due to uncertainty surrounding the nature of a property grant 
which is only granted on an ex post basis.  
 
As such, intellectual property rights are seen as a second best solution where 
various different creators, types of works, and types of users are pooled together 
so as to optimise the efficiency of the system at the ‘average’ level.  
Notwithstanding the fact that in some jurisdictions, the nuances of copyright law 
are slightly tailored to different subject matter (e.g. by granted different 
protection terms for different classes of works), it is indeed the general case that 
copyright law (and patent law) is structured to consider the ‘average case’.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
226 The issue of optimizing z as opposed to the elements zi is discussed in a later section.  
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[5]-3.2  Benefit Function 
 
Building on the premises of the L-P model, the V-W Model conceives of a social 
benefit function (W) that is dependent on the level of investment in works (I), the 
average social value of a work (v), and a discount rate (r). 
 
W = (I)(v/r) 
  
The level of investment I is a positive function of the level of propertisation (z). 
Furthermore, the investment function has two important characteristics. Firstly, 
it contains some given level of ‘independent investment’ that prevails even in the 
complete absence of copyright protection. Secondly, the function is subject to 
diminishing return to z, and hence adopts a concave shape. This is because the 
marginal incentives to creators are inherently higher closer to the core of an initial 
property grant, as opposed to periphery of the expanding boundary of copyright 
scope.  
 
The investment function is hence defined as follows: 
 
I = f(z) 
 
 dI/dz = f’(z) > 0 
 d2I/dz2 = f’’(z) < 0 
 When z = 0, f(z) = α 
 
V-W supposed that a possible characterisation of this function is I = α + log(z) 
  
 
[5]-3.3 Cost Function 
 
Again, building on L-P, V-W conceives of two categories of cost – (i) Coasean costs, 
and (ii) Market Imperfection costs. 
 
Coasean costs are those that exist in a ‘frictionless society’, i.e. a Coasean world 
devoid of transaction costs.  This is essentially the deadweight loss to society from 
market power and resulting exclusionary practices. V-W note that the relationship 
between this cost category and the degree of propertisation are difficult to specify 
a priori. For example, the z-component of length would likely have a concave 
shape, as the welfare-reducing effect of an additional year of protection is 
inherently less when consideration extensions further away from the date of 
original creation. However, for a z-component such as restrictions on the doctrine 
of fair use (or more generally limitations and exemptions to copyright), an 
increase in propertisation restricts more and more activities at the expanding 
boundaries of the copyright, hence leading to the possibility of a convex 
relationship. Nevertheless, for simplicity, V-M model the Coasean cost function as 
linear, where ρ represents the average deadweight loss associated with a 
copyright work.  
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The second cost component in the V-M model is called ‘market imperfection costs’, 
and are those related to transaction costs (including search and enforcement 
costs).227 This function is convex, as the further the extensions of the boundaries 
of a right, the lower the threshold for activities which require authorisation. 
Therefore, increasing z means an increased number of claims and licencing 
requests which may have otherwise been exempted under a lower value of z (for 
example under a de minimus exception). Furthermore, unlike real property, 
extensions of the boundaries of an intellectual property right may be associated 
with increased uncertainty as to where the boundary/border actually ends.228 V-
W suggests that a possible specification may be an exponential function. 
 
The total cost function is hence a summation of the Coasean cost function and the 
market imperfection cost function.  
 
 
Coasean Costs:    Cq = zρ 
 dCq/dz > 0 
 d2Cq/dz2 = 0 
Market Imperfection Costs:  Cm = zδ, where δ>1 
 dCm/dz > 0 
 d2Cm/dz2 > 0 
 
Total Costs:    C = Cq + Cm 
          C = zρ + zδ 
 dC/dz > 0 
 d2C/dz2 > 0 
 
 
[5]-3.4 Net Welfare 
 
Obviously, the net welfare function is the difference between the social benefit and 
social cost functions. Since, the social benefit function (W) is concave, and the 
social cost function (C) is convex, the welfare function (N = W – C) takes the form 
of an inverted parabola. As such, there exists a distinct point z* which corresponds 
to maximum social welfare (i.e. optimal scope of copyright protection). 
 
                                                        
227 Some readers might note that the use of the terms ‘Coasean Costs’ (for costs in a ‘frictionless 
world’; i.e. without transaction costs), and ‘Market Imperfection Costs’ (for transaction costs) 
might seem counterintuitive. However, the original terminologies are used to be consistent with 
the original model.  
228 On this point, it is duly noted that the issue of uncertainty mainly arises for intermediate levels 
of z. At very low values of z, users may reasonably assume that the majority of possible uses do not 
require authorisation, as the property right is weak; at very high values of z, the opposite is true – 
users may assume that the majority of uses do require authorisation, as the property right is very 
strong. There is no uncertainty at the extremes (values of 0 and 1).  
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Figure 5.1: Net Welfare for General Copyright Case 
 
 
[5]-4 APPLICATION TO BROADCAST SIGNALS  
 
The V-W model summarised above is admittedly crude and very generalised.  
However, its general nature makes it easily adaptable to compare various subject 
matters. In order to consider the question of scope of protection for broadcast 
signals, we may hence analyse how the intuitions and conjectures underlying the 
model apply to this unique subject matter.229 
 
 
[5]-4.1 Benefit Function 
 
In the case of the social benefit function, the critical departure from the case of 
‘average copyright work’ is the applied discount rate (r). Recall that the nature of 
a broadcast signal is to bundle various works (which may or may not themselves 
be subject to copyright protection). It is hereby conjectured that the discount rate 
for a broadcast signal (and the embedded bundle of works) is significantly greater 
than that for typical copyright works.  
 
Firstly, the value of the bundle itself is tied to time-specific consumer preferences 
and trends in the entertainment industry. Therefore, even if the value of 
individually bundled works depreciates relatively slowly over time, the value of a 
                                                        
229 In the following discussion a ‘prime’ variable represents the case of the broadcast signal subject 
matter (e.g. where z is the degree of propertisation for general copyright protected works, z’ 
represents the degree of propertisation in the case of broadcast signals). 
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given bundle depreciates much more rapidly, as the complementarity between the 
bundled elements deteriorates. For example, consider that even if a user enjoys a 
particular radio programme made and distributed fifty years ago, they will not 
necessarily enjoy the totality of broadcast schedule in which that programme was 
initially included. In economic terms, it is postulated here that the positive 
correlation between the utilities of individual programme schedule elements 
decreases overtime, irrespective of the absolute value of the individual utilities.  
 
Secondly, the very technical nature of a broadcast is that it exists as a transient 
and non-material form. By definition, a broadcast is a frequency or 
electromagnetic signal that persists only for duration in which the broadcast is 
actively transmitted. As such, it is impossible to derive value from the signal itself 
after the transmission has ceased, as it fails to perpetually exist in physical form, 
although its content may be perpetuated in ‘derived’ forms such as specific 
fixations.230  
 
Following from the above discussion, it is conjectured that the discount rate for 
broadcast signals (r’) is significantly greater than that which applies in the case of 
general copyright (r). 
 
r << r’ 
 
In terms of the other key variables in the social benefit function, an intuition for 
broadcast signal subject matter is much less obvious. For the level of independent 
investment (α), it is quite likely that the applicable level for the case of broadcast 
signals is greater. In the complete absence of copyright, an author or creator may 
have little potential (beyond the lead time due to the delay of copiers entering into 
the market) to accrue revenues. The entry of copiers pushes price down to 
marginal cost, and since copyright protected works are information goods with 
zero (or negligible) marginal costs, market price falls to zero. However, in the case 
of broadcast signals, broadcasters are able to capture significant revenues even 
without property rights; in fact, this is the business model of the two-sided-market 
that has underpinned the broadcasting industry for decades.231 Hence, we can 
conjecture that the level of revenue potentially accruing in the two-sided market, 
and hence the incentive to invest in the absence of a property right (β) is much 
greater than the independent investment in the case of general copyright. 
 
β > α 
 
In addition to the level of independent investment, the actual shape of the 
investment function may also differ. General copyright activity can conceptually 
cover a very wide range of activities and potential uses. However, the range of 
                                                        
230 However, control over fixation of content embedded in signals is quite different to other aspects 
of broadcasters’ rights, as it often directly relates to issues more akin to primary copyright 
(production), rather than broadcasting activities (distribution). In this regard, it can be noted hoe 
the concept of post-fixation rights creates various conceptual problems, particularly where it 
overlaps with underlying copyright.  
231 Chapter 3 provided a discussion on issues of two-sided-market equilibrium in broadcasting 
markets. 
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activities that may derive value from broadcasts is generally more limited. As such, 
most of the incentivisation effects of property rights are closer to the core of the 
broadcasters’ rights (i.e. more concentrated at the initial levels of propertisation). 
Commercial-scale activities further towards the boundaries of extensions of the 
property rights are rare for broadcast signals, and hence likely have even less 
revenue generating potential than the case of general copyright. The result is that 
it is very likely that the incentive function for broadcasters exhibits quicker and 
more substantial diminishing returns, as compared to the case of general 
copyright. We may relate then concavity of the broadcaster’s investment curve to 
that of the general copyright investment curve by some factor θ < 1.   
 
For example, if: I = α + log(z) 
                               then: I’ = β + log(θz) 
 
The last remaining key variable is the ‘average value’ of the subject matter under 
protection (v). As stressed in Chapter 3, the role of general copyright is to 
incentivise production, while the role of broadcasting rights is to incentivise 
distribution. The value of a broadcast is hence inherently tied to two factors: (i) 
the value of the work(s) embedded in the broadcast, and (ii) the extent to which 
the broadcast acts as the primary mode of distributing the work to the public. We 
may hence postulate that the value of a broadcast is a function of the value of 
copyright protected works by some factor λ (i.e., v' = λv). Given that a broadcast 
signal is only indirectly demanded (i.e. its utility is derived solely from the utility 
of the underlying work being distributed), it is quite reasonable to postulate that 
v is the upper-boundary of v’; this is to say that the average value of a broadcast 
cannot logically exceed the average value of an average copyright protected work 
(i.e. λ ≤ 1).232 , 233  
 
Additionally, a given copyright protected work can be embodied in various forms 
and those forms can be communicated in various ways. A broadcast of a work is a 
very specific form of distribution of a particular embodiment. As such, a general 
argument can be made that the average social value of a broadcast work is less 
than that of an average work.234 
                                                        
232 However, it is acknowledged that a rebuttal to this conjecture is that the positive correlation of 
utilities of the elements of a bundle may lead to complementarities that result in a total utility 
greater than the sum of the utilities of the individual elements. In such a case, the value of a 
broadcast which bundles n works together may be greater than nv, hence implying that on 
average, v’ can actually be greater than v when the complementarity effect on total utility is very 
strong.  
233 Interestingly, it might be possible that for come very specific works, the only value might be 
that derived from broadcast transmission. Firstly, such content might be content produced outside 
of a purely commercial context (e.g. a programming segment providing an emergency information 
bulletin). This might also more generally be time-sensitive (or ‘live’) programming such as sports 
and news broadcasts; as discussed in Chapter 4, these categories should be seen as special cases. 
In any case, the very nature of the process of designing an intellectual property is to consider the 
average case within the subject matter classification, and such ‘broadcast-only’ value works would 
unlikely represent a majority of total transmitted works.  
234 For example, consider a copyright protected short story, which can be embodied in the form of 
a literary work and subsequently be distributed as physical books for sale. Alternatively, the work 
can be performed and fixed (embodied) as a short film, and distributed via broadcast. That same 
embodiment can also be distributed via the sale of physical DVDs. Hence, the broadcast represents 
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Furthermore, on the issue of competing modes of distribution, trends in the 
entertainment industry certainly suggest that the role of broadcasting as a 
primary means of content distribution is diminishing. Even within the 
communications industry, end-users are shifting from traditional broadcasting 
services (centralised programme scheduling and one-way communication) 
towards new de-centralized and two-communication modes of distribution (e.g. 
video on demand services), which do not constitute the act of broadcasting for the 
purpose of copyright law. The result is that the value of ‘λ’ is also likely decreasing 
with changes in technology and the culture of content consumption.  
 
v' = λv 
where λ≤1 
 
[5]-4.2 Cost Function 
 
In terms of Coasean Costs, the relevant variable to analyse is that of ‘average 
deadweight loss’. Intuitively, the social value of a good and the deadweight loss 
associated with market power over that good are proportionally related. 235 
Generally, we may assume that the ratio between social value (v) and deadweight 
loss (ρ) is constant over different classes of copyright protected works. Since, λ 
represented the relationship between value in the cases of copyright general and 
broadcast signals (v' = λv), this same factor can be used to relate respective 
deadweight losses. 
 
v/ρ = v’/ρ’ 
v' = λv 
 
ρ’ = λρ  
where λ≤1 
 
However, further adjustments need to be made to this relationship, which will be 
revisited shortly after the below discussion on anti-commons effects. 
 
For cost functions, the most substantial divergence from the general copyright 
case comes into play for market imperfection costs. It is hereby conjectured here 
                                                        
a very specific embodiment and distribution whose expressive scope is much less than the 
underlying short story itself, which may be embodied and distributed in several alternative ways. 
The broadcast hence may have lower social value than the underlying work due to its limited 
expressive scope. It is noted though that this may not necessarily always be the case, as there may 
be examples of low value works whose value increased because of the efforts and talents of 
individual performers (think about great actors who excelled in otherwise average movies). 
However, in such cases the increase in social value is derived through performers’ rights (which 
are distinct concepts and property entitlements) rather than any inherent change in the social 
value of the underlying copyright protected work. 
235  Deadweight loss arises because some users are excluded from the market because their 
willingness to pay is less than the price charged (which is above marginal cost due to property 
right-derived market power). For goods with a high average social value, the cost of exclusion is 
likely to be correspondingly high. Similarly, for goods with a low social value, the cost of exclusion 
is likely to be similarly low.  
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that transactions costs are inherently higher in the case of broadcast signals. This 
is because the broadcasters’ rights are effectively a secondary right as they are 
‘neighbouring onto the rights of copyright’. As discussed in Chapter 4, this may 
lead to anti-commons effects for certain types of content, as a user who wishes to 
use a work as embodied in a broadcast would need to attain authorisation from 
both the broadcaster and the rightsholder in the embedded work.  
 
Any transaction costs that exist in the case of the general copyright case hence also 
exist in the case of broadcast signals, in addition to further transaction costs that 
arise due to the need to negotiate with two classes of rightsholders. However, as 
noted in Chapter 4, this anti-commons effect might be limited by the extent to 
which a user is able to find and negotiate directly with the copyright holder, as 
opposed to negotiating through the broadcaster and being subject the need for a 
dual licence. This hence relates to the extent that a broadcast is the primary means 
of accessing a particular work (which was one of the components of the parameter 
λ discussed above). We may hence isolate the ‘broadcast as access medium’ 
component (ε) from the other factors that are captured in the variable λ. This 
additional degree of transaction costs can be incorporated into the market 
imperfection cost function as follows: 
 
Cm = z(δ + ε) 
where δ>1, and ε≤λ≤1 
 
Now, revisiting the Coasean Cost function, it is useful to recognise that the 
possibility of an anti-commons effect not only has implications for transactions 
costs, but also for deadweight loss, as an anti-commons is associated with 
underutilisation of a given resource. Hence, the component ε should also be 
incorporated into the Coasean cost function to account for this additional 
deadweight loss.236   
 
ρ’ = (λ+ ε)ρ  
C’q = z(λ+ ε)ρ 
 
Summing the two cost functions yields the following total cost function. 
 
C’ = C’q + C’m 
C’ = z(δ + ε) + z(λ+ ε)ρ 
 
[5]-4.3 Net Welfare 
 
In essence, the above mathematical formulations represent the intuitions when 
consideration how the case of broadcasting signals differs from the case of 
copyright general in the V-W model.  
These intuitions are summarised as follows: 
                                                        
236 It may even be viable to argue that the Coasean Cost function for broadcast signals is even 
convex. This is because the periphery of the expanding property right is populated with activities 
that have low commercial value but high social value, such as incorporating portions of journalistic 
broadcasts in news reporting, or using fixations of transmissions for archiving.  
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(i) There is greater independent investment; 
(ii) There are more significant diminishing returns to investment; 
(iii) There is less average social value; 
(iv) There is a greater discount rate; 
(v) There relative deadweight loss is indeterminate;237 and  
(vi) There are greater transactions costs 
 
The cumulative effect of these conjectures is that the social benefit and social cost 
curves maintain their respective concave and convex shapes, although they 
converge more quickly. Furthermore, the absolute distance between the curves is 
greater due to the higher level of independent investment. However, this 
independent investment affects only the intercept of the social benefit function, 
and hence does not affect the curvature of the net welfare function, but only the 
point at which that function becomes negative.  
 
 
Diagram 5.2: Net Welfare for Case of Signals  
 
 
The result is that under these conditions, the optimal level of propertisation for 
broadcast signals (z’*) is less than in the case for copyright general (z*). This result 
is important as it implies that the level of protection offered for general copyright 
works, should be an upper boundary for the level of protection offered to 
broadcasting signals.  
                                                        
237 This depends on the values of λ and ε, both of which are less than one (and where λ > ε. 
Deadweight loss is greater in the case of broadcast signals (ρ’ > ρ) only where λ has a value much 
greater than 0.5, and ε is also very large; this would occur mainly in situations where the broadcast 
transmission is the primary means via which users have access to a given work, and where that 
work is not expressed and embedded in alternative media.  
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Therefore, in constructing a policy for property rights over broadcast signals, the 
scope of protection offered should not exceed that already offered in the case of 
primary copyright. Admittedly, this line of reasoning assumes that the current 
state of copyright protection is at least up the optimal point (i.e. z ≥ z*). However, 
it is not controversial to claim that there is a widespread view from various 
perspectives that the existing scope of copyright protection is already too high.238  
 
Even if one were to deny this view that copyright is already too strong, trends in 
copyright law suggest a continued expansion of copyright scope. In the case of 
Europe, one may infer a trend that the overall scope of copyright protection has 
been increasing in the last two decades via the cumulative effect of the following: 
(i) the EU Copyright Harmonisation Directive – which provides for a baseline 
copyright length of life of author plus seventy-five years, which is twenty-five 
years greater than the WTO-TRIPS baseline, (ii) the ECJ Infopaq Case ruling – 
which generally lowered the standard of originality for copyright eligibility, and 
(iii) the EU Database Directive, which exemplifies the expanding domain of 
copyright (or copyright-like) eligible subject matter.  
 
Furthermore, in the case of the US, Lemley (2004) notes, “By virtually any measure, 
intellectual property rights have expanded dramatically in the last three decades. 
Terms of protection are longer, the number of things that are copyrightable has 
increased, it is easier to qualify for copyright protection, copyright owners have 
broader rights to control uses of their works, and penalties are harsher. In addition, 
Congress has created entirely new rights.” 239 
 
 
[5]-5 ANALYSIS: APPLICATION TO LIMITATIONS AND EXEMPTIONS 
 
The above analysis concludes with the very general result that the optimal scope 
of protection for broadcasters’ rights is less than that for copyright. This result is 
particularly interesting in considering the case of limitations and exemptions, and 
anti-circumvention provisions. As discussed in Chapter 4, the non-excludable 
nature of information goods gives rise to incentives to employ ‘excludability 
inducing strategies’.  
 
In terms of scope of copyright protection, one form of expanded scope is the legal 
reinforcement of such strategies. These are known as ‘anti-circumvention’ 
provisions, and stipulate that permission is needed for users to by-pass 
technological protection measures (TPMs) such as encryption and copy 
protection. The result is a three-tiered regime that consists of (i) a primary legal 
entitlement in the form of copyright, (ii) the increased transactions costs due to 
TPMs, and (iii) legal reinforcement through anti-circumvention provisions. 
                                                        
238 The notion that existing copyright protection has gone beyond what is necessary to achieve its 
underlying policy objectives is a theme explored from many different perspectives. Generally, see 
Ricolfi (2011) on the issue of copyright reform in the modern era, Lessig (2011) on the issue of the 
changing role of copyright in the digital economy, and Choen (2007) on how the claims about the 
role of copyright in stimulating creativity seem to be harmfully inflated.  
239 Lemely (2004) at page 14 
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A key issue with this regime is that it may limit the ability to engage in activities 
that are permissible at the base level as they are allowable under doctrines of fair 
use or statutory limitations and exemptions. This is because the activity in 
question may only be carried out if the user bypasses the TPMs put in place; the 
result is that the user is in violation of anti-circumvention provisions, even where 
the activity attempted is permissible under ‘standard’ copyright law.  
  
In the case of broadcasting signals, an example would be the ability of a user to 
time-shift – i.e. record a programme for viewing at a later time or date. Such an 
activity is established as permissible under copyright law under doctrines of fair 
use and limitations to copyright, largely triggered by the outcomes of the US 
Betamax Case.240 However, in a digital broadcasting environment, a broadcaster 
may include in a broadcasting signal, certain metadata known as Rights 
Management Information (RMI) that stipulates the conditions under which the 
transmitted work may be used. Such conditions may possibly include restrictions 
on a user’s ability to record a given programme.  Furthermore, the RMI may even 
interface with the user’s terminal equipment to technically prohibit activities such 
as recording for later viewing. For the user to engage in the otherwise legal activity 
of time-shifting for later enjoyment, they would either have to find a technical 
means to bypass the TPM, or strip the RMI from the broadcast signal – both of 
which would constitute violations of anti-circumvention provisions.  
 
One possible perspective on this matter is that an adequately competitive market 
should be able to allow the ‘efficient level’ of TPMs to prevail. However, as argued 
in Chapter 4, the nature of broadcasting markets would not provide for such a 
result, given that (i) broadcast markets tend to be generally oligopolistic, and (ii) 
technological protocols in terrestrial broadcasting markets are subject to 
centralised regulation from the spectrum management authority.  
 
In any instance, the result of the model discussed in this chapter simply suggests 
that allowing over-broad protection though strong anti-circumvention rules is 
simply not socially optimal. This is because copyright scope at the ‘general 
copyright’ level is conditioned by certain fair use and limitations and exemption 
provisions. Given that z‘* should be set less than z*, it implies that individual 
components of the matrix of elements zi’ should be set less than zi. One such 
component which influences copyright scope is indeed the applicable fair use and 
limitations and exemption provisions. Hence, the same activities that are 
permitted under general copyright law should be also allowed at minimum under 
the rules relating to the rights of broadcasting organisations. In other words, fair 
use doctrines and/or limitations and exemptions to broadcasters’ rights should be 
at least as liberal as those that prevail for general copyright.  
 
                                                        
240 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), ‘the Betamax case’, 
the US Supreme Court ruled that making of individual copies of complete television programmes 
for the purposes of time-shifting is not copyright infringement, and is allowable pursuant to the 
principle of fair use. 
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Furthermore, it follows that where some particular type of broadcasting content 
is not subject to copyright protection (i.e. z=0), then the broadcast signal in which 
that content is embedded should also not be subject to protection (i.e. z’=0). 
 
 
[5]-6 OPTIMISATION ISSUES  
 
It is acknowledged here that the above implication that ‘for z’ to be set lower than 
z, each element zi’ should be set lower than the corresponding zi, where z’ and z are 
both weighted indices of these respective elements’ can be mathematically 
misleading.  
 
In other words, if z = z(z1, z2, …, zn), and  z’ = z’(z’1, z’2, …, z’n’), setting z’* < z* 
does not imply that z’i < zi . Firstly, if this were true, it would imply that the relative 
weightings in these indices are the same; certainly, this should not be the case, as 
the broadcasting sector is subject to unique public policy issues as compared to 
other copyright-based sectors in general (as stressed in Chapter 4). This is to say 
that the functions z and z’ themselves cannot and should not assumed to be the 
same.  
 
Furthermore, there would not be a direct mapping of zi elements to z’I elements, 
as the structure of general copyright law and the specific provisions governing 
broadcasters’ related rights are different; hence, the relevant policy elements that 
affect scope of protection are different. This is to say that not only are the number 
of elements n and n’ different, but some of the elements zi or z’i may have zero 
values for a given value of i.  
 
Take for example, the concept of ‘substantial similarity’ for copyright 
infringements, which is certainly a key element of z. The level of substantive 
similarity needed to trigger legitimate copyright infringement claims is one of the 
strongest judicial considerations that affect the overall scope of copyright 
protection. Furthermore, while this concept is most normally conceived in 
qualitative terms (i.e. the essence and character of the allegedly infringing copied 
elements), it can also be conceived in quantitative terms (i.e. what proportion of 
the allegedly infringing work is comprised of elements of the copied work). Hence, 
this concept lends very well to the idea of a continuous variable like an element zi.  
 
In the case of broadcasters’ rights, the activities under the scope of protection have 
much less of a continuous character, and are generally more binary in nature. For 
example, the act of a secondarily retransmitting an initial broadcaster’s signal 
cannot be evaluated in continuous variable terms – a signal is simply 
retransmitted or not. The same logic also applies for activities such as decryption 
– an encrypted signal is simply successfully decrypted or not – in practical terms, 
there are generally not ‘degrees of decryption’. One element of the bundle of rights 
of the broadcasting organisation that may be analysed in continuous terms may 
be the right of fixation.241 However, fixation rights for broadcasts generally exist 
                                                        
241 For example, various degrees of fixation can be made from a live television broadcast: ranging 
from a single frame/picture, clips of varying duration, to fixation of the complete programme. 
Furthermore, these fixations may be audio only, picture only, or audiovisual. Hence these different 
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in a much different policy space all together, and need to be analysed in 
conjunction with primary copyright law, which further complicates the issue of 
extrapolating a relationship between the optimisation of z and z’.242 
  
In any instance, notwithstanding the ways in which standard copyright and 
broadcasters’ rights diverge, the strongest criticism of the logic that each element 
of z’ would need to be set lower than the corresponding element of z in order for z*’ 
to be set lower than z* is that it simply ignores the main lesson from the economic 
analysis of patent law. That key lesson is that the various elements that affect 
scope of protection of an IPR (i.e. length and breadth) are inherently substitutable 
in nature, and hence form a policy trade-off. As a result of their respective subject 
matter characteristics, copyright law has evolved to have a very long term and 
(relatively) narrow breadth, while patent law is characterised by a relatively short 
term and very broad protection. In fact, it is on this notion of a policy trade-off that 
Gilbert and Shapiro argue for a patent right that can be virtually infinite in 
duration, with breadth adjusted to meet a defined award structure. In other 
words, there are conceivably different combinations of the elements zi or z’i which 
can result in the same overall value of z* or z’*.  
 
[5]-7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter focussed on the question of the ‘optimal scope of protection for the 
rights of broadcasting organisations’. In order to answer this question, it 
attempted to see how the existing literature on models of patent and copyright 
protection might be applicable to broadcast transmissions. However, instead of 
using models based on industrial organisation considerations, it used an 
‘Incentive-Access’ model based on a broader welfare-perspective.  
 
Analysing this model and adjusting its parameters to the case of broadcast 
transmissions, the main conclusion is that the optimal scope of protection for 
broadcasters’ related rights is lower than that for ’primary’ copyright. In applying 
this result, it was argued that there should be liberal interpretations of limitations 
and exceptions to copyright and related rights, particularly in terms of provisions 
on technological protection measures, and the application of anti-circumvention 
provisions. In this regard, regulations such as ‘broadcast flag’ policies might be 
undesirable.  
 
One constraint to this application is however the fact that there are different 
policy aspects that affect the scope of broadcasters’ rights, than those for other 
forms of intellectual property. As such, it is necessary to pay some attention to 
how these various policy elements differ; this very issue will be discussed in 
Chapter 6.   
                                                        
extents of fixation can conceivably be arranged on continuum akin to a scale of substantial 
similarity. 
242 The right of fixation exists in a much different policy space, as its main purpose may not be to 
protect broadcast transmissions per se, but rather to protect content which is not eligible for 
primary copyright-protection (such as live broadcasts of sports performances), and hence the 
broadcasters’ rights serve as a mechanism to fill the public good gap left by general copyright law 
(see discussion in Chapter 4). 
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CHAPTER 6: POLICY LEVERS FOR BREADTH OF PROTECTION 
 
This chapter directly follows from the previous Chapter 5, which analysed the 
issue of optimal scope of protection of broadcasters’ related rights, relative to 
copyright. Chapter 5 noted that the concept of ‘scope’ generally had two aspects – 
length and breadth of protection. This chapter focuses on the concept of ‘breadth’ 
of protection. In this regard, the underlying research question in this chapter is 
“What are the practical policy dimensions that affect the scope of protection for the 
related rights of broadcasting organisations?”  
 
 
[6]-1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Following from the discussions on the relationship between the optimal scope of 
broadcasters’ rights relative to that of ‘primary’ copyright, Chapter 5 noted some 
issues in how this relationship is to be construed. Central to this relationship are 
the various parameters which affect the overall scope of protection for the given 
subject matter, i.e. the elements zi of the vector z, where ‘z’ is a parameter that 
represents the overall level of ‘propertisation’. 
 
As noted previously, these parameters are normally separated into the concepts 
of (i) length and (ii) breadth. While the notion of length of protection is 
straightforward243, the concept of breadth of protection is complex as it groups 
together many different policy parameters and market characteristics. This 
chapter hence seeks to analyse the various constituent elements of the vector z – 
i.e., the various technical aspects of breadth and scope of protection, as they relate 
to the unique subject matter of broadcasting signals. This is done by analysing key 
features of both the copyright and patent law systems. 
 
 
 
By analysing the various policy levers that affect scope of protection in other areas 
of intellectual property, this chapter concludes that that these levers for 
protection breadth244 simply have little (or special case) significance to the case 
of broadcast signals. Hence, it is argued that the element of ‘limitations and 
exemptions’ should have a very high weighting in the over index z’ (the scope of 
protection for broadcasters’ rights). Consequently, the discussion attempts to 
justify the conclusion of Chapter 5 that ‘exemptions and limitations for 
broadcasters’ rights should be set less than that for general copyright’ (i.e. that 
indeed zi’* should be less than zi*, where ‘i’ is the ‘restrictiveness of limitations and 
exceptions and/or fair use doctrines’). This strong focus on limitations and 
exceptions is also briefly supported through a market correction perspective. 
 
 
 
                                                        
243 See Denicolo (1996), at 251. 
244 For an overview of some of the considerations that can affect protection breadth in the case of 
patent law, see Denicolo (1996).  
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[6]-2 ELEMENTS OF BREADTH OF PROTECTION  
 
The following section will review some of the key elements that are considered as 
affecting this breadth parameter, as identified in the literature on copyright and 
patent law.245  It will then briefly discuss how each element can or cannot be 
applied as a policy tool in the case of constructing broadcasters’ rights, and 
manipulating the overall scope of protection  
 
 
[6]-2.1 Substantive Qualifying Requirements  
 
In order to understand the concept of breadth in patent law, it is important to 
recall the relevant requirements for patent protection.246 To be eligible for patent 
protection, an invention or innovation must fall within defined statutory 
patentable subject matter, and be deemed as having (i) novelty, (ii) non-
obviousness or inventive step, and (iii) utility or industrial application.  
 
The novelty requirement ensures that the innovation is indeed a new solution to 
some technical problem, and is in place to ensure that protection is not given to 
knowledge which already exists (either under separate protection, or within the 
public domain). This avoids creating a duplication of rights or deadweight losses 
which do not correspond to the creation of new knowledge. Similarly, the 
inventive step or non-obviousness criteria determines whether the technical 
solution proposed would be ‘obvious’ to a person skilled in the relevant art of the 
subject matter; this ensures that patent applications are granted only where there 
is substantial and demonstrable advancement in the technical field, as opposed to 
minor incremental innovations.247 The third criterion of industrial application or 
utility, is arguable the least important criterion in terms of impact and economic 
significance – it requires that the patent application can be demonstrated as 
having practical value and are implementable in real world environments.248  
 
As patent protection is predicated on an application process, applications are 
examined to determine whether such requirements are met. Therefore, the 
                                                        
245 As noted previously, patents are construed as having a relatively short length of protection, 
while having a wide breadth. Copyright on the other hand has a relatively long term of protection 
and relatively narrower breadth. Given the nature of how these rights are structured, discussions 
on the concept of ‘breadth of protection’ are more developed in patent literature than for 
copyright, and as such, many of the factors discussed in this section are drawn from literature on 
the economic structure of patent law.   
246 The case of copyright requirements is discussed in the below sections on subject matter and 
legal certainty.  
247 In some jurisdiction, a separate legal entitlement exists for ‘utility models’ or ‘petty patents’ for 
incremental innovations that are not substantial enough to qualify for patent protection. However, 
Utility Models are generally not integrated into the system of agreements that underpins 
international harmonization of intellectual property policy. For an overview comparison between 
Utility Models and Patents, see Brack (2009).  
248 A common example of an invention that would not meet this criterion would be a perpetual 
motion machine, as such a machine is not possible to implement, as it would be in defiance of the 
natural laws of physics.  
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‘strictness’ of these requirements and extent of examination effectively form a sort 
of delineation to determine which applications are granted and which are not.249 
 
As such, one of the main factors that affect patent breadth is the stringency of 
requirements and prudency of examination. This is a function of both direct policy 
considerations, and institutional capacity. On the policy level, patent requirements 
are set out in the governing legislation and regulations, and are refined through 
precedents of the granting authority as well as case law where applicable. 
Furthermore, institutional factors such as resource and expertise constraints may 
affect the prudency of examination, especially in smaller, less developed 
jurisdictions. 250  Therefore, the ability to obtain a patent may differ between 
jurisdictions (or even subject matter) even where substantive law is relatively 
similar 251 , thus affecting the scope of protection of the patent system as it 
determines what applications are able to actually obtain protection. 
 
In the case of copyright, there is no requirement for formal registration to obtain 
protection.252 As such, there is no notion of a formal examination ex ante to the 
granting of a right. Copyright is considered as being granted by mere virtue of 
original authorship of a literary or artistic work.253 Therefore, one of the main 
policy dimensions that affect the overall scope of the protection of the copyright 
                                                        
249 The principle of patent grants is the exchange of private exclusive rights for socially beneficial 
technical information. As such, central to the patent examination process is an evaluation as to 
whether there is ‘sufficient’ disclosure – i.e. whether the information provided in the claims and 
description allow for effective reproduction of the innovation. In some jurisdictions, the applicant 
is also required to disclose the ‘best method’ of executing the disclosed innovation, which may 
include supplementary information outside of the scope of protection. In such cases, there is a 
greater degree of information disclosure, which may imply a lower overall effective scope of 
protection, as such supplementary information if kept secret, may provide some competitive 
advantage for the innovator, even after the patent has expired (hence providing a form of residual 
protection by increasing the costs of duplication for competitors).  
250 One extreme is to grant patents after applications are examined for formalities only, and no 
examination is done for compliance with substantive qualifying requirements. Such a system 
hence amounts to a registration system rather than a search and examination system, as technical 
validity examination ex post grant is fully delegated to the courts.  For a brief overview of how this 
compares to other regimes, see WIPO (2014) - Policy Guide on Alternatives in Patent Search and 
Examination. Lemley (2001) goes as far to even suggest that the patent office may make a rational 
decision to be ignorant of the validity of patent applications, and that courts are able to determine 
validity more efficiently. 
251 Bond and Zissimos (2010) provide a model of asymmetric equilibrium that should how optimal 
patent breadth can vary across countries, even if countries are identical. These differences arise 
from policy decisions regarding the role of innovation in overall economic development.  
252 Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention states that “The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights 
shall not be subject to any formality”. This provision is incorporated into international trade law 
through Article 9 of the TRIPs Agreement. However, which formalities are not necessary for the 
grant of copyright, some jurisdictions operate voluntary registration systems. Under US copyright 
law for example, an incentive for registration is given through the provisions that make 
registration necessary for claims for statutory damages; as such, registration facilitates a wider 
range of legal remedies in addition to providing increased legal certainty and lower burden of 
proof in instances of litigation. For a discussion on various rationales for registration, including 
market-based incentives, see Oliar et al (2014). 
253 The issue of the assumption of existence of copyright is discussed in the section below on legal 
certainty.  
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system, is the applicable standard for ‘originality’.254 The originality requirement 
in copyright law is generally considered to be low, particularly relative to the 
novelty requirement in patent law; in terms of this (which again reinforces the 
assertion that the cumulative effect of copyright is much broader than that of 
patents).  
 
[6]-2.1.1 Application to Broadcast Transmissions 
 
A broadcast transmission is generally not required to meet any formal 
requirements to enjoy protection as a related right. There is no requirement akin 
to the concepts of ‘originality’ in copyright law, or ‘novelty’ in patent law. 255 
Therefore, the applicable standards for such criteria do not form part of the policy 
dimensions which can be adjusted to affect the overall scope of protection.  
 
This lack of qualifying criteria is related to the fact that broadcasting is a technical 
rather than creative or innovative act, and hence there is certainty in the nature of 
the subject matter and its characteristics. Furthermore, the nature of a signal itself, 
independent of the content embedded within, is such that its protection does not 
constitute a removal of material from any information commons; as such, the very 
idea of qualifying criteria would not necessarily make sense for this subject 
matter.   
 
[6]-2.2 Certainty of Subject Matter 
 
Following from the above discussion, it follows that some qualifying criteria in 
intellectual property rights are continuous in nature. For example, there is 
conceivably a spectrum of different ‘levels of inventive step’ for a given field of 
innovation, and the scope of the patent system is partially set by the given 
standards used by the examining office. 256  Likewise, there is conceivably a 
spectrum of different levels of ‘originality’ for a given class of creative works, and 
the scope of the copyright system is partially set by defining the level of originality, 
where any works beneath that level are not able to qualify for copyright 
protection. Therefore, it can be said that there is some level of inherent 
uncertainty about the qualifiability of both patent and copyright subject matter. 
 
However, there are more (relatively) discrete criteria that also affect the 
qualifiability of protection – the concept of protectable subject matter. In both 
patent and copyright law, the set of protectable subject matter is normally defined 
by statute. However, given the practically infinite nature of the varieties of 
                                                        
254 As discussed in Chapter 5, the standard of originality for copyright is not only relatively low, 
but there is a trend in case law in various jurisdiction which suggested that the standard is 
becoming periodically lower.  
255 See Chapter 3 for discussion on this issue, particularly the lack of application of the functionality 
doctrine for broadcasters’ rights.  
256 For example, non-obviousness or inventive step is measured with respect to what a ‘person 
having ordinary skill in the art’ of the relevant technological field would consider as an obvious 
technical solution. As such, the way in which this notion of ‘a person ‘skilled in the art’ is construed 
and interpreted would have implications for the stringency of the non-obviousness criteria. For a 
discussion on some of the considerations for this concept, see Meara (2002).  
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different technical and artistic fields, the set protected subject matter is often 
defined on a negative basis; i.e. it is common for statute to set out what is not 
protectable subject matter, rather than what is.257 These definitions of protectable 
subject matter therefore form an important element of the overall scope of both 
the patent and copyright systems. 
 
Furthermore, the segmenting of different subject matter groups allows for various 
policy dimensions to be applied differently to different subject matter sub-groups, 
depending on public policy issues and the nature of the subject matter.  While this 
is not common in patent law, it is practiced in some sub-fields of copyright law.258  
 
In any instance, the policy dimension of defining subject matter groups depends 
on the degree to which the overall subject matter group is heterogeneous, and the 
ease of defining sub-groups which are relatively homogeneous. As such, there is 
an inherent trade-off in stratifying subject matter groupings; on one hand, there 
is a presumed increase in efficiency, as the system becomes more tuned to the 
nature of different subject matter classes, and their respective market 
characteristics and underlying incentives. On the other hand however, the more 
stratified the system becomes, the more arbitrary the delineations between 
different subject matter classifications, which necessarily introduces legal 
uncertainties and ambiguities which might even reduce the effective scope of 
protection in some cases.259  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
257 Article 2 of the Berne Convention (which is incorporated into the TRIPs Agreement though 
TRIPs Article 9) provided a non-exclusive list of the types of works that are included under the 
general definition of ‘literary and artistic works’.  However, Berne Article 2(6) goes on to state that 
it is a matter of domestic policy “to determine the protection to be granted to official texts of a 
legislative, administrative and legal nature, and to official translations of such texts”. 
Article 27(1) of TRIPs sets out that patents shall be available for “inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology”, while 27(2) and (3) set out conditions and subject matter 
which may be excluded from patent protection.   
258 Under TRIPs Article 12, the minimum length of protection is ‘life plus fifty years’; however, 
some jurisdictions may choose to offer longer terms, though this longer term need not necessarily 
be for all classes of works.  
259 Consider for example the case of copyright subject matter. It is intuitive that there is substantial 
certainty in delineating between two very different types of subject matter - for example works of 
music and works of architecture. The copyright system can thus be fine-tuned to take into 
consideration the different market characteristics and production incentives of these two classes 
of works. However, if the subject matter classification of ‘musical works’ is to be further stratified, 
it might imply making a delineation based on some relative structural characteristic such as genres 
of music. This would therefore involve some sort of subjective judgment on what constitutes 
different sub-groups, and introduce legal uncertainties and ambiguity, which reduces the scope of 
effective protection in the parent subject matter group as a whole. This may be seen as an economic 
basis for the doctrine of aesthetic neutrality, which provides that in the context of interpreting 
copyright law, the courts should not make judgments on the artistic merit or social value of works. 
This is partially the reason why extravagant symphonic orchestral composition and three-chord 
punk rock songs attract the same legal protection, despite their presumed differences in market 
characteristics and production incentives.  
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[6]-2.2.1 Applicability to Broadcast Transmissions 
 
The technical nature of broadcasting means that there is a high level of certainty 
about what constitutes broadcast transmission, and hence the subject matter 
scope is relatively well defined. Furthermore, given that broadcasting is defined 
for public policy regulation, there is even more certainty as to who possible 
beneficiaries are. There are however different possible ways to stratify 
broadcasting signals into sub-groups. Some of the ways to make distinctions 
between types of transmission include the technology used, the market of the 
intended transmission, and the geographical basis of the transmission.  As such, 
these distinctions can be used as policy dimensions in constructing the scope of 
protection for broadcasting organisations. However, given that these distinctions 
are technical in nature, they more accurately mirror the issue of beneficiary 
definitions rather than subject matter definitions.  
 
 
[6]-2.3 Classes of Beneficiaries 
 
The nature of the beneficiaries of a right can also be a policy dimension that affects 
overall scope of protection. While not generally practiced, it might be possible to 
legislate different terms of protection260 for different patent owners; for example, 
it can be stipulated that state or publicly funded research institutions enjoy a 
patent term shorter than that offered to their private counterparts.  
 
In the field of copyright law, the beneficiary is generally understood to be the 
‘author’ or a work; however, copyright may be vested in another party such as an 
employer under the ‘work for hire’ doctrine where there is an employee-employer 
relationship, and the work is created in the course of employment. Therefore it is, 
in principle, possible to define different terms of protection for different 
beneficiaries.261  
 
[6]-2.3.1 Applicability to Broadcast Transmissions 
 
As discussed above, it is indeed possible to make distinctions between broadcast 
signals depending on technical and market characteristics. In terms of technical 
mode of transmission, different subject matter in this regard would relate to 
different types of broadcasters, and hence beneficiaries. 
 
In terms of considering the scope of protection for broadcast transmissions, a key 
consideration is therefore the types of transmission and broadcasters that are 
                                                        
260 While this part of the discussion deals with different terms of protection, it is included as a 
factor affecting breadth of protection (as opposed to length), as the policy dimension is based on 
how the different possible groups of beneficiaries are partitioned. Furthermore, the differentiated 
treatment can also be on some other practical aspect of protection rather than term length.  
261 This is done, as the basis for calculating the beginning of the fixed-protection time is different. 
The standard case is to consider the life of the author and add on a fixed statutory length of 
protection (fifty years minimum), while a different basis for works-for-hire can be the date of 
publication or the date of production.  
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afforded protection.262  This is indeed a very critical issue as it relates to the role 
intellectual property plays in the evolving landscape of technology and content 
consumption. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a central aspect of the current international debate is 
whom the beneficiaries of broadcasters’ rights should be. In this regard, the 
critical question remains as to whether webcasting should attract similar 
protection as that offered to traditional broadcasting. Another way of 
differentiating between beneficiaries might also be to structure rights differently 
for commercial and public service broadcasters. As will be discussed in Chapter 
10, this is partially done – at least in terms of the right of retransmission.  
 
 
[6]-2.4 Territoriality and Exhaustion  
 
Generally, an underlying premise of intellectual property law is the principle of 
territoriality – an intellectual property right is only valid in the jurisdiction in 
which it is granted. Therefore, the exact scope of a right (or even its very existence) 
over the same innovation or work may differ between jurisdictions depending on 
national legislation.  
 
Stemming from this principle of territoriality, a significant economic policy 
dimension of intellectual property rights is the principle of exhaustion. The 
applicable exhaustion doctrine determines whether a party can legally (re)-sell a 
good protected by intellectual property in a national or international market.  
 
National exhaustion (sometimes referred to as the ‘doctrine of first sale’) exists in 
most jurisdictions, and provides that once a protected good is sold to the first 
buyer, the rightsholder is no longer able to exercise control over subsequent 
secondary sale of the good. Therefore, the intellectual property right is said to 
have been exhausted in the national market. This principle is rooted in 
considerations that analogous to policies on vertical restrictions in competition 
law.263 More controversial however is the principle of international exhaustion.  
Where international exhaustion exists, a rightsholder cannot restrict importation 
of a good that has been initially sold in a foreign market. Therefore, international 
exhaustion determines whether parallel importation of a protected good is 
possible – a factor which has a major impact on the economic power of a 
rightsholder where the good is subject to significant international trade and inter-
market arbitrage.264  It can therefore be said that all other things being equal, 
                                                        
262 The issue of how to treat different possible beneficiaries, or rather which beneficiaries to define, 
is a central issue in current policy debates on the protection of broadcasting organizations. In 
particular, the contentious issue is whether to extend the protection given to traditional 
broadcasters, to online broadcasters, which hence alludes to the application of the concept of 
technological neutrality. For further discussion, see Chapter 2.   
263 For discussion on relationship between exhaustion regimes and price controls, see Maskus 
(2000) at pp213 
264 The issues of exhaustion, parallel importation, and competition are particularly critical in the 
field of pharmaceuticals. Such policy dimensions are hence very important in debates about the 
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jurisdictions which practice international exhaustion offer a lower effective scope 
of protection than those which do not. In particular, it represents a restriction on 
a rightsholder’s exclusive right to authorise importation of a protected product. 
 
[6]-2.4.1 Applicability to Broadcast Transmissions 
 
For the most part, the concept of parallel importation is captured within the 
broadcasters’ retransmission right. Indeed, the concept of a retransmission of a 
broadcast signal is analogous to ‘resale’ of the protected subject matter, in that 
they are both a secondary distribution. However territorial considerations do not 
affect the application of this right.  
 
For example, consider a Broadcaster ‘A’ is operating in jurisdiction A, and a 
broadcaster B retransmits A’s signal. It does not matter whether B is based in 
jurisdiction A or some other jurisdiction B, as authorisation from Broadcaster A is 
needed in both cases.  The only territorially significant question is if the broadcast 
signal of A spills over into jurisdiction B; in such a case, the question arises as to 
whether the laws of jurisdiction B also apply. This matter is discussed in detail in 
Part IV of this manuscript, with particular regard to the ‘country-of-origin 
principle’.265  
 
Therefore, the concept of exhaustion – at least in terms of national vs. 
international exhaustion – is already captured in the concept of a retransmission 
right. It hence does not provide for a unique policy level to affect breadth of 
protection.266  
 
[6]-2.5 Scope of Claims and Similarity Standards 
 
Intellectual property rights are generally exclusive in nature, and they give the 
rightsholder control over authorisation and prohibition of certain activities 
relating to the protected subject matter. Furthermore, the economic basis of both 
patent and copyright law is the use of property rights to solve a public good 
market failure. Therefore, the economic power of intellectual property rights is in 
their negative assertion rather than their positive assertion; i.e. control over 
prohibition of activities. 
 
In understanding the scope of protection of intellectual property rights, it is 
therefore important to understand not only how the rights are constructed and 
granted, but also how they are applied to users and/or enforced against potential 
infringers. The natural corollary of the ‘set of activities that are protected’ is 
                                                        
role of intellectual property in economic development, and more specifically, health policy. 
Generally, see Love (2006) or Correa (2006).  
265 The country-of-origin principle provides that for the purpose of copyright law, a broadcast is 
deemed to have been made in the jurisdiction in which it was transmitted, irrespective of the 
jurisdiction in which it might be received.  
266 For completeness, it is stressed that the above comments relate to exhaustion of a broadcast 
communication. In terms of exhaustion of the copyright over the content embedded in a broadcast, 
the scenario is different. This issue is analysed in Chapter 10. 
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therefore the ‘set of activities that second parties can undertake without resulting 
in infringement’.  
 
In patent law, the exact limits of protection are determined by interpreting the 
claims set out in the patent fillings. The drafting of patent claims is a strategic 
decision by the patent applicant, as there is an inherent trade-off in the specificity 
of the claims. The applicant has the incentive to draft the claims as broadly as 
possible, so as to maximise the scope of protection for the innovation; i.e. occupy 
the maximum space possible within the technological field.267 However, too broad 
claims are likely to be rejected by the granting authority as not being compliant 
with the substantive requirements of patent law, and the principle of ‘sufficient 
disclosure’.  
 
It is therefore not only possible, but a critically important aspect of the innovation 
ecosystem as a whole, for second parties to engage in ‘inventing around’. This 
refers to finding another technical solution to the same technical problem 
addressed by a patent, without infringing on the claims of that patent.268  
 
Broadly construed claims, which would partially result from the standards of 
examine criteria used by the examining office (as discussed above)269, imply a 
wide scope of protection enjoyed by the rightsholder. This in turn translates to a 
lower scope for ‘inventing around’ by second parties, as there is a higher 
probability that a given (alternative) technical solution would violate the claims 
defined in the patent.270   
 
In terms of copyright law, the issue of infringement is assessed with reference to 
the concept of ‘substantive similarity’ between the protected work and the 
allegedly infringing work. The lower is the standard for similarity (or the more 
                                                        
267 Yiannaka and Fulton (2001) challenge the traditional assumption that an applicant would claim 
for the broadest level of protection possible. The authors consider the chosen breadth of claims as 
a strategic decision, in addition to the traditional decision of whether to patent or not, and conclude 
that the profit maximising firm will chose a level of protection to induce the desired behaviour by 
the entrant competitor.  
268  Denicolo (1996) discusses four interpretations of patent breadth from an industrial 
organisation perspective: (i) The fraction of cost reduction that does no spill out as freely available 
technology to the non-innovating firms, (ii) the ‘distance’ between the patented produce and the 
products other firms can sell without infringement (where a wider patent implies a high demand 
curve), (iii) the cost of imitation, and (iv) the number of applications of an innovation in 
independent markets which are reserved for the patentee. Furthermore, in modelling the optimal 
policy mix of patent length and breadth, the seminal treatment of Gilbert and Shipiro (1990) 
considers a very general definition of patent breadth – “the breadth of a patent with the flow rate 
of profit available to the patentee while the patent is in force”.  
269 Scotchmer et al (1998) at pg 24 states – “The US patent statute does not refer to patent breadth, 
except implicitly in how claims are limited by the enabling disclosure, and in the requirements of 
novelty and non-obviousness. These requirements mean collectively that the claimed technologies 
must differ substantially from ‘‘prior art.’’ The disclosure requirement is a test of whether the patentee 
actually invented the technologies claimed.” 
270 In analysing the role of effect patent life and breadth in technological progress, Scotchmer et al 
(1998) make a distinction between ‘lagging breadth’, which protects against imitation, and ‘leading 
breadth’, which protects against new improved products; the existence of the latter obviously 
implies a wider overall scope of protection. 
142 
lenient the applicable test) to trigger a finding of infringement, the greater is the 
scope of effective protection enjoyed by the copyright holder.271  
 
However, in addition to the issue of substantive similarity, some courts, when 
considering copyright infringement claims, examine the issue of likelihood of 
access to the protected work. The probability that the alleged infringer actually 
accessed the original work, is construed as a determinant of the probability that 
an infringement actually took place. As a result, courts may consider the factors of 
substantive similarity and likelihood of access in an inversely proportional 
manner, in making determinations on infringements. This is to say that where a 
very high likelihood of access has been established, a low degree of similarity can 
trigger a finding of infringement. What follows is that it is possible to have a 
finding of non-infringement even where there is a high degree of similarity, as the 
likelihood of access is very low.  
 
While the judicial practice described above is specific to the US copyright system, 
it is presented as it is a good exemplification of an important concept in 
intellectual property law – independent creation. The example above discussed a 
scenario where although two works may have been extremely ‘similar’, the 
likelihood of that the alleged infringer accessed the allegedly infringed work is so 
low, that the reasonable conclusion is that the allegedly infringing work was 
created independently, and similarities are relegated as mere coincidences. In 
copyright law, independent creation is permissible, and hence there is no finding 
of infringement in this scenario. The reasoning behind this is that the possible 
range of human creativity and its consequent expressions is so boundless, that the 
possibility of two creators producing the same work is so negligibly small, that 
permitting independent creation as a defence against infringement does not really 
restrict the effective scope of copyright protection in practical terms. 
 
In patent law however, independent creation is generally not permitted; i.e. 
ignorance of the existence of an existing protected technical solution is not an 
accepted defence against infringement of that patent.  
 
The existence of this policy follows from the fact that the number of viable 
technical solutions to a technical problem is finite, and constrained by the state of 
overall existing technology. Hence, the probability of two innovators producing 
the same innovation is relatively high272, and so permitting independent creation 
would result is major restriction on the overall scope of patent protection. 
                                                        
271 However, the foundation principle of the copyright system is that copyright is extended to 
creative expressions, but not conceptual ideas – this principle is known as the ‘Idea-Expression 
Dichotomy’, and is established in TRIPs Article 9(2), which states that “Copyright protection shall 
extend to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts 
as such”. The role of the court is therefore sometimes to determine whether an alleged 
infringement is merely an independent creative expression of the same underlying conceptual 
idea. 
272 A major branch of patent economics literature deals with patent races, where firms compete in 
R&D expenditures to obtain a patent. Such literature  often raises concerns about the social losses 
from rent seeking and duplication on costs. However, it does underscore the point that a given 
probability of competition firms arriving at the same technical solution is a common theoretical 
premise.  
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Furthermore, as the patent system is based on a system of fillings and openly 
accessible documentation, it is a viable expectation for entities engaged in 
innovation to conduct patent searches and investigations into the current state of 
the art, to ascertain whether their activities infringe on existing rights.273  
 
[6]-2.5.1 Applicability to Broadcast Transmissions 
 
The nature of broadcast transmission as intellectual property matter is very 
different than that in the patent and general copyright system. The subject matter 
of protection is a technical signal, and not necessarily abstract information whose 
protection represents some direct detraction from the public domain of possible 
knowledge.274 Furthermore, the protected subject matter is not of a creative or 
innovative nature. 
 
Consequently, the issue of infringing secondary creations does not arise – 
infringements only arise based on possible uses of the subject matter itself. 
Therefore, the issue of constructing a scope of protection though a notion such as 
an applicable standard for similarity does not apply. Indeed, substantively similar 
independent creation is indeed theoretically possible, if a second party 
broadcasting organisation assembles an identical programming schedule and 
transmits it independently. As such, the issues of similarity standards and claim 
scope do not form part of the policy dimensions that affect the overall scope of 
protection for broadcast transmissions.   
 
 
[6]-2.6 Costs of Application, Monitoring and Enforcement  
 
Where there is a formal system for application, examination, and registration, 
(such as the case of the patent system), the issue of fees is critical. Patent 
application fees and prosecution procedures are notoriously costly, and involve 
the expenditure of significant resources. While this does not affect the overall 
scope of protection per se, it does create a sort of barrier to entry in some cases, 
as it affects who can participle in the system before even being granted a property 
entitlement.  High patent fees and complicated prosecution procedures therefore 
disproportionally affect small and medium enterprises in a negative way, as such 
firms have greater limitations in terms of access to financing, legal expertise, 
reaping economies of scale in patent administration, and overall ability to bear 
risk. 
  
Regulation of application fees and procedural complexity can therefore indirectly 
affect the overall scope of protection from the specific perspective of an individual 
firm.  
 
 
                                                        
273 This is however not possible for those engaged in production of literary and artistic works, as 
not only is copyright not based on a compulsory registration system, but the nature of artistic and 
creative activities tends to be more dispersed (implying very significant search costs).  
274 See Chapter 3 for detailed discussion on this. 
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[6]-2.6.1 Applicability to Broadcast Transmissions 
 
As stated multiple times previously, copyright is generally a non-registration 
system, and hence the issue of fees and procedural complexity does not arise. This 
is also the case for broadcaster’s rights, where registration serves little possible 
purpose due to the lack of qualifying criteria.  
 
However, all branches of the intellectual property system (including 
broadcasting) require monitoring and enforcement in order to make protection 
effective. Therefore, the ability to absorb the costs of monitoring and enforcement 
activities is a relevant factor for the effective scope of protection enjoyed by any 
rightsholder. Nevertheless, such costs are determined by market environment 
factors, which are outside of the control of the policy maker.275 
 
 
[6]-2.7 Negative and Positive Rights 
 
Notwithstanding the above comments on monitoring and enforcement, one aspect 
that can affect these dynamics is the way that the property right is constructed – 
namely the notions of ‘prohibition’ and ‘authorisation’. 
 
To understand this concept, it is useful to first take examples from the language of 
the key intellectual property treaties. In terms of copyright, the TRIPs Agreement 
refers to the Berne Convention, which in turn sets out certain rights in the format 
that the copyright holder has the ‘exclusive right of authorising’ certain uses of a 
protected work. The WIPO Copyright Treaty also sets out rights using this same 
language.  
 
However, the Rome Convention sets out rights for broadcasting organisations 
with the language that broadcasting organisations ‘shall enjoy the right to 
authorize or prohibit’ certain actions. As discussed in Chapter 2, the TRIPs 
Agreement does not explicitly provide for broadcasters’ rights, but instead 
contains a provision that ‘broadcasting organizations shall have the right to 
prohibit’ certain actions. The Rome Convention however provides performers 
with a different right that takes the form of ‘the possibility of preventing’ (i.e. 
prohibiting) certain actions.  
 
Therefore, in the realm of copyright and related rights law, the textual basis of a 
right can take the form of the right to (i) ‘authorise’, (ii) ‘prohibit’, or (iii) ‘authorise 
and prohibit’ certain actions.  
 
In the area of patent law, TRIPs Article 28 sets out that patent owners have the 
exclusive rights to ‘prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent’ from 
undertaking certain acts. TRIPs Article 16 also uses similar language for the 
exclusive rights of trademark owners. The applicable provisions in the field of 
industrial property hence generally seem to take the form of a prohibition right. 
                                                        
275 See Chapter 7 for analysis of issues related to enforcement. 
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However, the explicit reference to the concept of the ‘owner’s consent’ also implies 
that these rights have an authorisation element.  
 
The difference between a ‘right to authorise’ and a ‘right to prohibit’ is not just 
semantic and is indeed quite significant. The notion of a ‘right to authorise’ implies 
a default state that authorisation is needed; an activity is therefore infringing if it 
is undertaken without such authorisation. A ‘right to prohibit’ however suggests 
that the right needs to be asserted; i.e. an action is only infringing if it continues 
after the rightsholder has asserted the right to prohibit. The right to authorise can 
therefore be exercised ex ante a restricted act but that act does not necessarily 
have to subsequently take place.276 The right to prohibit however can be exercised 
either ex ante or ex post a restricted act, either pre-emptively before an act has 
taken place, or reactively after the act has necessarily taken place.  
 
The right to authorise is therefore a positive right as it requires a certain action by 
the user (i.e. to seek authorisation), while the right to prohibit is a negative right, 
as it requires inaction (i.e. for the user to desist from the restricted act). 
Furthermore, the positive right implies a corresponding negative right, as 
prohibition of a restricted act naturally arises from the default state of withholding 
authorisation. The reverse is however not true, and the negative right (to prohibit) 
does not imply a corresponding positive right (to authorise); i.e. the rights are 
asymmetrical.  
 
The choice of wording can have major implications for the way in which rights are 
administered, and the terms under which certain activities are framed as 
permissible. Substituting an exclusive ‘right to authorisation’ with a ‘right to 
prohibit’ is therefore a shift in the default rule of permissible activity. Protection 
arises from a ‘right to authorise’ without an assertion of that right by the 
rightsholder. A ‘right to prohibit’ however, creates protection only when it is 
actively asserted by the rightsholder.277 Such an action of assertion might possibly 
involve the incursion of some form of transaction cost, and hence the net benefits 
to the rightsholder are lower for prohibition as compared to authorisation. 
 
From a Coasean bargaining perspective, it should not matter whether the right is 
one of authorisation of prohibition, as the ‘right to undertake the action’ or the 
‘right to prohibit the action’ would be efficiently negotiated and allocated 
irrespective of the initial property endowment. This is of course only the case in 
the absence of transaction costs. Where transaction costs do exist, the most 
desirable legal rule is one that bestows the property right onto the party that is 
able to administer it most efficiently. In this regard, transaction costs – specifically 
in the form of monitoring costs – are most certainly asymmetrical between 
rightsholders and users.  
 
                                                        
276  This is of course a simplified discussion on a static basis. In some circumstances, an 
authorisation right might also be granted retroactively ex post a restricted act.  
277 For completeness, it should however be noted that this discussion only affects the scope of 
protection offered by the property right itself. In reality, even where the right is only a right of 
prohibition, other legal rules might also prevent unauthorised actions by users. For example, there 
might be criminal liability for some intellectual property infringements. 
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A user – by definition – has knowledge of their own activity, and hence the 
possibility of potentially infringing on the rights of a third-party; of course, in 
practical terms, this is limited by certain legal uncertainties in the boundaries of 
existing rights (discussed below). However, it is extremely costly and very 
impractical for a rightsholder to actively monitor the activities of every potential 
user to ascertain potential infringements. Hence, it is less costly to administer a 
rule that users seek permission from rightsholders, rather than a rule that 
rightsholders must actively assert their rights in every case. For this reason, the 
majority of the intellectual property system is efficient in using authorisation 
rights as opposed to prohibition rights.  
 
These differences in cost of excising rights might also exist in actual adjudication. 
If a right to authorisation exists, the burden of proof for defence is generally on 
the accused infringer. For a right to prohibit however, the burden of proof is 
generally on the rightsholder to prove that the right was indeed asserted by not 
complied with. 
 
For these reasons, the ‘right to prohibit’ is necessarily a weaker right. This is 
entirely consistent with the general observation that related rights tend to be 
more restricted in scope as compared to primary copyright, and that patent rights 
are generally seen as very strong.278  
 
[6]-2.7.1 Applicability to Broadcast Transmissions 
 
It is indeed very much possible to frame broadcasters’ rights as a negative right 
(i.e. a right to prohibit) rather than positive rights (i.e. a right to authorise). Indeed, 
such an approach would seem quite consistent with the existing system of related 
rights law. However, the practical use of this policy lever would differ based on 
the different elements of the rights.  
 
For example, in the case of retransmissions, the restricted use is technical in 
nature and the pool of potential users (at least traditionally speaking) is finite and 
known with some degree of certainty. As such, monitoring costs are relatively low 
and the administration of the right is characterised by low transaction costs. 
Hence framing the broadcaster’s retransmission right as a negative right might 
have little impact in most cases. It may however still have market effects, as it 
shifts the burden of these transaction costs away from the user and towards the 
broadcaster, which might favour players with low bargaining power such as small 
cable networks in developing countries (who retransmit content from large 
foreign broadcasters). 
 
For rights such as fixation (and post-fixation), reframing broadcasters’ rights as 
negative rights might be desirable. Since such fixation rights are associated with 
various social costs (such as public domain enclosure and anti-commons 
                                                        
278 What is not insignificant is also to consider that the textual basis of copyright, patents, and 
trademarks all refer to an exclusive right. The word ‘exclusive’ is not used in the case of related 
rights, which seems to be an acknowledgement of the fact that related rights are often layered onto 
of primary copyright. 
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problems), negative rights might prevent restrictions of certain welfare-
enhancing uses for which the rightsholder might be rationally apathetic to 
potential infringements. However, the same goal can be achieved with more legal 
certainty by implementing strong limitations and exceptions to broadcasters’ 
rights, irrespective of how they are constructed. 
 
 
[6]-2.8 Legal Uncertainty 
 
Any discussion on how to construct the scope of a property right obviously 
presumes the existence of a right in the first place. However, this may not always 
be the case. In terms of real property, there is an extremely high degree of 
certainty in terms of the existence of a right (e.g. it is affirmed in the physical form 
of a deed). In contrast, in intellectual property cases, a contended issue might be 
the existence of the right itself.   
 
Within the intellectual property system, there is often varying degrees of certainty 
about the existence of a right. Generally, certainty is very high in registration 
systems such as patents, as an application for a right has been vetted by an 
examining authority, and affirmatively granted by the granting authority.  
 
However, the courts often have a further role in either upholding or negating an 
intellectual property right when litigation arises. As such, the court serves as sort 
of a mechanism for the secondary validation of a registered right. This role stems 
from the fact that before a determination can be made on whether a right has been 
infringed, it must first be established that that right exists. Furthermore, the 
competitive nature of technological (and sometimes creative) markets means that 
the court also serves the role to adjudicate between rightsholders and those in 
opposition to the existence of the supposed right, even outside of the context of 
infringement allegations.279 
 
This role of the court depends on the institutional strength of the examining and 
granting offices, which is often interpreted as translating into the quality of 
granted patents. High quality patents are deemed to stem from a system that has 
very comprehensive examination procedures for applications, and applies 
relatively high standards for qualifying criteria. In such cases, the role of the court 
as a secondary vetting instrument is often minimal, and therefore there is a high 
degree of certainty in the right (i.e. that its existence will be recognized and upheld 
by the court), even before any legal issue if brought to trial. 
 
Furthermore, many more developed jurisdictions have ‘opposition proceeding’ as 
part of the patent prosecution process, where third parties have an opportunity 
to give submissions on whether the application is compliant with the respective 
qualifying criteria. The purpose of such opposition proceedings is to strengthen 
                                                        
279 Given the nature of the sectors, challenges to patent validity generally come from competing 
firms. However, in the case of copyright validity, challenges generally arise by users rather than 
competitors. As such copyright validity debates are often linked to public policy grounds (e.g. free 
speech), rather than just pure economic interests.  
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the quality of the patent system, by providing an administrative alternative – ex 
ante patent grant – to the costly process of applying for a declaratory judgment 
before the courts for the nullification of a patent ex post grant. 
 
In contrast, institutional capacity for patent examination is often weak in many 
less developed jurisdictions. In fact, in some jurisdictions, only a general 
formalities check is done, and evaluating compliance with the requirements of 
substantive patent law is effectively delegated to the court system. In such cases, 
there can be said to be a high degree of uncertainty regarding the validity of the 
right, even though the granting authority has formally granted it.  
 
In the case of copyright, since there is no mandatory registration system, the 
existence of a right is only presumed by a rightsholder before the court 
affirmatively recognizes it. However, given the predictability of the applicable 
standards for originality and subject matter definitions, the assumption of the 
existence of copyright over most works is often reasonable. There is therefore less 
ambiguity about the existence of a right in the case of copyright – the issue tends 
to be on the nature of the exercise of the right, and the interpretation of whether 
a given activity constitutes infringement or not. A defence in the form of a counter-
claim for the nullification of a right is indeed much less common in copyright 
litigation than it is in patent litigation. 
 
The effect of the uncertainties regarding the legitimacy of a right directly reduces 
the effective scope of protection, as a rightsholder needs to discount the expected 
gains from any enforcement action to account the possibility that the right is 
nullified all together.  
 
However, it may also increase the scope of effective protection in some cases, as it 
implies some possibility of the existence of a right over subject matter that may 
have otherwise been rejected by a granting office, or deemed as non-protectable 
by the court. This would therefore dis-incentivize users and competitors who are 
very risk-averse as they would rather avoid the possibility of infringement all 
together, rather than engage in an activity even when the likelihood of upholding 
the right is very low. To add to this, uncertainties about the validity of a right often 
reinforce the power of the rightsholder where litigations costs are prohibitively 
high; debates over patent and copyright trolls are a testament to this. 
 
Nevertheless, the overall relationship between the issue of legal uncertainty and 
scope of protection seems to be ambiguous, case-specific, and difficult to 
generalise for analytical purposes. 
 
[6]-2.8.1 Applicability to Broadcast Transmissions 
 
The nature of broadcast signals is such that there is very high degree of certainty 
regarding the existence of a right. The activity is technical in nature, and therefore 
inherently determinate, and there are no subjective qualifying criteria. 280 
                                                        
280 This certainty is also related to the point discussed above about the clarity of subject matter 
definition. 
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Therefore, there are no policy tools that can be manipulated in terms of affecting 
legal certainty for protection of signals, which translate into affecting the overall 
effective scope of protection.  
 
 
[6]-3 LIMITATIONS AND EXEMPTIONS 
 
Limitations and exemptions on the exercise of rights are one of the most important 
policy dimensions of the intellectual property system. A central theme of the 
intellectual property system is the objective of balance, and limitations and 
exemptions are critical tools for achieving this balance.  They generally aim to 
provide a counterpoint to the grant of intellectual property rights and balance the 
interests of users with that of rightsholders.  
 
One perspective is that limitations and exemptions aim to correct market failures 
that arise when certain types of activity or users are marginalised from the market 
place. More generally however, they aim to correct market failures that may arise 
where public policy considerations (resulting from positive externalities, or moral 
positions) are seen as strong enough to supersede market-based transactions of 
authorisation or prohibition.   
 
In the context of international trade law, the scope of possible limitations and 
exemptions in both patent and copyright law are constrained by the requirement 
that they ‘must not conflict with the normal exploitation of the right’.281  
 
In the field of patent law, the most common exemption is the ‘research exemption’, 
which is normally constricted to application in the pharmaceutical sector. Such an 
exemption provides that research, clinical tests and trials pursuant to regulatory 
approval processes by potential market entrants, do not constitute infringement 
of a protected drug.282  
 
Limitations and exemptions in copyright however are more complex. Generally, 
there are two approaches: (i) an enumerated statutory list of limitations and 
exemptions, or (ii) a doctrine such as ‘Fair Use’, which must be interpreted and 
applied by the courts on a case-by-case basis. These two approaches reflect two 
different mechanisms of legal rules, where the former takes the form of a rule 
while the latter that of a standard.283  
 
                                                        
281 See TRIPs Article 13 for provisions in international trade law on limitations to copyright, and 
Article 30 for provisions on limitations to patents. 
282 For example, see (i) in US Law see the exemption provided for by USC 35 §271(e)(1), or (ii) EC 
Directives 2001/82/EC and 2001/83/EC  
283 For a general discussion of the economics of legal rules versus standards, see Kaplow (1992). 
In terms of different models of limitation and exemptions to copyright, the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of either approach flow from the analysis of rules versus standards generally.  
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Nevertheless, even in the case of doctrinal standards such as fair use, there are 
established precedents for the types of uses that constitute fair use. 284  It is 
therefore evident that principles of limitations and exemptions, whether through 
enumerated lists or doctrinal standards, form an important policy dimension 
which affects the overall scope of protection in copyright law, and to a lesser 
extent patent law.  
 
Like copyright, broadcasters’ rights are a bundle of rights that generally 
corresponds to different types of uses and activities. Furthermore, given that the 
demand for broadcast transmission is derived from the demand for the underlying 
programming content, the various uses of signals are derivative of the various 
uses of works. Therefore, limitations and exemptions to broadcasters’ rights are 
an important element of the overall scope of protection for that subject matter, 
just as is the case for primary copyright. 
 
 
[6]-3.1 Applying Limitations and Exemptions 
 
As previously discussed in Chapter 2, under international law, limitations and 
exemptions to copyright are permissible if they are compliant with the principles 
of the three-step-test.285 This means that the limitations are (i) confined to certain 
special cases, (ii) do not conflict with normal exploitation of the work, and (iii) do 
not unreasonable prejudice the interests of the rights holder.286 The question thus 
arises as to the relationship between limitations and exemptions for primary 
copyright and broadcasters’ rights. 
 
The purpose of limitations and exemptions are to provide for certain uses of 
copyright without explicit authorisation. Hence, all ‘special cases’ that warrant 
limitations and exemptions are based on specific uses of content, rather than the 
mode of access to such content. As such, the same special cases that apply in 
general copyright, would apply for broadcasting, as broadcasting is merely a 
single medium through which content can be accessed, and does not impute any 
implied unique use.287  
 
The second step of the three-step-test deals with the exploitation of subject 
matter. Copyright protected works can be exploited through various distribution 
modes and platforms, of which broadcasting is only one. In other words, despite 
the fact that the party undertaking the exploitation is different (the beneficiary of 
                                                        
284 For example, the majority of the exemptions and limitations explicitly provided for in Article 5 
of the EU Copyright Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC) have also been established as fair use 
scenarios under US case law.  
285  Article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement states as follows: “Members shall confine limitations or 
exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation 
of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.” 
286 For a detailed analysis of how the test should be interpreted, see the WTO Copyright Panel 
Decision of 2000; Case WT/DS160 
287 However, it is acknowledged that only certain types of works are distributed via the broadcast 
media, namely musical and audiovisual works. As such, limitations and exemptions that apply 
other classes of works (e.g. works of art situated in public places) simply have no relevance. 
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the right is the broadcaster, as opposed to the copyright-owner), broadcast signal 
exploitation is merely a subset of the total possible forms of exploitation of the 
underlying copyright protected content. Therefore, if a given activity does not 
conflict with normal exploitation of a work, it is implied that it does not conflict 
with exploitation through the medium of broadcasting. As such, any user activity 
that passes this aspect of the test for copyright, would also pass for broadcasters’ 
rights. 
 
The last step assesses whether a proposed limitation prejudices the interests of 
the rightsholder. According to Gieger et al (2003), this step is related to, but offers 
more flexibility than the second step, partially because the legitimacy of interests 
can have a normative rather than strictly positive dimension. Additionally, 
rightsholders may have interests that are not directly economic in nature; indeed 
the classical pedagogy of copyright law makes a distinction between economic 
rights and moral rights.288 As such, a certain activity may prejudice some non-
economic right of a rightsholder even if it does not conflict with normal 
exploitation of the work. However, given the nature of signals as subject matter, 
natural rights perspectives (or at least notions of moral personhood) are not 
applicable and hence rights are generally restricted to those, which are economic 
in nature.289 Therefore, proposed limitations and exemptions which pass step two 
would generally pass step three.  
 
 
[6]-3.2 Transaction Cost Perspective 
 
The above discussion on the applicability of the-three step test mainly analyses 
limitations and exemptions from a legal compliance perspective. In terms of 
economic efficiency, Gordon (1982) postulates that the optimal standard for 
permitting fair use (the doctrinal standard alternative to rule-form limitations and 
exemptions) is to consider whether, in a world of zero transaction costs, the 
rightsholder would consent (or rather be indifferent) to the proposed use.  
 
This perspective suggests that the role of limitations and exemption provisions 
are to facilitate uses that would otherwise be excluded from the market because 
net gains to either party are outweighed by the search and transaction costs 
involved in voluntary authorisation.  
 
Again, due to the derived demand nature of broadcast transmission, any proposed 
use of a broadcast signal by a user implies a desired use of the content embedded 
in that signal. Furthermore, in the case of using a work as accessed through a 
broadcast signal, the user must obtain authorisation from both the copyright 
owner and the broadcaster. Therefore, certain uses of content within broadcast 
transmission imply increased transaction and search costs, as well as a risk of anti-
commons issues such as holdout problems. If legislating limitations and 
                                                        
288  Furthermore, this distinction is rooted in the interactions different theories on intellectual 
property, such as welfare-oriented and natural rights perspectives. See Chapter 3 for a discussion 
on this issue.  
289 This point was argued in Chapter 3. 
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exemptions has an economic basis in mitigating information asymmetry market 
failures that arise in high transaction cost environments, then this argument is 
certainly applicable for the case of broadcast transmissions. Furthermore, given 
that some uses are hindered by the increased transaction costs of layered rights, 
it is possible to even argue that limitations and exemptions should be stronger for 
broadcast transmission than as for standard copyright. 
 
Furthermore, Loren (1997) argues that information asymmetry derived 
transactions costs are not the only market failure that copyright limitations seek 
to mitigate. Voluntary market exchanges also result in inefficient outcomes where 
the activity concerned results in positive externalities. As such limitations and 
exemptions provide for a mechanism to internalise these externalities by 
bypassing the price mechanism of market exchange. This is also a powerful 
argument for limitations and exemptions to broadcasters’ rights, and more 
specifically to copyright as supplemented by broadcasters’ rights, as traditional 
approaches to broadcast policy have placed strong emphasis on the positive 
externality aspects of information dissemination through the broadcast media.290 
 
 
[6]-4 CONCLUSION 
 
The conclusion of Chapter 5 was that the scope of protection for broadcasters’ 
rights (z’) should be set less than that for copyright (z).  
 
The scope of protection is affected by two parameters – length of protection, and 
breadth of protection. Chapter 5 however noted that length of protection is not a 
major policy lever for the scope of protection for broadcasters’ rights; i.e. changing 
this parameter does little to affect the overall effective level of protection. This 
chapter therefore went on to explore the various policy levers that affect breadth 
of protection and how they apply to broadcasting signals.  
 
All of these parameters (including length) can be represented as elements (zi or 
z’i) which affect the overall protection of copyright or broadcasters’ rights 
respectively. Chapter 5 noted that the issue of setting z’ < z can be complicated. 
This is because of the mathematical relationship between the elements – they 
form a of weighted index to result in the overall level of protection. 
 
It would therefore be superficially incorrect to just assume that if z’ < z, every 
element of those indices follows the same relationship (i.e that z’i < zi, for ∀ i). This 
is because if the elements are weighted, there are various different combinations 
of the elements which can yield a given relationship. One aspect of breadth of 
protection can be greater for broadcasters (than for copyright owners), while still 
resulting in an overall level of protection lower for broadcasters. 
 
                                                        
290  See Chapter 4 for discussions on the market failures and public policy dimensions in the 
broadcasting sector, including positive externalities.  
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The analysis in this chapter stressed that several of the policy levers that apply in 
patent and copyright law simply do not apply for broadcasts. Therefore, those 
particular elements (z’i) have zero values or zero weightings.  
 
This chapter further argued that limitations and exceptions are among the most 
important elements for affecting breadth of protection – particularly for 
broadcasters; that ‘lever’ should hence have a very high weighting in the overall 
formulation of z’. Given the lack of ‘breadth levers’, and the importance of the 
‘limitations lever’ in particular, this chapter argues that in order to ensure that z’ 
< z, the specific parameter of limitations and exceptions must be stronger (i.e. 
create a narrower breadth of protection) than for general copyright.  
 
The practical policy conclusion is that it is important to ensure that the limitations 
and exemptions implemented for broadcast transmission protection are at least 
as liberal as those offered for primary copyright. This chapter suggested that not 
only would such a construction be compatible with the relevant guiding legal 
principles, but that this approach is supported from a market failure correction 
perspective.  
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CHAPTER 7: ENFORCEMENT IN BROADCASTING MARKETS 
 
This is the third chapter of Part III of this manuscript. While Chapters 6 and 7 
focused on the theme of scope of protection, this chapter analyses the theme of 
enforcement of rights. In the regard, the underlying research question of this 
chapter is “What are the dynamics of intellectual property in broadcasting 
markets?” 
 
 
[7]-1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As stressed throughout this manuscript thus far, broadcasters’ related rights are 
independent of any copyright that may subsist in the content embedded within a 
broadcast.291 This layering of rights can lead to certain issues, such as possible 
anti-commons effects.292 Such anti-commons effects arise where a user wishes to 
make use a particular work (as accessed through a broadcast transmission), and 
must obtain authorisation for usage by both the copyright owner and 
broadcasting organisation. This results in a possible overall exacerbation of the 
existing problems of a copyright system that seems to be subject to a general trend 
of an expanded scope of protection.293 Another social cost of broadcasters’ rights 
is that it may result in an enclosure of the public domain and creation of 
deadweight losses, specifically for works which are not subject to copyright 
protection, or whose term of protection has expired. Hence, it is important to 
analyse whether and how the various aspects of broadcasters’ related rights 
contribute to market outcomes. One process through which such outcomes might 
be generated is  the in the enforcement actions taken against infringements in 
broadcasting markets.  
 
This chapter develops a framework to discuss how market characteristics affect 
the distribution of possible outcomes. It then concludes by suggesting a system of 
reassigning enforcement standing from copyright owners to broadcasters as an 
alternative to implementing unique and independent intellectual property rights 
for broadcasting organisations.   
 
 
[7]-2 BROADCASTERS’ RIGHTS IN THE MARKETPLACE 
 
Before moving on to creating a model to analyse enforcement, this section briefly 
recaps some basic premises of broadcasters’ rights, and how they function within 
the broadcasting market. 
                                                        
291 Article 1 of the Rome Convention (which deals with Related Rights including the Rights of 
Broadcasting Organisations), provides for the safeguard of Copyright Proper, and states that 
protection of all related rights “…shall leave intact and shall in no way affect the protection of 
copyright in literary and artistic works.” 
292  An anti-commons effect arises when a property right over a resource is fragmented over 
multiple rightsholders, leading to coordination problems, market inefficiencies, and reduced social 
welfare through general under-utilization; for a general overview, see Buchanan and Yoon (2000). 
293 This observation is discussed in Chapter 5.  
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[7]-2.1 Elements of Broadcasters’ Rights 
 
Like most forms of intellectual property, including general copyright, the ‘rights of 
broadcasting organisations’ should be considered as a bundle of different inter-
related rights. There are several possible constituent elements of the ‘bundle of 
rights’ that are the intellectual property rights of broadcasting organisations in 
relation to their own transmissions. Generally, broadcasters’ rights dictate 
activities between the broadcaster and two groups of second parties: (i) end-users 
(consumers), and (ii) competing broadcasters.  
 
For analytical purposes, this discussion shall generally focus on the ‘Right of 
Fixation’, i.e. the ability of the broadcasting organisation to authorise or prohibit 
fixations (e.g. recording in material form) of the material from their broadcasts. 
However, it is noted that some aspects of this analysis can be generalised to cover 
other elements of the bundle of rights. Furthermore, this discussion focuses on the 
enforcement of this right in terms of the relationship between broadcasters and 
end-users.  
 
[7]-2.2 Fixation Rights and Consumers 
 
In relation to consumers, broadcasters’ rights can be seen as tools to preserve 
market relationships that prevail at the level of primary copyright protection. In 
particular, this refers to the intermodal relationships between different media 
platforms, including both physically distributed forms (e.g. DVDs) and intangible 
modes of communication (e.g. broadcast signals or live performances). The idea is 
that a given copyright protected work can be delivered to consumers via different 
platforms and media formats, and that these platforms and formats have some 
inherent degree of substitutability. Hence, control over consumers’ use of 
broadcast signals minimises potential losses in other horizontal markets.  
 
For example, a broadcaster’s right to fixation provides that authorisation is 
needed for fixation (e.g. recording) of a broadcasting signal; hence, the inability of 
a consumer to freely record a television programme (i.e. produce their own 
physical reproduction) preserves the consumer’s willingness to pay for an 
authorised physical reproduction in the horizontal market (e.g. purchase a DVD).  
 
However, it is not necessarily immediately obvious whose market interests a 
broadcaster’s fixation right preserves. Certainly, a broadcaster’s ability to limit a 
user’s ability to fix a transmission of a particular work indeed somehow relates to 
the interests of primary copyright holders.  
 
Only in instances where (i) the broadcaster is also the producer of the work and 
hence owner of the underlying copyright, or (ii) the underlying work is not eligible 
for copyright protection in the first instance, will the broadcaster be the main and 
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sole beneficiary of enforcement of fixation rights.  Sports broadcasts are the 
primary example of this type of scenario.294  
 
In the more typical ‘base case’ however (i.e. where the work being broadcast is 
licenced from a programme supplier who holds copyright), the commercial 
interests of the primary copyright holder in horizontal markets come into play. As 
such, broadcaster’s rights that affect consumer incentives in horizontal markets 
presumably create positive externalities for primary copyright holders.295 
 
 
[7]-2.3 Basic Example 
 
The following discussion sets out the basic premise on which the Models in 
Sections 3 and 4 are based. 
 
Consider for example, a consumer ‘X’ who wishes to obtain a copy of a certain 
programme, where the content owner ‘C’ holds the copyright in the programme. 
In addition to licensing the work for broadcast to broadcaster ‘B’, C also markets 
authorised copies of the programme in some horizontal media market.  
 
It becomes known that X has obtained a copy of the programme by unauthorised 
fixation of B’s broadcast. X is assumedly infringing on both C’s right of 
reproduction (a component of primary copyright), and B’s right of fixation (a 
component of the broadcaster’s right).  
 
It is now interesting to analyse what B and C’s incentives are to pursue an 
enforcement action against X. 
 
As B has already transmitted the programme, it is inferred that the relevant 
benefits to B have already been gained from X. In particular, X has already been 
subjected to the advertising contained in same transmission in which the 
infringed programme was embodied (hence giving commercial value to the 
overall transmission), or has done their part to finance B through the legitimate 
receipt of the transmission (e.g. by paying their statutory television use licence 
fee, or subscription fee).  
 
Therefore, it would appear that only C has incentive to pursue enforcement action 
as the unauthorised activity represents lost potential revenue in the horizontal 
market for physical distribution (limited of course by the price in that market 
relative to X’s willingness to pay). As such, while C might be interested in passing 
off the costs of enforcement to B, it is questionable whether B has any real private 
incentive to enforce. 
                                                        
294 As discussed in Chapter 4, sports performances are generally not considered as eligible for 
traditional copyright protection, and hence broadcasters’ rights somewhat fill in this gap of subject 
matter protection eligibility. 
295  These externalities are only positive where the copyright holder is a profit-maximiser. In 
certain cases, a copyright holder’s goal may be that of maximum distribution – in such cases, 
enforcement actions by the broadcaster may restrict access and distribution, and hence create a 
negative externality. 
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Now, consider the case where C has licensed the work to two broadcasters: B1 and 
B2. For simplicity, and assuming the absence of embedded metadata to prove 
otherwise, it cannot be known with certainty whether a particular copy was 
obtained from a fixation of the transmission of either B1 or B2.  Indeed, if there is 
only one single fixation, the incentives do not change much.  
 
 
[7]-2.4 Subsequent Distribution 
 
The situation changes if X seeks to distribute copies of the programme to another 
consumer Y. Firstly, each copy made is a successive infringement on C’s 
reproduction right. The exact infringement of the broadcaster’s rights however 
depends on how that bundle of rights is constructed. As with before, there is the 
infringement of unauthorised fixation of the broadcast transmission. However, 
there may now be the related additional infringement of subsequent distribution 
of an unauthorised fixation.296 As such, there are multiple infringements of C’s 
copyright, as well as infringements of the broadcaster’s fixation and subsequent 
distribution rights (though it is not known whether it is B1 or B2). 
 
For each reproduction and subsequent distribution, there is an additional loss to 
C in terms of potential revenue in the horizontal market, in addition to that from 
the first fixation. Additionally, there is some loss to the broadcaster in the form of 
a contraction of its potential audience. This would mean a marginal decline in the 
size of the audience reach for advertising (meaning an erosion of advertising space 
value), or loss revenue in terms of a potential subscription or statutory licence (as 
each consumer Y chooses not to consume the content through the medium of 
broadcasting at all).  
 
Therefore, B1, B2 and C all have incentives to enforce against X, where X is engaging 
in subsequent distribution. However, they all also have an incentive to try to free 
ride off of each other’s possible enforcement efforts.  
 
Generally, it is reasonable to consider that C’s stake is likely to be larger than B’s 
(for example, the lost revenue from a potential DVD sale is greater than the lost 
revenue from a marginal viewer). 297  Also, it should be noted that the loss in 
revenue to the broadcaster is relative to the significance of the infringed 
programme in the overall programming schedule. As the number of separate 
unauthorised programmes that are fixed and distributed by increases (as a 
proportion of the broadcaster’s overall programming schedule), the broadcaster’s 
stake in enforcement action increases. 
 
                                                        
296 Conceptually, a fixation rights are distinct from post-fixation rights, which include subsequent 
distribution of the content of a fixed signal. For an overview on the debate regarding this 
distinction, see paragraph 23 of WIPO SCCR/17/INF/1 (2008). 
297 Of course however, the loss in revenue to the copyright holder is tapered by the consumers’ 
willingness to pay and likelihood of purchase in the horizontal market.  
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Furthermore, since the work was licenced to another broadcaster B2, uncertainty 
arises as to which broadcasters’ right of fixation was violated. Hence, as the 
number of ‘co-broadcasters’ increases, everyone’s incentive to enforce changes 
due to the desire to free-ride on each other’s enforcement actions.  
 
Essentially, a public good game arises in terms of the copyright owner and various 
broadcasters’ investments in monitoring and enforcement actions.298  
 
The following Sections now aim to discuss a simple model of how the enforcement 
behaviours of copyright holders and broadcasters interact. Section 3 presents a 
model of a single copyright owner licencing content to multiple broadcasting 
organisations. It seeks to analyse the circumstances that affect how broadcasters’ 
related rights influence market outcomes or create externalities for primary 
copyright holders. 
 
 
[7]-3 MODEL 1: MULTIPLE BROADCASTERS AND SINGLE COPYRIGHT 
OWNER 
 
 
This Model summarizes the interactions between the Copyright owner (C), and n 
different broadcast licensees Bi (who are assumed to be uniform in behaviour and 
structure). 
 
The scenario is premised on the following:   
 
i. Copyright owner C licences a programme to n different (identical) broadcasters  
ii. X illegally records one of the broadcasts and distributes m copies.  
iii. Each copy is a loss of R to the broadcast market (R/n for each broadcaster) 
iv. Each copy is a loss of P to the copyright owner (in a horizontal market) 
v. Either a broadcaster or the owner can pursue enforcement at cost E 
 
Variable Meaning 
m Number of distributed infringing copies 
n Number of content licenced broadcasters 
P (WTP-Adjusted) price in horizontal market 
E Cost of enforcement 
R Revenue from single broadcast viewer 
Table 7.1: Summary of Model Variables 
 
 
 
For a given user, the work can either be accessed through broadcast media (i.e. 
one of the n broadcasters), or through the horizontal market (i.e. either a 
legitimate copy from C, or an unauthorised from X). 
 
                                                        
298 It is important to note that in this chapter, enforcement actions are understood as actions which 
stop infringements or result in injunctive relief only. This part of the chapter does not consider the 
issue of award of damages for intellectual property right violations. 
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If there is effective competition between the broadcasting and horizontal markets, 
then there should be an equilibrium of relative prices. In other words, the prices 
in the two markets should be equal when adjusted for (i) the contribution of the 
specific work to the overall broadcast service, and in (ii) any premium that the 
consumer places on the ‘horizontal’ copy over enjoying the programme via 
broadcast.299  
 
Consider that Ṙ is the price payed for a broadcasting service (e.g. either the 
subscription fee, or the per-user average commercial value of the adverting space 
on a terrestrial service), while Ṗ is the price paid for a legitimate copy in the 
horizontal market. Ṙ and Ṗ represent the income that a broadcaster or copyright 
owner gets from a legitimate user/consumer.  
 
Since the broadcast is comprised of several programmes, the specific programme 
contributes only a proportion of the total value of that service (αṘ). Consumers 
might also gain more utility from one form more than the other, so consider that 
there is a higher wiliness to pay for the good in the horizontal market by some 
factor β. Hence, consumers are indifferent between the broadcasting service and 
the horizontal market where the adjusted prices are in equilibrium at (αβṘ = Ṗ). 
 
When some legitimate enforcement action is undertaken which results in an 
injunction against the infringing distributor (no matter by whom), the consumers 
who were previously served by the infringing market would now be redistributed 
between the n broadcasters and the market for legitimate copies sold by C. 
Suppose that a proportion µ of these users are not redistributed, and they leave 
the market as that they are no longer able to utilize the possibly lower priced (or 
free) infringing copy. Of the remaining consumers, Ɵ might uptake broadcasting 
services (as under equilibrium prices they are indifferent), while the remaining 
purchase legitimate copies.  
 
Enforcement against the infringer therefore creates a direct gain to the collective 
broadcasting sector, valued at (ƟαβṘ); the gain to the copyright holder would be 
(1-µ -Ɵ)Ṗ. As these additional parameters are inconsequential to this analysis, the 
per-unit gains to the broadcasting sector and the copyright owner can be 
simplified as just P and R respectively. P and R in themselves hence account for 
the fact that only some consumer would ‘legitimise’ their consumption in line with 
their willingness-to-pay. 
 
Furthermore, these gains would be uniformly distributed between the n 
broadcasters.  For each infringing sale stopped, the individual broadcaster would 
gain R/n, or a total of (m/n)(R) for the total of m infringements stopped. The 
copyright holder on the other hand, will gain a total of mP. 
 
If no enforcement takes place, the infringements will continue, and neither the 
broadcasters nor the copyright owner will gain or lose anything. However, if at 
                                                        
299 For example, consumers may be will to pay more for a physical copy as it can be enjoyed 
multiple times, and at any time unlike a transient broadcast.  
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least one party enforces, all parties gain their respective amounts, but anyone who 
enforces will also incur an enforcement cost E. 
 
As each of the broadcasters and the copyright owner can choose to either pursue 
enforcement action or forbear, their choices and relevant payoffs can be 
summarised as presented below.300 
 
 
 B: Broadcaster i 
Enforce Forbear 
C:
 C
op
yr
ig
ht
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r 
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e  C: (mP – E) 
B: ((m/n)(R) - E) 
 
 
C: (mP – E) 
B: (mR/n) 
Fo
rb
ea
r  
C: (mP) 
B: ((m/n)(R)  –E) 
 
 
C: 0 
B: 0 
 
Table 7.2: Enforcement Model 1 Payoffs 
 
It is not immediately possible to define an equilibrium for the above game, 
particularly because the dynamics of behaviour depends on the multiple 
exogenous variables (E, P, and R). However, it is obvious to note that either party 
(C or a single broadcaster ‘Bi’) would only consider enforcement when the costs of 
enforcement are outweighed by the private benefits of enforcement.  
 
As such, the different possible outcomes can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. No Enforcement Necessary – The sum of the total private gains to all parties 
from enforcement is less than the cost of enforcement. Neither will any 
party choose to enforce, nor is enforcement even socially desirable at all. 
 
2. Duplication of Efforts – The private gains from enforcement for both parties 
individually are greater than the costs of enforcement. Hence, both parties 
have an incentive to unilaterally enforce. This may result in a duplication 
of efforts and costs, which is a socially undesirable outcome.  
 
3. No Enforcement Pursued – The like with ‘duplication of efforts’ above, the 
net private gains for both parties might be positive, but both parties may 
choose to forbear in an attempt to free-fide off of the other. As a result, no 
enforcement action is pursued, even though it would have been socially 
desirable to do so.  
 
                                                        
300 This analysis generally assumes that gains are only from stopping infringement or attempting 
to legitimise consumption. In principle, these gains can hence be actually ex ante the act of 
infringement through promoting compliance. In any instances, the gains are not in the form of 
damages ordered by an adjudicating body.   
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4. Public Good Failure – The sum of the total private gains to all parties from 
enforcement is greater than the cost of enforcement. However, the 
individual private gains for each party are less than the cost of 
enforcement. No party has the incentive to unilaterally enforce, despite the 
fact that enforcement would be socially optimal. 
 
5. Single Party (One way) Free-riding – The private gains are greater than the 
cost of enforcement for only one party. This party has the incentive to 
unilaterally enforce, while the other does not. However, the party without 
an incentive to enforce will still enjoy some positive gain without spending. 
In order words, the enforcing party creates a positive externality from 
which the non-enforcing party benefits. A key feature in this case is that the 
certainty that one party will enforce and the other will not. 
 
These various possible outcomes, as linked to the relevant parameters, can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
Scenario Outcome 
1. C’s benefits less than enforcement 
costs; Individual B’s benefits less 
than enforcement costs 
 
mP < E ; (m/n)R <E 
No Enforcement Undertaken 
(No party has a unilateral incentive to enforce) 
   1.1 Sum of C and all Bi’s benefits is 
greater than enforcement costs. 
 
mP + mR > E 
Public Good Market Failure 
(No party has a unilateral incentive to enforce, 
even though it would be so socially beneficial) 
   1.2 Sum of C and all Bi’s benefits is less 
than enforcement costs. 
 
mP + mR < E 
No Enforcement Desirable   
(Neither does any party has a unilateral incentive 
to enforce, nor would it even socially beneficial) 
 
2. C’s benefit is greater than 
enforcement costs. 
 
mP > E 
C has an Enforcement Incentive  
 
   2.1 Individual Bi’s benefits is less than 
enforcement costs. 
 
(m/n)R < E 
Bi Free-rides 
(Bi has no unilateral incentive to enforce. C will 
thus enforce with certainty, creating a positive 
externality for Bi.; i.e. Bi free-rides ‘one-way’) 
   2.2 Individual Bi’s benefits is greater 
than enforcement costs. 
 
(m/n)R > E 
Strategic Decision  
(Both C and Bi have a unilateral incentive to 
enforce, and a strategic game arises. This may 
either result in (i) A duplication of enforcement 
efforts, of (ii) neither party enforcing in an 
attempt to free-ride off of the other. Both of these 
outcomes are socially inefficient)  
 
3. Individual Bi’s benefits is greater 
than enforcement costs. 
 
(m/n)R > E 
Bi has an Enforcement Incentive 
 
   3.1 C’s benefits is less than 
enforcement costs. 
 
mP < E 
C Free-rides 
(mirror of 2.1) 
 
   3.2 C’s benefits is greater than 
enforcement costs. 
 
mP > E 
Strategic Decision  
(same as 2.2) 
  
Table 7.3: Enforcement Model 1 Outcomes 
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Given the above set-up, a market may be conceived as being defined by the 
following variables:  
 
(i) ‘m’ which is essential a rate of infringement; 
(ii) ‘n’ which is the number of broadcast licensees; and 
(iii)  Exogenous parameters: 301 
i. P - average willingness to pay in the horizontal market 
ii. R- average revenue from a single broadcast consumer 
iii. E – cost of monitoring and enforcement  
   
This gives a distribution of outcomes over various values of ‘m’ and ‘n’ as 
illustrated in Figure 1 below. For analytical purposes, it can be assumed that 
various markets are characterised by some distribution of ‘m’ and ‘n’. Hence, if 
this distribution is assumed to be uniform, the relative areas on the plane ‘m vs. n’ 
represent relative probabilities.302  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Multiple Broadcasters with Unitary Elasticity 
 
                                                        
301 For convenience of graphical analysis, it is assumed that R<P<E, as per the discussion on the 
relative losses to the different parties. However, this assumption is only for the ease of graphical 
presentation of the discussion. It is not a strict limitation on the interpretation of the results. 
Furthermore, it acknowledged that a major limitation in this analysis is that E is likely to be several 
magnitudes of order greater than P and R; as such, any enforcement actions would only be viable 
at extremely high values of m, and the relative values of the other parameters would be generally 
inconsequential.  
302 Of course, the assumption that the market is uniform distribution of m and n is quite 
unreasonable. This comment is only made to illustrate how the figures can be interpreted. 
Furthermore, the exact (non-uniform) distribution would not necessarily be clear, as while the 
distribution of the number of licensee would be apparent, the rates of infringement would not be 
known with certainty.  
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A few interesting observations arise out of analysis of Figure 1. Firstly, it is noted 
that the outcome ‘C free-rides’ is only possible for values of n<R/P. Under the 
assumption that R<P, this means that this outcome never occurs.303  
 
Secondly, in high infringement markets (high values of ‘m’, where m>(E/P)), the 
outcome is either (i) A duplication of efforts (or attempted mutual free-riding), or 
(ii) B free-rides off of C. The distribution between these outcomes depends on the 
slope of the line ‘n(E/R)’. Where R is low (the broadcasting market is 
characterised as a relatively low-revenue market), the line is steeper, and the area 
defined by duplication of efforts decreases.  
 
Thirdly, and of most concern from a welfare perspective, is the observation that 
the area defined by a ‘public good failure’ depends on distance between (E/P) and 
(E/(R+P)), and hence the value of R. In low revenue markets (low value of R), the 
distance between these lines is minimal, and hence the scope for a public good 
market failure is less.  
 
 
[7]-3.1  Price Elasticity of Demand for Programmes 
  
Now, it is noted that the above analysis is based on a constant value of ‘R’ – this 
means that the number of licensees does not affect the total revenue in the 
broadcasting market accrued from the programme under consideration. When the 
number of licensees (value of ‘n’) increases, this means a shift in the supply curve 
for the programme under consideration to the right, resulting in a lower 
equilibrium price, and a high equilibrium quantity of programming consumed in 
the broadcasting market. Hence, assuming a constant value of R implicitly 
assumes that the Price Elasticity of Demand is unitary (ɛ =1), i.e. that the increase 
in quantity is exactly proportional the decrease in price. 304  Relaxing this 
assumption, there may be two other possible situations: 
 
(i) Demand is inelastic (ɛ<1), meaning that total revenue is decreasing in 
n; Or 
(ii) Demand is elastic (ɛ>1), meaning that total revenue is increasing in n. 
 
The distribution of outcomes in in these cases is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, 
which can be compared to the base case in Figure 1. 
                                                        
303 Outcome ‘C free rides’ only occurs when n(E/R)<(E/P), i.e. where n < R/P. If the assumption 
R<P holds, then the outcome corresponds to 0<n<1. Since n is defined as the number of licences 
in the market, it is a positive discrete number (i.e. n ≥1), hence this outcome is not possible if P>R. 
304 Price Elasticity of Demand (ɛ) is a measure of how responsive quantity demanded is to changes 
in price. This responsiveness determines the effect on total revenue from a price change, as it gives 
an indication to the extent that a change in price induces a positive (or negative) quantity change 
effect significant enough to compensate for the negative (or positive) price effect on total revenue 
(which is equal to quantity demanded times price). Hence, Price Elasticity of demand give 
information about the relationship between total revenue and price changes.  
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Figure 7.2: Multiple Broadcasters with Inelastic Demand 
 
In inelastic markets, as the value of ‘n’ increases, the space defined by ‘no 
enforcement necessary’ increases for low values of ‘m’, while at high values of ‘m’ 
the rate of expansion of the area defined by possible ‘duplication of efforts’ 
decreases. 305   More importantly, the space defined by a public good problem 
decreases, and actual closes off as n tends to infinity.  
 
 
Figure 7.3: Multiple Broadcasters with Elastic Demand 
 
 
                                                        
305 In the context of this discussion, ‘low levels of m’ refer to when m< E/(R+P), and high levels of 
m are when m > (E/P). 
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In elastic markets, as the value of ‘n’ increases, the ‘no need for enforcement’ area 
contracts at low levels of ‘m’, while at high levels of ‘m’, the probability of 
‘duplication of efforts’ dominates (increases at a faster rate than) the possibility of 
‘B free-riding off of C’. Furthermore, as n tends to infinity, the probability of a public 
good problem arising increases significantly.   
 
 
[7]-3.2 Interpretation of Results  
 
[7]-3.2.1 Broadcasters’ Perspective 
 
The analysis suggests some general but interesting conclusions. Firstly, low 
revenue markets are less prone to undesirable enforcement outcomes, such as 
duplication of enforcement efforts, mutual attempts at free-riding off of 
enforcement actions, and public good problems in enforcement.306 Furthermore, 
low revenue markets are more likely to result in a situation where broadcasters 
are able to free-ride off of the enforcement efforts of copyright holders without 
copyright holders being able to pass off enforcement costs to broadcasters. As 
such, low revenue markets seem to be preferable in terms of social outcomes, and 
for private outcomes of broadcasters. Similarly, broadcasters will enjoy free-
riding outcomes more often in competitive (high value of n) markets. 
 
Secondly, the elasticity of demand for programming has a major impact on the 
distribution of enforcement outcomes. In the case of elastic demand for 
programming, an increase in the number of licensees is associated with an 
increased likelihood of undesirable social outcomes.307 The probability of a public 
good problem in enforcement also increases, and the probability of duplication of 
efforts or mutual free-riding increases at a greater rate than the probability of 
broadcasters being able to free-ride off of copyright-holders’ enforcement efforts. 
There is also a decrease in the probability of a ‘no enforcement necessary’ outcome.  
 
In inelastic markets, an increase in the number of broadcast licensees is associated 
with a lower likelihood of undesirable outcomes, i.e. - duplication of enforcement 
efforts, mutual attempts at free-riding off of enforcement efforts, and public good 
problems in enforcement. Furthermore, an increase in licensees is also associated 
with a greater likelihood of broadcasters’ free-riding off of the enforcement 
attempts of copyright owners (relative to the probability of duplication of efforts). 
As such broadcasters will generally prefer the enforcement environment in an 
inelastic market.308 
                                                        
306 A speculative example of such markets would be public broadcasting service content.  
307  A speculative example of such markets would be daytime television, mass syndicated 
programming, and some 24-hour news networks.  
308 It is interesting to note that the analyses of (i) low revenue markets, and (ii) increasing the 
number of broadcast licensees, yield similar results. However, it cannot be said with certainty 
whether these effects would compound each other, as a decrease in total revenue (keeping the 
number of licensees the same), decreases the revenue per broadcaster and hence alters their 
incentives to enforce. In contrast an increase in the number of licensees in an elastic market does 
result in an increase in total revenue (as the increase in quantity consumed is more than 
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The general conclusion here is that inelastic markets will generally have lower 
tendency to demonstrate enforcement equilibrium problems. In fact, at higher 
levels of competition, there are generally lower likelihoods of undesirable 
outcomes. As such, for the broadcasting sector collectively, there appears to be a 
trade-off between the effects of increased competition: the effect on total revenue 
and the favourability of enforcement conditions, where the direction of these 
effects depends on the (in)elasticity of the market.  
 
From the perspective of the individual broadcaster which wishes to free-ride off 
of a copyright holder, enforcement outcomes are more desirable in either a (i) 
more-competitive elastic market, or (ii) a less-competitive inelastic market. Of 
course, these private gains would need to be weighed against the revenue earning 
capacity of the broadcaster relative to the state of competition. Therefore, the 
question arises as to whether the broadcaster ever wishes to exercise their 
exclusive rights over fixation and subsequent distribution.  
 
[7]-3.2.2 Copyright Owner’s Perspective 
 
From the various outcomes, it can be seen that fixation rights may in fact always 
be particularly useful for the broadcasting organisation, as it is not necessarily 
leveraged with absolute certainty in many scenarios.  
 
In fact, where the outcome is ‘duplication of efforts’, the existence of the 
broadcaster’s ability to enforce actually introduces uncertainty about whether the 
copyright owner will enforce, as both parties wish to free-ride off of each other. In 
these cases, removing enforcement as an option (by stripping the broadcaster of 
their related right), might actually be favourable to the broadcasting sector as a 
whole. 
 
The only scenario in which the broadcaster’s fixation right is conclusively useful 
is when unilateral enforcement would give rise to a net private gain to the 
broadcaster and not the copyright-holder. As discussed previously, such an 
outcome (i.e. copyright-holder free-rides off of broadcaster) is not possible when 
P>R. Similarly, such a situation is the only scenario in which a copyright holder is 
certain to lobby for the existence of broadcasters’ fixation and subsequent 
distribution rights.  
 
It is possible to further consider this issue by relaxing the assumption that the 
revenue loss in the horizontal market for the copyright-holder (P) is greater than 
the revenue loss to the broadcasting sector (R). As shown in Figures 1-3, the 
outcome ‘C free-rides off of B’ is only possible where n ≤ (R/P). As such, the 
copyright holder would want to lobby for broadcasters’ rights when R>P, so that 
there is the possibility of free-riding off of broadcasters’ enforcement efforts. This 
would be the case for programming content which is primarily consumed via the 
                                                        
proportional to the decrease in price), but it is uncertain whether this increase will result in an 
increase in revenue per broadcaster.  
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broadcast media, and has little commercial value in horizontal markets (e.g. time-
dependent live event).309 
 
Furthermore, for the most favourable enforcement environment, the copyright 
holder would licence a number of broadcasters up to n = R/P, so as to maximise 
the relative probability of being able to successfully free-ride. Therefore, there is 
the interesting conclusion that when broadcasters are given exclusive rights over 
their transmission, the copyright owner faces a trade-off between revenue 
maximisation from multiple licensees, and the favourableness of the enforcement 
environment.  
 
A final point of discussion concerns non-profit-maximising copyright owners. 
These are copyright owners whose goal is to maximise distribution rather than 
profit. In terms of the model discussed above, this would be equivalent to a 
copyright owner who does not operate in a horizontal market, or whose price in 
such market is zero. These owners would wish to avoid situations where 
broadcasters create negative externalities through enforcement actions which 
limit distribution and access to their works. As such, they would prefer low 
revenue and elastic broadcasting markets.  
 
From the perspective of the regulator, the policy goal is to maximise the certainty 
of enforcement, and minimise instances of infringements. 310  Hence, such 
regulators would prefer to exercise oversight in elastic markets, or at least 
inelastic markets with a low number of broadcasters. Interestingly, while all 
parties would seem to favour an elastic environment, the broadcaster prefers a 
more competitive licensee market, while the copyright owners prefer a smaller 
number of broadcasters.  
 
The main lesson to take away from this analysis is that, to the extent that the 
policy-maker can influence competition in the licensee market, the nature of the 
demand for programming content must be taken into consideration. This would 
be of particular relevance for issues such as considering which type(s) of content 
are permitted to be subject to compulsory licencing regimes, and which types are 
left up to the licencing discretion of the copyright owner.  
 
Furthermore, and most importantly, this discussion demonstrates that the range 
of scenarios in which broadcasters’ related rights necessarily improve 
enforcement outcomes is limited.  
                                                        
309 This may lead to questions about why X would fix and distribute the content if a horizontal 
market for the content does not exist. Such concerns would indeed be valid when discussing 
fixation of signals and after-markets for content post-broadcast. However, infringing activities can 
also include distribution without initial fixation; for example, communication to the public for the 
broadcast of a live event, or even retransmission through an illegal cable connection. This is an 
important point, as it shows how the discussion which began with a focus on fixation rights can be 
generalised to other types of rights for both copyright holders and broadcasting organisations.  
310  Irrespective of overall welfare implications, regulators and policy-makers (such as the 
broadcast commission or the intellectual property office) have a strong incentive to minimise 
infringements and maximise deterrence and compliance through monitoring enforcement, in 
order to signal stability and predictability in the regulatory environment. 
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Building on the analysis above of Model 1 (single copyright-owner and multiple 
broadcasters), Model 2 examines the case of a single broadcaster and multiple 
copyright owners.   
 
 
[7]-4 MODEL 2: SINGLE BROADCASTER AND MULTIPLE COPYRIGHT 
OWNERS 
 
At its core, the business model of broadcasting is to bundle content for distribution 
to the public. As such, a single broadcaster would generally licence content from 
multiple copyright holders, and assemble them into a programming schedule for 
eventual transmission.311  
 
As such, we can consider the case of a single broadcaster B who obtains the rights 
for programming content from several copyright owners Ci.312  Each copyright 
holder also presumably has commercial interests in other horizontal markets – 
these markets may be licencing to other broadcasters operating in the same 
market space, broadcasters in other markets, or other distribution platforms.  
 
When an infringer X records a broadcast without authorisation, they are violating 
the fixation rights of the broadcaster, as well as the reproduction rights of each 
copyright owner whose programmes were contained in the fixed recording. These 
copies may then be distributed to different third parties Y.  
 
However, the distributions of unauthorised copies in this form are more likely for 
individual programmes (as opposed to significant portions of an entire 
programming schedule). What is possible however, is that X can illegally 
redistribute the broadcast connection itself to Y (e.g. in the form of an illegal cable 
connection). In essence this can be considered as akin to a form of retransmission, 
but one undertaken by an independent infringing party rather than another entity 
operating in the broadcasting market.313 
This model is set up similar to Model 1, but instead of a single copyright holder 
and n broadcasters, there is a single broadcaster and n copyright holders. The 
scenario can be summarised as follows: 
 
i. Broadcaster B licences programmes from n different copyright owners Ci 
ii. X illegally redistributes the broadcast to m recipients  
iii. Every infringement m represents a loss P to each of the n copyright holders 
                                                        
311 See Chapter 4 for a discussion on issues regarding bundling of content in broadcasting markets, 
and how they relate to possible sector-specific market failures. 
312 As with the multiple licensees in Model 1, we assume that the multiple licensors in Model 2 are 
identical in structure and behaviour. This implies that the value of the licenced programmes is 
homogeneous.  
313 For this reason, Model 2 is much more useful than Model 1 as it moves away from specific 
analysis of fixation and subsequent distribution rights, and can be generalised to understand other 
aspects such as retransmission rights. Part IV of this manuscript examines issues in retransmission 
rights in detail.  
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iv. Every infringement m of each programme n, represents a loss of R to the 
broadcaster314  
v. Either the broadcaster or one of the copyright owners can pursue 
enforcement at cost E 
 
The logic of the losses to the broadcaster (R) and to copyright owners (P) is the 
same as in the previous Model 1. In this case however, the gains from enforcement 
are different. Each copyright owner Ci would gain the value P from each 
infringement that is stopped, totalling mP for the m total infringements. For the 
broadcaster however, the gains are of an amount R for every programme infringed 
upon, hence totalling nmR for m number of infringements of n number 
programmes.  
 
As with before, all parties derive their respective gains is at least one party 
enforces, net of any enforcement cost that they might expend. If no party enforces, 
then no one derives any gains or costs.   
 
Again, as each party can choose to either pursue enforcement action or forbear, 
their choices and relevant payoffs can be summarised as presented below.  
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Enforce Forbear 
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C: 0 
B: 0 
 
 
Table 7.4: Enforcement Model 2 Payoffs 
 
As with Model 1, there is no obvious equilibrium, as it depends greatly on the 
exogenous parameters P, R and E. Furthermore, it is again obvious that each 
player would only consider enforcement if the private benefits net the private 
costs are positive. The possible outcomes are the same as in Model 1, i.e.: (i) No 
Enforcement Necessary, (ii) Duplication of Efforts, (iii) Public Good Failure, or (iv) 
Single Party Free-riding. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
314 Total loss of expected broadcast revenue ‘R’ has a direction proportional relationship with the 
number of infringed programmes ‘n’. This is because, the more programmes infringed upon imply 
a greater likelihood of obtaining legitimate access (e.g. through paying subscription fees), or 
viewership for a longer period (and hence a greater extent of advertising impact). This relationship 
is assumed to be linear.  
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The various possible outcomes can be summarised as below. 
 
Scenario Outcome 
1. Individual Ci’s benefit is less than 
enforcement costs; B’s benefits less 
than enforcement costs 
 
mP < E ; nmR <E 
No Enforcement Undertaken 
(No party has a unilateral incentive to enforce) 
   1.1 Sum of all Ci’s and B’s benefit is 
greater than enforcement costs 
 
nmP + nmR > E 
Public Good Market Failure 
(No party has a unilateral incentive to enforce, 
even though it would be so socially beneficial) 
   1.2 Sum of all Ci’s and B’s benefits is 
less than enforcement costs 
 
nmP + nmR < E 
No Enforcement Desirable 
(Neither does any party has a unilateral incentive 
to enforce, nor would it even socially beneficial) 
 
2. B’s benefit is greater than 
enforcement costs 
 
nmR > E 
B has an Enforcement Incentive 
   2.1 Individual Ci’s benefit is less than 
enforcement costs 
 
mP < E 
Ci Free-rides 
(Ci has no unilateral incentive to enforce. B will 
thus enforce with certainty, creating a positive 
externality for Ci.; i.e. Ci free-rides ‘one-way’) 
   2.2 Individual Ci’s benefit is greater 
than enforcement costs 
 
mP > E 
Strategic Decision  
(Both B and Ci have a unilateral incentive to 
enforce, and a strategic game arises. This may 
either result in (i) A duplication of enforcement 
efforts, of (ii) neither party enforcing in an attempt 
to free-ride off of the other. Both of these 
outcomes are socially inefficient) 
 
3. Individual Ci’s benefit is greater 
than enforcement costs 
 
mP > E 
Ci has an Enforcement Incentive 
   3.1 B’s benefit is less than enforcement 
costs 
 
nmR < E 
B Free-rides 
(mirror of 2.1) 
 
   3.2 B’s benefit is greater than 
enforcement costs 
 
nmR > E 
Strategic Decision  
(same as 2.2) 
 
Table 7.5: Enforcement Model 1 Outcomes 
 
As with Model 1, it can be considered that various markets comprise some 
distribution of the number of licensors ‘n’ and an infringement rate ‘m’, where the 
parameters P (price in horizontal market), R (revenue in broadcast market), and 
E (enforcement costs), are exogenous. The distribution of outcomes is illustrated 
in Figure 4 below. 
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Figure 7.4: Multiple Licences (with Fixed Price) 
 
Analysis of Figure 4 shows some observations comparable with Figure 1. Here, 
high values of m and n correspond to the ‘duplication of efforts’ outcome, while 
low values of m and n correspond to the outcome ‘no enforcement necessary’. 
Generally, as n increases, the probability that ‘enforcement is not necessary’ 
decreases, and the probability that copyright holders free-ride off of the 
broadcaster’s enforcement efforts increases.315  
 
The ratio (P/R) is also of much importance in this Model. The outcome ‘B free-
rides off of Ci’ only occurs for high levels of m (m>(E/P)), and where n is less than 
(P/R). Therefore, the enforcement environment is more favourable to 
broadcasters (in terms of one way free-riding possibilities) when P is very high 
relative to R. 
 
Similar to Model 1, the problematic space ‘public good problem’ depends on the 
distance between (E/R) and (E/P+R). In markets where P is low (i.e. there is little 
or no horizontal market, and the broadcast sector is presumably the primary 
mode of distribution), there is little worry about a public good problem arising.316  
 
 
[7]-4.1  Cross Elasticity of Demand for Programming 
 
Further to the observation that public good failure depends on the value of 
programming in horizontal markets, an interesting use of this set-up is to consider 
                                                        
315 As noted previously, the exact distribution of markets in terms of m and n is not known, and 
this distribution would be the basis for determine exact probabilities of different outcomes. 
However, one can consider that the number of licensees’ n is known, and probability analysis is 
based on the fact that the infringement rate m is unknown, and hence there is uncertainty in the 
exact outcome. 
316 A Speculative example of such markets would be long distance broadcasts of sporting events.  
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how the distribution of outcomes in the broadcasting market depends on its 
relationship with such horizontal markets. 
 
The intuition behind this discussion so far, has been that there is some 
substitutability for particular copyright protected programme, as distributed via 
different platforms. The parameter of interest is hence the Cross-Price-Elasticity 
between the broadcast market prices and quantities in horizontal markets (ɛhb).317 
As the assumption is that the distribution platforms are substitutes in the minds 
of (at least some) consumers, the prevailing intuition is that ɛhb is positive (or at 
least non-negative). However, different types of content would have different 
magnitudes of cross-price-elasticity, which define how price changes in the 
broadcasting market affect demand (and hence price changes) in the horizontal 
market.  
 
In this Model, ‘n’ is defined as the number of copyright licensees that a broadcaster 
negotiates with. For small values of n, a few (or even a single) copyright holders 
have a monopolistic supply position with respect to the broadcaster (in its 
capacity as an intermediate consumer of the copyright content).  When n is much 
larger however, there is increased competition amongst copyright holders for 
licences with the broadcaster, resulting in downward pressures on royalty 
rates.318 Furthermore, the royalties paid to copyright holders are a major variable 
cost component of the broadcaster, and hence lower royalty rates imply lower 
costs, and lower prices to end-users. Hence, the price of content to consumers in 
the broadcasting market is decreasing with respect to the value of n. Since the 
content in the broadcasting market is a substitute for content in the horizontal 
market, these prices affect prices in the horizontal market. Lower prices in the 
broadcasting market then decrease demand and thus prices in the horizontal 
market.  
 
Therefore, the variable ‘P’ is decreasing in the variable ‘n’ by a rate conditioned by 
the cross-price-elasticity. Where there is high cross-price-elasticity, P decreases 
more rapidly with a steeper slope. In the extreme case where ɛhb = 0, P is fixed 
with respect to n (the case illustrated in Figure 4). The case of a positive cross-
price-elasticity is illustrated below in Figure 5. 
 
                                                        
317 Cross Price Elasticity (ɛhb) is a measure of the responsiveness in the quantity demanded for one 
good to changes in price of another good. It provides insight into the relationship between two 
goods, and more specifically, the degree of substitutability of goods. In this case, focus is on the 
relationship between the programme in the broadcasting market under analysis and the same 
programme in the horizontal market. A reduction in the price of broadcasting services, will cause 
a greater uptake of such services, as consumer substitute away from the horizontal market, 
lowering demand and reducing price in that market. The greater the value of ɛhb, the greater the 
degree of this cross-platform substitution price effect.  
318 This logic of course only holds when there is a free market in licensing, and royalty rates are 
determined by the price mechanism. Indeed, in some cases, royalty rates may be regulated as in 
cases of statutory or compulsory licences.  
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Figure 7.5: Multiple Licences with Decreasing Price (ɛhb >0) 
 
 
Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 4 gives rise to some interesting observations. 
Firstly, a positive cross-price-elasticity (P is increasing in n) causes the curve 
(1/n)(E/P+R) to relatively steepen as n increases, hence reducing the space 
defined by a ‘public good problem’ outcome. Therefore, as n increases, the 
probability of a public good failure decreases.  
 
Secondly, as n increases (and P decreases), value of (E/P) increases, hence 
widening the space defined by the outcome ‘duplication of efforts’. All of these 
effects are more pronounced and significant, the higher the degree of cross-price-
elasticity.  
 
[7]-4.2  Interpretation of Results  
 
These observations give rise to a very interesting proposition – in markets defined 
by a high degree of cross-price-elasticity319, the more competitive the licensor 
environment (i.e. supply of programming content), the more favourable the 
enforcement environment for copyright holders, in terms of one way free-riding 
off of a broadcaster’s enforcement efforts. In fact, while the market in its entirety 
benefits from lower royalty rates when there is competition between copyright 
holders, there are additional welfare gains from more certainty in enforcement 
conditions (reduced probability of duplication of efforts).  
 
From the perspective of copyright holders, the existence of broadcasters’ related 
rights (and hence ability to enforce) are more beneficial for markets with high 
cross-price elasticity, and high levels of competition. Similarly, regulators 
presumable prefer such markets as they imply greater certainty and high extents 
                                                        
319 A speculative example of such markets would be premium movie networks. 
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of enforcement against infringements. Furthermore, such markets are less 
preferable to broadcasters as they imply a reduced scope for free-riding, which is 
only possible at low levels of licensor competition irrespective of cross price 
elasticity. 
 
As with Model 1 in the previous Section, this discussion demonstrates that the 
range of scenarios in which broadcasters’ related rights necessarily improve 
enforcement outcomes depends on market context. 
 
 
[7]-5 STANDING AND ENFORCEMENT RULES 
 
The general theme of the above discussion is that market context plays an 
important role in affecting enforcement behaviour for broadcasters’ rights 
infringements. However, these nuances and possible uncertainties themselves 
stem from the fact that both copyright holders and related right holders are able 
to enforce against a joint infringement. Hence, in order to further understand how 
broadcasters’ related rights contribute to market outcomes, different hypothetical 
enforcement rules can be compared against the base case (where both the 
copyright owner and broadcaster can enforce).  
 
 
[7]-5.1  Alternative Enforcement Rules 
 
The following section briefly discusses some possible alternative enforcement 
rules, and how they affect market outcomes. The table below summarises the 
outcomes pursuant to the discussion that follows.  
 
Base Case 
Outcome 
Copyright 
Enforcement Only 
(No BRR) 
B’caster  
Enforcement only 
(Mandatory) 
B’Caster 
Enforcement via 
Pooled Standing 
No Enforcement 
Necessary 
No Enforcement 
Necessary 
No Enforcement 
Necessary 
 
No Enforcement 
Necessary 
Duplication of Efforts 
or Mutual Freeriding 
One-Way Freeriding 
C enforces; B freerides 
[+] 
One-Way Freeriding 
B enforces; C freerides 
[+] 
Duplication of Efforts 
(dis-incentivized) 
[o] 
Public Good 
Problem 
Public Good 
Problem 
Public Good 
Problem 
One way free-riding 
B enforces; Remits to C 
[+] 
One-Way Freeriding 
C enforces; B freerides 
One-Way Freeriding 
C enforces; B freerides 
Public Good 
Problem   
[-] 
Duplication of Efforts 
(dis-incentivized) 
[o] 
One way free-riding 
B enforces; C freerides 
Public Good 
Problem 
[-] 
One way free-riding 
B enforces; C freerides 
One way free-riding 
B enforces; C freerides 
Table 7.6: Alternative Enforcement Rules 
 
Different enforcement rules and resulting outcomes. [+] represents a presumed 
improvement in outcome, [-] represents a presumed worsening, and  [o] represents a 
change which is an improvement contingent upon the structure of net gain remittances 
(as compared to the base case of overlapping copyright and broadcasters’ related rights 
(BRR)) 
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The first hypothetical rule, is one in which broadcasters’ rights do not exist, and 
hence enforcement can be undertaken only by the copyright holder. In such 
scenarios, the outcomes where the broadcaster would have considered 
enforcement would now be different. The first case is where both the broadcaster 
and the copyright owner considered enforcement in the base case (and risked 
duplication of effort and/or mutual free-riding); the copyright owner will now 
certainly enforce and the broadcaster would enjoy one-way freeriding off of these 
efforts. From a social point of view, this is an improvement in outcome. The second 
case, is where the broadcaster would have enforced, and the copyright owner 
enjoys a one-way free riding position. Since the broadcaster cannot enforce under 
this hypothetical rule, the result is a public good problem, as it is socially optimal 
to enforce, but yet no enforcement takes place. This is hence a worsening of the 
outcome as compared to the base case.    
 
The second hypothetical rule is where only the broadcaster can enforce where 
infringements are through a violation of broadcasters’ rights, irrespective of the 
substantive claim that there is an infringement of copyright. In other words, where 
there is a joint infringement, only to broadcaster can enforce. This situation is 
essentially the mirror case of the first hypothetical rule discussed above. Where 
both parties would have previously considered unilateral enforcement, only the 
broadcaster can now enforce, and hence the outcome of possible duplication of 
efforts and/or mutual free-riding is replaced with an improved outcome of the 
broadcaster enforcing and the copyright owner enjoying one way free-riding. 
However, where in cases where the broadcaster would have previously 
unilaterally enforced (allowing the copyright holder to one way free-ride), there 
is now a public good problem which is a certain worsening of the social outcome.   
 
The third hypothetical rule is one in which the broadcaster does not have a unique 
legal entitlement (in the form of an independent intellectual property right), but 
has ‘standing’ on behalf of the copyright owner. This means that when the 
broadcaster is able to undertake enforcement action in its capacity as a licensee of 
the copyright owners whose rights are being infringed upon. The Models in this 
chapter focus on injunctive relief as the outcome of enforcement actions; hence, 
this ‘standing’ hypothetical rule does not change any of the existing incentives, and 
the outcomes are identical to that of the base case. All that has changed is the legal 
basis on which enforcement action is taken.  
 
The situation changes if enforcement gains in the form of actual damages are now 
taken into consideration (as opposed to mere injunction). In such a case, the 
broadcaster’s standing to take action now essentially acts as a mechanism to pool 
both the broadcaster and the copyright owners’ claims into one single 
enforcement action.320 Therefore, there is a change in the structure of incentives.  
 
This ‘pooling of claims’ notion is most significant in scenarios which would have 
otherwise been public good market failures. Under a single enforcement action, 
                                                        
320 The reasoning behind this approach parallels the concept of claims pooling in tort law. For a 
general discussion, see Aryres (1990).  
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the broadcaster can now claim for damages both for itself and on behalf of its 
copyright licensors; collectively, these gains are now significant enough to justify 
the costs of enforcement. The broadcaster would then be made liable to remit part 
of those net gains back to copyright holders, where every party receives a part of 
net gains proportional to their share in gross gains (and hence contribute to 
enforcement costs proportionally to their gains).    
 
The more interesting case is that in which under the base case, the copyright 
owner would have had incentive to unilaterally enforce, and the broadcaster 
would have enjoyed one way free-riding. Since the broadcaster can now claim on 
behalf of the copyright owner, both parties now have an incentive to enforce. In 
the first instance, there is hence a new risk of duplication of efforts and possible 
mutual free-riding. However, given the notion described above where an 
enforcing broadcaster would remit part of the gains to each copyright holder, and 
where each party contributes a proportional share to enforcement costs, the 
copyright owner would be dis-incentivized to undertake unilateral enforcement. 
This is because total expected gains would be greater to the copyright holder if the 
broadcaster exercises its standing to sue on the copyright holders’ behalf, as the 
enforcement costs would be effectively apportioned between the different parties. 
Therefore, under this hypothetical rule, there is an improvement in social 
outcomes, even when the base case was a possible duplication of efforts.  
 
 
[7]-5.2  Broadcaster Standing: Context and Issues  
 
Out of the various possible hypothetical enforcement rules, permitting the 
broadcaster to have standing to sue on behalf of copyright holders seems to be an 
attractive alternative to layered independent intellectual property rights. This 
attractiveness is partially rooted in the cost savings from a single enforcement 
action, and the apportionment of such costs and resulting benefits. 
 
However, even without broadcaster standing or some form of broadcasters’ 
rights, there may still be mechanisms to mitigate public good problems and risks 
of duplication of efforts. Where an infringement affects multiple copyright owner, 
these owners may coordinate amongst themselves in order to pursue a single 
enforcement action. However, this would be essentially structured as a prisoners’ 
dilemma game (or more specifically as cartel problem), and as the number of 
copyright owners increases, the incentive to defect increases, and hence there is a 
high risk of each party defecting in an attempt to free-ride off of the efforts of 
others increases. Granting a single party the standing to enforce on behalf of the 
other parties essentially by-passes this strategic problem, as explicit co-
ordination amongst all parties is not necessary for the efficient outcome. 
 
Furthermore, this system works as there is an alignment of incentives between 
the parties; in the context of this discussion, every infringement against the 
broadcaster is also an implied infringement against the copyright owner(s). 
 
Most importantly, this system is particularly attractive as it accomplishes at least 
part of the objectives of intellectual property rights for broadcasting organisations 
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without the accompanying social costs. As discussed above, licensee standing 
facilitates the objective of allowing the broadcaster to protect its commercial 
interests by enforcing against infringers. However, the action being enforced 
against is an infringement on only one right (primary copyright, rather than both 
copyright and a related right). Therefore, legitimate use is more viable as the risk 
of an anti-commons problem has been mitigated, an effect which itself can 
possibly reduce the incidence of certain types of infringements. 
  
Additionally, the absence of an additional layering of rights (in the form of a 
broadcaster’s related right) avoids the problem of public domain enclosure. 
Therefore, for works which are not subject to copyright protection, or for which 
the copyright-holder has partially relinquished part of their rights, there is no 
deadweight loss from property rights which do not correspond to production 
incentives.321 This is because there simply is no active legal entitlement, on which 
standing to enforce can be based and hence delegated. This is of particular relief 
for copyright-holders which are not profit maximisers, as the broadcaster is 
unable to create negative externalities through unwanted enforcement.  
 
[7]-5.2.1 Issues and Limitations 
 
However, as attractive as this system is on a theoretical basis, there are some 
evident practical problems. Firstly, this system only works if the broadcaster is 
fully aware of the copyright owner’s circumstances in the horizontal market. In 
reality, there would be a significant information asymmetry between the 
broadcaster and its content licensors. Only the copyright owner would be fully 
aware of consumption trends in its works across all media platforms (which 
determines losses in the horizontal market), and in any cases, both parties would 
necessarily have imperfect information about infringement rates. 
 
Secondly, this system does nothing to change incentives if enforcement results in 
only injunctive relief. However, it does lead to the same outcomes as the ‘base case’ 
(of simultaneous copyright and broadcasters’ related rights), without the social 
costs associated with layered property rights. If enforcement is interpreted as 
resulting in damages and/or compensation however, incentives do change. The 
attractiveness of a broadcaster standing approach however assumes a lot about 
the process of awarding such damages. It assumes that damages can be effectively 
calculated and awarded, which in itself is extremely problematic. Furthermore, it 
assumes a cogent mechanism for copyright holders’ shares in net gains to be 
remitted.  
 
Lastly, a system of broadcast licensee standing is based on pooling the interests of 
a single broadcaster and their content licensors. An enforcement action by a 
broadcaster will not only produce gains for these interested parties, but also for 
other third party broadcasters (or horizontal platform distributors) who may also 
be licensees of some of the respective content owners. As such, these third party 
                                                        
321 This includes works for which copyright protection has expired, works which are not subject to 
copyright protection in the first place, and works for which owners have voluntarily opted for an 
open licencing scheme (such as Creative Commons).  
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broadcaster are able to obtain some gain without contributing to enforcement 
costs.322 While the broadcaster standing approach addresses the issue of free-
riding amongst the broadcaster and its copyright licensors, it does not address the 
issue of free-riding amongst broadcasters with the same content licences. If there 
are several broadcasters who licence the same content, there may still be issues 
of mutual freeriding problems.  
 
 
[7]-5.3  Standing, Contracts and Property 
 
At this point, it is useful to further discuss the concept of standing to sue in the 
capacity of a licensee; in fact, the issue of licensee standing to sue is a fairly 
contentious area of intellectual property enforcement. The general doctrine that 
has emerged over time however, appears to be that only an intellectual property 
rights holder can initiate an enforcement action against an alleged infringer. In 
some cases, an exclusive licensee may have standing if the infringement action 
solely concerns the exclusive right which was subject to the licence, but the 
general rule appears to be that non-exclusive licensees do not have standing for 
enforcement action. 323   This doctrine has a particularly strong impact on 
broadcasting markets, where copyright licences are generally non-exclusive in 
nature. The policy basis of this doctrine appears to be the prevention of multiple 
actions by various non-exclusive licensees.  
 
An interesting perspective is provided by Balganesh (2007), who reasons that 
broadcasters’ rights can be interpreted as a mechanism to ‘propertise’ certain 
rights, which are normally granted via a copyright licence. Hence, these rights are 
structured as a shift from a contract law paradigm to a property rights paradigm, 
pursuant to efficiency arguments of property rights as a tool to reduce transaction 
costs.   
 
The author argues that these efficiency arguments, as applied to the right (or 
rather entitlement) to bring enforcement actions, fail for three reasons.324 Firstly, 
such rights go beyond the idea of minimising the costs of obtaining similar rights, 
as these rights could not have been contracted into in the first place (under the 
doctrine of ‘no standing for non-exclusive licensees’). Secondly, an independent 
broadcaster’s right does more than move the entitlement; it actually replicates it, 
hence going beyond a mere ‘propertisation’ of contractual terms which would 
have otherwise been included in a copyright licence. Thirdly, the efficiency (of 
                                                        
322 Recall that in Model 1, total sector revenue (loss) was split between n broadcasters who have 
the same content licence. In this chapter, Model 1 discussed the case of a single copyright-holder 
licensing to multiple broadcasters, while Model 2 discussed the case of multiple copyright holders 
licensing to a single broadcaster. In reality, a given media market would be comprised of multiple 
copyright holders and multiple broadcast licensees with varying interrelationships.  
323 While this doctrine is not universal, it does appear in the legal systems of several jurisdictions. 
For a discussion on this issue in the context of the US Intellectual Property system, see Blair and 
Cotter (1999). In the context of the EU, and more specifically, the lack of harmonization on this 
issue within the Internal Market, see de Werra (2013). 
324 Balganesh (2007), at pg. 1321 
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contract term propertisation) argument ignores the fact that transaction costs 
exist on both sides of the producer-consumer equation.325 
 
To this, it can be added that any purported efficiency gains from minimising 
transactions costs are likely to be negligible. This is because broadcasters and 
copyright owners are repeat players – they have well established networks 
amongst themselves, and do perpetual business with each other as their business 
models are actually based on their relationships with each other. Therefore, 
transaction costs in terms of contracting into rights would be negligible, as the 
market place would naturally produce standard term contracts as a matter of 
course of business.  
 
As a concluding point, it would be noted that broadcasters’ rights appear to 
facilitate the exact opposite goal of the ‘no standing for non-exclusive licensees’ 
doctrine; while the doctrine is akin to a ‘floodgates principle’, in that it is purpose 
is (at least partially) to avoid multiple actions, the existence of broadcasters’ rights 
by definition create the possibility for two different actions against a single 
infringement.  
 
Given the distinct characteristics which define the relationships between 
copyright owners and broadcast distributors, it is here argued that such licences 
should be exempt from the doctrine of ‘no standing for non-exclusive licensees’. 
In fact, one example of where there is actually a statutory exemption to this 
doctrine can be found in the US Copyright Code.326 
 
 
[7]-6 CONCLUSION 
 
The existence of a unique intellectual property right for broadcasting 
organisations in relation to their programme-carrying signals must be analysed in 
the context of the wider intellectual property system. 
 
More specifically, such rights provide broadcasters with a cause of action against 
infringers which overlaps with the cause of action enjoyed by the copyright 
holders with whom the broadcasters have licencing arrangements for content 
                                                        
325 The argument here is that even if property rights reduce the transaction costs associated with 
contractually acquiring certain rights, it creates new transaction costs for users who must now 
navigate through an additional layer of liability, in order to facilitate authorised usage.  
 
326 See USC Title 17, §501(c), which states as follows: “For any secondary transmission by a cable 
system that embodies a performance or a display of a work which is actionable as an act of 
infringement under subsection (c) of section 111, a television broadcast station holding a copyright 
or other licence to transmit or perform the same version of that work shall, for purposes of subsection 
(b) of this section, be treated as a legal or beneficial owner if such secondary transmission occurs 
within the local service area of that television station.” However, it is acknowledged that this 
particular exemption is specific to television broadcasters taking action against cable 
retransmitters within their own local service jurisdictions. Furthermore, this policy seems to have 
evolved as a competition regulation tool in telecommunications and broadcasting regulation, 
rather than being born out of wider copyright policy and intellectual property considerations.  
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distribution. This creates a dynamic where the enforcement behaviour of 
broadcasters and copyright owners becomes interrelated.  
 
This chapter presented two simple models to demonstrate that market 
characteristics, specifically elasticities of demand, infringement rates, and market 
concentration, have a major impact on these interrelationships. More specifically 
these factors affect the extent to which socially undesirable outcomes such as 
public good problems in enforcement or wasteful duplication of efforts arise. 
Furthermore, such market context likely differs between different types of 
audiovisual content. This results in a situation where the effect of intellectual 
property rights (or rather enforcement thereof) is heterogeneous across different 
types of copyright protected works. 
 
Additionally, these discussions showed that there are at least some contexts in 
which copyright holders can ‘pass-off’ at least some aspects of their enforcement 
activities to distributors such as broadcasters, when broadcasters have unique 
rights on which to pursue enforcement action. As such, a strengthening of 
broadcasters’ related rights can have an indirect effect of strengthening the 
position of commercially-oriented copyright holders. This is an important 
observation as it implies that the issue of ‘optimal scope of protection’ should be 
addressed holistically in terms of the entire copyright and related rights system, 
and analysis of specific related rights should not be disjoint from analysis of 
general copyright; these systems need to be ‘calibrated’ in conjunction.  
 
Finally, this chapter proposes that some of social costs associated with the rights 
of broadcasting organisation can, at least in principle, be mitigated through an 
exemption to the ‘no standing for non-exclusive licensees’ doctrine. An allocation 
of enforcement standing from copyright holders to broadcasters can hence be an 
alternative to at least some aspects of unique and independent broadcasters’ 
related rights.  
 
The discussions in this chapter are theoretical. The actual socially optimal level of 
enforcement is an empirical question, which would require information on the 
infringement and losses – information that is necessarily opaque in nature. 
Furthermore, a truly complete social welfare analysis would require a 
consideration of the welfare-enhancing aspects of unauthorised use of signals, 
which needless to say is an extremely complicated task beyond the intended scope 
of this manuscript.  
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PART IV: ANALYSIS OF RETRANSMISSION RIGHTS 
 
CHAPTER 8: THE EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR RETRANSMISSION  
 
Part IV of this manuscript focuses specifically on the topic of retransmission rights 
– both in terms copyright holders’ broadcasting rights, and the retransmission 
rights of broadcasting organisations. Retransmission rights are one of the most 
complex areas of copyright, and peruse the most commercially significant aspects 
of broadcasters’ rights. As will be discussed in this Part, retransmission activities 
also exhibit high transactions costs, particularly relevant for Law and Economics 
analysis.  
 
The goal of this Part is to construct some understanding of the relationship 
between the retransmission rights of broadcasters and those of other classes of 
rightsholders (namely copyright owners). As these specific rights are inseparable 
in their exercise, such an analysis will ultimately contribute to a better 
understanding of the theoretical bases of broadcasters rights themselves.  
 
In order to achieve this, Chapter 8 first uses the European Union legal framework 
as a case study to ascertain the various policy aspects of retransmission. However, 
the European framework is currently in a time of transmission, where reforms to 
the transmission regime are being considered. Chapter 9 builds on the framework 
established in Chapter 8, and critically analyses the arguments on which the 
proposed reforms are based. Finally, Chapter 10 sets out the substantive 
contribution of this Part, building on the different approaches identified in 
Chapters 8 and 9.  
 
As Chapters 8 and 9 are largely legal descripted, and readers exclusively 
interested in Law and Economics may wish to bypass to Chapter 10. 
  
 
[8]-1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter aims at analysing the framework of the European Union for 
retransmission activities. The purpose of this case study is to ascertain the various 
possible approaches and dimensions of retransmission regulation, so as to return 
to the question of the theoretical bases of broadcasters’ rights in Chapter 10. In 
this regard, the underlying research question of this chapter is “What are the key 
features of the current European Union legal framework for regulating 
retransmission activities?” 
 
This chapter thus focuses on the case study of European Union law, and gives a 
historic and analytical account of the broadcasting acquis – the various directives, 
regulations, and key judgements that are relevant to broadcasting and 
retransmission rights. The main existing instrument dealing with retransmission 
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rights is the Satellite-Cable Directive.327     As this Directive was adopted in 1993, 
the technological context of broadcasting has significantly changed since then, 
creating many new issues for the application of copyright law in this sector. To 
this end, the European Commission recently published a new proposal for a legal 
instrument to address online broadcasting services.328  
 
The subsequent Chapter 9 analyses this new proposal, in the context of the wider 
framework of applicable European law established in this Chapter 8. Specifically, 
the policy proposals are contextualised by a network of several existing 
Directives: The Television Without Frontiers Directive, the Satellite-Cable 
Directive, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the Collective Management 
Directive, and relevant case law from the CJEU.  
 
 
[8]-2 BASIS FOR COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN THE EU 
 
Authors of literary and artistic works enjoy certain protections under copyright 
law. Copyright is however, a bundle of separately exercisable rights relating to 
different activities; one such element of copyright is the right to authorise (or 
prohibit) communication of a protected work to the public, including via 
broadcast. Protection is also offered for other forms of communication, such as the 
‘making available’ of a work at a place and time determined by a user, which is 
mostly relevant for on-demand type services.  
 
Furthermore, it should be recalled that the exploitation of a given work may not 
only involve the copyright of an author, but also the related rights (or 
neighbouring rights) of other contributing parties. The international legal 
framework for intellectual property rights generally covers three distinct 
categories of related rights holders: (i) performers, (ii) producers, and (iii) 
broadcasting organisations.329 
 
When exploiting audiovisual works (such as communicating them via a 
broadcast), authorisation is generally needed from both the copyright holder, and 
the performers whose performances are fixed in that work. In the case of musical 
works, authorisation is also needed from a third category of rights holder – the 
producer of the phonogram (sound recording). Collectively, the rights of all of 
these different right holders in relation to authorising a broadcast of a work can 
be called ‘broadcasting rights’, which are distinct from the ‘broadcaster’s rights’ 
which are held by broadcasting organisations.   
                                                        
327  Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules 
concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable 
retransmission  
328 European Commission 2016/0284 (COD) - Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council laying down rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to 
certain online transmissions of broadcasting organisations and retransmissions of television and 
radio programmes 
329 While there are other possible categories of related rights, these three categories are the ones 
provided for in the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations. 
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If a broadcast signal is then retransmitted, authorisation is presumably again 
needed from all of these rights holders, in addition to the initial broadcaster 
themselves, who holds a related right over the use of their broadcast transmission. 
Collectively, the rights of all of these different right holders in relation to 
authorising a retransmission of a work can be called ‘retransmission rights’. 
 
In order to have a meaningful discussion on the legal framework for how 
broadcasting and retransmission rights are regulated, it is useful to first discuss 
the basis under which these rights are established.   
 
 
[8]-2.1 Information Society Directive 
 
There are several EU instruments that contain provisions relevant to copyright 
law. However, arguably the main instrument is the Information Society 
Directive. 330  This directive sets out three general categories of rights: (i) 
Reproduction rights (Article 2), (ii) Right of Communication (Article 3), and (iii) 
Distribution Rights.  In the context of broadcasting, the most relevant of these 
categories is the right of communication to the public. 
 
Article 3(1) provides for an exclusive right for authors, covering the rights to “to 
authorise or prohibit any communication to the public of their works, by wire or 
wireless means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a 
way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them.”  
 
It is interesting to note that the use of the word ‘including’ in this provision, 
implies that the ‘making available to the public right’ is a sub-set or fragment of 
the broader ‘communication to the public’ right; this concept of making available 
to the public mainly relates to on-demand type services, as qualified by the 
concept of the public being able to access the work at an individually chosen time 
and place. Article 3(1) hence provides a broadly constructed ‘communication to 
the public right’, which covers both wired and wireless communications, and on-
demand type services.  
 
Article 3(2) sets out the rights of related right holders.  It provides for a ‘making 
available right’ for performers, producers (of both phonograms and films), and 
broadcasting organisations (in relation to fixations of their own broadcasts). This 
making available right however only deals with on-demand service type 
situations. The Information Society Directive itself does not provide for 
broadcasting rights for related rights holders; these rights are provided for in a 
separate instrument – the Rental Directive. 
 
 
 
                                                        
330 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society 
186 
[8]-2.2 Rental Directive 
 
The Rental Directive331 adds a new category of rights to those already provided 
for in the Information Society Directive – rental and lending rights. Furthermore, 
this Directive also contains various substantive provisions on related rights. 
 
In relation to broadcasting activities, Article 8 of the Rental Directive is relevant. 
Article 8(1) of the Directive provides for performers to have an exclusive right to 
authorise or prohibit ‘broadcasting by wireless means and the communication to 
the public of their performances, except where the performance is itself already a 
broadcast performance or is made from a fixation’. While the language of this 
provision covers only broadcasting via wireless means, it also includes 
‘communications to the public’, which would cover both wired and wireless 
communications.  
 
Article 8(2) then provides for some rights for phonogram producers. More 
specifically, where a phonogram is used for broadcasting (or any communication 
to the public), a single equitable remuneration is to be paid by the user, covering 
both the performer’s right and the producer’s right. Therefore, in the case of 
musical works, producers and performers do not have exclusive rights, they have 
a more limited right to remuneration. Furthermore, this remuneration right must 
be administered together for both classes of related rights holders, in a single 
payment made by users; how this remuneration is then shared is deferred to the 
agreements between producers and performers, or in the absence of such - the 
national laws of Member States.  
 
For completeness, it is noted that while film producers have a ‘making available’ 
right under the Information Society Directive, they do not have a public 
communication right under the Rental Directive.  
 
Article 8(3) of the Rental Directive makes provision for the rights of broadcasting 
organisations. This Article reads as follows: “Member States shall provide for 
broadcasting organisations the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit the 
rebroadcasting of their broadcasts by wireless means, as well as the communication 
to the public of their broadcasts if such communication is made in places accessible 
to the public against payment of an entrance fee.” 
 
Under this provision, broadcasters have an exclusive right to authorise or prohibit 
the ‘rebroadcasting of their broadcasts by wireless means’. Broadcasters are also 
provided with a specific ‘communication to the public’ right, which covers 
communications where the broadcast is ‘made in places accessible to the public 
against payment of an entrance fee’.  
 
Analysing the cumulative effect of the above provisions, it would appear that in 
terms of a broadcaster’s rights – the right to communication to the public is much 
                                                        
331 Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual 
property 
 187
narrower in scope than that of other classes of rights holders. While other rights 
holders have a general right of communication, which can – in principle - apply to 
any communication made in a public place (for example if a television set is on in 
a bar), the broadcasters right only applies where access to the public place is 
subject to a fee (e.g. where a bar charges an entrance fee to watch a popular 
programme).  
 
A very important point to note is that the scope of the retransmission right is 
limited to rebroadcasts by wireless means. Hence wired rebroadcast – such as 
those made on a cable or IPTV network - are not covered. However, the scope of 
this right does go beyond what is provided for in the Rome Convention, where the 
right is limited to simultaneous rebroadcasts.332 Furthermore, the beneficiaries of 
this right are not limited to traditional broadcasters whose initial transmissions 
are necessarily wireless. 
 
Despite this specific scope of the broadcaster’s retransmission right in the Rental 
Directive, this does not mean that a broader retransmission right – particularly 
one that covers non-wireless retransmissions – does not exist. It is very much the 
case that in transposing the Directive, individual Member States may decide to 
provide more protection to broadcasting organisations.333  
 
 
[8]-2.3 Relevance to Discussions 
 
The purpose of the previous section was to establish that within the framework of 
European copyright law, copyright and related rights holders have a broadcasting 
right which is sometimes construed as a fragment of the broader right of public 
communication. In the specific case of producers and performers of phonograms, 
this is not an exclusive right, but a right to equitable remuneration. In the rest of 
the discussions in this paper, copyright and related rights holders will be generally 
grouped together and referred to as ‘rights holders’ for ease of discussion – a 
generalisation which does not detract from the accuracy of the discussions due to 
the similar scope of these exclusive rights.  
 
 
[8]-3 COPYRIGHT FRAMEWORK FOR THE BROADCASTING SECTOR 
 
.  The European framework for broadcasting consists of several legal instruments 
which will be roughly presented in chronological order.334 However, it should be 
                                                        
332  Article 3(g) of the Rome convention states that rebroadcasting “means the simultaneous 
broadcasting by one broadcasting organisation of the broadcast of another broadcasting 
organisation.” 
333 Recital 16 of the Rental Directive states that “Member States should be able to provide for more 
far reaching protection for owners of rights related to copyright than that required by the provisions 
laid down in this Directive in respect of broadcasting and communication to the public.” 
334 Although the Directives below will be presented and discussed in chronological order, it is 
acknowledged that the first two Directives discussed below – the Television Without Frontiers and 
Satellite-Cable Directives, were adopted in 1989 and 1993 respectively, while the Directives above 
– the Information Society and Rental Directives, were adopted in 2001 and 1992 respectively. 
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noted that the discussions below are not just on the legal instruments relevant to 
intellectual property, but in some cases also more general media policy; the need 
to discuss these latter instruments is to provide a coherent context for 
understanding the overall policy framework in which the regulation of 
broadcasting and retransmission rights exists.  
 
 
[8]-3.1 Television Without Frontiers 
 
An appropriate starting point to discuss European-wide policy on retransmission 
is the 1984 Green Paper on Television without Frontiers (Green Paper on the 
Establishment of a Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and 
Cable). This Green Paper sets out a vision for a common European market for 
audiovisual works and broadcasting. As the issue of copyright law and 
retransmission was discussed in this Green Paper, it was not discussed in depth in 
the subsequent 1988 Green Paper on Copyright and Challenges of Technology. 
 
The 1984 Green Paper discusses various options for addressing the problems 
associated with cross-border broadcasting and retransmission. 335  It takes the 
view that a legislative solution is necessary, which can either take the form of (i) 
continuing to grant exclusive broadcasting rights, but regulating their 
exploitation, or (ii) imposing a statutory licence on broadcasting rights, or 
reducing them to an entitlement to remuneration.336 The Green Paper analyses 
these two options, their mechanisms, and their compatibility with various existing 
agreements, most notably Article 222 of the EEC Treaty337. The paper ultimately 
takes the view that “a statutory licence might be recommended as the most effective 
means of achieving liberalisation”.338  
 
 
Most of the Policy positions in the Television without Frontiers Green Paper were 
subsequently implemented through in the Television without Frontiers Directive, 
which was adopted in 1989. However, this Directive mainly dealt with the issue of 
broadcast content regulation, such as content quotas, advertising regulations, and 
protection of minors; the Directive did not address the issue of copyright law and 
                                                        
335 From a Law and Economics perspective, there is the matter of what degree of harmonisation is 
actually optimal. However, this chapter largely takes the goal of market integration as given. As 
this chapter is main descriptive, Chapter 9 contains a sub-section of the economic significance of 
the policy issues analysed in Chapters 8 and 9. 
336 Television Without Frontiers Green Paper, pg. 318 
337 Article 222 of the EEC Treaty (TFEU Article 345) states that the Treaties in no way prejudice 
the rules in Member States governing the system of property rights. The question to be answered 
is therefore whether restrictions on broadcast rights imposed at the Community level would 
amount to such prejudice. The Green Paper concludes that such restrictions are not in violation of 
EEC Article 222, based on arguments extending from existing jurisprudence that stress the 
difference between the existence of a property right, and the exercise of those rights.  
338 Television Without Frontiers Green Paper, pg 330. This historical commentary is provided, as 
for many it might seem surprising to learn that European policymakers were at one time actively 
considering statutory licencing as an option. The prevailing negative view of statutory licencing 
might thus be seen as a modern result of the strong lobbying power of copyright owners. 
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retransmission. Hence, although the matter was not included in the 1988 Green 
Paper on Copyright and Challenges of Technology, it was discussed in the 1991 
follow-up to that paper.  One of the concluding actions of this follow-up paper was 
a “Proposal for a directive on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright 
and neighbouring rights applicable to satellite and cable broadcasting”.  
 
Generally, after adoption of the Television without Frontiers Directive, the lack of 
harmonisation in the field of copyright law as it applies to broadcasting seemed to 
be a major hindrance to the achievement of a free internal market for broadcasting 
services, as envisioned in that Directive.339  
 
 
[8]-3.2  Satellite-Cable Directive 
 
Coordination of policy regarding copyright for broadcast retransmissions came in 
the form of the Satellite-Cable Directive, which was adopted in 1993. 340  This 
Directive put forward an ambitious framework for the application of copyright 
law for broadcasting services. The Directive’s significance is characterised by two 
key concepts – (i) the country-of-origin principle, and (ii) mandatory collective 
management.  
 
The Satellite-Cable Directive begins by asserting that an author’s exclusive right 
to authorise the communication of a work to the public exists, particularly in 
terms of communication via satellite. This Article effectively confirms that 
transmission via satellite is indeed included within the scope of the general 
copyright concept of ‘communication to the public’. 
 
 
In order to fully appreciate the significance of this Directive, it is necessary to first 
recall that the act of broadcasting (and retransmission) is very transaction cost 
                                                        
339  In recapping the significance of the Television without Frontiers Directive, the European 
Commission in its 2002 Implementation Report of the subsequent Satellite-Cable Directive made 
the following comments (pg 3):  
“However, despite this instrument (Television without Frontiers Directive), the cross-border 
broadcasting of television programmes by satellite and their retransmission by cable from other 
member States was still being hampered by a degree of legal uncertainty arising from disparities in 
the national provisions on copyright. This legal framework had to be completed as regards copyright. 
A Community audiovisual area could not in fact take concrete shape without effective protection for 
copyright and related rights. Indeed, such protection is a factor which favours the creation of new 
works within the European Union by enabling the right holders and users to benefit fully from the 
European dimension of broadcasting. Moreover, this protection, which sometimes takes the form of 
an exclusive right, helps to avoid a situation in which right holders are implacably opposed to the 
broadcasting or re-broadcasting of programmes beyond national borders, and thus avoids 
fragmentation of the internal market.” 
340  As noted by van Eechoud (2009) this Directive differs from other Directives aimed at 
harmonization of various aspects of substantive copyright law within the EU, as it deviated from 
the prevailing approach of approximating national laws, and introduced an entirely new approach. 
(Ch. 1, pg. 6). 
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intensive, and involves a very large number of rights holders with whom 
authorisation agreements must be concluded.341 
 
[8]-3.2.1 Country-of-Origin Principle 
 
A key policy point of this Directive is that it establishes the country-of-origin 
principle (principle of origin). This is significant, as before the Directive, there 
were competing views as to the jurisdiction for the applicable laws, where satellite 
transmissions cross national borders.342 This principle is established in Article 1, 
which defines the terms ‘satellite’ and ‘communication to the public via 
satellite’.343   
 
In summary, the country-of-origin principle asserts that - for the purposes of 
copyright law – a communication to the public is deemed to have been made in 
the jurisdiction where a broadcast transmission is initiated. This contrasts with 
the competing principle that a separate communication to the public has been 
made in every jurisdiction in which the broadcast transmission can be received. 
The consequence of the principle is that only a single body of national copyright 
laws is applicable to a cross-border transmission.344 
 
The principle-of-origin, as set out in the Satellite-Cable Directive is a very 
interesting legal mechanism, as it not only clarifies a possible legal ambiguity, but 
it does so by actually extending the application of certain provisions of national 
copyright law outside of traditional jurisdictional boundaries.345  
                                                        
341 According to EBU (2017), “a major public service broadcaster is likely to conclude more than 
70000 contracts with rightsholders to produce hundreds of thousands of hours of programming every 
year. A single one-hour TV programme can be made up of around 70 different contributions and 
involve up to 100 rightsholders.” 
342 The debate about the applicable law is discussed in the original Television Without Frontiers 
Green Paper (pg. 303). The legal ambiguity in terms of whether the applicable law is the 
jurisdiction of signal reception or that of signal transmission is referred to in Recitals 7 and 14 of 
the Satellite-Cable Directive.  
Furthermore, according to Hugenholtz (2009, pg. 8), previous to the adoption of the Directive, 
several national courts determined that satellite broadcasts were a restricted act in every 
jurisdiction within the reception area of the transmission, which is reflective of a country-of-
reception principle.  
343 Article 1(2)(b) states the following: “The act of communication to the public by satellite occurs 
solely in the Member State where under the control and responsibility of the broadcasting 
organization, the programme-carrying signals are introduced into an uninterrupted chain of 
communication leading to the satellite and down towards the earth.” 
344 One interesting perspective on the principle-of-origin principle is that is creates a unitary right 
of transmission via satellite, which can only be exercised in the country of transmission uplink. See 
Hugenholtz (2009), pg. 7 
345 According to the 2002 Satellite-Cable Directive Implementation Report (at pg. 6): “The object of 
the Directive, with the definition of the notion of communication to the public by satellite at 
Community level, was to put an end to the legal uncertainty regarding the rights to be acquired, by 
specifying the place where the act of communication occurs and the copyright legislation applicable 
to contractual relations regarding the transfer of rights. The applicable law is that of the Member 
State in which the programme-carrying signals are transmitted; its application extends beyond 
national borders into the Member States in which the signals are received (although, in technological 
terms, the footprint covers many areas other than those of the Member States, the term "footprint" in 
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As a result of the country-of-origin principle, a broadcaster transmitting a 
broadcast via satellite to different jurisdictions, only needs to obtain authorisation 
with respect to communication to the public in the jurisdiction of transmission; 
this hence provides for more legal certainty (and less negotiating complexities) 
when compared to the alternative of needing a licence in every jurisdiction in 
which the signal is received (which would be the case under a principle-of-
reception, i.e. where a communication to the public is deemed to have taken place 
in the jurisdiction in which the transmission is received).   
 
[8]-3.2.2 Mandatory Collective Management 
 
The second major policy aspect of the Satellite-Cable Directive is its introduction 
of a novel regime for clearing retransmission rights through mandatory collective 
management. This regime was introduced as an alternative to the controversial 
compulsory licence (or statutory licence) system originally envisioned in the 1984 
Green Paper, which was resisted by rights holders.346  
 
According to Article 8, cross-border retransmissions are to be based on individual 
or collective agreements between the retransmitting parties, and the rights 
holders. This Article therefore precludes Member States from opting for a system 
of involuntary licencing. As such the Directive not only deviated from a 
compulsory licensing scheme as originally envisioned in the Television Without 
Frontiers Green Paper, but actively prohibits the possibility of such. Instead, it 
created a regime of mandatory collective management.  
 
The core of the Directive’s collective management mechanism is Article 9, which 
provides that the transmission right of copyright or related right holders must be 
exercised through a collective management organisation (CMO). Article 9(2) 
extends this mandatory collective management approach set out in 9(1) by 
making a provision for cases in which a rights holder has not transferred the 
management of their rights to a CMO; in these cases, the CMO within that 
jurisdiction which manages the respective category of rights for other rights 
holders, shall be deemed to manage the rights holder’s rights. This hence has the 
effect of automatically expanding the repertoire of works that any given CMO 
represents. However, it should be noted that where there is more than one such 
CMO managing a category of rights, the rights holder is free to choose which 
organisation is to represent their interests. 
 
In terms of the retransmission rights of broadcast organisations themselves, the 
Directive provides in Article 10 that the provisions of Article 9 do not apply. As 
such, the obligation to use a collective licensing regime does not apply to rights 
held by a broadcasting organisation. Such rights would include the related rights 
of the broadcasting organisation over its signal, the copyrights/related rights for 
                                                        
this Report refers only to the territory of the Member States). This principle avoids the cumulative 
application of several national legislations of the various Member States covered by the footprint 
(recitals 14 and 15).” 
346 See Hugenholtz (2009), pg 8 
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content created by the broadcaster, or the copyright/related rights for content 
created by a third party but transferred (or exclusively licenced) to the 
broadcaster. 347 Furthermore, it is interesting to note that while Article 9 does not 
apply to the broadcaster’s related rights, Article 8 still applies. Therefore, the 
Directive does not permit a compulsory licencing regime for rights held by the 
broadcaster, and as such, the licencing of individual broadcast signals for 
transmissions must be done on a voluntary basis.348 It is however important to 
note that licencing on a voluntary basis does not mean licencing on an individual 
basis. In fact, while collective licencing is not mandatory for rights held by the 
broadcasting organisation, the broadcaster can still opt to have a CMO manage 
their rights, and hence use voluntary collective licencing.349  
 
An interesting implication of the Article 10 exemption is in cases where the 
original broadcaster acquired the retransmission rights for all of the 
programming content within its transmission. The broadcaster would therefore 
be able to legitimately licence the entire bundle of rights needed for 
retransmission (i.e. the right to communicate to the public for the broadcaster’s 
own related right, as well as the copyright and related rights in the embedded 
                                                        
347 The original language of Article 10 is not explicit in articulating the exact rights which are 
exempt from Article 9. The exact wording of Article 10 is as follows: “Member States shall ensure 
that Article 9 does not apply to the rights exercised by a broadcasting organization in respect of its 
own transmission, irrespective of whether the rights concerned are its own or have been transferred 
to it by other copyright owners and/or holders of related rights.” 
The phrase ‘the rights exercised by the broadcaster in respect of its own transmission’ implies 
reference to the broadcaster’s related rights. However, the following phrase ‘irrespective of 
whether the rights concerned are its own or have been transferred to it by other copyright owners 
and/or holders of related rights’ qualifies the preceding with reference to copyrights and related 
rights in the programmes themselves. 
However, based on a comment in the 2002 Report on the application of the Directive, it appears 
that Article 10 is meant to apply to copyright and related rights in relation to programming 
content. That comment reads as follows: “Article 10 takes into account the particular situation of 
broadcasting organisations. These are, in effect, both holders of exclusive rights to their own 
programmes and acquirers of rights for the initial broadcasting of the programmes which they have 
acquired. In this context, they have been given latitude to negotiate the acquisition of rights for the 
retransmission of programmes, without rightholders being mandatorily represented by a collecting 
society” 
348 Article 8 does not explicitly refer to the related rights of broadcasting organisations in relation 
to their signals. However, Recital 21 clarifies that statutory licencing would not be permitted, even 
for broadcaster’s rights. This Recital reads as follows: “Whereas it is necessary to ensure that 
protection for authors, performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations is 
accorded in all Member States and that this protection is not subject to a statutory licence system; 
whereas only in this way is it possible to ensure that any difference in the level of protection within 
the common market will not create distortions of competition” 
349 This possibility is clarified in Recital 29 of the Directive, which states: “Whereas, in order to 
ensure that the smooth operation of contractual arrangements is not called into question by the 
intervention of outsiders holding rights in individual parts of the programme, provision should be 
made, through the obligation to have recourse to a collecting society, for the exclusive collective 
exercise of the authorization right to the extent that this is required by the special features of cable 
retransmission ; whereas the authorization right as such remains intact and only the exercise of this 
right is regulated to some extent, so that the right to authorize a cable retransmission can still be 
assigned ; whereas this Directive does not affect the exercise of moral rights” 
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content); in such a case, there would therefore be no need for a CMO to act as a 
market intermediary.  
 
 
[8]-3.3 Territoriality and Market Fragmentation 
 
Despite the ambitions of European policymakers, the Television Without 
Frontiers and Satellite-Cable Directives would ultimately fail at creating a truly 
integrated Pan-European market for audiovisual works and services.  
 
[8]-3.3.1 Satellite-Cable Implementation Report 
 
In 2002, the European Commission published a Report on the Implementation of 
the Satellite and Cable Directive. The general tone of this report was that the 
objectives of the Directive had not been met. In particular, the Report pointed to 
the role of copyright licensing practices in hindering the realisation of a free 
internal market for broadcasting. In commenting on the ways in which copyright 
licencing practices have hindered the objectives of the Directive, the 2002 
Implementation Report noted the following: 
 
“Recent years have seen a proliferation of television channels, a large number of 
which are encrypted and accessible by subscription only. However, even if a viewer 
located outside the Member State in which transmission is organised is prepared to 
make the requisite payment, they often receive a negative response from the 
broadcasting organisation concerned, as the latter does not hold the copyright 
relating to broadcasting in the Member State in question. The absence of a transfer 
of rights may result in the absence of an economic interest on the part of the 
broadcasting organisation in ensuring that its programmes are broadcast outside 
its national market (given the reduced audience) or in the absence of a willingness 
to transfer on the part of the rightholders… 
 
A trend is thus emerging whereby producers sell their programmes to broadcasting 
organisations on condition that satellite transmissions are encrypted so as to ensure 
that they cannot be received beyond national borders. This encryption enables 
producers to negotiate the sale of the same programmes with broadcasting 
organisations in other Member States. 
 
However, the principle laid down by the Directive, in keeping with the logic of the 
internal market, envisages the transfer of rights, under the law of the country in 
which the communication is introduced, for the entire footprint: in practice, a 
transfer on a national basis has the effect of fragmenting the market and runs 
counter to the principle of the Directive.”350  
 
 
As previously noted, the principle-of-origin implies that the default situation is 
that once a right to communicate a work has been transferred to a broadcaster (to 
broadcast the work in the domestic market of the broadcaster), the initial 
communication to the public is legitimate in any jurisdiction (inside the internal 
                                                        
350 - European Commission Satellite and Cable Implementation Report, 2002; pg. 7 
 
194 
market) in which that transmission can be received. In these jurisdictions, cable 
operators can then retransmit these signals, by clearing rights under the collective 
licensing regime. The success of a market for retransmissions is therefore 
somewhat predicated on a community-wide market for initial broadcasts based 
on the principle-of-origin.  
 
However, it has apparently been the practice of rights holders to licence the 
communication to the public for their works for exploitation only in the 
jurisdiction in which the original broadcast is made. As such, the principle-of-
origin does not manifest into its envisioned form of creating a community-wide 
market for broadcasts. The consequence of this is that exploitation of the original 
transmission (including possible retransmission) in other jurisdictions cannot be 
based on the combination of the principle-of-origin, and the fact that 
communication to the public has already been authorised in that originating 
jurisdiction. The result is the fragmentation of the internal market through 
national licencing business models. This fragmentation is made possible and is 
facilitated by rights management practices such as signal encryption; if a cable 
operator were to attempt to retransmit the signal in another jurisdiction, they 
would need to decrypt the signal, and hence possibly be in violation of anti-
circumvention provisions351.  
 
It is clear that the difficulties in creating an internal market with true freedom of 
movement of goods and services arise from the very territorial nature of 
intellectual property rights. In this regard, there are many interesting possibilities 
regarding the creation of a truly unified European legal framework for copyright; 
however such a new framework would generally represent a massive reform, and 
possible structural changes in the certain fundamental principles of copyright 
law.352  For example, the possibility of a Community-wide system of copyright 
registration has been discussed353, but such would only be possible as an option 
system, as the Berne Convention requires that copyright protection not be subject 
to formalities 354 . Similarly, the creation of a single unified Community-wide 
copyright would mean a fundamental shift away from the principle of 
territoriality, and hence represent not just a regulatory reform in how intellectual 
property rights are exercised, but a radical change in the basis of the system.  
 
The current system of harmonization of copyright law by means of Directives does 
not have an impact on the territorial reach of national legislations. This means that 
broadcasting rights will remain national rights. A supranational broadcasting 
                                                        
351  As noted in Chapters 2 and 4, Anti-circumvention provisions refer to legal rules which 
supplement intellectual property rights, by prohibiting the bypassing of technological protections 
measures (such as provision) which are used to restrict access to content protected by copyright.  
352 For an analysis on the principle of territoriality, and the challenges it poses in the context of 
European copyright law reform, see EPRS (2015a). 
353  Question 14 of the European Commission’s 2011 Consultation Green Paper on online 
distribution of audiovisual works was “What are your views on the introduction of an optional 
unitary EU Copyright Title? What should be the characteristics of a unitary Title, including in relation 
to national rights?” 
354 Berne Convention Article 5(2) 
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right would require a European copyright regulation, but this is not on the cards. 
Even if it were, EU authorities would not be entitled to prejudge the national 
property rights system of Member States. Consequently, EU-wide copyright would 
not deprive national legislation of its substance but would lead to a dual system of 
rights, as is the case with European trademark and design law.355  
[8]-3.3.2 Premier League Case 
 
A major development in European broadcasting law came with the 2011 
judgement by the European Court of Justice on the Premier League Case. The 
judgement in this case set many significant precedents, which had implications on 
a variety of issues in European copyright law. 
 
In this case, the Football Association Premier League had the practice of licencing 
the television broadcast rights of its matches on an exclusive and territorial basis. 
In order to maintain this territorial market fragmentation, licensees were 
contractually obliged to encrypt their transmissions, and prohibited the 
broadcaster from selling signal decoders to parties outside of their respective 
jurisdiction. The dispute arose when parties in the UK were found to have 
purchased decoders from the broadcaster licensee in Greece (at a lower price than 
it would cost in the UK).  
 
In terms of the issue of market fragmentation, the Premier League case therefore 
gives a good example of the practice of combining territorial licencing with a 
contractual obligation for signal encryption. 356  The Court provided interesting 
clarifications on EU law on a variety of issues arising from this dispute.  Firstly, it 
found that the purchased foreign decoding devices are not ‘illicit devices’ within 
the meaning of the Conditional Access Directive (98/84/EC). 357 
 
The Court also found that national legislation, which prohibits the sale and use of 
foreign decoding cards, would be inconsistent with the principles of European 
Union law.358 Firstly, such a prohibition would be contrary to Article 56 of TFEU, 
                                                        
355 EBU (2011), page 31 in response to Consultative Question 14 of the 2011 Green Paper. 
356 Paragraph 35 of the judgement summarised this practice, and reads as follows: “In order to 
protect the territorial exclusivity of all broadcasters, they each undertake, in their licence agreement 
with FAPL, to prevent the public from receiving their broadcasts outside the area for which they hold 
the licence. This requires, first, each broadcaster to ensure that all of its broadcasts capable of being 
received outside that territory – in particular those transmitted by satellite – are encrypted securely 
and cannot be received in unencrypted form. Second, broadcasters must ensure that no device is 
knowingly authorised so as to permit anyone to view their transmissions outside the territory 
concerned. Therefore, broadcasters are in particular prohibited from supplying decoding devices that 
allow their broadcasts to be decrypted for the purpose of being used outside the territory for which 
they hold the licence.” 
357 Ruling 1 of ECJ Judgment Premier League Case (Judgment of 4. 10. 2011 - Joined Cases C-403/08 
AND C-429/08) 
358  The Court noted that such a prohibition could not be justified either by the objective of 
protecting intellectual property rights, or encouraging the public to attend live football matches. 
The Court’s discussion on protection of intellectual property rights is particularly interesting and 
has many significant implications. Firstly, the Court noted that there is no copyright in sports 
matches themselves (paragraphs 96-99); however, it is possible for a Member State to provide 
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which prohibits restrictions of freedom of provision of services.359 Furthermore, 
the Court found that the clauses of an exclusive agreement between a rights holder 
and a broadcaster, which oblige the broadcaster not to supply decoding devices to 
consumers outside of the territory of that licencing agreement, amount to a 
restriction on competition, and are hence prohibited under TFEU Article 101.360  
 
Lastly, the ruling of the Court clarified that acts of reproduction incidental to the 
process of broadcasting and communication to the public, can be subject to 
limitations and exemptions from normal copyright exclusivity.361  
 
In the context of this discussion, however, the important consequence of this 
judgement is that the existing practices which facilitated broadcast market 
fragmentation could neither be maintained though legislative nor through 
contractual provisions.  
 
For completeness of discussion, it should also be noted that in terms of 
interpreting the Satellite-Cable Directive, other ECJ case of relevance – the ‘Airfield 
Case’.  This case involved the interpretation of Article 2 in the context of the 
Directive, arising from a dispute between collective management organisations, 
and a ‘satellite package provider’ (company which offers a package of several 
channels, as transmitted by satellite, and can be viewed by subscribers via the use 
of a provided decoder). In this case, the Court ruled that Article 2 must be 
interpreted as requiring the package provider to obtain authorisation from rights 
holders.362  
                                                        
some other form of protection for sports performances, and such protections would not be 
contrary to EU law (paragraphs 100-104). Assuming that some protection does exist, the rights 
holder is entitled to reasonable and appropriate remuneration, which does not necessarily mean 
the maximum possible remuneration (paragraphs 107-116). Therefore, appropriate remuneration 
does not include a premium resulting from market segmentation though territorial exclusivity; 
such premiums are reflective of price differences between national markets, where such 
partitioning is irreconcilable with the fundamental aim of facilitating the internal market 
(paragraphs 114-116).   
359 Ruling 3 of ECJ Judgment Premier League Case (Judgment of 4. 10. 2011 - Joined Cases C-403/08 
AND C-429/08) 
360 Ruling 4 of ECJ Judgment Premier League Case (Judgment of 4. 10. 2011 - Joined Cases C-403/08 
AND C-429/08). 
For completeness, it should however be noted that ECJ case law on the issue asserts that the act of 
territorial licencing itself is not an anticompetitive act (paragraph 137 of Premier League 
judgement). This principle was established in the Coditel II Case (Judgement of 6.10.1982, Case 
262/81). 
361 Ruling 8 of ECJ Judgment Premier League Case (Judgment of 4. 10. 2011 - Joined Cases C-403/08 
AND C-429/08) 
362 The Ruling of the Airfield case states as follows “Article 2 of Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 
September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to 
copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission must be interpreted as 
requiring a satellite package provider to obtain authorisation from the right holders concerned for 
its intervention in the direct or indirect transmission of television programmes, such as the 
transmission at issue in the main proceedings, unless the right holders have agreed with the 
broadcasting organisation concerned that the protected works will also be communicated to the 
public through that provider, on condition, in the latter situation, that the provider’s intervention 
does not make those works accessible to a new public.” 
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[8]-3.3.3 Coditel I Case 
 
A discussion on the Premier League case, and its implications for the Satellite-
Cable Directive would not be complete without contrasting that case with a 
previous case heard by the Court of Justice of the EEC - the Coditel I case363.   
 
The Coditel I case involved a dispute arising from the rights to exploit a French 
film. The owners of the copyright to the film in question had granted an exclusive 
licence to distribute the film in Belgium; a German television channel 
subsequently broadcast the film, and that broadcast could be received in Belgium. 
The Coditel companies in Belgium then relayed the relevant broadcast over their 
cable diffusion networks (which relayed both Belgian and foreign broadcasts). 
The Belgian licensee had then not only brought action against the Coditel 
companies, but also the French rights holder, for not observing its exclusive 
licence.  
 
The referring court had ruled that Coditel undertook a communication to the 
public, and that the authorisation given to the original German broadcaster did 
not authorise distribution outside of Germany. The argument put forward by the 
Coditel companies was that the exclusive licence given to the Belgian licensee was 
in violation of the provisions of the EEC Treaty. This resulted in referring to the 
Court of Justice, certain questions on the interpretation of certain EEC Articles. 
Ultimately, the Ruling of the Court of Justice was as follows: 
 
“The provisions of the Treaty relating to the freedom to provide services do not 
preclude an assignee of the performing right in a cinematographic film in a Member 
State from relying upon his right to prohibit the exhibition of that film in that State, 
without his authority, by means of cable diffusion if the film so exhibited is picked up 
and transmitted after being broadcast in another Member State by a third party 
with the consent of the original owner of the right.”  
 
-European Court of Justice Ruling on Case 62/79/1980/ECR 4, pg. 905 
 
In summary, the Court ruled that the holder of an exclusive licensee could assert 
their rights to prevent a retransmission of a work, which was originally broadcast 
in another jurisdiction. As such, the implication is that the practice of territorial 
licencing for audiovisual works does not amount to a restriction of freedom to 
provide broadcasting services across borders.  
 
Of most interest are the grounds on which this ruling was based. The Court noted 
that the rights holder and the assignees have a legitimate interest in calculating 
fees based on the probable number of performances, and in authorising television 
broadcast only after the film has been exhibited in cinemas for a certain period of 
time. Hence, these two forms of exploitation are interrelated, and this context 
must be considered.364  
 
                                                        
363 C-62/79, Coditel and others v. Ciné Vog Films and others (1980) 
364 Paragraphs 13-14 of Coditel I ruling 
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The Court goes on to make a very strong statement in grounds 15 that “Whilst 
Article 59 of the Treaty prohibits restrictions upon freedom to provide services, it 
does not thereby encompass limits upon the exercise of certain economic activities 
which have their origin in the application of national legislation for the protection 
of intellectual property, save where such application constitutes a means of 
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States. 
Such would be the case if that application enabled parties to an assignment of 
copyright to create artificial barriers to trade between Member States.”  
 
Further to this, the Court thus asserts that right holders have freedom of contract 
to define the geographical boundaries to which a licence applies; the wording of 
subsequent grounds put forward also implies that the Court did not see relevance 
in the fact that these geographical boundaries were national territories.365   
 
In any instance, it is interesting to note how the Coditel I Case anticipated 
emerging issues regarding the application of copyright law to cross-border 
broadcasting activities. This case hence very much set the context for subsequent 
policy discussions. In fact, the European Parliamentary Research Service actually 
describes the Satellite-Cable Directive as ‘a (not so timely) reaction’ to the Coditel 
I Case.366  
 
[8]-3.3.4 Comparison of Coditel I and Premier League Cases 
 
Considering that the Coditel I Case was ruled on in 1980, and the Premier League 
Case in 2011, it is interesting to see how the rulings in these two cases compare; 
the general theme of the Coditel ruling was one favourable to territorial licensing, 
while that of the Premier League case was not. 
  
Interestingly, in determining its judgment in the Premier League Case, the ECJ 
actually explicitly considered the implications of the Coditel case. 
 
The Premier League judgment had concluded that prohibitions on the use of 
foreign decoders cannot be justified in light of the objective of protecting 
intellectual property rights.367 The Court then went on to explicitly clarify that this 
conclusion is not inconsistent with the Coditel I ruling that community law does 
not preclude the practice of territorial licensing. 368   The Court based this 
                                                        
365 “The effect of this is that, whilst copyright entails the right to demand fees for any showing or 
performance, the rules of the Treaty cannot in principle constitute an obstacle to the geographical 
limits which the parties to a contract of assignment have agreed upon in order to protect the author 
and his assigns in this regard. The mere fact that those geographical limits may coincide with national 
frontiers does not point to a different solution in a situation where television is organized in the 
Member States largely on the basis of legal broadcasting monopolies, which indicates that a 
limitation other than the geographical field of application of an assignment is often impracticable.” - 
Grounds 16 of Coditel I Case Judgment 
366 EPRS (2015b) at pg. 59 
367 Premier League Case ruling, paragraph 117 
368 Doubt is not cast on this conclusion by the judgment in Coditel I, which has been relied upon by 
FAPL and others and by MPS in support of their arguments. It is true that, in paragraph 16 of that 
judgment, the Court held that the rules of the Treaty can- not in principle constitute an obstacle to 
the geographical limits which the parties to a contract of assignment of intellectual property rights 
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statement on the assertion that the contexts of the two cases were different.369 
Specifically, the Court noted that in the Coditel I case, the cable broadcasting 
company did not have authorization for communication to the public of the work 
(in the jurisdiction where that communication originated). However, in the 
Premier League Case, the broadcasters did have authorization to carry out acts of 
communication to the public in the jurisdiction of broadcast.370  
 
In the Coditel I Case, the original German broadcaster was not a party to the 
dispute – it was rather the Belgian retransmitter. As such, no conclusion can be 
made as to whether there was any liability on the part of the German broadcaster, 
who had rights to broadcast the work inside of Germany, but whose signal 
transmission spilled over into Belgium. In principle, liability would be incurred if 
the act of communication to the public took place in a jurisdiction in which the 
broadcaster had no authorization to do so. As such, liability for infringement 
would be dependent on whether the act of communication was deemed to have 
taken place in the jurisdiction of the transmission, or the jurisdiction of reception; 
in the former case, the broadcaster would not be liable as it had authorization to 
broadcast the work in Germany, and in the latter case it would be liable as it did 
not have authorization in Belgium. This ambiguity again highlights the 
significance of the introduction of the principle-of-origin in the Satellite-Cable 
Directive.   
 
In the Premier League Case, the broadcast in question was made by the Greek 
broadcasting organization. Since this took place after the adoption of the country-
of-origin principle, the broadcaster would have only needed authorization to 
communicate the work to the public in the jurisdiction of the broadcast’s origin. 
As such, even though the signal was received in the UK, there is no liability for 
infringement as for the purposes of copyright law, the communication to the 
public is deemed to have been made in Greece, where the broadcaster indeed had 
authorization to broadcast the work. As such, the broadcast and reception of the 
Greek broadcaster’s signal was legitimate; pursuant to this logic, the Court took 
the view that preventing the use in the UK, of signal decryption decoders sources 
sourced from the Greek broadcaster, was not justifiable as a means to purportedly 
protect the intellectual property of the communicated work.  
 
 
[8]-3.4 E-Commerce Directive  
 
The E-Commerce Directive371 was adopted in 2000 and does not directly deal with 
copyright issues, nor specific media sector policies. However, it codifies a very 
                                                        
have agreed upon in order to protect the author and his assigns and that the mere fact that the 
geographical limits in question coincide, in some circumstances, with the frontiers of the Member 
States does not require a different view. – Paragraph 118 of Premier League Judgement 
369 Premier League Case ruling, paragraph 119 
370 Premier League Case ruling, paragraph 120 
371 Directive 2000/31/EC of The European Parliament and of The Council of 8 June 2000 on certain 
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal 
Market (Directive on electronic commerce) 
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important principle in communications law – the principle of intermediate 
liability. This principle addresses how certain classes of service providers in the 
communication sector are exempt from liability resulting from infringements 
made by the underlying communicated content.  
 
This issue of intermediary liability is addressed through the ‘mere conduit’ 
principle of Article 12 of the Directive, reproduced below.  
 
Where an information service is provided that consists of the transmission in a 
communication network of information provided by a recipient of the service, or 
the provision of access to a communication network, Member States shall ensure 
that the service provider is not liable for the information transmitted, on 
condition that the provider:  
 
(a) does not initiate the transmission;  
(b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and  
(c) does not select or modify the information contained in the transmission.  
 
The concept of intermediary liability is relevant to this study, as it is interesting to 
consider how it might apply to the business of broadcast retransmission.  
 
Consider the example of a cable television service provider, who provides a 
subscription-based service of multiple different channels. Further consider that 
there are three groups of channels on the service: (i) Channels where the content 
is compiled by the service provider, (ii) channels directly provided by a third party 
(‘cablecaster’), and (iii) channels which are simultaneous and unaltered 
retransmissions of broadcasts made by over-the-air broadcasters.  
 
Considering the service provision as a whole – it is unquestionable that the service 
provider initiates the transmission; it therefore fails to meet criterion ‘a’ for mere 
conduit status. It will also likely fail to meet criterion ‘b’ as a subscription business 
model implies that the service provider does indeed select the recipients of the 
transmission.  In principle, it might meet this criterion if its model was to openly 
transmit the content to the unrestricted public.  
 
The interesting aspect of this analysis is criterion ‘c’. If the entire service is taken 
as a single transmission, then the service provider clearly fails to meet this 
criterion, as it indeed actively selects the individual channels to be included in its 
service. However, if each individual channel is interpreted as being a separate 
transmission, then the situation is different. For channels where the content was 
assembled by the service provider, the criterion is not met. For cablecasts and 
retransmitted broadcasts however, the service provider does not exercise any 
editorial control – the content is neither selected nor modified. However, in the 
case of retransmissions, modifications are not even possible in the first case, if 
these retransmissions are made under the regime of the Satellite-Cable Directive. 
In the Satellite-Cable Directive, retransmission is defined as being ‘simultaneous, 
unaltered and unabridged’. In theory, it is possible for the service provider to 
retransmit a broadcast with some delay or alterations; however, such a 
retransmission would not be subject to compulsory collective management. 
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In conclusion, the practice of retransmission, for all intents and purposes, does not 
qualify for ‘mere conduit’ status under the E-Commerce Directive. This is an 
important point, as it affirms that retransmitters are indeed liable to the content 
they transmit. However, given the particularly unique context of such 
transmissions, unique activity-specific solutions for mitigating such liability are 
justified. In the context of copyright law, a such solution is the regime of 
mandatory collective management. In the field of public law, the solution lies in 
how retransmissions are treated in the context of content regulation; this is 
discussed in a subsequent sub-section of this chapter.   
 
  
[8]-3.5 Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
 
In order to have context to discuss the policies that apply to copyright and 
broadcasting law, it is useful to also discuss broader policies that affect media 
services. 
 
[8]-3.5.1 Taxonomy of Services 
 
Generally, media services can be categorised as either ‘linear’ or ‘non-linear’. 
Linear services refer to traditional broadcasting services, where the broadcaster 
takes multiple works, bundles them into a programming schedule, and transmits 
such to end-users. In contrast, non-linear services differ from broadcasting 
services in that the time of communication is determined by the user, and not the 
service provider.  
 
As such, non-linear services can be thought of as analogous to a ‘digital library’, 
where users can select a preferred work to be viewed at any time. These services 
can be provided on a flat-fee subscription basis, or a pay-per-view basis. However, 
what is important to note is that generally, these services are comparable to 
broadcasting in that the selected work can only be viewed immediately – no 
reproduction of the work is made for the purpose of transferring such a copy to 
the user (as would be the case where a digital download is purchased).372  
 
In European law, the legal distinction between linear and non-linear audiovisual 
services is rooted in the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. This Directive was 
adopted in 2010, and among other things, provides an update to the Television 
Without Frontiers Directive (and its subsequent amendments). 
 
                                                        
372 It is however important to note that in order to provide such online (on-demand) services, 
broadcasters need to clear a different set of rights than those required for the initial broadcast, 
namely the reproduction right and the making available right.  According the EC 2011 Green Paper 
on Online Audiovisual Distribution, “It is noted that these rights are technology neutral. The need to 
clear the making available right arises from the service provided (the making available of a work "on 
demand") regardless of delivery platform or protocol used (e.g. cable network, internet protocol or 
other). These rights are provided by the international treaties of which the EU and its Member States 
are members (the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO performances and phonograms Treaty) and 
in the EU acquis (Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001, the "Information Society Directive". (pg. 8) 
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The Directive distinguishes between two forms of audiovisual media services – 
traditional (linear) services such as television, and on-demand (non-linear 
services). In the context of this Directive, linear broadcasting includes analogue 
television, digital television, live streaming, webcasting, and near-video-on-
demand373.374 Interestingly, the definition of audiovisual media service in Article 
1(a)(i) explicitly states that all services are either a television service, or an on-
demand service. As such, this definition represents a widening of the legal view of 
television, by adopting a technologically neutral definition with included online 
broadcasts, once they are meant for simultaneous viewing. Excluded from the 
definition of audiovisual media services are platforms for user-generated content, 
and private correspondence. 375  Furthermore, the Directive covers audiovisual 
media, and hence does not apply to audio transmissions and radio services.  
 
In terms of on-demand services, the Commission justifies bringing such services 
under the scope of regulation as they compete with television broadcast 
services.376 However, the Directive recognises that the very nature of non-linear 
services is such that the user has more choice and control than in the case of non-
linear services, and hence the impacts on policy issues (such as content 
regulation) are different; on this basis the Directive imposes lighter regulation on 
on-demand services, where the rules are less restrictive.377  
 
The Directive places certain obligations on media service providers. However it is 
important to note that the definition of a ‘media service provider’ is linked to the 
concept of ‘editorial control’; As such parties which engage in mere transmission 
of content (where editorial responsibility lies with a third party), do not fall within 
this definition.378 This can be seen as a re-iteration of the ‘mere conduit’ principle, 
as set out in the E-Commerce Directive, which provides for exemptions from 
regulatory liability for intermediaries.379  
 
 
 
                                                        
373 ‘Near-video-on-demand services’ refer to the practice of some broadcasters to repeat a single 
programme continuously at staggered time intervals. The user is therefore not able to arbitrarily 
choose the time of enjoying a programme (as would be the case in full video on demand), but is at 
all times able to wait for a short period for the next airing of the programme.  
374 Recital 27 of Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
375 Recitals 21 and 23 of Audiovisual Media Services Directive, respectively 
376 Recital 24  
377 Recital 58 
378 Recital 26 
379 The Audiovisual Media Services Directive acknowledges the significance of its relationship with 
the principle set out in the E-Commerce Directive in Recital 25 and Article 4(8).  
The relevant provision of the E-Commerce Directive dealing with the ‘mere conduit’ principle and 
intermediary liability is Article 12(1), which states as follows: ”Where an information society 
service is provided that consists of the transmission in a communication network of information 
provided by a recipient of the service, or the provision of access to a communication network, Member 
States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information transmitted, on condition 
that the provider: (a) does not initiate the transmission; (b) does not select the receiver of the 
transmission; and(c) does not select or modify the information contained in the transmission.” 
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[8]-3.5.2 Country-of-origin principle 
 
The core of the Directive is the ‘country of origin principle’, which is the essential 
provision for the creation of an internal market.380 Under this principle, only one 
Member State should have jurisdiction over an audiovisual media service 
provider. 381  Following from this, a service provider only needs to meet the 
regulatory obligations and law of the country in which their communications 
originate. 
 
This principle is set out through a combination of Articles 2 and 3 of the Directive. 
Article 2 states that Member States shall ensure that all media service providers 
under their jurisdiction comply with the requirements applicable to audio media 
services intended for the public in that jurisdiction. This hence sets out a kind of 
primary jurisdiction that the Member State has over the service providers 
established within its territory.  It is noted here that the criteria for ‘country of 
origin’ is different here than it is in the Satellite-Cable Directive; in the former, the 
relevant jurisdiction is that of the service provider’s establishment, while in the 
latter it is the jurisdiction in which the communication is initially transmitted.382  
 
Article 3 of the Directive sets out that Member States “shall ensure freedom of 
reception and shall not restrict retransmissions on their territory of audiovisual 
media services from other Member States for reasons which fall within the fields 
coordinated by this Directive.” The implication of this provision is that once a 
service meets the legal requirements in its country of origin, it can be received or 
retransmitted in another country without having to meet separate legal 
requirements in the importing country. The result is that Article 3 essentially 
asserts that the primary jurisdiction established in Article 2, is an exclusive 
jurisdiction. 383  Therefore, the result of the principle is a reduced regulatory 
burden on service providers and greater legal certainty, which both contribute to 
promotion of cross-border services and the development of the internal market.  
 
[8]-3.5.3  Regulatory Provisions and Rights for Major Events 
 
The remaining provisions of the Directive relate to various issues, such as: (i) 
provision of basic information to consumers, (ii) content regulation (restrictions 
on hate speech, protection of minors, advertising regulations, local content quotas, 
etc.), (iii) support for production and distribution of local and independent works, 
(iv) exclusive rights and news reporting, and (iv) administrative provisions. As 
noted above, the regulatory burdens are generally lower for on demand services 
as compared to linear services.  
                                                        
380 Recital 33 
381 Recital 34 
382 The likely reason for this is because of the technical difficulty in determining the origin of a 
communication in an online context. 
383 The policy basis of the country of origin principle is elaborated in Recital 36, which states that 
“The requirement that the originating Member State should verify that broadcasts comply with 
national law as coordinated by this Directive is sufficient under Union law to ensure free movement 
of broadcasts without secondary control on the same grounds in the receiving Member States.” 
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For all intents and purposes, the Directive does not contain any major provisions 
on the application of copyright law for audiovisual services. However, Chapter V 
of the Directive (Articles 14 and 15) does contain some provisions which set out 
interesting policy provisions with implications for copyright licencing practices. 
 
Article 14 provides the possibility for Member States to take measures to prevent 
broadcasters under their jurisdiction, from broadcasting events that the Member 
State regards as being ‘of major importance for society’, on an exclusive basis such 
that a substantial proportion of the public is excluded from following coverage on 
free television. The Article also obliges Member States to prevent broadcasters 
under their jurisdiction from exercising exclusive rights in such a way that the 
public of another Member State (in which the programming in question is deemed 
to be of major importance for that society) is denied coverage. In practice, such 
events are normally major sporting events.  
 
This Article hence represents a restriction on the freedom of contract of both 
broadcasters and owners of broadcasting rights for such events; Such restrictions 
on the private interests of these parties are deemed to be justified in light of the 
social benefits of accommodating the public interests in ensuring access to 
widespread coverage. The provisions of course do not preclude the possibility of 
licencing broadcasting rights on an exclusive basis, but merely place a restriction 
on how those rights are exercised, once granted.  
 
Article 15 sets out further restrictions on the scope of exclusive rights for coverage 
of events of major social significance. This Article sets out that where a 
broadcaster has exclusive rights to broadcast a high public interest event, all other 
broadcasters (including those from other jurisdictions) must have access to the 
exclusive content for the purpose of short news reports. Such access must be 
provided on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis, and there should be 
freedom for the second broadcaster producing the news segment to choose the 
short extracts.  However, such extracts can only be used for broadcasting news 
programmes; the extracts can only be used for on-demand services if it is provided 
by the same media service provider on a deferred basis. Furthermore, 
compensation for the use of these extracts is limited to the marginal costs of 
providing access to the content for the producers of the news programme.   
 
Article 15 hence provides an obligatory duty to deal for holders of exclusive rights 
in high public interest events, and a prohibition on profiting from such dealings, 
though this is limited to licencing extracts of the works for incorporation into 
news programmes. This provision is hence comparable to the limitations and 
exceptions to exclusive copyrights that exist in some jurisdictions for news 
reporting. In fact, the list of possible limitations and exceptions to copyright 
contained in Article 5 of the Information Society Directive, does include the cases 
of “reproduction by the press, communication to the public …of broadcast works…,, 
…. in connection with the reporting of current events, to the extent justified by the 
informatory purpose…”. However, unlike the possible limitations and exemptions 
set out in the Information Society Directive (which are at the discretion of 
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implementing Member States), the limitation implied by Article 15 of the 
Audiovisual Services Directive is mandatory. 
 
 
The purpose of taking note of this provision on major events is to stress that 
exceptions and limitations to the norms of intellectual property exploitation – and 
specific policies for specific public policy purposes and market circumstances – 
are an important part of the intersection between media law and copyright law.   
 
[8]-3.5.4 Latest Developments 
 
For completeness, it is noted that in May 2016, the European Commission issued 
a new Proposal to amend the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, to account for 
various changes in the market environment. 384  The main elements of the 
proposed amendments are: (i) simplifying the rules for determining country of 
origin, (ii) reducing burden of advertising limits for television broadcasters, (iii) 
allowing for new approaches for promoting European works, including imposing 
financial contributions on on-demand service providers, (iv) updated prohibitions 
on hate speech, (v) new provisions on protection of minors (including restrictions 
applied to online and on-demand services), (vi) inclusion of video-sharing 
platforms, and (vii) new provisions on the independence of regulators. As of 
October 2018, these amendments are anticipated to be soon adopted.385 
 
 
[8]-3.6 Collective Management Directive 
 
The final existing legal instrument relevant to discussing copyright and media 
services is the Collective Management Directive of 2014.386 
 
The Directive sets out provisions dealing with two issues: (i) the principles and 
rules under which all CMOs should function, and (ii) multi-territory licensing for 
online music services.  
 
The Directive is important, as CMO play a critical role in the overall intellectual 
property landscape, and the policy objectives of many other instruments (such as 
the Satellite-Cable Directive) require effective and efficient CMO operations to be 
fulfilled. Before the Directive, significant difference existed between the national 
rules governing the functioning of CMOs.387 As such, there was a clear need to 
                                                        
384  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services in view of changing 
market realities; 2016/0151 (COD) 287 final; 25.5.2016, Brussels, COM(2016) 
385  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/european-parliament-approves-
revised-rules-audiovisual-media-across-europe; accessed on 18-10-2018. 
386 Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on 
collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in 
musical works for online use in the internal market 
387  Recital 5 of Collective Management Directive  
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codify a legal instrument to ensure a high standard of governance and 
transparency in CMO operations across the in internal market.  
 
Title II of the Directive outlines provisions that apply to all CMOs, operating in all 
categories of rights management. It sets out provisions on issue such as the rights 
of rights holders (in relation to their dealings with CMOs), membership rules, 
governance principles, supervisory functions, and the general obligations of 
CMOs. The directive also sets out specific principles on how licences are to be 
granted, and licensing revenue is to be collected, used, and distributed, including 
how deductions are made. Furthermore, the Directive sets out broad principles 
for how representation agreements388 are to be managed, and how information is 
to be made available to all stakeholders, including the public.  
 
[8]-3.6.1 Online Music Services as Users of Works  
 
Before proceeding to discuss the second policy area of the Collective Management 
Directive, it is first useful to undertake a short discussion on why online music 
services warrant special treatment. The example below aims to illustrate this.  
 
Like audiovisual media services, audio (generally music) media services can either 
take the form of traditional linear broadcasts or on-demand services. However, 
on-demand music services have a unique characteristic in that the size of the 
repertoire of works that are used is of orders of magnitude greater.  
 
For the purpose of illustration, consider a hypothetical traditional television 
broadcaster who broadcasts without interruption, a programming schedule of 
thirty-minute programmes, where no programme is broadcast more than once for 
an entire year. This broadcaster will broadcast a total of 17,520 works in a 
calendar year.389 Of course, this is an extreme estimate for the number of works 
the broadcaster has to clear rights for, as (i) certain works are aired several times,  
(ii) multiple individual works are likely different episodes in series or catalogue 
of works controlled by the same rights holder, and hence subject to a single 
licensing agreement, (iii) some of the programmes aired might be produced by the 
broadcasters themselves, and hence the issue of rights acquisition for 
broadcasting does not arise, and (iv) some not insignificant proportion of airtime 
would consist of commercial advertising.  
 
Similarly, consider a hypothetical traditional radio broadcaster who broadcasts 
without interruption, songs of three minutes in length, where no song is broadcast 
twice in a calendar year. Such a broadcaster would broadcast a total of 175,200 
different works. 390  Again, this is an extreme estimation, as (i) for commercial 
                                                        
388 A ‘representation agreement’ is an agreement between two CMOs, where one CMO acts on 
behalf of the other, in conducting licencing agreements. It contrasts with a ‘reciprocal agreement’ 
where this representation is mutual – i.e. both CMOs acts on behalf of the other, usually in terms 
of licencing agreements within the national jurisdiction of the acting CMO.  
389 Two programmes per hour, for 24 hours a day, for 365 days a year results in 17,520 individual 
programmes.  
390 20 three minute songs per hour, for 24 hours a day, for 365 days a year results in 175,200 
individual songs. 
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radio, a small number of popular works in a given season are repeatedly 
broadcast, and (ii) radio broadcasting airtime would also consist of a large 
proportion of advertising, announcements, and other non-music content.  
 
Estimating the number of works used in on-demand services is much more 
difficult, as the specific catalogue offered varies greatly between service providers. 
Nevertheless, one estimate puts the maximum size of the catalogue of one the 
largest online on-demand audiovisual service providers in the US as around 8,000 
works.391 In contrast, major on-demand music services tend to offer a catalogue of 
over 30 million works.392  
 
Content  Service  Works Used 
Audiovisual 
Television Broadcasting           17,520 
On-Demand             8,000 
Music 
Radio Broadcasting         175,200 
On-Demand     30,000,000    
 
Table 8.1: Hypothetical estimate of maximum number of works used by different 
types of media service provides393  
 
It is hence clear that even using the most liberal estimates, the number of works 
involved in on-demand music services is of orders of magnitude greater than that 
for traditional radio or television broadcasting, or on-demand audiovisual 
services. This characteristic makes for a particular challenge for administering 
copyright, especially in the context of online services, which are accessible in 
multiple countries. Baring the application of any principle to the contrary, rights 
would therefore need to be cleared for an enormous number of works, in every 
jurisdiction in which the service is offered. 
 
This also creates challenges for CMOs representing performance rights for musical 
works. Because of the scope of operations of online on-demand music services, 
advanced administrative infrastructure is needed by the CMO, particularly in 
terms of data processing relating to the licensing and use of protected works, and 
the disbursement of payments to rights holders. 
 
                                                        
391 At its peak in 2014, Netflix offered a total of 8,103 titles (both movies and television shows), in 
the US market. The size of this repertoire has been shrinking due to competition from other digital 
media providers.  For context, Netflix is widely seen as one of the market leaders in the provision 
of on-demand audiovisual services, though its market share seems to be decreasing due to greater 
competition. Note on Source: The original source – Allflix (a website dedicated to cataloguing the 
programmes offered on Netflix) – is no longer online, but the data in the report was cited by several 
notable news outlines, such as Time (http://time.com/4272360/the-number-of-movies-on-netflix-is-
dropping-fast/; accessed on 18-10-2018)   
392 For example, Spotify, one of the market leaders in online music streaming services, claims to 
offer access to over 35 million individual songs. Source: 
https://newsroom.spotify.com/companyinfo/; accessed on 18-10-2018. 
393 For avoidance of doubt, these are certainly not meant to be realistic estimates; they are highly 
exaggerated maximum estimates, used merely to highlight the magnitude of the differences. 
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Consider that the scale of this operation is a function of not only the licenced 
repertoire, but of the number of end-users and the level of usage of the average 
end-users. Tracking every individual use (e.g. stream or download) of every single 
user, can hence amount to managing data of millions of individual transactions. 
Hence without adequate automated processes, the processing of those uses would 
not be economically viable.394  
 
Furthermore, it is useful to note that while on-demand audiovisual services 
generally offer the ability to stream a programme, on-demand music services may 
offer the option to download works as well as stream works. Where downloads 
are involved, this might involve clearing ‘mechanical rights’ (as opposed to the 
‘performance rights’ involved in streaming) – not only are these rights possibly 
held by different rights holders, but they may be managed by different CMOs. 
Clearing the rights for download and streaming services is therefore more 
complex that clearing for just streaming.  
 
[8]-3.6.2 Multi-Territory Licensing for Online Music Services 
 
Because of the scale of use of works in on-demand music services, special policies 
for such services can be justified. Furthermore, in the online context, which is 
generally by definition a cross-border service, the issue of clearing rights for 
multiple territories also arises.  
 
Licensing for online music services also raises challenges for CMOs and rights 
holders themselves. One of the challenges how national legal frameworks – which 
are designed for licensing activities that take place on a national basis – apply 
when providing multi-territory licences, or providing licences to users in other 
jurisdictions. As such, there is legal uncertainty that acts as a deterrent to 
participation in the multi-territory licensing market.395  
 
Furthermore, it appears that in some cases, commercial users of works sometimes 
obtain two sets of rights: (i) multi-territory licences from parties representing 
major repertoires of works, and (ii) mono-territorial licences limited to national 
territories. 396  The latter mono-territorial licences are obtained from national 
CMOs who have reciprocal agreements with other societies, and are used to cover 
repertoire that is not already covered by the former major multi-territorial 
licences.397  
 
The result of the prevailing legal uncertainty is hence that some online services 
are licenced through a combination of multi-territorial and national licences. This 
is undesirable as it not only increases the contracting costs of service providers, 
                                                        
394 Collective Management Directive Impact Assessment, pg. 25 
395 Collective Management Directive Impact Assessment, pg. 26 
396 Collective Management Directive Impact Assessment, pg. 27 
397 ‘Reciprocal Agreements’ refer to agreement between two CMOs to enter into a partnership in 
which either member is permitted to act on behalf of the other member within its respective 
jurisdiction. Revenue collected on behalf of the other CMO are then remitted accordingly.  
 209
but it can also limit the provision of services to the territories in which both the 
multi-territory and the national licence simultaneously apply.398  
 
Furthermore, the overlap of multiple licences can result in blurred boundaries of 
the represented repertoires, especially where there are both multi-territorial and 
national licences from CMOs that might already have reciprocal agreements with 
each other. The result is that it is possible for certain single uses of works to be 
double-invoiced to users, further increasing legal uncertainty and operation costs. 
It is further possible that where CMO offers multi-territorial licences, but lacks the 
requisite data management systems, certain works that should be covered under 
the licence are not matched when tracking usage by the licensee. Hence, national 
licences might be used by users in order to provide a sort of ‘insurance’ in cases 
where there are gaps in the administration of the multi-territorial licence due to 
data management deficiencies.  
 
Therefore, improved coordination between CMOs is necessary, particularly as it 
relates to reciprocal and representation agreements. This further reiterates the 
need for general coordination on national standards for CMO operation. It also 
means that the qualitative nature of the data kept on works needs to be improved 
in order to prevent instances of conflicting claims of ownership and/or 
representation – an issue which would largely not have previously existed where 
licensing practices were limited to a national territorial basis. This again 
underscores the need to ensure that CMOs operating in the multi-territory 
licensing market need to meet high standards in terms of their capacity to 
administer licences and undertake the necessary data processing.  
 
Title III of the Collective Management Directive sets out provisions which 
specifically apply only to CMOs who grant multi-territorial licences for online 
rights in musical works.  
 
Mainly, the provisions ensure that when CMOs administer such licences, that they 
have the technical and administrative capacity to do so. This specifically refers to 
the capacity to “process electronically, in an efficient and transparent manner, data 
needed for the administration of such licences, including for the purposes of 
identifying the repertoire and monitoring its use, invoicing users, collecting rights 
revenue and distributing amounts due to right holders.” (Article 24) 
 
Hence, some investment in information technology systems would be necessary 
for CMOs wishing to offer these specific multi-territory licences. Further 
provisions ensure that the information of the CMO’s repertoire of works is 
accurate and transparent, and there is accuracy and timeliness in invoicing, 
reporting, and payment to rights holders.  
 
An important mechanism of the Directive, is the relationship it sets up between 
CMOs, in order to encourage multi-territory licensing for the use of musical works 
online. Article 29 provides that representation agreements are of a non-exclusive 
                                                        
398  Collective Management Directive Impact Assessment, pg. 2). 
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nature. As such, CMOs are encouraged to enter into reciprocal agreements with 
multiple other CMOs for multi-territorial online licensing.  
 
This non-exclusivity compliments the provisions of Article 30, which provides that 
where a CMO (which does not grant multi-territory licences) seeks a 
representation agreement with another CMO (which does offer multi-territory 
licensing), the receiving CMO is obligated to accept the request.  
 
Furthermore, under Article 31, if a CMO does not offer multi-territory licensing, 
and does not enter into a representation agreement with another CMO which 
does, the members of that CMO can withdraw their online rights in musical works 
for the purpose of multiple-territory licensing (without having to withdraw these 
rights for the purpose of mono-territory licensing); these withdrawn rights can 
then be exercised individually by the rights holder, or collectively though another 
CMO. The effect of this provision is that a rights holder always has access to the 
possibility of multi-territory licensing.  
 
The cumulative effect of these provisions is to promote the aggregation of 
repertoire through facilitating representation agreements, and encouraging more 
efficient multi-territory licensing practices. 
 
The concept behind the Directive seems to be one of giving CMOs a strategic choice 
as to whether they wish to invest in the data processing upgrades necessary to 
administer multi-territory licences. The general alternative to this choice would 
be to execute representation agreements with other CMOs for the purpose of 
multi-territory licencing. For CMOs that meet the requirements necessary to 
administer licences on a multi-territory basis, the legal requirements would apply 
to its own repertoire, as well as the repertoire of other CMOs it represents through 
representation agreements. Therefore, it is envisioned that there would emerge a 
few CMOs with a large number of representation agreements, and hence a large 
‘aggregated repertoire’. These CMOs are referred to as ‘passport entities’, and 
would be able to reap the economies of scale necessary though repertoire 
aggregating, to offset the compliance costs of the legal requirements set out in 
Title II of the Directive.399   
 
[8]-3.6.3 Extended Collective Licencing and Country-of-origin principle  
 
Ultimately, the Directive shows that for online music services, European policy 
makers chose a strategy of encouraging aggregation of repertoires and developing 
the administrative infrastructure for multi-territory licencing.  
 
The chosen strategy clearly deviates from the country-of-origin principle set out 
in the Cable and Satellite Directive, as well as the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive. Under the Collective Management Directive, for the purposes of 
copyright law - a provider of online music services still engages in acts of 
communication to the public (and reproduction in the case of providing 
downloads) in every territory in which services are offered. Hence authorisation 
                                                        
399 Collective Management Directive Impact Assessment, pg. 44 
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from rights holders is needed in each one of these territories; the Directive merely 
invokes an environment more favourable to a market for multi-territory licences.  
 
In contrast, if the country-of-origin principle were applied to online music 
services, then the copyright relevant acts of the service provider would be deemed 
to occur only in the territory in which that service provider is based. As such, only 
a single national licence would be needed for rights clearance. The mechanism of 
the country of origin principle is therefore equivalent to a legal fiction that a single 
national licence has the scope of a multi-territorial licence, or at least the legal 
presumption that national CMOs are always able to grant multi-territory licences.  
 
For the country of origin principle to work in this context it would have to be 
applied alongside a system of extended collective licencing. Extended collective 
licensing is where a single CMO is deemed to represent the entire repertoire of 
works; hence the repertoire administered by the CMO is ‘extended’ to include all 
other works not within that CMO’s repertoire, hence creating a presumption that 
the CMO is able to grant a full blanket licence for the use of all works.  Normally, 
the chosen CMO is the organisation that represents the largest proportion of rights 
holders and the universal repertoire, and acts on behalf of all other CMOs. The 
effect of this mandate extension is an automatic aggregation of repertoire; this is 
in contrast with the ‘licencing passport’ model, where repertoire aggregation is 
undertaken on a voluntary contractual basis.  
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that under extended collective licencing, 
individual rights holders (onto whose rights the extension applies) can still opt 
out of the extended licence and exercise their rights individually (or through 
another collective organisation). Therefore, the model of extended collective 
licencing does not actually mandate rights administration through the selected 
CMO, but merely creates a default rule under which the selected CMO acts as an 
agent on behalf of all rights holders.  
 
The Commission however notes that one problem is that in an online context it is 
difficult to determine the exact ‘country of origin’ based on technical criteria.400 
However, it is noted that the criteria used to apply that principle in the context of 
the Audiovisual Media Services Directive is one of a legal establishment nature.  
 
As such, it would appear that while the Commission is willing to adopt an online 
application of the country of origin principle in the general content regulation and 
authorisation context, it is reluctant to do so in the context of copyright law.  
 
However, the most relevant argument against adopting a combination of extended 
collective licensing and the country-of-origin principle to online music services 
again rests on the demands of those services on systems for copyright 
administration.  
For all online media services, the major market failures are the high transaction 
costs and legal uncertainties associated with provided cross-border services.  
                                                        
400 Collective Management Directive Implementation Report pg. 46 
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Policy interventions therefore must focus on mechanisms to reduce these 
transaction costs and provide legal certainty – this is exactly what collective 
licensing and the country-of-origin principle achieve respectively. However, for 
online music services, there is the additional market failure of the capital 
investments needed by CMOs to invest in data processing, and enter into the 
multi-territory licensing market (as quasi-natural monopolies).   
Applying the country of origin principle to online service would therefore shift the 
burden of these data processing requirements to the CMO selected to act as the 
extended collective licensing agent, without providing any real incentive for that 
CMO to make the necessary investments. Furthermore, obliging the CMO to make 
these investments would amount to a disproportional regulatory burden, and 
possibly undermine the freedom of enterprise (fundamental freedom to conduct 
a business) of the organization. The licensing passport model, while lacking the 
elegance of the principle-of-origin, can therefore be seen as having one main 
advantage – it leaves compliance with standards for capacity requirements for 
multi-territory licensing as a voluntary and strategic decision for individual CMOs 
to make. Presumably, as technology advances and the burden of the costs of 
massive data processing become less significant, these grounds for preferring the 
licensing passport model will erode. 
[8]-3.6.4 Parallel Direct Licencing  
 
Besides the country-of-origin principle and the licensing passport model, another 
possible policy approach considered by the Commission was a system of ‘Parallel 
Direct Licensing’. 401  Under this model, CMOs would be prohibited from 
representing rights holders on an exclusive basis, at least in terms of online 
distribution rights.  
Rights holders themselves would then negotiate licences (specifically for online 
use) with users, without having to withdraw their rights from the CMO.402 The 
result is hence a system of ‘parallel direct licences’. A variation of this approach, is 
allowing rightsholders to choose between exclusive and non-exclusive mandates. 
Hence, where the CMO does not offer multi-territory licences, the rights holder 
can opt to licence these rights themselves or through another CMO.   
This option is attractive as it does allow for more market-based flexibilities in 
licensing practices. However, the increased range of licensing choices might be at 
the cost of the freedom of contract of rights holders, if they are not able to grant 
their chosen CMO an exclusive mandate.   
In terms of legal certainty, this policy option may have effects in both directions. 
                                                        
401 Collective Management Directive Impact Assessment, pg. 42. It is noted that the Commission 
also considered a fourth option – a ‘Centralized Portal’, where individual CMOs pool their 
repertoires for clearance though a centralized portal, so the purposes of multi-territory licensing. 
However, this option was rejected as it would create de facto monopoly whose functioning would 
necessitate price fixing and customer allocation, and hence whose very existence would be in 
violation of European competition law. (pg. 47) 
402 Collective Management Directive Impact Assessment, pg. 44 
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On one hand, more flexibility means that users have greater certainty that they 
would be able to secure authorization from rights holders, particularly when 
CMOs do not offer multi-territory licences. However, parallel direct licences 
administered by rightsholders might result in uncertainties about the precise 
repertoires covered by CMOs.  
Furthermore, there would be some increase in the administrative costs of CMOs, 
due to the need to adjust licensing agreement and invoices to ‘carve out’ for the 
rights administered directly by individual rights holders. There will of course also 
be some transaction (and administrative) costs to rights holders who not have to 
negotiate and execute rights on their own, rather than the normal channels of their 
CMO. Economies of scale to rightsholders in negotiating and contracting might 
also therefore be lost.  
Also, there is the obvious increase in transaction costs for users, who also need to 
now execute agreements with users who choose to directly administer their 
rights. However, only rights holders with a portfolio of high valued works would 
likely have the resources and bargaining power necessary to execute parallel 
direct licences. Without there being recourse to an alternative CMO that does offer 
multi-territory licences, it is thus possible that a large proportion of the universal 
repertoire – particularly works with lower market values – will fail to find 
opportunities for legitimate online distribution. The result is hence a possible 
restriction of content diversity, and a consolidation of market power in the online 
market by rights holders in more popular works. The policy framework should 
hence focus on ensuring that all rights holders have access to opportunities for 
multi-territory licensing agreement for the use of works online.403  
An interesting perspective on this model is considering how it relates to the policy 
objective of encouraging CMOs to make the necessary investments to administer 
multi-territory rights for online use. On one hand, the scale of the data processing 
requirements for administering multi-territory licences decreases, as the CMO 
does not unavoidably have participation agreements with other CMOs. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that the costs of such administration are 
significantly lower, as there are high economies of scale in large-scale data 
processing. Hence, having multiple CMOs invest in such capacity seems less 
efficient than designing a policy mechanism to promote the aggregation of 
repertoire to reap these economies of scale.  
[8]-3.6.5 Multi-Territory Licensing for Broadcasters 
 
In terms of administering multi-territory licences for online use of musical works, 
it is important to take notice of Article 32 of the Collective Management Directive. 
This Article provides that the entire Title II of the Directive on multi-territory 
                                                        
403 It is useful to note that aggregating repertoires of different valued works is in the best interest 
of the market itself, as there are strong supply-side economies of scale. Online services are 
attractive not only for access to popular works, but for the number of total works which can be 
accessed, given the value-added functionality of content discovery algorithms which recommend 
new (often previously unknown and hence low-economic value) works to users based on their 
preferences and usage trends.  
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licencing does not apply to licences offered to broadcasting organizations, in 
relation to a broadcaster’s simulcasts and ancillary online services.404  
 
The rationale for exempting licences for broadcasting organisations is not 
explicitly spelt out by the Commission; however, some context for this policy 
position is given by Recital 48 of the Directive.405 It would appear that in the view 
of European policy makers, the existing status quo of obtaining national licences 
from local CMOs is sufficient for licencing broadcasters’ online ancillary services. 
 
 
Broadcasters would generally have licencing agreements with their local CMO for 
the primary broadcasts, and under the principle-of-origin (as set out in the 
Satellite-Cable Directive), rights clearance is only needed in the jurisdiction of 
initial signal transmission. However, the country-of-origin principle does not 
currently apply to the ancillary online services of a broadcaster, and hence such 
online communications are – for the purposes of copyright law – deemed to have 
taken place in every territory in which the online services are accessible. 
Therefore, the broadcaster would need a multi-territory licence in order to 
provide its ancillary online services.  
 
However, compared to online on-demand music services, the scope of use of 
musical works for broadcasters is much smaller. Therefore, multi-territory 
licencing administration for broadcast licensees is not associated with the major 
data processing requirements that arise for on-demand music services.  This less-
complex scope of usage is also not just a function of the number of works used, but 
also how the use is distributed amongst end-users. In the case of online-music 
services, each end-user would have a different usage of works pattern, and these 
individual uses need to be aggregated in order to determine to total usage of a 
licenced work; this layer of complexity does not apply in the case of licencing 
works for use in broadcasts, as the number of end-users ultimately accessing a 
                                                        
404 Simulcasts refer to the online distribution of broadcast transmissions (radio or television), 
undertaken simultaneously with the traditional terrestrial transmission. ‘Ancillary services’ is a 
broader term that refers to various services offered by a broadcaster online, which compliment, 
but are subordinate to, its primary terrestrial broadcast. This hence includes simultaneous as well 
as differed online broadcasts and previews; this does not include the making available of individual 
works on an on-demand basis. 
405 Recital 48 of the Collective Management Directive states as follows: “Broadcasting organisations 
generally rely on a licence from a local collective management organisation for their own broadcasts 
of television and radio programmes which include musical works. That licence is often limited to 
broadcasting activities. A licence for online rights in musical works would be required in order to 
allow such television or radio broadcasts to be also available online. To facilitate the licensing of 
online rights in musical works for the purposes of simultaneous and delayed transmission online of 
television and radio broadcasts, it is necessary to provide for a derogation from the rules that would 
otherwise apply to the multi-territorial licensing of online rights in musical works. Such a derogation 
should be limited to what is necessary in order to allow access to television or radio programmes 
online and to material having a clear and subordinate relationship to the original broadcast 
produced for purposes such as supplementing, previewing or reviewing the television or radio 
programme concerned. That derogation should not operate so as to distort competition with other 
services which give consumers access to individual musical or audiovisual works online, nor lead to 
restrictive practices, such as market or customer sharing, which would be in breach of Article 101 or 
102 TFEU.” 
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work is the number of end-user who at most receive – or at least actually watch or 
listen to – a specific broadcast. The distribution of the use of individual works is 
therefore linear in this regard.  
 
As a result of these considerations, it seems unnecessary to apply the strict 
regulatory obligations set out in Title II of the Collective Management Directive, as 
a high level of administrative capacity is not a prerequisite for effective 
administration of multi-territory licences for broadcast organisations as a specific 
sub-set of licensees.  
 
 
[8]-4 MODERNISING THE POLICY FRAMEWORK 
 
Returning specifically to the issue of broadcast policy and regulation, the old 
Television Without Frontiers Directive was repealed and updated by the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive; these updates were largely a response to 
changes in technology. However, no corresponding instrument has (to date) been 
adopted to update the Satellite-Cable Directive.  
 
It is important to understand that the Satellite-Cable Directive deals with original 
broadcasts which are transmitted via terrestrial means or satellite, and where that 
signal is retransmitted by a cable broadcaster (or by microwave system). Hence, 
the collective management regime in the Directive does not apply to other forms 
of retransmission.  
 
For non-cable forms of retransmission, the existing ‘standard’ legal provisions on 
copyright and related rights would be relevant. In particular, these would be the 
exclusive rights of authors, performers, and producers to prohibit or authorise the 
communication of their works to the public (or the making available of their works 
to the public).406 As such, individual holders of both copyright and related rights 
would hold exclusive rights (or at least a right to remuneration) in relation to 
communication to the public via retransmission that is not made via cable. This 
however does not mean that collective management for such retransmissions is 
not possible, but only that it is not mandatory. It can therefore be said that 
regulation of retransmission within the internal market does not follow the 
principle of technological neutrality.  
 
In the 2002 Implementation Report, for the case of retransmission via satellite, 
the Commission took the view that to treat such retransmitters the same as cable 
retransmitters would amount to ‘equality of treatment in appearance only’, as 
they are different situations.  More specifically, the Commission noted that while 
cable retransmissions are restricted in their geographical reach, satellite 
retransmissions can go beyond national borders, or even outside of the internal 
market. 407  It concludes that the Commission does not therefore consider it 
                                                        
406  These rights are established under Directives 92/100/EEC (the Rental Directive) and 
2001/29/EC (Information Society Directive). This interpretation is explicitly supported by the 
2002 Cable Satellite Directive Implementation Report (pg. 14). 
407 European Commission Satellite and Cable Implementation Report, 2002, pg. 15 
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appropriate (at least at that stage) to extend the CMO model to other mediums and 
technological platforms for broadcast retransmission. 
 
The Commission justified its disapproval of extending the collective management 
model to satellite retransmissions with the following comments:    
 
“To impose the principle of collective management on retransmission activities would 
amount to limiting considerably the freedom of rightholders, who would no longer be able 
to object to the retransmissions in question. However, some of the programmes contained in 
these retransmissions are not only the subject of an act of communication in the 
broadcasting context, but may also be presented on other media, in accordance with a 
chronology designed to maximise potential remuneration in respect of the work concerned. 
It should be noted that the chronology for the various acts of communication for a particular 
work is organised on a national basis, depending on the initial success achieved in the 
Member State where the work was produced. 
 
However, the retransmission of programmes in packages broadcast by satellite is part of this 
media chronology: to the extent that the technical means used ensure a vast reach for the 
method of retransmission concerned, a limitation on the exercise of exclusive rights would 
jeopardise this chronological chain and thus, to a certain extent, the potential remuneration 
in respect of a work.”408  
 
The above language is interesting, as it seems to signal a scaling back of the 
Commission’s enthusiasm for the collective licencing model. In fact, previous 
statements seemed to explicitly justify limiting the freedoms of rights holders due 
to the unique characteristics of retransmission markets. Furthermore, the notion 
of protecting/facilitating media chronology practices409 goes against the very goal 
of creating a market in which there is free movement of audiovisual and 
broadcasting services, as these practices by definition are meant to create market 
fragmentation. 
 
More recently however, the need to revisit this issue has again come to the 
forefront. In 2015, the European Commission published a communication titled A 
Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe. One of the major objectives of the 
strategy was improving cross-border online access to content throughout the 
internal market; as a part of this aim, the Commission noted the need to review 
the Satellite and Cable Directive to “assess the need to enlarge its scope to 
broadcasters' online transmissions and the need to tackle further measures to ensure 
enhanced cross-border access to broadcasters' services in Europe.”410  
 
 
[8]-4.1 Technological Neutrality and Taxonomy of Platforms 
 
In order to understand how the regulation of retransmissions interfaces with the 
changing technological landscape, it is important to consider the concept of 
                                                        
408 European Commission Satellite and Cable Implementation Report, 2002, pg. 15  
409 ‘Media chronology practices’ refers to practices relating to publishing a work at different times 
depending on geographical markets, and distribution platform. This is discussed further in 4.8 of 
this chapter.  
410 Digital Market Strategy 2-15, pg. 7 
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‘Technological Neutrality’.411 Technological Neutrality is a principle often applied 
in telecommunications law; it suggests that regulatory frameworks should apply 
equally to all technological platforms in terms of service delivery or content 
distribution; i.e. legal rules should neither favour nor discriminate against any 
particular form of technology, as such might create market distortions and 
possible impediments to innovation. 
 
In order to have a context for discussing technological neutrality and its relevance 
for broadcasting and retransmission, it is useful to first set out a very broad 
overview of different broadcasting services. 
 
Firstly, there are traditional broadcasts, which have generally been the focus of 
this manuscript up to this point. Such broadcasts are undertaken on a terrestrial 
basis using specific frequency bands, and are hence transmitted ‘over the air’.  
Terrestrial broadcasts can also include broadcasts via satellite, which allow for 
greater coverage of a transmitted signal, and more efficient use of scarce spectrum 
resources. These transmissions have traditionally been via analogue protocols, 
but in recent times, most developed jurisdictions have switched over to the 
provision of digital broadcasting services. Under digital broadcasting systems, less 
spectrum is used, meaning there is room for a greater number of broadcasters in 
the market. Furthermore, there may be a role for content aggregators who collect 
the signals of broadcasters in order to have greater efficiency with a consolidated 
digital transmission.  
 
In terms of the online world, it is necessary to differentiate between two forms of 
broadcasting over the internet. The first form is where a broadcaster streams their 
programming schedule online, in parallel to their traditional (offline) broadcast. 
As this is undertaken simultaneously, this form of online broadcasting is known 
as ‘simulcasting’. In principle, a simulcast is technically a broadcaster’s online 
retransmission of its own broadcast.  
 
For completeness, it is useful to note that there are also scenarios in which 
broadcasters may stream their programming schedules online with some delay. 
These services are sometimes called ‘catch-up’ services, as their deferred nature 
is designed to allow viewers to re-watch a programme a second time, in case that 
they were not able to view the initial broadcast. It is critical to note that for both 
simulcasting and catch-up services, the broadcaster is in control of the 
transmitted content and the scheduling. These services hence do not include the 
provision of individual programmes selected at a specific time by the viewer; such 
services are known as on-demand or non-linear services (as opposed to the linear 
nature of traditional pre-determined broadcasting schedules).   
 
The second form of online broadcasting is the case where the broadcaster only 
operates online, and does not transmit any analogous terrestrial signal; this form 
of content distribution is normally referred to as ‘webcasting’.   
 
                                                        
411 For a discussion on technological neutrality in the context of copyright law, see Siu (2013). 
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In terms of retransmissions, the technical platforms used can generally be 
categorised into ‘closed’ and ‘open’ networks. Closed networks refer to cases in 
which services are provided through a physical connection to the infrastructure 
and network of the service provider. This physical connection hence means that 
the network is not ‘open’ to anyone wishing to access services. This category 
would hence include traditional cable services, digital terrestrial services, IPTV 
(Internet Protocol Television) provided over closed circuit networks, subscription 
satellite services, and mobile networks.  
 
The category of ‘open networks’ essentially refers to the open network of the 
internet; content distribution services provided exclusively through the internet 
are often referred to as ‘over the top’ services, as their delivery does not involve 
any owner of fixed infrastructure, and there is no specific allocation of bandwidth 
for the content communication (i.e. it is transmitted in parallel to the wide array 
of other forms of data also transmitted over the internet).412 Since these services 
are in principle accessible to anyone with an internet connection (and on any 
device), they are considered to be provided over ‘open’ networks.  
 
 
[8]-4.2 Proposal for New EU Regulation 
 
Further to the Digital Single Market Strategy, and under the theme of 
“Modernisation of the EU copyright rules”, in 2016 the European Commission 
issued a bundle of new proposed legal instruments in the field of copyright law. 
These proposals were: 
 
1. A Proposed Regulation on Online Transmissions413, 
2. A Proposed Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market414, and 
3. Two instruments concerning the implementation of the Marrakesh 
Treaty415  
                                                        
412 Assuming of course that internet service provision is guided by the principle of ‘Net Neutrality’, 
under which all data transmitted over the network is treated equally. 
413 European Commission 2016/0284 (COD) - Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council laying down rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to 
certain online transmissions of broadcasting organisations and retransmissions of television and 
radio programmes - (‘Proposed Online Transmissions Regulation’). 
414 2016/0280 (COD) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
copyright in the Digital Single Market. This draft instrument contains various proposals to address 
a number of modern copyright issues. There are however three particularly contentious issues 
which are currently being debated: (i) Article 3 which deals with permission for text and data 
mining, (ii) Article 11 which introduces a new ancillary right for news publishers, and (iii) Article 
13 which stipulates possible monitoring obligations for intermediaries. The Directive also 
proposes certain new mandatory exceptions and limitations.  
415 The Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, 
Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, is a copyright treaty administered by WIPO (The 
World Intellectual Property Organisation), which was adopted in 2013. The two European legal 
instruments were adopted in September 2017 – (i) Directive (EU) 2017/1564 Of The European 
Parliament And Of The Council of 13 September 2017 on certain permitted uses of certain works and 
other subject matter protected by copyright and related rights for the benefit of persons who are 
blind, visually impaired or otherwise print disabled and amending Directive 2001/29/EC on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, and (ii) 
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The Proposed Regulation on Online Transmissions was produced further to 
preceding exercises on the Satellite-Cable Directive including a Retrospective 
Evaluation, and a 2015 Public Consultation 416 . Even before these evaluations 
however, the Commissions issued a 2011 Green Paper on Online Audiovisual 
Distribution. 417  In any instance, the Proposal appears to be a welcome, but 
overdue, initiative to update the policies originally set out in the Satellite-Cable 
Directive, and to adapt them to the online environment. 
 
As noted by the Proposal, the principle-of-origin does not currently apply when a 
broadcaster clears rights for its online services.418 Furthermore, the system for 
clearing rights for retransmissions, through mandatory collective management 
does not currently extend to retransmissions for means other than cable or 
microwave systems. The Satellite-Cable Directive can hence be said to not reflect 
the principle of technological neutrality. The new proposed regulation is thus an 
attempt to fill the gaps created by the non-technologically neutral nature of the 
Satellite-Cable Directive.  
 
Unlike the Satellite-Cable Directive, the proposed instrument is a regulation; 
unlike Directives, which must be transposed into national law, regulations are 
directly binding law the Member States of the EU. According to the Commission, 
the instrument of a regulation was chosen so as to have direct application and to 
ensure uniform application as well as their entering into force at the same time.419  
 
As an important note, the Proposal clarifies that the proposed regulation would 
neither oblige broadcasting organisations to provide services across borders, nor 
to oblige retransmission service providers to include in their services 
programming from other Member States.420  
 
 
[8]-4.3 Extending Country-of-origin principle 
 
One of the new concepts introduced by the Proposal is the concept of ‘ancillary 
services’.421 These are services that are ‘those services offered by broadcasting 
                                                        
Regulation (EU) 2017/1563 Of The European Parliament And Of The COUNCIL of 13 September 2017 
on the cross-border exchange between the Union and third countries of accessible format copies of 
certain works and other subject matter protected by copyright and related rights for the benefit of 
persons who are blind, visually impaired or otherwise print-disabled. 
416  Survey and data gathering to support the evaluation of the Satellite and Cable Directive 
93/83/EEC and assessment of its possible extension – Final Report; European Commission, 2016 
417 European Commission (2011) Final Green Paper on the online distribution of audiovisual works 
in the European Union: opportunities and challenges towards a digital single market - COM(2011) 
427 
418 Reasons for and objectives of proposal, page 2 
419 Recital 17 
420 Recital 19 
421 Article 1(a) of the proposed regulation defined ‘ancillary online service’ as “…an online service 
consisting in the provision to the public, by or under the control and responsibility of a broadcasting 
organisation, of radio or television programmes simultaneously with or for a defined period of time 
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organisations which have a clear and subordinate relationship to the 
broadcast’. 422  As such, this would include simulcasting, catch-up, and other 
possible services, but explicitly excluding the provision of access to individual 
works (on demand services). 
 
Article 2 of the proposed regulation then extends the principle-of-origin to such 
ancillary online services. Recital 9 also explicitly clarifies that the principle-of-
origin is only to apply for ancillary services, and not to any subsequent 
communications or reproductions of works.  
 
 
[8]-4.4 Extending Treatment of Retransmissions 
 
The Proposed Regulation defines retransmissions as being simultaneous, 
unaltered, and unabridged retransmissions. It includes retransmissions made by 
means of closed networks, but explicitly excluded those made over the open 
internet.423  
 
Article 3(1) of the Proposal then goes on to provide that retransmission rights can 
only be exercised via a CMO. Article 3 is hence an extension of Article 9(1) of the 
Satellite-Cable Directive to other technological platforms. Similarly, the principle 
of automatic extension of the repertoire of the CMO to cover rights holders who 
have not transferred their rights (as contained in Article 9(2) of the Directive), is 
also contained in the Proposal’s Article 9(2). However, on this matter, the Proposal 
does contain one additional layer of detail. In both the Directive and the Proposal, 
where there are more than one CMO representing a certain category of rights, and 
a rights holder has not transferred their rights to any of these, the rights holder is 
free to choose which CMO is to represent them; the Proposal goes further than this 
to clarify that in cases where the non-transferring rights holder has not made such 
a choice, the Member State in which rights are to be cleared may indicate which 
CMO is mandated to manage such non-transferred rights. While the Directive did 
not preclude this exercise by implementing Member States, explicitly providing 
for this possibility indeed adds to increased legal certainty.  
 
Additionally, Article 4 of the Proposal is analogous to Article 10 of the Directive; it 
provides that the rights held by the initial broadcasting organisation itself are 
exempt from the requirement of mandatory collective licencing.  
                                                        
after their broadcast by the broadcasting organisation as well as of any material produced by or for 
the broadcasting organisation which is ancillary to such broadcast”. 
422 Recital 8 
423 Article 1(b) of the proposed regulation defines ‘retransmission to mean ”…any simultaneous, 
unaltered and unabridged retransmission, other than cable retransmission as defined in Directive 
93/83/EEC and other than retransmission provided over an internet access service as defined in 
Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council19, intended for reception 
by the public of an initial transmission from another Member State, by wire or over the air, including 
that by satellite but excluding online transmission, of television or radio programmes intended for 
the reception by the public, provided that such retransmission is made by a party other than the 
broadcasting organisation which made the initial transmission or under whose control and 
responsibility such transmission was made.” 
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An interesting point to consider is that while the principle-of-origin does not apply 
to webcasts, the definition of retransmission only refers to ‘an initial transmission 
from another Member State’.  As such, the mechanism of mandatory collective 
licencing can hypothetically apply for a retransmission of a webcast. 
 
 
[8]-4.5 Current Status of Proposal 
 
It is important to note that the Proposal being analysed in this chapter is subject 
to on-going activities as of the time of writing. For completeness, it is necessary to 
therefore make brief observations about current developments. However, the 
analysis will still focus on the 2016 Proposed Regulation, as this remains the 
published benchmark for anticipated EU policy. For avoidance of doubt, it is 
stressed that recent and future developments do not change the fundamental 
analysis and theoretical arguments presented in this chapter. 
 
In the forum of the European Parliament, a May 2017 Rapporteur’s report seemed 
to support an even wider scope for the Proposed Regulation, and generally seems 
to support broader application of a country-of-origin principle.424 The concluding 
explanatory statements is even that “Cable retransmission must be made 
technology-neutral where it is equivalent to retransmissions from cable network 
operators, in order to take account of technological progress in this area too.”    
 
However, the final position adopted by the European Parliament’s Legal Affairs 
Committee in November 2017 deviated from the earlier Rapporteur’s Reports in 
its positions, and reflected a vision a more restricted Regulation. 425  The 
Committee rejected extending the principle-of-origin to all ancillary content, and 
proposed to narrow its scope to cover only “news and current affairs content”.  
Additionally, it allows for broadcasters to geo-block their online content is this is 
agreed upon with rightsholders.  
 
Furthermore, the European Council has also agreed on a position which differs 
from the Commission’s original Proposal. 426  The Council’s position is that the 
country of origin principle should also be reduced in scope, to cover only works 
that are finances and controlled by the broadcasting organisation, and to exclude 
all sports events, both for radio and television.  
 
                                                        
424 Draft Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying 
down rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions 
of broadcasting organisations and retransmissions of television and radio programmes; European 
Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs; 2016/0284(COD); 10.5.2017 
425 Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down 
rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of 
broadcasting organisations and retransmissions of television and radio programmes; European 
Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs; A8-0378/2017; 27.11.2017 
426  European Council/Council of the EU Press Release of 15/12/2017 - 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/15/online-cross-border-
tv-and-radio-broadcasts-council-agrees-negotiating-stance/  (accessed on 21-10-218) 
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It is therefore clear that is it not certain what the final scope of the Proposal 
Regulation will be. According to the European Parliament Legislative Train Web 
portal “Interinstitutional negotiations to reach an agreement on a final text have 
started in January 2018. The first and the second trilogue took place respectively in 
February and March 2018 without noticeable progress.” 427  Furthermore, 
information is not currently available on the outcome of the most recent October 
2018 negotiations. It would hence seem that the exact path of this legal instrument 
cannot be anticipated at this time, even though some progress is anticipated to be 
made soon. 
 
[8]-4.6 Other Recent Developments  
 
Before moving on to detailed analysis of the new Proposed Regulation, it is useful 
to also take stock of recent developments in European media and communications 
law. Most notably two recent legal instruments have been adopted, dealing with 
geo-blocking, and cross-border service portability.  
 
[8]-4.6.1 Geo-Blocking Regulation 
 
Geo-blocking refers to the practice of blocking a user or consumer’s ability to 
access an online interface (website or application) based on geographical location. 
More generally, it relates to discriminating between consumers in terms of 
pricing, access, or terms and conditions of providing a good or service, based on 
consumers’ locations. As such, is associated with restrictions of cross-border 
commercial transactions in digital markets.  
 
In February 2018, a new EU Regulation addressing geo-blocking was adopted.428 
The Regulation prohibits geo-blocking practices, and hence promotes the 
objective of a Single Digital Market. However, media services - broadcasting (and 
retransmission) services, and well as non-linear services – are not subject to the 
Regulation.429  
 
This is provided for in Article 4(1)(b) that states that traders are prohibited from 
applying different conditions to access of goods or services based on geographical 
grounds, where a customer seeks to “receive electronically supplied services from 
the trader, other than services the main feature of which is the provision of access to 
                                                        
427  European Legislative Train Schedule: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-
train/theme-connected-digital-single-market/file-jd-regulation-on-online-transmissions ; 
(accessed21-10-218) 
428 Regulation (EU) 2018/302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2018 on 
addressing unjustified geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers' 
nationality, place of residence or place of establishment within the internal market and amending 
Regulations (EC) No 2006/2004 and (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC 
429  According to Recital 8, “…this Regulation should apply, inter alia, to non-audiovisual 
electronically supplied services the main feature of which is the provision of access to and use of 
copyright protected works or other protected subject matter, subject, however, to the specific 
exclusion and the subsequent evaluation of that exclusion for which this Regulation provides. 
Audiovisual services, including services the principle purpose of which is the provision of access to 
broadcasts of sports events and which are provided on the basis of exclusive territorial licences, are 
excluded from the scope of this Regulation.” 
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and use of copyright protected works or other protected subject matter, including 
the selling of copyright protected works or protected subject matter in an intangible 
form” (emphasis added). This would hence obviously include online broadcasting, 
retransmission, content streaming, and audiovisual on-demand services. 
However, it should be noted that it would also include other services associated 
with delivery of copyright protected works, such as computer games and e-books.  
 
However, Article 9 provides that by 2020, a review of the Regulation shall take 
place, with specific attention to the exemption of services associated with 
copyright-protected works are provided for by Article 4(1)(b).  
 
This Geo-Blocking Regulation is relevant to discussions on copyright 
administration for broadcasts and retransmissions because it shows that despite 
concerted moves by European policy-makers towards a Digital Single Market, the 
issue of cross-border media services remains particularly contentious. In fact, this 
Regulation shows a special regulatory space continues to be carved out for the 
issue of online broadcasting.  
 
[8]-4.6.2 Online Service Portability Regulation  
 
The Online Service Portability Regulation430 was adopted in June 2017, and came 
into force in April 2018431. The purpose of this Regulation is to allow users of 
online content services, to continue to use such services when travelling to other 
Member States. Without such a regulation, when a user travels within the Internal 
Market, they might not be able to use online services to which they are a legitimate 
subscriber, because the terms of usage might limit use to with the user’s 
jurisdiction of residence; this can also be a result of market segmentation licencing 
practices by rightsholders, who might licence certain content to online service 
providers only within specific territorial boundaries. The Regulation hence ensure 
that users are able to enjoy cross-border portability of services to which they are 
subscribers while staying temporarily in any Member State, as if they were in their 
own country of residence. 
 
Article (2)(5) of the Regulation defines the services to which cross-border 
portability must apply, as audiovisual media services (as defined in the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive), broadcasting services, and on-demand 
services.432  The main provision that creates cross-border portability is Article 
3(1) which places a direct obligation on service providers to allow users to access 
                                                        
430 Regulation (EU) 2017/1128 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on 
cross-border portability of online content services in the internal market. 
431 Corrigendum to Regulation (EU) 2017/1128 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
June 2017 on cross-border portability of online content services in the internal market; Official 
Journal of the European Union L 168 of 30 June 2017. 
432 Article 2(5) - ‘online content service’ means a service as defined in Articles 56 and 57 TFEU that a 
provider lawfully provides to subscribers in their Member State of residence on agreed terms and 
online, which is portable and which is: (i) an audiovisual media service as defined in point (a) of 
Article 1 of Directive 2010/13/EU, or (ii) a service the main feature of which is the provision of access 
to, and the use of, works, other protected subject- matter or transmissions of broadcasting 
organisations, whether in a linear or an on-demand manner; 
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and use their services while temporarily in any Member State, as if they were in 
their own Member State of residence.433  
 
Most relevant for this analysis however, is the legal mechanism through which the 
Regulation’s objectives are made possible, as set out in Article 4 (‘Localisation of 
the provision of, access to and use of online content services’), which states that 
“The provision of an online content service under this Regulation to a subscriber who 
is temporarily present in a Member State, as well as the access to and the use of that 
service by the subscriber, shall be deemed to occur solely in the subscriber’s Member 
State of residence.” Furthermore, Article 7 even goes on to even invalidate 
contractual provisions between rightsholders and online content service 
providers that would conflict with application of the Regulation.434  
 
The provisions of the Regulation are interesting in how it compares with the 
country-of-origin principle as applied in the Satellite-Cable and Audiovisual Media 
Services Directives. In those Directives, the core point is that a communication to 
the public is deemed to be made – for legal purposes – in the country from which 
it is transmitted, rather than the country in which it is received.  
 
In the Portability Regulation, a cross-border service is also – for copyright 
purposes – essentially deemed to be used in a user’s country of residence (which 
might not even necessarily be the country of origin of the transmission), rather 
than the country in which the user is temporarily located and using the service. 
The main difference is that under an actual country-of-origin principle, once the 
transmission is legitimately made in the original country, any user in any country 
can benefit from its receipt. However, under the cross-border portability system, 
the beneficiaries are restricted to users who would have legitimately been able to 
receive the transmission in their country of residence.  
 
In both cases however, a legal fiction is created so as to reduce transaction costs, 
and ensure cross-border access to media content services. Furthermore, Recital 
23 clarifies that the legal fiction created in the Regulation is not one in which the 
user is considered to be located in their country of residence (even when 
travelling), as they are still allowed to access services that might only be accessible 
in the visited Member State.435  
                                                        
433 Article 3(1) – “The provider of an online content service provided against payment of money shall 
enable a subscriber who is temporarily present in a Member State to access and use the online content 
service in the same manner as in the Member State of residence, including by providing access to the 
same content, on the same range and number of devices, for the same number of users and with the 
same range of functionalities.” 
434  Article 7 – “Any contractual provisions, including those between providers of online content 
services and holders of copyright or related rights or those holding any other rights in the content of 
online content services, as well as those between such providers and their subscribers, which are 
contrary to this Regulation, including those which prohibit cross-border portability of online content 
services or limit such portability to a specific time period, shall be unenforceable.”  
435 Recital 23 states that “In order to ensure that providers of online content services covered by this 
Regulation comply with the obligation to provide cross-border portability of their services, without 
acquiring the relevant rights in another Member State, it is necessary to stipulate that those providers 
should always be entitled to provide such services to subscribers when they are temporarily present 
in a Member State other than their Member State of residence. This should be achieved by establishing 
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This Regulation is relevant to the analysis at hand, because it shows that European 
policymakers not only acknowledge how territorial copyright practices can 
undermine the rights and interests of consumers and user, but they also recognise 
the importance of adjusting copyright rules concerning the application 
jurisdiction for online transmissions.  
 
While the Online Services Portability Regulation does not create direct 
implications for the Proposed Regulation for Online Transmissions, there is 
certainly some conceptual connection between the two legal instruments.  Most 
certainly, the policy goals facilitated by the Online Services Portability Regulation 
largely parallel the objective that would be achieved of updating the provisions of 
the Satellite-Cable Directive to apply to new technological distribution platforms. 
The idea of adopting a technologically neutral approach to the principle-of-origin, 
would therefore not be inconsistent with the willingness for European 
policymakers to adopt the recent Online Services Portability Regulation. 436  
                                                        
that the provision of, access to and use of such online content services should be deemed to occur in 
the subscriber’s Member State of residence. This legal mechanism should apply for the sole purpose 
of ensuring the cross-border portability of online content services. An online content service should 
be considered to be provided lawfully if both the service and the content are provided in a lawful 
manner in the Member State of residence. This Regulation, and in particular the legal mechanism by 
which the provision of, access to and use of an online content service are deemed to occur in the 
subscriber’s Member State of residence, does not prevent a provider from enabling the subscriber to 
additionally access and use the content lawfully offered by the provider in the Member State where 
the subscriber is temporarily present.” 
436 The conceptual relationship between these two legal instruments is best summarised by the 
comments made by the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs Rapporteur in the May 
2018 Report on the Proposed Regulation for Online Transmissions:   
“The rapporteur takes the view that the regulation (Proposed Regulation on Online Transmissions) 
will greatly improve the everyday lives of people in a wide range of groups in the EU. While the 
regulation on the cross-border portability of online content services in the internal market 
(hereinafter: the Portability Regulation) guarantees the cross-border use of payment services for 
services which have already been purchased, it makes this conditional on the user’s stay in another 
Member State being merely temporary. This includes stays for travel, holiday or study purposes.   
The regulation under consideration here, meanwhile, focuses on groups of people who are 
permanently resident in a Member State and yet have a legitimate interest in accessing the online 
services of broadcasting operators established in other Member States.   
This covers the 13.6 million or so people who, along with their families, are actively exercising their 
right to freedom of movement under EU law. This shows up particularly clearly the rigid nature of 
the borders that still exist in the digital internal market, unlike in the analogue single market. While 
freedom of movement for persons and goods in the internal market is guaranteed, access to 
broadcasting services, and thus to programmes from one’s home country, is not.  
The regulation will also benefit linguistic minorities in a number of Member States. In border areas 
in particular it is hard to explain to people why access to programmes broadcast in their native 
language is possible using old technologies, but not via the internet - which is by now also an 
established technology.  
The regulation will also protect the legitimate interest in promoting foreign languages, which are the 
basis of understanding between European nations, by enabling people to listen to programmes 
broadcast in languages other than their own.  
It will also simplify pan-European access to programmes from other Member States, thus making an 
important contribution to forming a European viewing public.  
Lastly, the services covered by the Portability Regulation mostly provide only entertainment, while 
access to news and information services is excluded from its scope. Such access, however, is essential, 
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[8]-5 CONCLUSION 
 
The legal framework for retransmission rights in the EU is complex. It is 
comprised of a network of different legal instruments that seem to amount to an 
overall patchwork. This network consists of various different Directives, case law 
precedents, and more recently – regulations, which create a very complex system 
of media and communication law.  Given the complexities of this network, it is 
clear that the regulation of retransmission activities must be analysed in the 
context of the wider framework for media and communications law. 
 
While the Information Society and Rental Directives provide for the intellectual 
property rights that are relevant to media services, the Satellite-Cable Directive is 
the most important Directive in terms of how those rights are administered – 
particularly in terms of retransmission activities. The most important features of 
the Satellite-Cable Directive are the country-of-origin principle for broadcasts, 
and mandatory collective management for retransmission rights. However, the 
Satellite-Cable Directive’s origins show that European policymakers originally 
considered a statutory licence.  
 
Since the implementation of that Directive, there has still been significant market 
fragmentation, and the Coditel I and Premier League cases both provide context as 
to how such fragmentation interfaces with the overall legal framework. It is clear 
from these experiences that there exists a fundamental tension between the EU 
drive to market integration, and the territorial nature of intellectual property 
rights.  
 
Furthermore, there are several other legal instruments that define the legal 
framework, such as the Audiovisual Media Services Directive; this Directive also 
applies the country-of-origin principle, although on a much different basis that 
then Satellite-Cable Directive. Additionally, online audio services are subject to an 
entirely different regime under the Collective Management Directive, which uses 
a separate approach to promoting cross-border services through the 
administration of copyright.  
 
Other recent developments, such as the Geo-Blocking and Online Service 
Portability Regulations show that the development of integrated cross-border 
media markets are a priority for European policy-makers. However, there is still 
a need to update the Satellite-Cable Directive. In this regard, the new Proposed 
Regulation on Online Transmissions aims at filling the gaps in the existing legal 
framework. Chapter 9 analyses this proposal in more detail, and assesses the 
arguments that underpin its policy positions. 
                                                        
particularly in the era of ‘fake news’ and declining trust in traditional media. It has special relevance 
as a tool for fostering democracy. Easier access to programmes from other Member States is to be 
welcomed in the interests of promoting an information society.”  
-Draft Report on the Proposal for Regulation 2016/0284(COD), 10.5.2017; page 22 
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CHAPTER 9: THE EU PROPOSAL ON ONLINE TRANSMISSIONS  
 
This Chapter directly follows on from Chapter 8. While Chapter 8 set out a detailed 
description of the current European Union framework for retransmissions, this 
Chapter analyses the issue of updating that legal framework. In this regard, the 
underlying research question in this Chapter is “Does the Proposed European Union 
Regulation on Online Transmission succeed in adequately updating the legal 
framework for retransmission?” 
  
As with Chapter 8, readers exclusively interested in Law and Economics 
analysis may wish to skip to Chapter 10. 
 
 
[9]-1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 8, the main instrument for regulating 
retransmission rights in the EU is the Satellite-Cable Directive. The core principles 
of that Directive are the country-of-origin principle for broadcasts, and the use of 
mandatory collective management for retransmission rights. 
 
However, this Directive is based on a technological context that has changed 
dramatically. In this regard, the recent Proposal for a new EU Regulation on Online 
Transmissions has been published.  The intention is for such a regulation to 
update the legal framework for regulating retransmission rights. This chapter 
analyses the new Proposed Regulation, particularly in the context of the wider 
legal framework established in Chapter 8.  
 
The next section summarises and compares the various legal instruments 
discussed in Chapter 8, and notes the general exclusion of online services from the 
Proposal. Each subsequent section then critically analyses the various arguments 
put forward to justify this exclusion. The overall conclusion is that bases of these 
arguments are likely misplaced, and that there ideally reforms to the 
retransmission framework should be made on a technology-neutral basis.  
 
 
[9]-2 COMPARISON OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS  
 
Based on the analysis in Chapter 8, the European legal framework for the 
application of copyright in the broadcasting sector is comprised of several 
different instruments. Furthermore, the principles and policy positions of these 
instruments seem to be applied differently across different sub-sections of the 
media sector landscape.  
 
Table 9.1 below summarises how these various instruments and principles apply 
to different media platforms and services, and allows for a quick and easy 
comparison of how different policy principles apply to different services. 
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Platform Service Applicable Instrument(s) 
Jurisdiction 
(public law) 
Jurisdiction 
(copyright) 
Copyright 
Administration 
 
Offline 
Terrestrial 
Broadcasting 
Sat-Cable 
Directive;  
AV Media 
Directive 
Country-of-
origin 
principle 
Country-of-
origin 
principle 
Individual 
licensing  
(by default) 
Retransmission 
(Cable)  
Satellite and 
Cable 
Directive 
National 
(by default) 
National  
(by default) 
Mandatory 
Collective 
Licensing 
Retransmission 
(other closed 
networks) 
Online 
Broadcasting 
Regulation 
National 
(by default) 
National  
(by default) 
Mandatory 
Collective 
Licensing 
 
 
Online 
Simulcasting Online 
Broadcasting 
Regulation;  
AV Media 
Directive 
Country-of-
origin 
principle  
(AV only) 
Country-of-
origin 
principle 
Individual 
licensing  
(by default) 
Webcasting AV Media 
Services 
Directive 
Country-of-
origin 
principle 
(AV only) 
National  
(by default) 
Individual 
licensing  
(by default) 
On-demand 
Audiovisual 
AV Media 
Services 
Directive 
Country-of-
origin 
principle 
National  
(by default) 
Individual 
licensing  
(by default) 
On-demand 
Music 
Collective 
Management 
Directive  
National  
(by default) 
National  
(by default) 
Licensing 
Passport Entities 
Retransmission AV Media 
Services 
Directive 
Country-of-
origin 
principle 
National  
(by default) 
Individual 
licensing  
(by default) 
Table 9.1: Summary of European Legal Framework for Media Services 
 
 
[9]-2.1 Application of Country-of-Origin Principle 
 
One of the first major observations from this table is that the country-of-origin 
principle seems to be applied quite inconsistently. Generally, it is more widely 
applied for the purposes of public law and content regulation than it is for 
copyright law. Three particular comments are relevant in this regard. 
 
Firstly, this gap in application of the principle is in large part due to the 
combination of the wide scope of the Media Services Directive, and the 
unwillingness of European policy-makers to consider an extension of the country-
of-origin principle to online services besides webcasting.  
 
Secondly, the country-of-origin principle is never applied to any offline 
retransmission services. The purpose of the principle is to prevent simultaneous 
application of multiple national laws. However, generally speaking, issue of 
conflicts of law or simultaneous application of multiple national laws do not arise 
for offline (closed network) retransmission services, as these services are 
typically territorial in nature. This is because these services use physical 
telecommunications infrastructure, which is often restricted to the boundaries of 
 229
a single member state. Furthermore, the regulatory authorisation of the rights for 
provision of electronic communications networks and/or services is still granted 
on national basis, and the regulatory obligations associated with such 
authorisation may differ between Member States. 437  As a consequence, even 
where specific network infrastructure extends across national borders, service 
provision over these networks may be restricted by the necessities of having 
legally distinct operations in every Member State. Hence, the problems that the 
country-of-origin principle seeks to fix, simply do not exist in the case of 
retransmissions over closed networks.  
 
Thirdly, it is noted that the country-of-origin principle is not applied to any class 
of audio media services (at least in the field of public law); such services are 
discussed separately below. 
 
[9]-2.1.1 Country-of-Origin and Retransmissions  
 
The above comments noted that the country-of-origin principle is neither applied, 
nor necessary for closed network retransmission services. In the field of copyright 
law, the application of the principle is inconsequential, as service provision is 
limited to actual territory of (re)transmission origin. However certain problems 
do arise with retransmitted signals themselves, in the field of public law.  
 
The following example helps illustrate this scenario – Consider a broadcast made 
in territory A, and retransmitted by a service provider based in territory B. 
Furthermore, the service provider operates on a closed network, and only 
provides services to end-users in B. 
 
The country-of-origin rule states that the provider is making a public 
communication in territory B. Hence, B’s laws apply. Even if no country-of-origin 
rule was applied, there is no question as to where the communication to the public 
takes place.  
 
If the service provider also provides services to the neighbouring countries C and 
D, then without a country-of-origin principle, the laws of B, C, and D would all 
apply. Hence the principle is useful for cases of cross-border service provision.  
 
The example so far only considered the application of the laws of two groups of 
territories – those where the service originated, and those where the service is 
received. The service provider does not make any communication to the public in 
territory A (and A is hence irrelevant in terms of copyright issues concerning the 
retransmission). However, the laws of country A – where the original broadcast 
was communicated – are also relevant in terms of public law. In fact, the broadcast 
would have already presumably met the content regulation standards and 
applicable public law requirements of country A.   
                                                        
437 See the Authorisation Directive (Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services. 
This Directive harmonises provisions regarding how public telecommunications and broadcasting 
service providers are granted authorisation to operate).  
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When that broadcast is retransmitted in country B (and C and D), it would again 
have to meet new regulatory standards.  Without a country-of-origin rule for 
retransmissions it would have to meet the standards of B, C, and D (in addition to 
A). With the rule, it would have to meet the standards of B (in addition to A). Even 
with the principle applied, the broadcast is simultaneously subject to multiple 
national laws. These are not exactly the kind of situations that country-of-origin 
rule seeks to prevent, as in this case, the liability for the content is on two different 
parties – the broadcaster is liable in territory A, and the retransmitter in territory 
B. Nevertheless, it does represent a significant regulatory burden for the 
retransmitter; just as they have little a priori information regarding copyright 
liability (i.e. the works used, and the identities of the respective rights holders), 
they have little a priori information for content liability.   
 
In addition to providing for the application of the country-of-origin principle for 
audiovisual media services, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive also 
harmonised certain substantive regulatory provisions. One of the purposes of 
such harmonisation is to ensure that the regulatory standards of each Member 
State are sufficient to facilitate a cross-border market for audiovisual services, 
unencumbered by cumulative regulatory costs/burdens.  The thinking is 
therefore that once an audiovisual media services meets the regulatory 
requirements of on Member State, it does not necessarily need to meet the 
requirements of another State, when programmes are provided across borders 
(either through cross-border transmissions, or retransmission by other service 
providers in the second jurisdiction).438 
 
One possible way to address this problem would be to interpret country-of-origin 
in the context of a retransmission to mean the country-of-origin of the original 
broadcast that is being retransmitted. However, there are undesirable 
implications of this. It can imply that the act of retransmission is a neutral act for 
regulatory purposes, and that the retransmitter is only acting as conveyance 
network.  
 
Such an interpretation would clearly be at odds with the established principle that 
a retransmission is in fact a separate communication to the public under 
copyright. Considering a retransmission to be commensurate with an initial 
broadcast – for the purpose of public law – would hence amount to an unnecessary 
and inconsistent legal fiction. Furthermore, such legal fiction would imply that the 
retransmitting part has a status akin to that of a ‘mere conduit’ (even though it 
does not meet that criteria), and might create major uncertainties as a precedent 
for intermediary liability.    
  
The Audiovisual Media Services Directive provides a much more parsimonious 
                                                        
438 This is thinking is articulated in Recital 36 of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, which 
states as follows: “The requirement that the originating Member State should verify that broadcasts 
comply with national law as coordinated by this Directive is sufficient under Union law to ensure free 
movement of broadcasts without secondary control on the same grounds in the receiving Member 
States. However, the receiving Member State may, exceptionally and under specific conditions, 
provisionally suspend the retransmission of televised broadcasts.” 
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solution to this problem.  It simply provides for a general prohibition on 
restrictions of retransmissions, which supersedes the regulatory requirements in 
the territory of retransmission. Article 3(1) of the Directive provides that “Member 
States shall ensure freedom of reception and shall not restrict retransmissions on 
their territory of audiovisual media services from other Member States for reasons 
which fall within the fields coordinated by this Directive.” 439  Hence, by default, 
retransmissions are essentially exempt from national public law provisions. 
 
[9]-2.1.2 Audio Media Services  
 
Observation of Table 9.1 shows that the policy framework separates the treatment 
of radio and television services. 
 
In particular, the entire Audiovisual Media Services Directives does not apply to 
radio broadcasting or audio services; this is made clear by Recital 23 of that 
Directive which states that for the purposes of that Directive “the term 
‘audiovisual’ should refer to moving images with or without sound, thus including 
silent films but not covering audio transmission or radio services.” Hence, the main 
policy tools of that Directive – the country-of-original for public law, and content 
regulation provisions – do not apply to audio services.  
 
However, radio services are included under the Satellite-Cable Directive. The 
definition of ‘communication to the public by satellite’ set out in Article 1(2)(a) of 
that Directive only refers to ‘programme carrying signals intended for reception 
by the public’; no comment is made to suggest that such ‘programmes’ should be 
interpreted as excluding audio works. Furthermore, the definition of ‘cable 
retransmission’ under Article 1(3) refers to “simultaneous, unaltered and 
unabridged retransmission by a cable or microwave system for reception by the 
public of an initial transmission from another Member State, by wire or over the air, 
including that by satellite, of television or radio programmes intended for reception 
by the public.” Hence, radio broadcasting is explicitly covered by the 
retransmissions provisions of the Satellite-Cable Directive. 
 
In terms of the new Proposed Regulation on online broadcasting, radio services 
are indeed included – in fact, radio programmes are explicitly referred to in the 
very name of that proposed instrument.440 Furthermore, the case of online music 
services is seen as a special case, in that the issue of significant data processing 
capacity for CMOs (a quasi-public good problem in terms of investment) is unique 
to that class of services – therefore, such services are subject to unique provisions 
in the Collective Management Directive.  
 
                                                        
439 For completeness, it is however noted that the remaining provisions of Article 3 do provide for 
derogations from these prohibitions under certain condition, particularly where there is concern 
that content is in potential violation of Article 27 (on the protection of minors) or Article 6 (on hate 
speech). 
440 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of The Council laying down rules on the 
exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting 
organisations and retransmissions of television and radio programmes; (emphasis added) 
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Therefore, it is useful to question why audio and audiovisual broadcasting are 
treated similarly for the purposes of copyright law, while they are treated 
separately for the purposes of public law. 
 
[9]-2.1.3 Content Neutrality and Regulation 
 
All things considered, differentiating between audiovisual and audio content is 
indeed a somewhat arbitrary distinction. ‘Audiovisual’ by its very etymology has 
both an ‘audio’ and a ‘visual’ (moving images) component. However, the definition 
of audiovisual includes silent movies (i.e. works with a visual component but no 
audio component). By corollary, there are some types of works which might have 
an audio component but no corresponding visual component, and such 
programmes would need to be classified; such programmes might include 
dramatic readings of screenplays, audiobooks, talk shows, and editorial 
commentaries on current events.  
 
For these types of works, the potential for their distribution to create negative 
social externalities is no different than for audiovisual works. For example, two of 
the areas in which there is specific concern about negative externalities of 
audiovisual content, are protection of minors and hate speech.441 Article 6 of the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive Member prohibits the broadcast of 
programming content that might ‘contain any incitement to hatred based on race, 
sex, religion or nationality’. Article 27 of the Directive, addresses content that 
‘might seriously impair the physical, mental or moral development of minors, in 
particular programmes that involve pornography or gratuitous violence’.  
 
Generally, one can postulate that the possibility of inciting hatred arises from the 
audio component of audiovisual works – in particular, the utterances made by 
individuals, especially in the context of editorial programming like talk shows. 
However, in the case of violence and pornography, these issues are more likely to 
arise from the moving images component of the works. Therefore, taking the 
various issues and goals of content regulation collectively, there is no reason to 
make an arbitrary differentiation between how regulatory rules apply to different 
combinations of sounds and images.  
 
Furthermore, modern broadcasting exists in a context of rapid changes in 
technologies for content distribution and the culture of content creation. 
However, legal rules cannot necessarily anticipate in advance how these changes 
will impact markets and business models. As such, regulation which is technology 
and content specific will necessarily be reactive in nature.  
 
For example, with current technological trends, it is possible that three-
dimensional entertainment might become popular in the near future. 
Furthermore, future technologies might facilitate broadcast-type services that 
                                                        
441 While are various aspects of content regulated under the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, 
programming which is either (i) harmful to minors, or (ii) likely to incite discriminatory hatred is 
choses as the examples because these are the areas which, under Article 3(2), can justify 
exemptions to the provisions against restricting foreign retransmissions.  
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incorporate components beyond sound and images – such as interactive elements 
of touch, taste and smell simulation. Obviously, the regulatory issues surrounding 
such innovative services cannot be fully anticipated. However, there is no reason 
to believe that the changing nature of these services will preclude possibilities of 
content-related issues such as abuse of minors, and incitement of hatred. 
Therefore, a content-neutral approach to regulation would be consistent with 
prevailing public policy goals.  
 
Therefore, harmonisation of content regulation – including the application of the 
country-of-origin principle - should take a content neutral approach, or at least 
treat audiovisual and audio services similarly.  
 
[9]-2.1.4 Country-of Origin Principle and Online Audio Services  
 
As noted previously, the uniqueness of online music services justifies a sui generis 
approach to copyright management – the licencing passport model. The 
justification for choosing this approach was to ensure that only CMOs that have 
made the necessary investments in high capacity data processing are able to 
administer multi-territory licences. 
 
The reason that the country-of-origin principle is not applied (in conjunction with 
the principle of extended collective management), is that there is no guarantee 
that the relevant CMO(s) in the country where communications originate would 
have made these investments in data processing capacity. Furthermore, to oblige 
CMOs to make such investments on an involuntary basis might amount to a 
disproportionate regulatory burden.  However, in the long term, as data 
processing technologies become cheaper and more advanced, high capacity 
operations are likely to become the norm for all CMOs operating in this field. 
Therefore, at that point, it might become viable to apply the country-of-origin 
principle for online music services.  
 
At this point, to apply the country-of-origin principle might not even necessarily 
even be at odds with the licencing passport model. Under the Collective 
Management Directive, individual rights holders always have the option of being 
represented by a CMO which offers multi-territory licences, even if that is not their 
primary organisation. This gives rise to a number of ‘passport licencing agencies’ 
– CMOs that have aggregated content and are able to administer multi-territory 
licences. Applying the country-of-origin principle would merely mean that a multi-
territory licence is not needed for online music services; only a licence in the 
jurisdiction of communication origin is needed. However, the licencing fees paid 
by the service provider would take into account the actual reach of its services, 
and the number of territories covered. The multi-territory licence would hence be 
converted into a national licence, where the licencing base goes beyond national 
reach, and thus the extra-territorial reach is internalised. Hence, entities that 
qualify to offer multi-licencing licences will still be able to administer the 
‘extended’ national licence, if it is that the rights for the country or origin are 
included in its aggregated repertoire. Like the current system, royalty payments 
will simply be remitted to other CMOs through existing representation or 
reciprocal agreements.  
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One argument against such an application is that it might result in potentially 
destructive competition between CMOs. This is because several CMOs can offer 
multi-territorial licences – and hence an ‘extended’ licence in the country of 
service origin - and hence service providers would be able to choose the CMO 
which offers the most attractive licencing terms. This argument is analysed in a 
later sub-section of this chapter.  
 
[9]-2.1.5 Overall Assessment 
 
In addition to inconsistent application of the country-of-origin principle, and the 
isolation of audio services, the last major observation based on Table 2 is that 
different copyright administration tools are used for different services. Generally, 
a regime of individual licencing is the default mechanism; of course rights holders 
are free to voluntarily opt for collective licencing. When specific services are 
provided under certain conditions however, it may be necessary to restrict the 
freedom of contract of rights holders and implement some form of limitation on 
certain rights. In this regard, it is noted that online music services, and 
retransmissions services are such special cases – the respective natures of both of 
these cases, and why they necessitate an alternative to individual licencing have 
already been discussed in detail. However, it is noted that online retransmission 
services have been excluded from the tool of mandatory collective management.  
 
Together, the choice to neither apply the country-of-origin principle to online 
services (besides simulcasting), nor apply mandatory collective management to 
online retransmissions reflects a general exclusion of online services from the 
policy framework for broadcasting rights and retransmissions. The following 
sections of this chapter shall be dedicated to analysing the arguments on which 
this exclusion is based.  
 
 
[9]-2.2 Exclusion of Online Services  
 
One of the main observations arising from taking a holistic look at the European 
Legal Framework, is that even with the new Proposed Regulation, online services 
are generally excluded from key copyright policy mechanisms. In particular, the 
country-of-origin principle does not apply to many online services for the 
purposes of copyright, even though it applies for other regulatory purposes. 
Furthermore, the mandatory collective management regime does not apply to 
retransmission services provided online. 
 
Analysis of the new Proposed Regulation can give some insight into the basis of 
such exclusion. According to the Commission, various options were explored for 
dealing with the issue of right clearance for cross-border broadcasts and 
retransmissions.442 
 
 
                                                        
442 Impact Assessment on the Modernisation of EU Copyright Rules (2016) 
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[9]-2.2.1 Online Broadcasts  
 
For online broadcasts, three options were considered. The first option was a non-
legislative option which promotes voluntary agreements for online services. This 
option was rejected as the outcome would depend on rights holder’s willingness 
to licence on a voluntary basis, and hence would not ensure a homogenous 
licensing regime. The second option was to legislate the application of the country 
of original principle to broadcasters’ ancillary services. This is the option that 
ultimately formed the basis for the Proposed Regulation.  
 
Option 3 was to extend the application of the country of origin principle to all 
online transmissions, even webcasting services which are not aligned to an 
‘offline’ broadcast.443  
 
Any application of the country of origin principle would reduce transactions costs, 
and make online broadcasts more viable. However, Option 3 was rejected on the 
basis that “…the webcasting market is still at a development stage and that online 
operators may easily relocate their establishment in the EU” and that “…it would 
also generate legal uncertainty for right holders and could lead to a lowering of the 
level of protection.”444 
 
Furthermore, review of the Impact Assessment which accompanied the 
publication of the Proposed Regulation suggests further concerns with a wide 
application of the country of origin principle.  
 
This main concern seems to be that a country-of-origin principle, combined with 
the principle of free movement of services, will lead to a risk of ‘establishment 
shopping’ (regulatory arbitrage) by service providers who easily relocate their 
activities. This might hence lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of the level of 
copyright protection, as well as copyright fees.445  
 
An associated concern is that if there is indeed a ‘race to the bottom’ for copyright 
fees, this – along with the more general perceived reduction in the ability engage 
in territorial licencing – will incentivise rights holders to administer licencing on 
an individual basis rather than through a CMO (the issue of ‘repertoire 
disaggregation’).446  
 
Lastly, one interesting perceived downside of applying the country of origin 
principle to webcasts is that it might create a legal grey area. This would result 
from the fact that the line between webcasting (linear online services) and on-
demand services (non-linear online services) might be a bit blurred.447 Hence, a 
legal framework which applied the country-of-origin principle to webcasts, but 
not on-demand services might create certain legal ambiguities. However, for 
                                                        
443 Impact Assessment; pg. 36  
444 Proposed Regulation; pg. 7 
445 Impact Assessment; pg. 37 
446 Impact Assessment; pg. 34-35 
447 Impact Assessment; pg. 36 
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context, it should be noted that that Commission did not examine the possibility 
of an ever wider application of the country of origin principle (to include even non-
linear on-demand services), as such a policy would have been outside of the 
targeted objected of the Digital Single Market Strategy to enhance cross-border 
broadcasting services. 448  Nevertheless, it can be expected that the main 
opposition to such a wide application of the country-of-origin principle to on-
demand services would be based on claims that it would undermine rights 
holders’ ability to engage in territorial licencing.  
 
[9]-2.2.2 Online Retransmissions 
 
In the field of retransmissions, the Commission similarly considered two options. 
The option that ultimately formed the basis of the Proposed Regulation, was to 
limit the application of mandatory collective licencing to IPTV retransmissions, 
and services over similar closed networks.  The alternative was to consider 
extending the mandatory collective licencing model to all forms of 
retransmissions, as long as they ‘are provided to a defined number of users’; this 
would hence include application to over-the-top services over the open internet. 
In justifying the exclusion of over-the-top retransmission services, the 
Commission gives the following rationale:  
 
“Although Option 2 would allow a wider range of retransmission services to benefit 
from reduced transaction costs for the clearance of rights, it would also entail risks 
of undermining right holders' exclusive online rights and distribution strategies, 
leading to a reduction of licensing revenues. Option 1 did not present such a risk, as 
most of the retransmission services provided over "closed" electronic 
communications networks rely on the established infrastructures located in a 
particular territory.”  
– Proposed Regulation; pg. 7 
  
 
Recital 10 of the Proposed Regulation gives further context to the scope of 
application of the mandatory collective licencing regime for retransmissions, and 
the significance of being linked to fixed infrastructure. It suggests that operators 
of retransmission services offered on closed networks provide services that are 
equivalent to those of cable providers. As such, they should enjoy the same 
benefits of rights clearance through the collective management mechanism set out 
in the Satellite-Cable Directive. However, retransmissions services which are 
offered on the open internet have different characteristics – they are not linked to 
any particular infrastructure, and their ability to ensure a controlled environment 
is limited.  
 
This still does not provide a clear economic rationale for excluding online 
retransmission services over open networks. However, the Impact Assessment 
does suggest that the general theme is ‘loss of control over licencing fees and 
licencing terms’. 449  In particular, it refers to a perceived risk that “…that 
rightholders would not always be able to choose the optimum business strategies in 
                                                        
448 Impact Assessment, pg. 27 
449 Impact Assessment, pg. 49 
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order to obtain the return on investment made.”450 It is further suggested that this 
concept of ‘optimal business strategies refers to the practice of having different 
release windows for works in different markets, and over different platforms.  
 
 
Based on the above discussions, it would appear that there is much overlap in the 
justifications for excluding online services from both the country-of-origin 
principle and mandatory collective licence for retransmissions. Specifically, there 
is the general concern that rightsholders lose control over their ability to contract 
into the licencing terms that maximise their profits due to a loss of ‘online 
exclusivity’. There is also a strong fear of a possible ‘race to the bottom’ caused by 
regulatory arbitrage, which would drive down remuneration, and lead to possible 
repertoire disaggregation. Specifically, for online retransmissions, there is also the 
perceived issue of undermining practices related to media release windows.  
 
Finally, there is a connecting undercurrent through all of these arguments that 
because the online market environment is still in its developing stages, it is 
difficult to anticipate how these markets will react to new regulatory instruments; 
as such, the approach seems to be one of waiting to see how the markets evolve, 
and hence avoid a truly technology-neutral approach. While this perspective does 
have some credence it does point towards a reliance on reactive rule making, 
rather than regulation based on robust high level policy principles. Furthermore, 
it can even be said that deficiencies in the legal framework can actual hamper the 
development of new markets, as applying old rules in new environments creates 
market distortions; in this regard, a ‘wait and see’ policy approach can actually be 
quite harmful.  
 
 
[9]-2.3 Collective Management meets the Country-of-Origin Principle  
 
The above discussions look at application of mandatory collective management, 
and the country-of-origin principle separately. However, for online 
retransmissions, it is interesting to consider how these two policies might 
interface.  
 
In the case of closed networks, retransmission is by nature restricted to the 
physical location of network infrastructure. Hence, such services are generally 
offered within a single national market, or at most between contiguous national 
markets. Hence, the conflicts of law and uncertainties of the country-of-reception 
principle do not apply. However, these issues would apply in the context of online 
retransmissions, as such services are necessarily provided across borders.  
 
Therefore, to have a meaningful discussion on extending the collective 
management model to online retransmissions, there must also be a discussion on 
similarly extending the country-of-origin principle.  
 
                                                        
450 Impact Assessment; pg. 50 
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If the country-of-origin principle applies to online retransmissions, then the 
service provider would only need to clear rights in the country in which they 
operate. If the mandatory collective management model is also extended, then the 
service provider would only need to negotiate with the CMO representing 
rightsholders in the country of origin.  
 
If there is no extension of the country-of-origin principle, but there is an extension 
of the collective management principle, service providers would need to negotiate 
licences from CMOs for every territory in which they wish to provide services. 
Generally, where service providers offering cross-border services licence works 
though CMOs, they can either obtain a multi-territory licence from CMOs with 
aggregated repertoires (as in the case of online music services), or they can obtain 
several individual national licences.  
 
Therefore, in order to promote true cross-border retransmission services, there 
should be some kind of mechanism to promote multi-territory licencing, in the 
absence of extending the country-of-origin principle. The model of promoting 
repertoire aggregation to create licencing passport entities, as is done in the case 
of online music services, is one possible option. However, this is likely to be 
ineffective, as the high data processing requirements of online-music licencing is 
the driving force for such repertoire aggregation. As these requirements do not 
exist, and therefore do not constrain the administering of licences for 
retransmission service providers, there is little scope for a mechanism to promote 
multi-territory licences. A retransmission service provider will hence still have to 
clear rights from multiple national CMOs, and there is no guarantee that all 
relevant rights for all of the content being retransmitted will be included, to 
prevent hold-out problems from individual rights holders. 
 
The alternative of applying the country-of-origin rule, and the principle of 
extended collective licencing is hence perhaps preferable (as is done for closed 
network retransmission). 
 
For completeness of discussion, it is noted that in order to apply the principle of 
extended collective management, it is theoretically not necessary to extend the 
country-of-origin principle.  These two principles, while working together, solve 
two different problems. The country-of-origin principle prevents the application 
of multiple national laws, and the need to clear multiple territorial rights. The 
mandatory CMO model prevents hold-out problems from individual rights 
holders, and minimises the transaction costs incurred by retransmitting parties. 
Mandatory collective management without a rule of origin will hence not ensure 
that the service is provided in multiple cross-border markets in the first place, but 
where they are provided, that rights are easily cleared for retransmission in 
individual national markets.  
 
This therefore represents two possible forms of this policy solution – extending 
the mandatory collective licencing mechanism for online retransmissions – either 
with or without a corresponding extension of the country-of-origin principle.  
 
 239
Also both principles, while representing a further possible restriction on rights 
holders seem preferable, not only in terms of achieving the policy goal of 
promoting the creation of a free cross-border market, but also in terms of 
theoretical consistency. This consistency is particularly in terms of applying the 
principle-of-origin uniformly across different bodies of law (as the principle 
already applies to online retransmission service providers under the Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive). Such consistency becomes even more important as 
technological change blurs the boundaries between broadcasting and 
retransmission, as discussed in Chapter 10.  
 
The following Sections of this chapter will now analyse the arguments put forward 
against fully extending the regulatory framework to online services.  
 
 
[9]-2.4  Economic Relevance of Issue 
 
As discussed in Chapter 8, the main motivation of European policymakers is to 
facilitate integration of broadcasting markets by promoting the cross-border 
provision of broadcasting services.  
 
Without policy intervention, free markets for media services based on profit 
maximisation seems to lead to a large degree of market fragmentation and 
territorial licencing practices. However, in the view of the EU, this is an inefficient 
outcome because of the strong positive externalities associated with broadcasting 
services. More specifically, cross-border broadcasts are a mechanism for 
promotion of cultural diversity and building regional social linkages – a major 
theme of the entire European integration project. Therefore, policy intervention 
is needed to promote such services.   
 
In terms of market characteristics, the legal uncertainties and high regulatory 
burden from the application of multiple legal rules (in the case of cross-border 
broadcasts), and high transaction costs (in the case of retransmissions) 
exacerbate the existing market failure of large positive externalities. 
 
The goal of the European policymaker is to therefore consider legal rules which 
would reduce these uncertainties, regulatory burdens, and transaction costs. 
These legal rules would largely relate to the exercise of copyright and related 
rights – including the rights of broadcasting organisations.  The country-of-origin 
principle and mandatory collective management for retransmissions are two such 
policies. However, with the evolution of these services, these rules no longer 
account for the full breadth of the cross-border broadcasting market.  
 
More specifically, with an increased role and prominence of online media services, 
the issues of accumulation of multiple laws (as well as high transaction costs) now 
have even greater relevance. In the current framework, the non-application of the 
principle-of-origin and mandatory collective management to online services is 
therefore an obstacle to facilitating increased cross-border service provision.  
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The sections that follow critically analyse the arguments made against applying 
these principles to online services. 
 
 
[9]-3 TERRITORIAL EXCLUSIVITY 
 
One of the broader arguments against extending policy provisions to online 
services, is that it undermines the ability of rights holders to engage in exclusive 
territorial licencing, given that online transmissions are cross-border by nature. 
This argument is essentially legal in nature, and alludes to the tensions between 
market integration and the territorial nature of rights.  
 
This argument is weak, as its applicability is not much different for a broadcaster’s 
online ancillary services, which are included under the scope of the Proposed 
Regulation.  
 
Furthermore, the country of origin principle does not preclude a rightsholder 
from entering into territorial licences with content distributions, including 
broadcasters. The essence of the Premier League Case was not that territorial 
licencing is not possible, but that such licencing cannot create the outcome of 
absolute territorial exclusivity.  
 
In fact, a rights holder can still divide their intellectual property rights into any 
geographical coverage boundaries that they wish as a basis of contractual freedom 
– the country-of-origin principle merely clarifies a potential conflict of laws issue. 
An online broadcast therefore becomes – for the purpose of copyright law – a 
broadcast made from the specific Member State in which the webcaster is based. 
Hence, territorial licencing is still technically permitted, it is just that the concept 
of territorial fragmentation in an online context – an artificial construct to begin 
with - loses its significance.   
 
Furthermore, in the shadow of the Premier League Case, there is the importance 
of what other practices a broadcaster or rights holder might choose to pursue 
desired territorial exclusivity. In the case of online broadcasts, this would be the 
practice of geo-blocking. As previously discussed, the recent Geo-blocking 
Regulation – at least for now - excludes from its scope broadcasting services. 
Hence, it is still currently possible for broadcasters and rights holders to enforce 
some sort of practical territorial exclusivity for some online broadcast content, 
even if the country of origin principle is applied on a technologically neutral basis. 
 
 
[9]-4 REGULATORY COMPETITION 
 
One of the most prevalent arguments against extending the country-of-origin 
principle to online services, stems from the fact that online service providers are 
not bound by a connection to capital infrastructure; as such, they are able to easily 
move between jurisdictions, and relocate their operations. As such, these service 
providers can take advantage of regulatory arbitrage, and relocate their service to 
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the jurisdiction which has the most favourable licencing environment.451 For a 
broadcaster, the most favourable licencing environment is the one that minimises 
the costs they incur in rights acquisition and administration.  
 
The core economic issue is therefore whether extending the country-of-origin 
principle to online services will result in socially harmful regulatory competition. 
If this is the case, any welfare gains from wider dissemination of services might be 
overshadowed by welfare losses due to erosion of the incentives of the intellectual 
property system itself. 
 
For context, it is important to note that this debate is not new. The European 
Broadcasting Union, in its response to the European Commission’s 2011 Green 
Paper on Online Audiovisual Distribution, notes that the regulatory competition 
argument was previously used by rights holders during the discussions which 
preceded adoption of the Information Society Directive. Ultimately, that Directive 
did not contain provisions which generalised the provisions of the Satellite-Cable 
Directive.452  
 
The argument appears to be that such relocation can create legal uncertainty 
through regulatory arbitrage resulting from changes in national legal frameworks. 
National legal frameworks would change as individual States compete by trying to 
attract the establishment of online service providers. In an extreme case, this can 
lead to a ‘race to the bottom’, where this competition causes regulatory oversight 
to decreases across the internal market, to the detriment of prevailing policy goals. 
In the context of copyright law, the relevant regulatory and policy goal would be 
the protection of rights for communication to the public - via broadcasting - 
including retransmission rights.  
 
This argument is superficial at best for a number of reasons. Primarily, it assumes 
that there is a spectrum of legal provisions, which can apply to copyright and 
related rights, which can be manipulated at the national level to affect the licensing 
environment for broadcasters.  
 
This would be the case if the authorisation to communicate works were exercised 
on an involuntary basis. For example, if the Pan-European model were that 
Member States legislate statutory licences for the retransmission (or even 
primary broadcast) of protected works, then it would be possible to have 
differences between the statutorily defined compensation rates, which could lead 
to arbitrage. However, the existing framework is that licencing remains voluntary 
(even if exercised on a collective basis), and hence rates are determined through 
                                                        
451 This possibility is alluded to in comments on page 12 of the 2011 Online Audiovisual Green 
Paper. 
452 It is worth noting that the Commission, in the context of the 2001 Copyright Directive, had tried 
to generalise the solution previously adopted for satellite communication but encountered fierce 
opposition from right holders, who feared losing control over the broadcasting of their works on 
the internet. The main argument put forward at the time by those opposed to localising the act of 
communication to the public in the broadcast's country of origin lay in the fact that a "race to the 
bottom" might ensue. (EBU, 2011; pg. 18) 
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private negotiations. Hence, there is no possibility for regulatory competition on 
this parameter.  
 
An extreme example of regulatory competition might even be in the parameter of 
offering copyright protection in the first place. However, this is not possible, as 
substantive copyright law is harmonised at the European level through a series of 
Directives and instruments. 453  It would not be possible to provide a more 
favourable licencing environment for broadcasters, as the current body of Union 
law firmly asserts that an exclusive right exists to authorise or prohibit 
communication to the public of a work, which included communication via 
broadcast. Furthermore, the existing body of law also asserts that a 
retransmission right also exists (for both primary rights holders, and broadcasters 
themselves), even if in some circumstances, the administration of this right is to 
be conducted on a collective basis.  
 
In addition to the existence of the right of communication to the public, various 
other details of substantive copyright law are harmonised at the European level, 
and in most cases, this harmonisation takes the form of a minimum level of 
protection. For example, the length of protection is harmonised though the Term 
Directive, where Member States may offer longer terms than those prescribed, but 
shorter terms are impermissible. As such, there is no policy flexibility for an 
individual Member State to decrease the level of protection below the harmonised 
level, and create significant opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.  
 
 
Even outside of Europe, international legal instruments on copyright law (in 
particular the WTO TRIPs Agreement) harmonises many aspects of substantive 
intellectual property law, to the extent that significant regulatory arbitrage 
possibilities based on differences in national law are generally low.  
 
Even if individual countries were able to decrease the level of overall copyright 
protection to attract the establishment of content distributors, this would be at 
the cost of reducing incentives for content creators. In theory, there might hence 
be an overall decrease in cultural output, which could possibly be greater than the 
gains of attracting new investments from content distributors. In any case, as the 
content distributors being referred to are online, attracting such service providers 
is not even necessarily associated with any major gains in investments or local 
employment in the first place, due to the decentralized nature of online 
commercial activities.  
 
 
[9]-4.1 Exceptions and Limitations to Exclusive Rights  
 
This is however one area in which it is possible to have reductions in the scope of 
protection of rightsholders – the implementation of limitations and exemptions to 
exclusive copyright. This might perhaps be most relevant for broadcasting 
networks specialising in news reporting and current affairs coverage.  
                                                        
453 This harmonisation is acknowledged by Recital 5 of the Proposed Regulation.  
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Article 5(3) of the Information Society Directive provides for various exceptions 
and limitations to the exclusive rights of communication and making available to 
the public. In particular, Article 5(3)(c) allows for exemptions for “reproduction by 
the press, communication to the public or making available of published articles on 
current economic, political or religious topics or of broadcast works or other subject-
matter of the same character…” 
 
However, the provisions of Article (5)(3) are not mandatory, and hence 
implementation of these exemptions is at the discretion of Member States. 
Therefore, States that do have a strong exemption which benefits news 
broadcasting will be more favourable for news broadcasters (or retransmitters of 
news broadcasts). The general implications of this are well articulated by Renda 
et al (2015): 
 
“The exceptions provided under Article 5(3)(c) have relevant cross-border effects in connection 
to the online provision of news via web. Also in this circumstance, according to the principle of 
territoriality, the national copyright law of both the country where the reporting of current 
events is made and the country where the news is received do matter. Diverging national 
implementations as well as discrepant interpretations by national courts may generate legal 
uncertainty and increase the risk for media providers to infringe copyright in certain Member 
States. This may discourage (or increase the cost of) both pan-European media services as well 
as the provision of news targeted to a national audience via the web to citizens based in different 
Member States. Obstacles generated by copyright law are proportionally more burdensome for 
private individuals (e.g. bloggers) and small and medium enterprises that can invest a limited 
amount of resources to be acquainted with 28 different national copyright regimes. This aspect 
is particularly worrisome as in some Member States, such as Italy, only professional media 
providers are beneficiaries of this exception.”454  
 
Applying principles such as the principle-of-origin to all online media might 
therefore induce some online broadcasters to relocate to jurisdictions in that 
there is a strong new reporting exemption. However, such effects would only be 
limited to broadcasters with very specific news reporting formats.  
 
In terms of regulatory competition, a technologically neutral approach (i.e. 
treating online broadcasting services similarly to traditional broadcasts), might 
therefore give individual jurisdictions an incentive to implement news reporting 
exemptions in order to attract media service providers seeking the most 
favourable legal environments.  
 
Nevertheless, this is certainly not the kind of national copyright reforms that 
might amount to a ‘race to the bottom’. It would merely imply a more widespread 
implementation of a specific copyright limitation which is already firmly 
established in various jurisdictions, and whose legitimacy is very much 
acknowledged within the international intellectual property law system.  
 
Additionally, any such limitation would still be bound by the test for limitations 
and exemptions which exist in international copyright law, and is stipulated in 
Article 5(5) of the Information Society Directive; i.e. that the limitation can only 
                                                        
454 Renda et al (2015), pg. 82 
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be applied “in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation 
of the work or other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the rightholder”.  
 
This test therefore provides a safeguard against the possibility that regulatory 
competition in exceptions and limitations induced by a technologically neutral 
principle-of-origin erodes the interests of copyright holders.  
 
Hence, applying the country-of-origin principle to online services would not likely 
result in socially harmful regulatory competition, including in the area of 
limitations and exceptions. 
 
 
[9]-4.2 General Inter-State Competition  
 
For completeness of discussion, it is noted that the issue of regulatory competition 
is not restricted to intellectual property rights protection. In its 2016 Consultation 
Report on the Satellite-Cable Directive, the Commission noted that “The Directive 
has facilitated cross-border access to satellite broadcasting services by reducing 
copyright-related barriers but has not been the only driver in facilitating cross-
border access. Other considerations have had great influence on the decision to offer 
TV and radio programmes across a border, including the skills and infrastructure 
available in the country of origin, the potential for economies of scale and national 
regulatory regimes for broadcasts in general. Broadcasters’ decisions whether to 
target audiences across borders also depend on their perception of demand.”455 
 
Hence, there may indeed be certain possibilities of arbitrage by media content 
services providers (including online broadcasters) which may create regulatory 
competition between EU Member States. However, such competition would most 
likely be in areas such as tax incentives and other regulatory spaces outside of the 
copyright law system; in any instance, the important point is that such policies 
would exist irrespective of (and would not be specifically induced by) wider 
application of the country-of-origin principle. 
 
 
[9]-5 COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT 
 
In terms of regulatory competition, this possibility is not only relevant to 
discussing the principle-of-origin, but also for mandatory collective licensing 
practices. If the mandatory collective management model were extended to online 
retransmissions (along with the country-of-origin principle), then such service 
providers would have the incentive to relocate their services to the jurisdiction 
with the most favourable CMO environment.  
 
While the practice and structure of CMOs would differ between countries, the 
principles under which they operate within Europe would be subject to the 
provisions of the Collective Management Directive. 
                                                        
455 Satellite-Cable Directive Consultation Report 2016, pg. v 
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In principle, it is possible to have regulatory competition in terms of national 
oversight for CMOs. For example, CMOs, acting as market intermediaries and 
agents for rights holders, should be encouraged to be efficient; best practice 
guidelines should be followed for performance indicators such as the ratio of 
administrative costs to licencing revenue. The more efficient the organisation is in 
its operation processes, the less administrative costs are passed on to licensees. 
The application of the norms of competition law also affects the relationship 
between CMOs and licensees; where CMOs are subject to stricter standards in 
terms of prevention of possible anti-competitive conduct and discriminatory 
licensing, licensees have more certainty in the reasonableness and fairness of the 
terms and costs of licences.   
 
While the practice and structure of CMOs would differ between countries, the 
principles under which they operate within Europe would be somewhat 
harmonised in accordance with national implementation of the Collective 
Management Directive. Hence, the existence of this Directive (assuming successful 
transposition of its provisions at the national levels) mitigates to possibility of 
significant regulatory competition in this area. 
 
Even if national competition was possible in terms of CMOs oversight, this is not 
the type of regulation that would result in a race to the bottom in pursuit of 
attracting the establishment of online service providers.456 The effect is actually 
the opposite – it is the type of competition that would put upwards pressure on 
regulation, ultimately driving the subjects of regulation towards greater efficiency 
and accountability, which ultimately is more favourable for all licensees.  
 
This is because licensees would be attracted to the most efficient CMOs which offer 
the best service. If jurisdictional arbitrage is possible on the grounds of CMO 
oversight, Member States would have the incentive to tighten oversight in order 
to make CMOs more efficient, and hence attract relocating online service 
providers as licensees.   
 
Therefore, the argument that ‘applying the country-of-origin principle to online 
services may lead to an erosion of intellectual property protection through 
regulatory arbitrage’, is unfounded; in fact, it is even possible that the effects of 
such an application would cause regulatory competition which strengthens 
market institutions though stronger CMO oversight. 
 
 
[9]-5.1 Collective Management Competition 
 
In terms of a possible ‘race to the bottom’, a more complicated issue is competition 
between CMOs themselves. The argument here is that applying the country-of-
origin principle to online retransmissions (along with mandatory collective 
                                                        
456  According to Recital 9 of the Collective Management Directive, Member States are able to 
impose more stringent standards than those laid down in the Directive. The standards in the 
Directive are therefore designed to be minimum standards.  
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management) would result in harmful competition between CMOs. Service 
providers would relocate to jurisdictions, where the national CMO offers the most 
attractive licencing fee; hence in order to attract licensees, CMOs would reduce 
their licensing fees resulting in an erosion of compensation to rights holders. In 
order to assess this claim, it is necessary to consider the incentives and 
competitive context of CMOs in the first place. 
 
As a fundamental principle of economics, the price mechanism of a free-market is 
predicated on the profit-maximising motive of private firms. However, CMOs are 
generally not profit-maximisers in the traditional sense. They are market 
intermediaries - agents of the rights holders that they represent. In fact the 
Collective Management Directive defines CMOs as being ‘organised on a not-for-
profit’ basis.457  
 
However, individual rights holders themselves may be profit-maximisers, and 
wish to extract the maximum possible rent from the exploitation of their rights. 
Hence, the CMO as an agent of rights holders wishes to extract maximum rent.  
  
By themselves, individual CMOs would generally represent different repertoires 
of works, especially where exclusive representation is practiced. Hence, a licence 
from one CMO is not a substitute for the licence from another – they cover rights 
for different sets of works; a licence will always be needed from the CMO whose 
works are being used. 
 
However, CMOs generally have reciprocal agreements with each other, where 
they represent their partnering organisation’s members in licencing transactions. 
This means that different CMOs could ultimately represent the same repertoire 
for a given licencing transaction. In this case, licences from different organisations 
would be substitutes for one another, assuming that a licensee is free to choose 
which CMO to negotiate with.  This is particularly true where extended collective 
management is practice, as is the case for mandatory collective licencing for 
retransmission activities.   
 
[9]-5.1.1 Simple Theoretical Example  
 
For analysis, consider two hypothetical CMOs – Organisation A, and Organisation 
B, each with their own membership, and reciprocal agreements with each other. 
Since the two organisations have a reciprocal agreement, a user (potential 
licensee) is indifferent between licences from either organisation.  
 
                                                        
457  Article 3(a) of the Collective Management Directive defines ‘Collective Management 
Organisation’ to mean “any organisation which is authorised by law or by way of assignment, licence 
or any other contractual arrangement to manage copyright or rights related to copyright on behalf 
of more than one rightholder, for the collective benefit of those rightholders, as its sole or main 
purpose, and which fulfils one or both of the following criteria: (i) it is owned or controlled by its 
members; (ii) it is organised on a not-for-profit basis;”  
For completeness, note that Article 3 also defines that an ‘independent management entity’ is an 
entity which carries out licencing on behalf of rights holders, but is not controlled by rights holders, 
and is organised on a for-profit basis.  
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If Organisation A decreases its licencing rate below that of Organisation B, then all 
users would negotiate a licence with A (to pay the lower rate). Organisation A 
would see an increase in revenue, and Organisation B would have no revenue.  
 
If the CMOs operated on a for-profit basis, then the organisation who granted the 
licence would keep some proportion of that revenue, and then remit the remaining 
income to rights holders (after making deductions to offset administrative costs). 
This might result in competition which drives down licencing fees through the 
following chain of events. 
 
Firstly, A reduces its licencing rate. In this case, A would make some profit, B 
would make no profit, but still the members of both A and B would earn their 
respective royalty receipts.  
 
Next, as a profit maximiser, B would then have the incentive to further decrease 
the licence rate to attract the user licence, and earn some profit; A would then earn 
no profit. Members of both A and B still earn royalties, but the level of numeration 
is less as the initial licence revenue (before deduction of CMO) is less. 
 
A will then have the incentive to again reduce licencing revenue below that of B, 
creating a cycle of competition which pushes licencing prices down to marginal 
cost, and ultimately eroding away the rents of rightsholders. 
 
Hence, for-profit CMOs have the incentive to compete on licencing fees, which 
reduces the rent accrued to rights holders.  This is an outcome of the competitive 
market that results from reciprocal agreements which transform the licences from 
each organisation into perfect substitutes. Naturally, CMOs as profit-maximisers 
would wish to charge monopoly prices, which would mean reducing the extent to 
which licences from different organisations are substitutable – an outcome 
achieved by moving away from reciprocal agreement arrangements.  Once there 
is a system of reciprocal representation in place (or a regime of extended 
collective management), then there is misalignment between the incentives of a 
profit-maximising CMO and its members.  
 
In contrast, if the CMO operates on a non-profit basis, there is no misalignment 
between the incentives of the organisation and its members; neither the CMO, nor 
the members have an incentive to pursue a decrease in licencing rates.458 In fact, 
both parties are – in principle – indifferent regarding the organisation from which 
the user obtains the licence.  
 
The above example illustrates that the concept of a for-profit CMO is theoretically 
not compatible with the concept of extended representation; if the two were to 
exist simultaneously, there would be a fundamental conflict of incentives between 
rights holders and their management organisations. Hence, given the nature of 
                                                        
458 This is of course assuming that whatever the prevailing licence rate is, it is above the user’s 
willingness to pay. If the fees are too high and are above the user’s willingness to pay, then no 
licence will be executed – in such a case rights holders will of course have the incentive to drop 
licencing fees to the maximum amount that a user would actually pay.  
 
248 
assumed non-profit CMO operation, there is no theoretical basis for a possible 
‘race to the bottom’ resulting from competition between CMOs induced by an 
extension of the country-of-origin principle. 
 
[9]-5.1.2 Discrimination Between Local and Foreign Rights Holders 
 
This above dynamic of CMO competition is however made more complex by 
factoring in the relationship between reciprocal agreements and administrative 
costs.459 Intuitively, one can imagine that rights management costs are different 
for managing works under a representation agreement, compared to works of the 
CMO’s own members.  
 
Administrative costs are incurred in preparing, negotiating, monitoring, and 
enforcing licences, as well as in collecting, allocating and distributing licencing 
revenues.  
 
For revenues remitted through representation agreements, separate income 
allocation statements and payments must be made for the partner CMO. On one 
hand, the fixed costs might be higher for extended-members ( compared to own-
members), as the rights management information provided by the represented 
CMO must be made compatible with the systems of the representing CMO. On the 
other hand, the allocation statements and payments may be more efficient as they 
are a single large transfer to the partner CMO, rather than a series of individual 
allocations and payments to individual rights holders. However, there are likely 
also other costs differences associated with the different reporting requirements 
for individual own-members and partner CMOs, especially when cross-border 
remittances are made.   
 
No matter the case, the relative burden on own-members and extended-
representation members depends on how administrative costs are allocated, and 
how management costs are deducted. If the result is that deductions from rights 
holders represented through representation agreements (or foreign rights 
holders where there is a statutory extension of the repertoire) are different 
(presumably higher), then the incentives of rights holders change.  
 
Consider that Organisation A administers a licence that covers the works of both 
A’s members and B’s members. However, the administrative deductions are 
higher for foreign remittances than they are for local distributions. Therefore, B’s 
members’ end up with a lower level of per-work/per-use net income. 
 
In such a case, B’s members would have a preference for managing their rights 
through their own Organisation B, as the net income would be higher due to lower 
administrative deductions. Therefore, B’s direct members would have an 
incentive to have B’s licencing fee lowered, so that the user obtains the licence 
from Organisation B instead of Organisation A. However, the amount that the 
licencing rate would be decreased would be - at most - the margin between the 
                                                        
459 Article 12 of the Collective Management Directive deals with deduction of management fees 
generally, while Article 15 deals with deductions in representation agreements. 
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deductions made by A for local, and foreign rights holders; further decreasing 
licencing fees beyond this amount would result in less net revenue for B’s 
members than if the licence was given through Organisation A at the existing fee 
level.  
 
Despite the limit of this margin for fee reduction, licencing prices can still be 
driven down. In the above example, the situation has merely flipped – A’s 
members now end up with lower remuneration, and have some incentive to make 
A lower its fee. The process can therefore continue until fees are driven down to 
marginal cost – even though the marginal costs are different for the two sets of 
members. This is indeed a legitimate concern, as this results even in the absence 
of profit-maximising motives of the CMOs themselves.   
 
However, this theoretical situation is unlikely to be a major issue for multiple 
reasons. Firstly, because CMOs are not allowed to discriminate with respect to the 
terms on which they grant licences, a reduction in licencing rates affects all 
revenue streams. The increases in revenue from granting some licences locally 
(and being subject to less administrative deductions) would also be associated 
with decreases in revenue from other licence sources (even those which were 
initially already granted locally).  
 
Furthermore, pressures by rightsholders for their CMO to decrease licencing rates 
pursuant to this logic would mainly be for licensees who use mostly use works 
from that CMO only. If a user mostly uses works from A’s repertoire, then the 
losses to B’s membership from high deductions is minimal, as that revenue stream 
is small in the first place. If however, a user mostly uses works from B’s repertoire, 
then B’s membership would be more concerned, and have a greater incentive to 
drive Organisation B to instead administer the licence though a marginal 
reduction in the licence fee.  
 
In this regard, broadcasters (and by extension retransmitters) might be such 
users, given that broadcasting schedules tend to be primarily driven by the 
demands of individual national markets. Furthermore, CMO membership tends to 
be highly localised - meaning that Organisation B’s members tend to be rights 
holders from territory B, who have rights in works which are at least partially 
marketed for the domestic market of B. Hence, broadcasters primarily operating 
in market B would be driven to obtain a licence from Organisation B. Although the 
divergence of incentives between local and foreign rights holders does marginally 
create a reduction in the licencing fee rate, the result was not that of true 
regulatory arbitrage. Regulatory arbitrage is of concern, as it causes market 
distortions due to shifting the forum for licencing negotiations to some arbitrary 
secondary jurisdiction. In this case, the chosen forum is not arbitrary – quite the 
opposite in fact, as the country-of-origin principle causes the licencing jurisdiction 
to revert to the jurisdiction of principle operation.  
 
In any case, the above case of diverging incentives of local members and foreign 
rights holders would only materially arise if a CMO is able to discriminate between 
local rights holders and extended-representation rightsholders at all. In fact, such 
discrimination is expressly prohibited by Article 14 of the Collective Management 
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Directive.460 As such, proper oversight of CMOs would preclude the possibility of 
foreign rights holders having different incentives than that of local members. 
 
Interestingly, differences in net income due to different deductions might actually 
occur in the opposite direction. Sometimes, in addition to deductions to cover 
administrative and managerial costs, CMOs make deductions to fund social, 
cultural and educational services at the national level.461 However, deductions 
from rights revenues derived from rights managed under representation 
agreements are limited to what is agreed upon in the representation 
agreement.462 Therefore it is possible to have situations where total deduction 
proportions are higher for local members than for represented foreign rights 
holders. Interestingly, this would not result in any downward pressures on 
licensing fees.  
 
Consider again that Organisation A administers a licence both on behalf of its 
members, and the members of Organisation B. A makes deductions for cultural 
outreach initiatives, but the agreement between A and B does not allow for 
deductions to fund such initiatives. Hence, while managerial costs are deducted 
from both A’s members’ and B’s members’ share of rights revenue, A’s members’ 
share is also subject to cultural service deductions. Therefore, the local members 
(A’s members) end up with a lower per-work/per-use net revenue than the 
foreign members (B’s members). If A’s members are self-interested profit-
maximisers (i.e. they perceive that they get no direct gain from the cultural 
initiatives), then they would prefer for the licence to be administered through 
Organisation B. However, A’s members have no say in the operations of 
Organisation B (as they are not direct members), and hence cannot induce B to 
lower the licencing rate to attract the licensee. A’s members’ recourse is therefore 
only to – if possible – mandate that their organisation cease such cultural 
initiatives.  
 
 
[9]-5.2 Existing Price Differentials 
 
It is noted that in reality, there are indeed differences in the licencing rates charged by 
different CMOs.463 Presumably, the rates for copyright licences would depend on the 
market demand conditions of a specific market. Application of the country-of-origin 
principle to online broadcasts would create a single demand function, as authorisation 
                                                        
460 Article 14 of the Collective Management Directive states “Member States shall ensure that a 
collective management organisation does not discriminate against any rightholder whose rights it 
manages under a representation agreement, in particular with respect to applicable tariffs, 
management fees, and the conditions for the collection of the rights revenue and distribution of 
amounts due to rightholders.” 
461 Such deductions are allowed for under Article 12(4) of the Collective Management Directive. 
However, Article 13(6) allows for Member States to place restrictions on how such deductions are 
used. 
462 This is provided for in Article 15(1) of the Collective Management Directive. 
463 See the example given on pg. 37of the Impact Assessment. 
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to communicate copyright protected works in any one Member State would imply 
authorization in all other states. Therefore, the application of the principle should result 
in an integrated online marketplace on the demand side.  
 
On the supply side, it should be stressed that part of the existing mandatory collective 
licencing regime are the policies to extended repertoires though the practice of rules 
that assume extension of representation, and encouragement of cross-border reciprocal 
agreements.  
 
Hence, with proper oversight, the ‘market’ for competing CMOs should become one in 
which fees are generally uniform, as the market-specific conditions which give rise to 
price differentials across markets fade away in a properly integrated market 
environment.  
 
In conclusion, the risks of a ‘race to the bottom’, as induced by extending the 
country-of-origin principle and mandatory collective licencing to online services, 
is somewhat unfounded, at least on a theoretical basis. Any such possibility of 
licence competition between CMOs is mitigating by the combined effect of various 
principles. These principles are the principles of non-discrimination, non-profit 
operation, and extended representation. Consequently, within this framework, 
CMOs have no incentive to engage in such destructive competition that erodes 
remuneration to rights holders.  However, this is predicted on a strong regulatory 
framework for CMO oversight across jurisdictions.  
 
In fact, in terms of pricing behaviour, CMOs have an incentive to collude by 
inflating licencing fees, abusing their de facto monopolistic positions, which 
though harmful to users, might actually increase remuneration to rights holders. 
This is of a major concern as unlike traditional firms that attempt to collude, the 
non-competitive nature of CMOs means that they do not have any unilateral 
incentive to defect from the collusion agreement (even if such agreement is 
neither explicit nor premeditated). This further underscores the need to have 
strong oversight over CMOs, including strong competition regulation.464  
 
 
[9]-6 DISAGGREGATION OF REPERTOIRE 
 
One of the prevalent fears of expanding the country-of-origin principle to all 
online services is that it would result in a disaggregation of CMOs’ repertoires. This 
might occur because rightsholders choose to exercise their rights through 
individual licencing rather than through CMOs, due to the perceived loss of control 
associated with multi-territory collective licencing for online broadcasters. Such 
an outcome would directly undermine the objectives of the Collective 
Management Directive, to encourage the aggregation of repertoire.  
 
                                                        
464 The issue of possible competition violations by CMOs, though very interesting, is not relevant 
in a major way for the objectives of this paper. For a discussion on this, see Drexl (2009), Ch 11 
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This scenario will only occur where rightsholders exercises their rights differently 
in different jurisdictions. Consider that a rights holder uses individual licencing 
for broadcasts in State A, but licences through the national CMO in State B. If the 
country of origin principle is applied, then an online transmission from a 
webcaster based in State B would be legitimate also in State A; the rights holders 
hence lost their ability to individually licence in State A.  The fear is that the rights 
holder will now voluntarily withdraw from the CMO in State B, and pursue 
individual licencing in both States.  
 
This will therefore result in a contraction of the repertoire of the CMO, and the 
webcaster must not conclude licences with the CMO, as well as individual rights 
holders who have withdrawn. The sum effect is that although the country-of-
origin principle decreased transaction costs for the webcaster in terms of the 
obtaining licences relating to a larger number of jurisdictions, total transaction 
costs might actually increase as the webcaster must now obtain licences from a 
larger number of individual rights holders in addition to the applicable CMO.  
 
While there is indeed validity to this concern, this perspective only represents a 
part of the situation. In fact, transaction costs will now also increase for the rights 
holder, as they must now negotiate and administer contracts which had 
previously been handled by the CMO. Essentially, what happens is that there is a 
move from a situation where rights holders pursue mixed practices (i.e. collective 
licencing in some territories, and individual licencing in others), to one in which 
only one practice is operable (i.e. collective licencing under the country-of-origin 
principle, or individual licencing in all countries).  
 
The question as to whether the rights holder will truly have any incentive to 
withdraw from a CMO hence depends on whether the margin between rents from 
individual licencing in all States and rents from a single collective licence is greater 
than the increase in transaction costs associated with handing all licencing 
activities on an individual basis. This is likely to only be the case for very large 
rights holders who control high commercial valued works, which are likely to 
attract greater rents if exploited through individual licences; indeed, it is generally 
true that the commercial value of works is sometime ‘averaged out’ when 
collective licencing is practiced, meaning that high valued works effectively 
subsidise lower valued works. However, these large rights holders (e.g. US film 
companies) are likely to have chosen individual licencing approaches in the first 
place across all jurisdictions - even before applying the country of origin principle, 
as these entities already have the incentive and administrative capacity to 
administer their own individual licences.  
 
Given that the country-of-origin principle for broadcasts is not associated with 
mandatory collective management (as in the case of retransmissions), it is the 
possibility of massive repertoire disaggregation from a technologically neutral 
approach to broadcast transmissions (and the country-of-origin principle) is 
likely very overstated.  
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[9]-7 ONLINE EXCLUSIVITY 
 
Another argument put forward against extending the collective management 
model to online retransmissions is that “it would also entail risks of undermining 
right holders' exclusive online rights and distribution strategies, leading to a 
reduction of licensing revenues”.465 
 
It is noted here that there is no distinct legal concept called ‘exclusive online 
rights’. In determining what exactly this terms means as a copyright law concept, 
a cue can be taken from the Collective Management Directive. In this Directive, 
‘online rights in musical works’ are defined as the rights of an author of music 
works, which are provided for in Articles 2 and 3 of the Information Society 
Directive, and which are needed for the provision of an online service.466 Hence, 
this refers to the reproduction and ‘communication to the public’ rights of authors. 
The term ‘exclusive online rights’ for audiovisual media, can hence be inferred to 
mean the equivalent rights aforementioned. 
 
This argument does not hold against theoretical scrutiny for various reasons. First 
of all, applying mandatory collective licences to online retransmissions would not 
have the effect of undermining online distribution exclusivity, any more than 
applying the country-of-origin principle to broadcasters’ ancillary services would.   
 
The argument here appears to be that rights holders may wish to licence content 
for broadcast distribution, but not online distribution, and therefore wish to keep 
these distribution channels independent of each other. Therefore, allowing for the 
collective licencing for online retransmission of a broadcast would bypass the 
rights holders’ possibility for individual licencing discretion. The result would be 
that a work, which was individually licenced for terrestrial broadcast, ends up 
being collectively licenced for distribution through online retransmission. The 
logic of the argument is that the exclusive right to control retransmission online 
should hence be maintained.  
 
This argument loses coherence when it is analysed along with the proposal to 
allow for the country or original principle to apply to broadcasters’ ancillary 
services. Under this application, a broadcaster’s online simulcast is deemed to take 
place, for the purposes of copyright law, in the jurisdiction where that broadcaster 
is based; in fact, this would be deemed as the same jurisdiction in which the 
original terrestrial broadcast is occurring. As the broadcaster clears the rights to 
communicate the work in that local jurisdiction, the authorisation to communicate 
the work to the public can therefore also cover its online simulcast. Therefore, 
unless the broadcast is able to licence the work for broadcast, subject to a 
restriction that the work cannot be simulcast, a terrestrial broadcast 
automatically implies a possible simultaneous online communication. This 
scenario underscores the notion that a simulcast is essentially an online 
retransmission of a broadcaster’s own primary transmission.  In summation, the 
policy positions of (i) rejecting the application of mandatory collective licencing 
                                                        
465 Proposed Regulation pg. 7 
466 Article 3(n) of the Collective Management Directive  
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for online retransmissions, and (ii) applying the country-of-origin principle for 
broadcasters’ online ancillary services, are incompatible in terms of attempting to 
avoid the undermining of exclusive online rights and distribution strategies. 
 
 
[9]-7.1 Media Chronology 
 
Notwithstanding the above discussion, it is useful to address the argument that 
undermining online elusive rights might disrupt prevailing commercial practices, 
and the profitability of a work in the first place.  
 
To do this, it is necessary to recall that rights holders seek to maximise the returns 
made from a given work through strategising its distribution in different markets 
and across different platforms. For the former, the practice traditionally involved 
territorial licencing, and for the latter, it means staggering licencing across 
different platforms. For example, the marketing of an audiovisual work such as a 
film often involves first focussing on the most profitable national markets before 
distributing the work in other secondary markets (where modifications may have 
to be made such as overdubbing for another language). This national market 
segmentation is done in parallel with exploiting the work through different media 
platforms in a phased approach; for example, films are normally always released 
in theatres before being released in physical form or distributed via broadcast.  
 
On the issue of national market segmentation, it is important to recall the goal of 
the entire European framework for broadcasting rights and retransmission 
regulation, which started with the original Television Without Frontiers Directive. 
This goal was to create a truly Pan-European internal market for audiovisual 
services – a concept generally at odds with the practice of national market 
segmentation. Furthermore, the position taken by the European Court of Justice 
in the Premiere League Case was that in determining the reasonable remuneration 
for a work that has already been legitimately broadcast, considerations should not 
be made for the inclusion of a premium arising from territorial market 
fragmentation 467  Therefore, the current jurisprudence suggests that policy 
instruments, which undermine the possibilities for rights holders to price-
discriminate amongst national markets, are not necessarily inconsistent with the 
objective of protecting intellectual property rights.  
 
On the issue of chronology in distribution across platforms, the question thus 
arises as to whether online retransmissions would harm rights holders’ interests 
by disrupting media chronology practices. To answer this question, it is useful to 
first have some discussion on the nature of media chronology. In this context, a 
commercial audiovisual film will be used as the example going forward. Generally, 
the matter of how an audiovisual work is exploited across different distribution 
platforms is up to the contractual agreements between the authors of films, and 
potential distributors. As such, the exact chronology employed by right holders, is 
that sequence that is deemed to maximise profits, and is thus subject to market 
                                                        
467 ECJ Judgment Premier League Case (Judgment of 4. 10. 2011 - Joined Cases C-403/08 AND C-
429/08) paragraphs 114-116 
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forces. It would however appear that for audiovisual works, the traditional model 
is distribution in the following sequence: (i) theatrical release, (ii) physical release 
(e.g. DVD), (iii) Video on Demand (near to physical release), (iv) pay television, 
and finally (v) free television.468  
 
The default state of the market is that release windows are left up to negotiations 
between rights holders and service providers. This is confirmed in the Audiovisual 
Media Service Directive which states that: 
 
“It is important to ensure that cinematographic works are transmitted within 
periods agreed between right holders and media service providers.  
 
The question of specific time scales for each type of showing of cinematographic 
works is primarily a matter to be settled by means of agreements between the 
interested parties or professionals concerned.”  
 
– Recitals 76-77 
 
Furthermore, Article 8 of that Directive states that “Member States shall ensure 
that media service providers under their jurisdiction do not transmit 
cinematographic works outside periods agreed with the rights holders.”  
However, it is that there are a few jurisdictions in which there are explicit 
statutory provisions on media chronology. 469  For example, audiovisual 
distributions in France are subject to ‘statutory windows’, which dictate the delays 
between different forms of release, as set out in the relevant legal decree. These 
rules provide that a film that is released in theatres cannot be release through 
physical means or video-on-demand until four months have elapsed since 
theatrical release; the minimum windows for other distribution platforms are no 
release via pay television before ten months, free television before twenty-two 
months, and subscription video on demand services before thirty-six months. 
Additionally, there are also jurisdictions that link the provision of film subsidies 
to mandatory release windows.470 However, the cases of Member States having 
explicit legal provisions on media chronology appears to be exceptions to the 
general trend where release windows are a matter of private contractual 
agreements.471 
 
It is also relevant to note here that European Court of Justice jurisprudence does 
not take issue with national legislation on media chronology windows. In the 
Cinéthèque case, the ECJ ruled that such national laws were not incompatible with the 
relevant EEC Treaty Article on the free movement of goods, where such laws 
                                                        
468 IRIS (2008) at pg. 2 
469  According (Ranaivoson et al, 2014), three EU Member States have statutory provisions on 
release windows – France, Bulgaria, and Portugal. 
470 Four EU Member States have such rules linking film support to release windows - Germany, 
Austria, Latvia, and Spain (Ranaivoson et al, 2014)  
471 IRIS (2008) at page 5. 
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prohibit the importation of distributions of the work outside of the prescribed 
windows.472 
 
The purpose of the above discussion is to demonstrate that media chronology 
windows – whether an outcome of market-based negotiations or statutory 
provisions – generally have a standard sequence; in this sequence, distribution via 
the broadcast media almost always occurs near the end of the product life cycle of 
an audiovisual work. Furthermore, national market segmentation tends to 
concentrated at the earlier stages of this cycle.  
 
In terms of the notion of an ‘exclusive online right’ – this ostensibly refers to the 
right to authorise and prohibit communication to the public or distribution of a 
work, online, such a right would most logically be related to making a work 
available on an ‘on demand basis’, which corresponds to the ‘video on demand’ 
element of the media chronology sequence. This form of exploitation comes before 
terrestrial broadcasting in the traditional media chronology sequence.  Even in the 
expected case that new innovate forms of online exploitation are developed, such 
modes of exploitation are still likely to occur before terrestrial broadcasting. 
Therefore, online retransmissions of traditional broadcasts are very unlikely to 
have any disrupting effect on the media chronology and licencing practices of 
rights holders. Extending the tools of mandatory collective licencing to online 
retransmissions is therefore not likely to entail any major risk of undermining the 
online exclusive rights and distribution strategies of rights holders.  
 
For completeness, it is however noted that the above counter-argument is 
strongest for the case of collective management for online retransmissions. It is 
however also applicable for the country-of-origin principle for webcasts, given 
that broadcasting in foreign markets tends to be at the end of the media 
chronology window.  
 
However, the counter-argument does not apply well in terms of applying the 
country-of-origin principle to non-linear online services. This is a result of the 
national market segmentation aspect of media chronology (as opposed to the 
platform release window aspects). In fact, it is admitted that online on-demand 
services would relate to an earlier stage of the established platform release 
windows, and hence coordinating this part of the release window across all 
jurisdictions (which would inevitably result from applying a country-of-origin 
principle to non-linear online services) could undermine the legitimate business 
strategies of rights holders; this is because when the work might be in the video-
in-demand phase in one market, it might still be in the theatrical release phase in 
another.  
 
Hence, the argument that a country-of-origin principle might undermine business 
practices is certainly more valid for non-linear services, than it is for online 
broadcasting. A truly technology neutral application of the principle-of-origin 
                                                        
472 However, according to IRIS (2008, at pg. 7), the ECJ came to this decision based on evidence 
provided by France which supported the economic significant of cinema distribution, as was the 
case at the time of judgement (1985); this evidence would likely no longer apply today, and hence 
the context of the judgement has changed considerably.  
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would hence trigger a move away from the market separation (but not platform 
separation) aspect of media chronology practices. However, such a move would 
be indeed in line with the concept of free cross-border flows of services, and a 
truly integrated market for media services and intellectual property. Nevertheless 
- for the time being at least – the possibility of applying geo-blocking for online 
content services (given the copyright services exemption in the Geo-Blocking 
Regulation) provides a mechanism to maintain the status quo of media chronology 
market segmentation. 
 
 
[9]-8 INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
 
The discussions and analysis in this chapter focus on principles of copyright law 
and practice; it does not take an industrial policy perspective, nor does it take a 
broad look at the competitive landscape of the copyright or communications 
industries. Such would certainly be outside of the scope of this manuscript. 
However, it is useful to still make a few brief remarks on the significance of 
technology neutral copyright policy for industrial policy. 
  
In this regard, one further criticism of not extending policy considerations to 
online services is that it still creates market distortions. The country-of-origin 
principle and mandatory collective licencing greatly reduce the transaction costs 
associated with cross-border broadcasting and retransmission services. However, 
the beneficiaries of these principles (under the current framework, including the 
new Proposed Regulation) are only undertakings that operate on traditional or 
closed networks. These are either service providers who own closed domestic 
networks, or lease the capacity from another network operator.  
 
There is both great competition for the use of existing infrastructure, and large 
capital costs associated with investing in new networks, which essentially create 
high barriers to entry in this market. Online broadcasting and service provision is 
therefore a formidable competitor to what has traditionally been an oligopolistic 
market. Not extending policy provisions that reduce operational costs to online 
broadcasters, therefore amounts to a policy of favouring incumbent providers, 
and restricting the competitive potential of a technologically neutral marketplace. 
It would therefore be in the interest of economic efficiency to adopt a policy of 
true technological neutrality, which embraces the competitive possibilities of 
online service provision, rather than protecting incumbent business models based 
on natural monopolies. 
 
A concerted effort to update the Satellite-Cable Directive for the modern 
technological landscape should hence adopt a technologically neutral approach. 
On this point, it should be noted that even the original 1993 Directive was based 
on an understanding that provisions designed for cable systems should be more 
broadly applied to microwave retransmission systems (Article 1(3)), given that 
the market failures being addressed are associated with economic functions 
rather than technical characteristics.   
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Not only is it relevant to consider the competitive landscape in the downstream 
distribution (and infrastructure) part of the content value chain, but also that in 
upstream content production itself. There exists an extremely wide range in terms 
of the commercial positions of authors and performers, for both musical and 
audiovisual works. More established authors and performers are more likely to 
have the bargaining power and resources to administer individual licencing 
agreements themselves. For small less established content-creators, the 
transactions costs alone associated with contracting may be too high to access 
commercial distribution on broadcasting and new media platforms. 473  Hence, 
simplifying the licencing environment and reducing these transaction costs in a 
technology neutral way creates a more competitive environment for media 
content more generally. Without such an approach, there is a risk of consolidation 
of market power in media production markets, and a crowding out of less-
commercially oriented works (which are normally associated with higher positive 
externalities); this ultimately undermines the public policy goals of the 
broadcasting sector, such as the promotion of artistic diversity, plurality of 
opinions, and preservation of cultural heritage.  
 
Lastly, it should be noted that a technologically neutral policy approach would 
provide a more conducive environment for innovation, and would result in more 
consumer choice. The online environment indeed provides the possibility for 
many new services which cannot be anticipated, and the specific issues associated 
with those services cannot predicted; however, policy-makers should at least 
create an environment in which innovation can take place. While the alternative 
is indeed the status quo of waiting for new services to arise and then attempt at 
assessing the relevant legal and policy questions, it should be noted that existing 
legal uncertainties could lead to many innovative services and new business 
models not coming to market in the first place.  
 
 
[9]-8.1 Technological Neutrality as Proactive  
 
On a very general note, consistency in policy making should be regarded as 
desirable. In an environment where technology and culture are rapidly evolving – 
certainly at a faster rate than legal rules can - it is difficult and often ineffective to 
rely on reactive regulation. As such, policymakers should opt for a general 
approach of proactive regulation. Such a proactive approach should be based on 
high level principles and standards that are assumed to have general applicability, 
unless a very specific set of circumstances necessitates more specifically tailored 
legal rules. Indeed, legal certainty is an important institution for market efficiency.  
 
In the context of the issues analysed in this chapter, one example of such a high-
level policy would be to apply the country-of-origin principle to all media services 
– irrespective of platform and content type; this is of course assuming a federal 
jurisdiction model such as the EU, where internal market integration is a central 
                                                        
473 Interestingly, this point draws a strong parallel to similar arguments that are often put forward 
in favour of Net Neutrality. Indeed, technology neutral regulation of distribution platforms is in 
many ways a complimentary policy to net neutrality.  
 259
overall policy objective. Where the particular market context of a service is such 
that a specific and unique market failure is identified, only then should an 
exception or alternative to this high-level policy position be considered. 
 
For example, Chapter 8 noted that the context of online music streaming services 
justified a unique sub-sector-specific approach; indeed, such a unique approach is 
taken in the Collective Management Directive. However, the market 
circumstances which create this unique problem are contextual. As technology 
evolves, this context changes, and it is even likely that the situation of the online 
music market would no longer be one of a unique problem. The licencing passport 
model envisioned by that Directive is hence not necessary to serve as a permanent 
solution.  The purpose of that model – and that particular legal instrument - is to 
serve as a catalyst for development of the administrative infrastructure needed 
for that market to work efficiently. The need for a unique regime is therefore not 
necessarily a permanent state. Once that infrastructure is developed, the legal 
regime can easily move towards one where there is greater consistency in the 
policy approach taken across different markets.  
 
The core point is that specific policies to address specific market failures are only 
necessary so as long as the contexts which give rise to those specific issues exist. 
Should those context cease to exist, a move towards more general and broadly 
applicable policy principles is desirable, as it reduces the extent to which legal 
rules need to play catch-up with changing technological trends. 
 
Furthermore the more general issues that define the sector are the transaction 
costs intensive environments of broadcasting and retransmission activities, and 
legal uncertainty from accumulated jurisdiction for cross-border   service 
provision. There is no reason to believe that these market failures are technology-
specific, and hence there is no reason to maintain policy solutions to these market 
failures which are technology-specific.  
 
On the point of legal catch-up, the history of the European legal framework for the 
application of copyright law to retransmission activities is evidence of this 
technology-law lag. The Coditel I Case was ruled on in 1980, and largely foresaw 
issues related to copyright administration for retransmission activities. However, 
the Satellite-Cable Directive was not adopted until 1993. This was notably also 
four years after the Television Without Frontiers Directives of 1989, although both 
Directives share the same roots in terms of their initial policy proposal origins. 
Furthermore, while the provisions of the Television Without Frontiers Directive 
were updated for the digital age in 2010 with Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive, a corresponding proposal to update the Satellite-Cable Directive did not 
come until 2016. Indeed, it would appear that intellectual property laws – at least 
as applied to the broadcasting sector – are subject to an ever greater lag behind 
technology than other areas of law.  
 
Therefore, as technological change in the media sector occurs even more rapidly, 
it would be wise for European lawmakers to take larger strides towards more 
consistent policy approaches for the media sector based on broad default 
principles such as technological neutrality – so as to avoid continuing losing the 
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race between evolving technologies and adapting regulations, and creating 
undesirable market distortions from patchwork legal frameworks.  
 
As a final point, it is critical to understand one particular defining characteristic of 
technological changes in the media and convergence sector – convergence. 
Convergence is the phenomenon in which the traditional boundaries between 
services, distribution platforms, and user devices disappear. In this environment, 
defining services based on technological grounds is becoming increasingly 
arbitrary and even unnecessary; the modern digital environment is one in which 
user experiences in entertainment, communications, and media consumptions are 
integrated. Therefore, adhering to frameworks that are based on regulating 
services based on their enabling technology platforms is unsustainable, and even 
undesirable. These frameworks not only create legislative lags, but they may 
result in market distortions and regulatory failures that merely supplant the 
market failures that they were designed to address in the first place. 
 
As such, it is critical that in an environment of convergence, modern copyright law 
seeks to find a basis in technological neutrality. 
 
 
[9]-9 CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter 8 analysed the copyright law concept of communication to the public, as 
it takes the form of broadcasting and retransmission rights. This was done in the 
specific context of the existing European Union legal framework that deals with 
these rights. Two key policy features of this framework were identified and 
discussed – the country-of-origin principle, and the approach of mandatory 
collective management. While the core focus was on the application of these 
principles in the context of broadcast retransmissions, it was also necessary to 
take a wider look at the legal rules that apply to the media sector.  
 
Against a backdrop of the existing legal framework, this chapter then focussed on 
analysing the new European Commission Proposal for a Regulation on Online 
Transmissions, and how this proposed legal instrument applies these policy 
features. It was argued that the Proposal’s scope is insufficient in that it excludes 
application of these key policy tools to online services. In this context, this chapter 
attempted to refute some of the arguments against such application, while 
advocating for a technologically neutral approach to copyright law in the context 
of broadcasting and retransmission services. 
 
If European policymakers truly believe in the importance of promoting cross-
border broadcasting services, particularly due to the presence of strong positive 
externalities, then the current Proposal is deficient. The existing tools of the 
principle-of-origin and mandatory collective management should be extended to 
online services. This would also have the additional benefit of bring greater 
coherence to the overall legal system. 
 
Such would be welfare-enhancing, particularly because the claimed social costs of 
such an extension are likely overestimated. It is very unlikely there will be any 
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resulting regulatory competition, erosion of existing economic rights, pressures 
on royalty rates, disaggregation of repertoire, or undermining of ‘exclusive online 
rights’.  
 
The only likely major disruption might be specifically in the application of the 
country-of-origin principle to online on-demand audiovisual services. This is 
because of current media chronology and market segmentation practices, which 
also has implications for other digital legal rules (such as the Geo-Blocking 
Regulation discussed in Chapter 8). At the core of this potential disruption is a 
fundamental issue unique to the European case – the tension between market 
integration and the territorial nature of intellectual property rights. This tension 
however goes far beyond just the broadcasting sector alone.  
 
Looking at the bigger picture, the analysis of the European case study in Chapters 
8 and 9 do have certain relevance for the overarching research question on this 
manuscript. Firstly, where broadcasting services are provided across borders, 
some jurisdiction rule is need to settle potential conflict of law issues. If the 
positive externalities from broadcasting services are very strong, then a legal 
fiction such as the principle-of-origin can be used to reduce legal uncertainty and 
transaction costs. This would relate to the exercise of public communication rights 
of all classes of rightsholders, including broadcasters exercising retransmission 
rights over their own signals (which is in itself a subset of the act of public 
communication via broadcasting).  
 
Furthermore, the discussions in this chapter argue that where interventions are 
made regarding the exercise of public communications rights (including 
broadcasters’ retransmission rights), rules should ideally be applied on a 
technologically-neutral basis. This should however not be conflated as an 
argument for a technologically-neutral definition of the beneficiaries of 
broadcasters rights themselves, which is a separate issue (comments on this are 
made in Chapter 11).  
 
Using the insights gained in Chapters 8 and 9, the next chapter shall focus on the 
relationship between the retransmission rights of different classes of 
rightsholders.  
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CHAPTER 10: THEORIES OF RETRANSMISSION RIGHTS 
 
This Chapter is the third chapter in Part IV of this manuscript, which focuses on 
retransmission rights. It is also the final chapter before the final conclusion 
chapter. While Chapters 8 and 9 focused on the case study of the European Union, 
this chapter attempts to take a more general approach in understanding 
retransmission rights. In this regard, the core research question of this chapter is 
“What are the theoretical bases and economic mechanisms of retransmission 
rights?”  
 
 
[10]-1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The evolution of retransmission rights is complex, involving a history of 
accumulated case law, legislative reforms, and interpretations of international 
copyright law in various jurisdictions. As stated by Gendreau (1990), “The 
evolution of the retransmission right can only be described as chaotic. It has lived 
through multiple periods of expansion and retrenchment as it has progressed from 
the relatively inconsequent wire retransmission of radio broadcasts to hotel rooms 
to large scale international cable retransmissions of television broadcasts”.474  
 
This chapter builds on the lessons learnt from the European case study in Chapters 
8 and 9, and takes a step back to attempt to construct a simple understanding for 
the theoretical and doctrinal basis of retransmission rights. Since the various 
approaches to regulating broadcast retransmissions are understood as a deviation 
from the standard case of exclusive copyright, it is useful to therefore frame such 
policies as limitations and exceptions to copyright, and understand them from a 
Law and Economics perspective.  
 
This chapter has three main section. First is a section on retransmission 
approaches as limitations and exceptions to copyright. Based on the case studies 
of the previous chapters, this section develops a taxonomy for policy approaches 
to regulating retransmission rights. Second is a section which  attempts to apply 
various Law and Economics perspectives to understand the nature of these rights. 
Finally, an analysis is undertaken of the relationship between the retransmission 
rights of copyright holders and broadcasters from a legal and technical 
perspective, with a particular focus on the concept of ‘communication to the 
public’.  
 
 
[10]-2 LIMITATIONS TO RETRANSMISSION RIGHTS 
 
The first broad objective of this chapter is to draw from the previous discussions 
in Chapters 8 and 9 to catalogue the various approaches to the administration of 
retransmission rights.  In order to do this, it is necessary to first establish the basis 
                                                        
474 Gendreau, Y. (1990) – The Retransmission Right: Copyright and the Rediffusion of Works by Cable, 
Intellectual Property Law Monographs, ESC Publishing Ltd., Oxford; at pg 57. More generally, for a 
history of the evolution of retransmission rights, see this monograph.  
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of these rights. Annex 4 presents a detailed account of the legal bases for these 
rights. However, the key points are here summarised.  
 
Retransmission rights are presented in international law in two ways. Firstly, they 
are explicitly provided for in the Berne Convention. Secondly, they can be 
considered as a fragment of the broader ‘right to public communication’ in the 
WCT. Performers and producers also have similar rights, though these might be 
weaker and often restricted to a mere right to remuneration.  
 
In terms of limitations and exceptions to these rights, the Berne Convention allows 
for implementing parties to determine the conditions under which these rights 
are exercised. Hence, limitations to retransmission rights are possible, once the 
rightsholder maintains a right to equitable remuneration. Through various cross-
references in international provisions on copyright and related right law (and the 
principle of ‘equivalency’), the implied permissibility of limitations on 
retransmission rights also applies to the rights of performers and producers. 
However, international copyright law also stipites that limitations and exceptions 
must pass the so-called ‘three-step-test’. Any policy interventions which amount 
to limitations on the retransmission rights must hence past this test.  
 
 
[10]-2.1 Justifying Special Cases 
 
The sub-sections below analyse how the unique market activities analysed in 
Chapters 8 and 9 relate to this notion of copyright limitations.475 
 
[10]-2.1.1 Retransmission as a Special Case 
 
The three-step-test requires that the limitation be in ‘certain special cases which 
do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work/performance/recording and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holder’. The 
requirement of Berne Article 11bis(2) that the rightsholder be afforded a right to 
obtain equitable remuneration assures that the legitimate interests of the 
rightsholder is not unreasonable prejudiced (third step). Furthermore, the nature 
of retransmission activities, and the fact that retransmitted works by definition 
have already been legitimately broadcast means that limitations to exclusive 
rights to facilitate retransmission do not conflict with normal exploitation (second 
step).  
 
What remains to be asserted is that retransmission activities indeed constitute a 
‘certain special case’ (first step). As discussed in detail in Chapter 8, broadcast 
retransmission is a highly transaction cost intensive activity, and without some 
mechanism to mitigate these costs, the activity itself would not be viable. 
                                                        
475 For clarity, it should be understood that while Chapter 6 already discussed limitations and 
exemptions, this was in reference to the related rights of broadcasters themselves. The discussions 
in this chapter focus on limitations and exceptions to copyright, particularly when works are 
communicated via broadcasts and subsequent retransmissions.   
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Retransmitters, no matter the technological platform used, do not have the 
information, time, or negotiating capacity to conclude authorisation agreements 
with every rights holder who holds interest in the content being retransmitted. As 
this problem is unique to this activity, it can indeed be said that retransmission 
constitutes a ‘certain special case’ for copyright and related rights exploitation. 
 
Furthermore, there is inherently some level of legal uncertainty involved with all 
broadcasting – including retransmission activities. Broadcast signals typically 
contain a large number of works (audio and audiovisual programming), and hence 
involve a massive number of rightsholders (authors, performers, and producers). 
Operating on such a large scale, there will always be some level of uncertainty as 
to whether all relevant authorisations have been acquired even where best efforts 
have been used for good faith negotiations.  This legal uncertainty is also linked to 
more transactions costs, as there are often high search costs in identifying 
rightsholders in the first place. A simple example might be a news broadcast of a 
public event where music is played, or where public art appears in the scene. 
While there are generally di minimums standards and specific limitations and 
exceptions for such ‘incidental use’, there will always be some level of uncertainty 
as to whether these apply and what relevant authorisations are needed.  
 
[10]-2.1.2 Cross-Border Broadcasts as a Special Case 
 
As the country-of-origin principle (discussed in detail in Chapter 8), is a specific 
doctrinal legal fiction, its proper analysis should be seen as a matter of relating to 
the core concepts of copyright law, specifically the interpretation of 
‘communication to the public’. However, its signification can also be explained 
through the lenses of limitations and exceptions to core copyright principles. 
 
 The country-of-origin principle does not ‘unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the rights holder’ because presumably, if it is known a priori that the 
communication will be deemed as authorised in every country of reception, then 
the value of such dispersed reception would be internalised in the costs of 
acquiring authorisation for transmission in the country of origin. While this 
reduces the bargaining power of a rightsholder, it increases the assumed captive 
audience and hence increases the compensation that the rightsholder can request. 
Therefore, the bargaining power of the broadcaster is actually also reduced, as 
authorisation for transmission in one jurisdiction is the same as that for all 
jurisdictions in the integrated market and hence such authorisation is associated 
with a high price. If any party’s legitimate interests were unduly limited, it would 
therefore be that of small local broadcasters whose commercial interests are only 
intra-jurisdictional.  
 
The principle also does not conflict with normal exploitation of the 
work/performance, as the work has already been authorised for broadcast in the 
country of origin. The extent that further simultaneous broadcasts in other 
jurisdictions represents ‘normal exploitation’ is hinged on the trade-off between 
the practice of territorial licencing and the policy goal of market integration. 
Hence, as discussed in Chapter 8, it is critical to have a clear policy framework (and 
enabling case law) to clarify this context. In any case, as discussed in Chapter 9, 
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for many types of works, broadcast distribution is near the end of the value-chain, 
and hence disruptions to ‘normal exploitation’ are minimal (though admittedly 
greater for a broadcast than for a retransmission).  
 
Lastly, the case of broadcasting (in the context of an integrated regional market) 
certainly qualifies as a ‘special case’. As discussed in Chapter 8, this is due to fact 
that cross-border broadcasts are a market in which there are significant 
information asymmetries (between broadcasters, rightsholders, users, and 
regulators) in terms of the applicable legal framework. The possible cumulative 
application of multiple national laws not only creates a significant regulatory 
burden, but legal uncertainties that amount to a unique market failure. On these 
grounds, the country-of-origin principle can be interpreted as a policy tool to 
address this ‘special case’ of market failure.  
 
 
[10]-2.2 Taxonomy of Policy Options 
 
The above argued that the act of retransmission constitutes a special case that 
justifies limitations and exceptions to exclusive public communication rights. 
Using the discussions from Chapters 8 and 9 as a basis, it is possible to now 
catalogue the various possible approaches to implementing such limitations. 
However, those discussions did not contain a working example of one important 
policy tool – the compulsory licence. Therefore, the European case study is 
complemented by a short case study of the US ‘Retransmission Consent’ system, 
presented at Annex 5.  
 
Building on those case studies, this section builds a taxonomy of the policy options 
for regulating retransmission rights.  
 
[10]-2.2.1 Trade-off Between Freedom of Contract and Legal Certainty 
 
There are various policy approaches that can be used to mitigate the problems of 
high transaction costs and legal uncertainty associated with the exploitation of 
retransmission rights. The various tools therefore have different effects on the 
prevailing level uncertainty and transaction costs, and a comparison of these tools 
suggests that the policymaker faces a trade-off between legal certainty and 
freedom of contract. The greater the limits placed on the excise of a right, the 
greater the level of legal certainty for users of those rights, but the lower the level 
of freedom of contract of the rights holder. The figure below summarises this 
relationship as it relates to different possible approaches to the exercise of 
copyrights. 
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Table 10.1: Retransmission Policy Options 
 
 
[10]-2.2.2 Individual Licencing 
 
The ‘default’ position would be Regime A - one of exclusive rights practiced 
through voluntary individual licencing. Indeed, this is the case that describes the 
vast majority of the intellectual property system. In such a system, there is 
maximum contractual freedom for the rightsholder, but minimal legal certainty 
for the user. While there is no uncertainty in the legal rules that apply, the legal 
certainty stems from the transaction costs associated with identifying every single 
rightsholder who has interest in a given broadcast or retransmission, as there is 
no institutional ‘safeguard’ to protect the broadcaster from unintentional 
infringement. This is also the most transaction cost intensive case. 
 
 
[10]-2.2.3 Collective Licencing 
 
The next case is Regime B – non-exclusive voluntary collective management. This 
tends to be the default case when transaction costs are high for rightsholders (as 
opposed to users) for the administration of their rights, and where usage involves 
a large repertoire of works (for example in the management of performance rights 
for musical works). The restriction on the freedom of contract of the rightsholder 
comes in the form of delegating the task of concluding agreements to the CMO. The 
greater the tendency for rightsholders to voluntarily administer their rights 
through collective management organisations (CMOs), the larger the repertoires 
of these CMOs, and the greater the legal certainty for users such as broadcasters 
who have licences from those organisations. Transaction costs are also very low 
for both users and rightsholders, as the broadcaster mainly contracts with the 
CMO rather than with a large number of individual rightsholders.  
 
However, some rightsholders may – in certain cases or for certain uses – still 
assert their rights on an individual basis; this might be the case for owners of very 
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high-valued rights who have significant bargaining power. In this way, the 
rightsholders still retain a strong degree of freedom of contract. Of course, these 
rightsholders might also choose to always licence on an individual basis, as 
collective management is voluntary. Any insistence of individual licencing 
decreases legal certainty for the broadcaster, and increases transaction costs. This 
system might also be a useful policy tool where CMOs do not engage in certain 
licencing practices that the policy-maker wishes to encourage, and hence some 
freedom of contract needs to be returned to rightsholders. As discussed in Chapter 
8, and example is the European Commission’s consideration of ‘Parallel Direct 
Licencing’ for multi-territory licencing for the online use of musical works.  
 
In Regime C, collective licencing is still voluntary, but rightsholders that choose to 
administer their rights through collective management do so on an exclusive 
basis. This means that rightsholders are not able to switch between the systems 
of individual and collective licencing, and must make a discrete choice; there is 
hence a restriction on the freedom of contract of the rightsholder. In such a case, 
there would be greater legal certainty and less transaction costs for licensees. Of 
course, the issue of non-exclusive versus exclusive CMO representation is an issue 
that is depends to how CMOs are regulated. However, as a general note, a greater 
degree of CMO oversight implies a greater extent of resulting legal certainty. 
 
In Regime D, there is ‘extended collective management’, meaning that CMOs not 
only represent their direct members, but also other rightsholders in the same class 
who have not explicitly opted out of such representation in order to administer 
their rights on an individual basis. This therefore represents a sort of middle 
ground between voluntary collective licencing (Regimes B and C) and mandatory 
collective licencing (Regimes E and F). In such a situation, there is much greater 
legal certainty (and less transaction costs) than Regimes B and C, because there a 
greater coverage of the collective licence provided by the CMO, and hence a lower 
degree of liability for the broadcaster licensee. However, since the rightsholder 
must actively assert their desire to engage in individual licencing activities, there 
is a restriction of the freedom of contract, particularly where the rightsholder fails 
to actively make such an assertion.  
 
The next case is Regime E, in which there is mandatory collective licencing (with 
possible assignment). The restriction on freedom of contract here is significant as 
rightsholders are stripped of the possibility of engaging in individual licencing. 
However, they may still choose to assign their rights to some other intermediary 
instead of the CMO. An example of this system would be the provisions of Article 
10 of the EU Satellite-Cable Directive, as discussed in Chapter 8. Under that 
Directive, rightsholders can only administer their rights for broadcast 
retransmissions through a CMO. However, under Article 10, they may 
alternatively choose to transfer those retransmission rights to the broadcaster 
whose initial broadcast is to be retransmitted. In this way, the rightsholders still 
maintain some degree of freedom of contract. A user would therefore have to 
negotiate these rights though the original broadcaster.  
 
Such a provision does not necessarily have a major effect on legal certainty, as 
there is no uncertainty about the mechanism through which rights must be 
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cleared. All rights not cleared though CMOs would have to be cleared through 
broadcasters who have been assigned such rights. There is only marginally more 
uncertainty as to which rights need to be cleared through which mechanism, 
which is easily cleared up during negotiations with the original broadcaster. There 
are however notable effects on transaction costs. Assuming that a broadcasters’ 
retransmission right is exists and is administered on an individual basis, the 
retransmitting party must negotiate a retransmission agreement with the original 
broadcaster.  In addition to the broadcaster’s retransmission right, there will also 
be negotiations for the content retransmission rights assigned to the broadcaster 
by other rightsholders. There is no increase in search costs, as the retransmitting 
party is already negotiating with the broadcaster irrespective of Article 10 
assignments by other rightsholders. However, there might be greater negotiating 
costs as there is a larger bundle of rights being negotiated for.  
 
In Regime F, collective management is mandatory, but exclusive assignments such 
as those under Satellite-Cable Directive Article 10 are not possible. This 
represents a further restriction of the freedom of contract of the rightsholder, 
whose only active decision is to choose the CMO to which they belong. However, 
often there is no such choice, as the rightsholder might be restricted to the CMOs 
within their jurisdiction, which might be statutory or natural monopolies. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 9, where there is strong harmonised 
oversight over CMOs, there services are almost perfectly substitutable, and there 
is no major incentive to practice arbitrage regarding membership between 
different organisations. The only effective aspect of freedom of contract that is 
maintained is the rightsholder’s ability to influence the licencing decisions of the 
CMO, given that the CMO is an agent of its members. However again, if there are 
strong regulatory requirements of non-discrimination in licencing practices, the 
CMO is quite limited to its ability to make licencing decisions in the first place.  
 
In this Regime, transaction costs are lower than in Regime E, because negotiations 
with the original broadcaster are simpler and less costly. Furthermore, in the 
absence of broadcasters’ rights (or where there is a strong limitation or exemption 
to broadcasters’ rights such as a compulsory licence or must-carry status), there 
may be no negotiating costs with the broadcaster at all.  
 
[10]-2.2.4 Non-voluntary Licencing 
 
The next case is Regime G, in which there is compulsory licencing. A compulsory 
licence is where the rightsholders have a duty to deal with users, and hence do not 
have the freedom of contract to deny a licencing request. Legal rules therefore 
mandate that rightsholders execute licences with broadcasters. In addition, 
regulations may also provide for some mechanism to collect and distribute the 
fees associated with compulsory licences, akin to the role of a CMO.   
 
A compulsory licence is a mechanism that is mandated by a given competent 
authority – including courts, regulators, arbitration panels, or law-makers. In 
addition, the compulsory licence technically has to be asserted by the user – the 
restriction on the freedom of contract for the rightsholder is that they cannot deny 
the licence (i.e. authorisation is compulsory). Since the inability to deny a licence 
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causes a collapse of the price mechanism, the compulsory licence is also normally 
associated with a regulated royalty rate, or at least strict terms for how such a rate 
is calculated. 
 
Regime H, is the case of the statutory licence, which is a special case of a 
compulsory licence; the difference is somewhat pedantic. The statutory licence is 
explicitly provided for in legislation (or regulations), and hence a request for 
authorisation does not need to be initiated by a user. Authorisation is given by 
virtue of the applicable legal rules themselves. Hence, a licencing contract is 
conceptually in place even if the user does not actually undertake the particular 
activity in question. Furthermore, under a statutory licence the actual royalty rate 
is typically defined in the legal rule itself. 
 
The rightsholder has almost no freedom of contract in either regime, as they have 
no control over authorising usage. However, under a compulsory licence, the 
rightsholder might still be able to make representations before the competent 
authority (court, regulator, or arbitration panel) regarding the factors that should 
be taken into consideration in determining licencing terms, including royalty 
rates. Furthermore, such competent authorities play a more active role in the 
market and have a greater ability to modify rules based on changing market 
circumstances as compared to legislators. It can therefore be said that in this 
regard, the freedoms of rightsholders are even more restricted under a statutory 
licence than under other forms of compulsory licences. 
 
In both regimes, transaction costs are eliminated, at least in terms of negotiating 
costs. There are however still search costs, as the broadcaster may have to assert 
the authorisation, or even distribute the regulated payments to rightsholders. 
These regimes therefore only truly minimise transaction costs is they are 
complimented by an institutional mechanism to collect and redistribute royalty 
payments. In both cases, legal certainty is extremely high as there is certainty that 
authorisation from all relevant rightsholders has been facilitated. 
 
The last case, Regime I, is exhaustion. Exhaustion is where exclusive rights can no 
longer be exercised after initially being exercised. In this case, it is to say that once 
the right to communicate a work to the public has been exercised, the right to 
influence any further distribution (i.e. retransmission) no longer exists.  The 
concept of exhaustion is discussed in detail later in this chapter. Nevertheless, for 
the sake of completeness, it is noted that exhaustion represents a regime that 
completely eliminates all freedom of contract of the rightsholder, as there is no 
longer any right or entitlement on which a contract can be based. Similarly, legal 
certainty is maximised as the absence of rights implies the absence of liability for 
retransmitters, and transaction costs are zero as there is no transaction to be 
performed. However, such a system would not be permissible under international 
copyright as a limitation and exception, as it would deny the rightsholder the right 
to equitable remuneration.  
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[10]-3 RETRANSMISSION THROUGH ANALYTICAL LENSES 
 
The above section aimed at establishing a taxonomy of policy tools for limiting 
retransmission rights. With this established, the section below aims at analysing 
these tools using the lenses of three different perspectives: (i) default rules, (ii) 
property and liability rules, and (iii) the doctrine of copyright exhaustion.  
 
 
[10]-3.1 Default Contractual Rules 
 
When contracting, parties draft a contract so as to provide for terms for various 
circumstances, many of which might be changing due to external factors. 
However, as parties seek more detailed contractual terms to account for different 
situations, transaction costs (particularly in the form of negotiating costs) 
increase. Therefore, there are often various situations that parties do not explicitly 
contract terms to accommodate, because to do so might be too costly. In such 
cases, the legal system filling in these gaps through ‘default rules’.476 One of the 
purposes for such rules is to attempt to substitute for the actual terms that the 
parties would have contracted into in the absence of transactions costs.  
 
 
However, there may be circumstances where transactions costs are so high that 
they prevent parties from contracting in the first place. In such cases, the legal 
system might adopt an approach of ‘regulation which mimics the market’, by 
imposing default rules that parties would have contracted into had the costs of 
contracting not been prohibitive.  
 
Framing limitations to retransmission rights as default rules therefore bears great 
similarity to the transaction cost perspective of limitations and exceptions 
discussed in Chapter 6; i.e. that the role of limitations such as Fair Use is to 
facilitate uses that have been excluded due to prohibitive transaction costs. 
However, an important difference is that a justification of Fair Use amounts to an 
exception to copyright, and hence a bypassing of the exclusive right altogether. On 
the other hand, application of a default rule facilitates mutual contractual 
exchange, and hence leaves the right to equitable remuneration intact.  
 
Furthermore, in terms of trying to explain retransmission agreements (and the 
rights that underpin them), it should be noted that there are four relevant 
contracting parties: rightsholders, the initial broadcaster, the retransmitter, and 
CMO intermediaries. However, the retransmission is subject to a series of 
agreements between different sets of two of these parties, namely (i) the 
rightsholder and the broadcaster, and (ii) the retransmitter and the broadcaster. 
There are no explicit voluntary agreements between rightsholders and 
retransmitters, which speaks to the core issue of prohibitive transaction costs 
(and inherent unpredictability) in retransmission activities.  
 
                                                        
476 Parisi, F. (2013) – The Language of Law and Economics, Cambridge Press; entry for ‘default 
rules’  
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As property rights can also be a tool for minimising transaction costs associated 
with voluntary contracting, broadcasters’ rights can be seen as such a mechanism. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 7, there are various conceptual problems with 
this justification of moving from contracts to property rights in this case, 
particularly in the context of enforcement again infringements.   
 
Policy tools used to limit rightsholders’ retransmission rights can however still be 
understood through the lens of default rules, particularly in terms of the use of 
CMOs. Extended Collective Management is the regime best explained using such a 
perspective. In this case, regulations provide that in the absence of an explicit 
agreement between rightsholders and certain users (namely retransmitters), a 
default rule of CMO representation is applied, whereby the CMO has a presumed 
capacity to represent the rightsholder. While the rightsholder has contracted with 
the initial broadcaster, in the absence of a provision to the contrary, the 
retransmission right is assumed to be administered through the CMO.  
 
Generally, this might be seen as a ‘majoritarian default rule’, as it would be the 
arrangement that most rightsholders would choose in any case in the absence of 
transaction costs.  However, for owners of high-value works that might attract 
remuneration greater if licenced individually, this may also be seen in some ways 
as a ‘penalty default rule’. This is because extended CMO representation provides 
an incentive to either explicitly contract or not, and mitigate the inefficiencies 
involved with legal uncertainty of not having a declared position. In both cases, 
the important thing to note is that rightsholders are still free to explicitly contract 
an alternative arrangement to the default rule, by either transferring 
retransmission rights to the broadcaster, or executing a separate contract with the 
retransmitter. 
 
Another explanation of extended collective management is that it equates to a shift 
in the presumption of CMO representation, and hence the presumption of 
authorisation once a broadcaster does indeed hold a CMO licence. Hence, the 
default mechanism through which the rightsholder’s exclusive rights are 
exercised shifts from one of ‘authorisation’ to one of ‘prohibition’; i.e. the 
broadcaster is presumed to be authorised to use the work (in its capacity as a CMO 
licensee) unless expressly prohibited by the rightsholder. As discussed in Chapter 
6, this shift is in itself a mechanism to limit the breadth of intellectual property 
rights. 
 
To a less extent, default rules might also explain the model of mandatory collective 
management where assignment is possible. In this case, the contractual choice is 
between authorising retransmission through CMO representation, and an 
exclusive assignment to the initial broadcaster. The default rule in this case is that 
representation is through a CMO, which is the relatively more efficient alternative, 
as assignment can result in increased negotiating and contracting costs as 
discussed above. 
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[10]-3.2 Property and Liability Rules 
 
The notion of ‘Property Rules versus Liability Rules’ is a central theme in the field 
of law and economics, and is a very powerful tool for engaging in the economic 
analysis of intellectual property law. Calabresi and Melamed (1972)477 provide 
the foundations of this area and discuss how these two mechanisms for protecting 
legal entitlements differ.  
 
Property rules allow the entitlement holder alone to determine the market 
exchange price for use of the entitlement. The legal system supports this property 
rule through injunctive relief; i.e. users cannot use the entitlement unless 
explicitly authorised to do so. In contrast, liability rules allow a user to use the 
entitlement without explicit authorisation of the entitlement holder, once 
adequate compensation is paid. The legal system supports these liability rules 
through awarding damages to entitlement holders, rather than injunctive relief.  
 
The standard case is generally that copyright takes the form of a property rule. 
However, while related rights are constructed to generally take the form of 
exclusive rights, in many cases – such as in broadcasting – they are reduced to a 
mere ‘right to equitable remuneration’, which is a form of a liability rule.  
 
Generally speaking, the law and economics of property and liability rules finds 
that when transaction costs are low, property rules are more efficient, as parties 
can freely negotiate for the use of an entitlement. In contrast, when transaction 
costs are high, liability rules have a comparative advantage, as prevailing 
transaction costs reduce the ability of parties to efficiently bargain.  
 
The standard case of individual licencing of retransmission rights is clearly a 
property right. Regimes of voluntary collective management (both exclusive of 
non-exclusive) are also property rules, just that the rightsholder choose to use the 
CMO as an intermediary for administration of the right; the CMO merely acts as a 
repository of accumulated and consolidated individual rights which reduces the 
transaction costs associated with individual licencing.  
 
In the case of compulsory or statutory licencing, the regime is clearly one of a 
liability rule. Rightsholders do not have the ability to bargain for use of their rights 
or determine the price of authorisation. Their rights have been reduced to an 
entitlement to compensation, and such compensation is determined by a 
competent authority. Given the transaction costs intensive environment of 
retransmission activities, it is therefore obvious why liability rule regimes are a 
prevalent policy choice for such secondary broadcasts.   
 
Where collective management is mandatory however, such regimes are an 
interesting middle-ground between property and liability rule regimes. While 
CMOs act as consolidated administrators of individual property rules, the fact that 
individual rightsholders do not have direct influence over the licencing terms for 
                                                        
477 Calabresi, G. and Melamed, A. A. (1972) - Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 Harvard Law Review 1089 
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the use of their works (i.e. no possibility for direct licencing) makes this scenario 
resemble a liability regime. However – in principle – individual rightsholders have 
some say in the activities of their representing CMOs who act as their agents; 
therefore, some semblance of a property rule system is maintained.  
 
In de jure terms the CMO still make active licencing decisions based on property 
rules. In de facto terms however, their ability to make such decisions might be 
limited. As argued in Chapter 9, strong oversight over CMOs reduced the scope for 
individual organisations to determine licencing conditions, inclusive of prevailing 
royalty rates. Therefore, while mandatory collective management model remains 
at its core a property rule regime, the greater the degree of market integration and 
regulatory supervision, the more that such a system resembles a liability rule 
regime. It can even be said that mandatory collective management converges to a 
compulsory licencing regime, albeit where the ‘competent authority’ for 
determining compensation are market conditions themselves.  
 
On this point, one common criticism of liability rules is that it is difficult (and 
costly) to determine the exact level of damages that should be awarded. 
Furthermore, there are administrative costs associated with liability rules. In the 
case of retransmission however, liability rules would apply equally to a large 
group of interested parties.  There would hence be significant economies of scale 
in determining and administering remuneration rates, unlike court-ordered tort 
damages, which are determined on a case-by-case basis.  
 
Furthermore, such rules would tend to average out the compensation offered to 
rightsholders. The consequence here is that some rights holders might be 
overcompensated (relative to the actual market value for the exploitation of their 
works), while some are undercompensated. Essentially, a single remuneration 
rate – whether administered through a CMO or a compulsory licence – would 
effectively create a subsidy for lower-valued works, funded by rights holders of 
higher-valued works.  
 
Given the tendency for content production and distribution markets to be 
oligopolistic, higher-valued works might tend to be high budget works targeted 
for larger audiences. Hence, such a subsidy would consistent with the public policy 
dimensions of broadcasting (discussed in Chapter 4), such as promoting localism 
and pluralism.  
 
Furthermore, another major advantage of liability rules over property rules is 
their ability to mitigate holdout problems when entitlements must be sought from 
a large number of rightsholders.  Such problems are briefly discussed in the sub-
section below.  
 
[10]-3.2.1 Liability Rules and Holdout Problems  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, one of the key features of a broadcasting schedule is its 
function in bundling individual programmes that have complimentary 
characteristics.  
 
 275
Where multiple property rights are involved for complimentary goods, there are 
however strong possibilities for holdout problems. Holdout problems occur 
where authorisation is needed from multiple owners of a fragmented property 
right, and hence each owner creates an externality on the others. The result is that 
each owner has an incentive to withhold authorisation in order to extract the 
maximum surplus possible from the buyer, hence leading to negotiating failures, 
and the inability to reach a Parato-optimal resource allocation.  
 
Annex 6 explains how these problems might arise in the context of a bundle of 
complimentary goods. 
 
In such cases, liability rules might be a useful tool for correcting the market 
failures associated with holdout problems induced by property rules. This is 
because no individual rightsholder would have the unilateral capacity to holdup 
the assembly of a bundle of programming content. Interestingly, this perspective 
suggests that liability rules may be useful, not only for cleaning rights for 
retransmissions, but even for clearing the rights contained in initial broadcasts, 
where such are bundles of complimentary programmes sourced from different 
rightsholders.  
 
 
[10]-3.3 Copyright Exhaustion 
 
The concept of copyright exhaustion is not only one of the possible regimes for 
retransmission described in the taxonomy above, but it is in itself another possible 
lens through which such rights can be analysed. Exhaustion refers to the 
circumstances in which intellectual property rights are no longer enforceable 
after some extent of exploitation.  
 
In terms of copyright law, exhaustion is normally used in the context of the right 
of distribution of some physical carrier in which some copyright protected work 
is embedded (e.g. a book or compact disk). Exhaustion can either take place at the 
national, regional, or international level. National exhaustion would mean that 
once a copyright holder authorises the sale of a book, that right of distribution is 
no longer applicable within the jurisdiction in which that book was sold; the result 
is that the copyright owner has no control over further distribution of the book 
(such as a second-hand sale) within the jurisdiction, but may exert control outside 
of the jurisdiction (e.g. over imports). If exhaustion were international, such 
control is not possible at all after the initial sale.   
 
In terms of international intellectual property law, individual jurisdictions are 
able to determine the exhaustion regime they wish to apply.478 In the European 
Union, a regime of regional exhaustion is followed. Article 4(2) of the Information 
Society Directive provides that an author’s distribution right is exhausted only 
                                                        
478 Article 5 of the TRIPs Agreement states that “For the purposes of dispute settlement under this 
Agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 [National Treatment and Most-Favoured-
Nation Treatment] nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of 
intellectual property rights.” 
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after the first sale or transfer of a work (or copies thereof) is made with the 
consent of the rightsholder. 479  However, such exhaustion applies to only 
distribution rights. The right of public communication – the right exploited in the 
act of broadcasting – is explicitly not subject to exhaustion; this is hence an 
indirect affirmation that the right of public communication includes a 
retransmission right in addition to a broadcasting right.480 Nevertheless, it is still 
worth giving some attention to how exhaustion doctrines might inform a 
theoretical understanding of retransmission rights.  
 
Exhaustion doctrines have several positive spillover effects.481 Firstly, they create 
secondary markets, which increases overall access to works and gives creators 
incentives to improve their offerings to compete with such markets. Secondly, it 
promotes cultural preservation and access to controversial works whose 
distribution might be otherwise limited in politically repressive environments. 
Thirdly, and of most relevance to the analysis at hand, they reduce transaction 
costs between rightsholders and users, particularly in terms of information costs 
for users who must ascertain what restrictions on use may apply, and possible 
hold-up problems. Additionally, exhaustion also facilitates the decentralisation of 
innovation, as it allows users to adapt and modify products pursuant to their own 
preferences and interests. Lastly, exhaustion facilitates competition between 
technological platforms, as there is a reduced scope for consumers to be locked-in 
to specific platforms, and content can be ported between competing platforms. 
 
In the context of retransmission, exhaustion – as a structural limit on copyright 
and related rights – therefore has relevance as a mechanism to reduce the 
transaction costs between rightsholders and retransmitters. However, it also has 
relevance as a means of promoting competition between different technological 
platforms for distributing audiovisual content, such as online distribution. As 
argued in Chapter 9, a technologically neutral model of regulating retransmission 
would provide for an enabling environment for technological innovation.  
 
Despite these possible welfare-enhancing aspects, there might also be welfare 
decreasing effects if exhaustion greatly diminishes the production incentives that 
copyright is supposed to provide in the first place. In this regard, it is useful to 
make distinctions between after-market uses by individual consumers and uses 
by other commercial entities. Where uses are productive in nature and interact 
with other products and services to generate some personal gain (as opposed to 
unproductive, such as use by individual consumers), it may be reasonable and 
                                                        
479 Information Society Directive Article 4(2) states as follows: “The distribution right shall not be 
exhausted within the Community in respect of the original or copies of the work, except where the 
first sale or other transfer of ownership in the Community of that object is made by the right-holder 
or with his consent.” 
480 Information Society Directive Article 3(3) states as follows: “The rights referred to in paragraphs 
1 and 2 [communication to the public, and making available rights] shall not be exhausted by any act 
of communication to the public or making available to the public as set out in this Article.” 
481 Puig, A. R. (2013) – Copyright Exhaustion Rationales and Used Software: A Law and Economics 
Approach to Oracle v. UsedSoft, JUPITEC 3, 159 
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socially desirable to allow copyright holders to extend some control on a product 
even after it has left their (initial) commercial sphere.482  
 
In the case of retransmissions, the specific users (retransmitters) are not 
individual consumers, but commercial entities using broadcast content for profit. 
Therefore, complete exhaustion – while reducing transaction costs and facilitating 
innovation – might not be the best solution. It is possible that full exhaustion might 
result in dilution of the initial incentives provided by the copyright system. As 
such, an intermediary solution, such as that of mandatory collective management 
or a compulsory licence might be optimal. 
 
[10]-3.3.1 Exhaustion and Pro-Competitive Restraints 
 
While exhaustion may have various spillover effects, it may also create an obstacle 
to certain pro-competitive practices. The ability to control distribution even after 
an initial distribution is a major area for competition regulation. Such control may 
take the form of either vertical or horizontal constraints. Law and Economics has 
increasingly highlighted the possible pro-competitive effects of vertical restraints 
in certain settings.483 In contrast, horizontal constraints are still generally seen as 
anti-competitive in nature.  
 
It is difficult to classify the relationship between a broadcaster and a 
retransmitted as categorically ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical’. The relationship is vertical 
as the retransmitter operates further down the value chain, and ‘re-distributes’ 
the signal of the original broadcaster, and possibly even operates in a distant 
market. However, where the two operate in the same local market, they may have 
a somewhat horizontal relationship in that they compete for audience reach. The 
nature of the horizontal relationship between a broadcaster and a retransmitter 
depends on the relationship between their audiences; this is discussed in the 
section on ‘A New Public’ below.   
 
In terms of vertical restraints, the idea is that distributors are provided with 
incentives to make specific investments in the context of long-term contracts.484 
These investments create efficient distribution networks by providing for services 
like localised advertising, pre-sale promotion, and after-sale support. However, 
such investments do not form a major part of broadcasting services. Firstly, since 
broadcasting is only one means of distributing a work (and the distribution 
platform closer to the end of the value chain), it is not necessarily associated with 
major advertising or pre-sale activities. However, local broadcasters may indeed 
make investments in advertising a given work to increase its potential viewership, 
which can be undermined by parallel imports of a broadcast distribution; this very 
specific case is discussed below. Additionally, since the value of a broadcast is by 
definition instantaneous, the issue of investments in areas like post-sale and 
support services do not arise.  
 
                                                        
482 Puig (2013); Paragraph 26 
483 For a discussion on this issue, see Hovenkamp (2011) 
484 Puig (2013); Paragraph 39 
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Another economic argument against exhaustion is that it limits the ability of 
rightsholders to engage in price discrimination. 485  Price discrimination is the 
ability of a supplier to charge the maximum price to individual consumers, 
according to their respective reservation price and willingness to pay. In some 
circumstances, price discrimination can be welfare enhancing, as it minimises the 
deadweight losses that result from a single monopoly price that may be associated 
with a property right. However, the concept of price discrimination simply does 
not apply – and cannot apply – to the case of any broadcasting service for the 
simple reason that such services are by definition provided to multiple-users 
simultaneously.  
 
Therefore, arguments for limited application of exhaustion doctrine, based on 
supposed pro-competitive effects of vertical constraints and price discrimination, 
simply do not apply in the case of broadcast retransmissions.  
 
[10]-3.3.2 Exhaustion and Parallel Importation  
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, one of the major implications of exhaustion policy in 
other areas of intellectual property (namely in patents), is to regulate parallel 
importation. However, due to the nature of broadcast transmissions, the issue of 
parallel importation generally does not arise in a major way for broadcasters’ 
rights. They may however arise in the case of copyright protected works. 
 
For example, a work may be licenced for exclusive broadcast to broadcaster A in 
country A, and to broadcaster B in country B. However, another entity C (also in 
country A) may retransmit the foreign signal of broadcaster B in country in A. Both 
C and A therefore transmit the same work in country A, and compete for the same 
fixed audience; this would be to the commercial detriment of broadcaster A who 
would have otherwise had exclusive distribution in territory A. This is indeed a 
situation that is a form of parallel importation. If the rightsholder’s right to 
authorise public communication via broadcast is fully exhausted, then they cannot 
prohibit the ‘importation’ of the content via C’s retransmission of B’s signal. With 
full exhaustion, the initial incentives of the copyright system might actually result 
in the content own having a disincentive to pursue broadcast licensees at all, and 
instead pursue other more profitable horizontal modes of distribution. 
 
However, if the property right is limited to a compensatory liability rule, the 
rightsholder will still receive remuneration from C to compensate for the revenues 
potentially lost due to undermining A’s exclusivity. Broadcaster A however – as 
the local licensee – loses revenue, as some viewers might switch to C’s 
retransmission of B’s signal instead.  
 
In situations like this communications regulators may use policy tools outside of 
the property rights system to accommodate the commercial interests of the local 
broadcaster. In this scenario, a ‘local substitution’ rule might be used. Such a rule 
requires that when there is simultaneously a local and foreign broadcast of the 
same content, all platforms must – for the duration of the simultaneously aired 
                                                        
485 Puig (2013); Paragraph 55 
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programme – substitute the foreign signal with the local signal. Therefore, any 
cable or other subscription networks retransmitting foreign signals essentially 
‘redirect’ local consumers to the local signal. The effect is that the local 
broadcaster is able to maintain their exclusivity for the specific programme and 
maximise its audience reach (and hence advertising revenue), while 
retransmissions of foreign signals are still permitted.  
 
Similar to the US case study in Annex 5, this is an example of how regulatory rules 
in the communications sector can be used to solve the issues specific to 
retransmission markets, without relying on expanding the exclusive rights of 
private parties.  
 
 
[10]-4 THE LINKS BETWEEN DIFFERENT RETRANSMISSION RIGHTS 
 
 
The previous two sections focussed on the retransmission rights of copyright 
owners. To build an understanding of the retransmission rights of broadcasters, it 
is necessary to understand the relationship between this two sets of rights. 
 
Copyright owners (and to an extent, producers and performers) have certain 
public communication rights which are the basis on which works are included in 
broadcast communications. When those work are broadcast, the related right of 
the broadcasting organisation also comes into existence.  
 
Any transmission would then be based on the retransmission right of the first 
broadcaster, as well as the retransmission right of the copyright owners (which 
its itself another manifestation of the broader public communication right).  
 
In this process, the activation of the related right of the broadcasting organisation 
is inseparable from the activation of the retransmission rights of the copyright 
owners. The question as to whether the broadcasters’ rights have been triggered 
therefore depends on a determination as to whether the public communication 
right has been triggered a second time. 
 
At its core, the issue relates the boundaries between the activities of broadcasting 
and retransmission. Understanding these boundaries is therefore central to 
understanding the scope of nature of broadcasters’ rights themselves. 
Conveniently, because of the concurrence of activation of the rights, such an 
understanding can indirectly come from an analysis and interpretation of 
copyright without the need to directly consider related rights. 
 
Accordingly, this section focusses on the relationship between the activities of 
broadcasting and retransmission from legal and technical perspectives.  
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[10]-4.1 Relevance of Boundaries 
 
There are virtually infinite possible scenarios that might involve the use of a work 
embedded in a broadcast, as there are limitless possible combinations of places, 
times, and context in which a broadcast - like any other subject matter - may be 
used. In each such case, the balance of economic interests between rightsholders, 
the user, and society would be different. 
 
However, the legal system cannot be expected to consider this balance of interests 
on a case-by-case basis in terms making determinations on copyright 
exploitation.486 Firstly, such a case-by-case analysis would be disproportionately 
and prohibitively costly to administer given the global frequency of use of 
copyright-protected works. Secondly, such a case-by-case analysis would imply 
that there would be little a priori certainty as to whether a given use is permissible, 
and hence many possible socially beneficial uses might not be undertaken in the 
first place. As a result, legal rules regarding property rights should provide some 
optimal level of certainty and delineate the conditions of copyright 
exploitation. This is the purpose of defining and interpreting the concept of 
'communication to the public'.  
 
A finding that a communication to the public has occurred triggers the property 
right, and the ability of the rightsholder to capitalize on their economic interests 
by capturing a portion of the generated welfare. This is not to say that 
rightsholders have no economic interest where a given use is not deemed as a 
'communication to the public', but rather that the overall balance of interests does 
not lead to their rights being triggered. 
 
When the communication in question is a secondary use (i.e. a retransmission or 
public use of a transmission), the situation is a bit more complicated. If the rights 
of both the broadcaster and copyright owners are triggered, then the value 
captured through the use of private property rights would be shared between the 
parties. 
 
The question of interpreting the notion of ‘communication to the public’ therefore 
not only conditions the ability of rightsholders to capture value-added, but also 
dictates the parties amongst who that value is distributed.  
 
Defining the boundaries between broadcasting and retransmission – within the 
larger context of communication to the public – therefore directly conditions the 
effective scope of the rights of the broadcasting organisation. Conceptually, it 
might be possible to grant broadcasters a retransmission right, but if 
retransmission is defined so narrowly that this right is never triggered, then right 
has no practical effect.  
 
 
 
                                                        
486 On this issue, the Law and Economics literature on ‘Rules vs Standards’ stresses that there is a 
trade off in terms of the specificity of a legal rules and how effectively they are administered.  
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[10]-4.2 The Notion of a New Public  
 
The question of retransmitting a broadcast signal is inseparable from the question 
of public communication of the content embedded in that signal. Therefore, it is 
useful to pay attention of the matter of how the concept of ‘communication to the 
public’ is interpreted. 
 
This section analyses selected case law on the concept of ‘communication to the 
public’, with a thematic focus on the concept of ‘a new public’. It will highlight the 
apparent inconsistencies of the court in this regard, and the effect this has on the 
boundaries of retransmission rights themselves. This will then be used to make 
some commentary on the theoretical composition of broadcasters’ related rights. 
 
[10]-4.2.1 The New Public in the US 
 
As noted in Annex 5, much of the early stages of the US retransmission regime 
focussed on interpreting the notion of ‘public communication’ of works. An 
important component of this interpretation is term ‘public’ which gives rise to a 
very critical question – should copyright law apply differently when a 
retransmission (or any ‘secondary’ communication) is made to the same audience as 
the initial communication, as opposed to being made to a ‘new public’? 
 
In the ‘Fortnightly’ case, SCOTUS ruled that no communication to the public was 
made, as the ‘retransmission’ was made to a public group already included within 
the intended reception area of the initial broadcast. The act of retransmission 
hence amounted to a technical assistance for better reception.  
 
In the ‘Teleprompter Case’, SCOTUS also ruled that the ‘retransmission’ did not 
amount to a public communication of protected works, even though the secondary 
communication was essentially to a new audience. In that case, the court 
considered the business model used by the initial broadcaster. Since the initial 
broadcast was funded through advertising revenue (some of which would be 
remitted to copyright owners), retransmissions expanded audience reach and 
hence the value of advertising. It was therefore in the commercial interests of both 
the broadcaster and rightsholders to permit retransmissions.  
 
Since those judgments, the US system has of course become considerably more 
refined. However, the notion of communication to the public – and how limitations 
to such may apply – are strongly linked to the features of the broader 
communications sector regulatory regime. Since broadcasters are licenced on a 
territorial basis, there is complete and certain information on the audience scope 
of a given broadcaster, and definitive determinations can be made about the 
locality of a broadcast. Therefore, there can be great certainly about the rules that 
apply for retransmissions, including how to apply the provisions of the 
compulsory licence, retransmission consent, and distant signal importation rules.  
 
In the US system, there is hence considerable certainty with the interpretation of 
the notion of a new public, and how it relates to triggering retransmission rules.  
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[10]-4.2.2 A New Public and Public Communication in the EU 
 
In the European Union, there is much less legal certainty about how the right of 
public communication applies for ‘secondary communications’. In fact, 
interpreting the notion of ‘communication to the public’ is one of the most 
notoriously challenging aspects of EU copyright law. There are several cases from 
the European Court of Justice on the matter of interpreting the public 
communication right under Article 3 of the Information Society Directive.  
  
One of the challenges in this regard is that – as discussed in a previous section of 
this chapter – European Copyright law constructs a very broad concept of public 
communication. This broad conception subsumes all three rights outlined in 
Article 11bis(1) of the Berne Convention under Article 3(1) of the Information 
Society Directive: (i) the broadcast right, (ii) the retransmission right, and (iii) the 
right of public communication of a broadcast.487  
 
The interpretive guide to the Berne Convention does however give some support 
to this approach, mainly by noting that the three rights under Article 11bis are not 
mutually exclusive but should be understood as cumulative. 488  Consolidating 
them into a broader right hence might even create more legal certainty by 
avoiding possible doctrinal loopholes in attempting to apply discretely defined 
sub-rights.  
 
The core question of defining a communication to the public for a secondary 
transmission is whether a rightsholder’s authorisation to communicate a work in 
a broadcast covers subsequent uses of that broadcast. According the Guide to the 
Berne Convention – the answer is explicitly “no”.489 This is because, both public 
communication of broadcast containing a work (e.g. via loudspeaker) and 
retransmission of a broadcast create a situation where ‘an additional section of the 
public is enabled to enjoy the work and it ceases to be merely a matter of 
broadcasting’.490 Interpreting the concept of ‘an additional section of the public’, 
or rather the notion of ‘new public’, is therefore critical.  
 
                                                        
487  Recital 23 of the Information Society supports such a broad interpretation of the public 
communication right, and states as follows: “This Directive should harmonise further the author's 
right of communication to the public. This right should be understood in a broad sense covering all 
communication to the public not present at the place where the communication originates. This right 
should cover any such transmission or retransmission of a work to the public by wire or wireless 
means, including broad- casting. This right should not cover any other acts.” 
488 WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention; page 69 (paragraph 11bis.14) 
489 WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention; page 68 (paragraph 11bis.11/12) 
490 “Just as, in the case of a relay of a broadcast by wire, an additional audience is created (paragraph 
(1) (ii)), so, in this case too, the work is made perceptible to listeners (and perhaps viewers) other 
than those contemplated by the author when his permission was given. Although, by definition, the 
number of people receiving a broadcast cannot be ascertained with any certainty, the author thinks 
of his licence to broadcast as covering only the direct audience receiving the signal within the family 
circle. Once this reception is done in order to entertain a wider circle, often for profit, an additional 
section of the public is enabled to enjoy the work and it ceases to be merely a matter of broadcasting. 
The author is given control over this new public performance of his work.” - WIPO Guide to the Berne 
Convention; page 68 (paragraph 11bis.12) 
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The purpose of the above discussion is to provide some context for the section 
below on selected European Court of Justice (ECJ) cases on interpretation of 
Article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive. While some of these cases may 
not explicitly relate to broadcast retransmissions (at least in the traditional 
sense), clarifications on ‘public communication’ would be a pre-requisite for 
understanding whether certain acts are deemed as retransmissions in the 
meaning of copyright law, and hence whether the question of broadcasting rights 
presumably arises at all.  
 
[10]-4.2.3 Communication in Public Places  
 
The first case for discussion is known as the Hoteles Case, ruled on in 2006.491 This 
case involved a hotel owner who provided television sets in hotel rooms, resulting 
in a dispute with the relevant national collective management society 
representing authors of musical works in Spain. As an interesting historical note, 
the use of broadcasts in hotels has specifically always been a key driver of the 
evolution of case law on the retransmission right in several jurisdictions.492  
 
In this case, the ECJ ruled that “While the mere provision of physical facilities does 
not as such amount to communication […], the distribution of a signal by means of 
television sets by a hotel to customers staying in its rooms, whatever technique is 
used to transmit the signal, constitutes communication to the public within the 
meaning of Article 3(1) of [The Information Society Directive]’. Furthermore, the 
Court ruled that “The private nature of hotel rooms does not preclude the 
communication of a work by means of television sets from constituting 
communication to the public”.493  
 
In arriving at this determination, the Court considered the fact that the presence 
of television sets (and the ability to receive broadcasts) resulted in some implied 
commercial benefit to the hotel494, and that the although reception of broadcasts 
might be by individual room occupants, there is a cumulative effect of multiple 
rooms with successive turnover; 495  hence, hotel clientele constitute a new 
public.496  
 
These factors are significant as the ruling in Hoteles contrasts with the 2012 ECJ 
Judgement on the Del Corso Case.497 The latter case involved a dentist who played 
protected phonograms in his dental office while treating patients. However, in that 
case – and unlike in the Hoteles Case – the ECJ ruled that such use of protected 
                                                        
491 European Court of Justice Case C-306/05 - Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España 
(SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA; Judgement decided on 7 December 2006 
492 For an overview of such history, generally see Gendreau (1990) 
493 ECJ Judgment on Case C-306/05; Final Ruling 
494 ECJ Hoteles Judgement; Paragraph 44 
495 ECJ Hoteles Judgement; Paragraph 38/39 
496 ECJ Hoteles Judgement; Paragraph 42 
497 European Court of Justice Case C-135/10, SCF v Del Corso (C-135/10) - Società Consortile 
Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso; Judgement decided on 15 March 2012 
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works did not amount to public communication. One of the factors in that case 
seemed to be that patients were not active in the choice of whether to enjoy 
listening to the protected works, and that these patients are at the office solely to 
receive dental treatment, which is unaffected by the ‘broadcast’ of musical 
works. 498  Similar issues were then again analysed in the Osa 499  and Reha 
Training500 Cases, which involved the use of works at a spa and at a rehabilitation 
centre respectively. In both cases, the ECJ ruled that there was some competitive 
or commercial benefit to use of protected works, and hence such use does 
constitute a public communication. 
 
The purpose of comparing these two cases – none of which involve retransmission 
– is that in interpreting public communication, the logic of the ECJ is that clearly 
those contextual factors must be taken in to consideration. However, commercial 
and competitive context appears to be one important factor.  
 
[10]-4.2.4 TV-Catch-Up I Case 
 
The next case to be discusses explicitly involves the concept of broadcast 
retransmission – the TV-Catch-Up I Case.501 This case involved a dispute between 
commercial broadcasters (who enjoyed both broadcasters’ rights in their signals 
and copyright in some of the content being broadcast), and an ‘internet 
broadcasting service’ which allowed users to view live steams of free-to-air 
television broadcasts. In this case, the ECJ ruled that: 
 
1.      The concept of ‘communication to the public’, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of 
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 
must be interpreted as meaning that it covers a retransmission of the works included in a 
terrestrial television broadcast 
 
– where the retransmission is made by an organisation other than the 
original broadcaster, 
 
– by means of an internet stream made available to the subscribers of that 
other organisation who may receive that retransmission by logging on to 
its server, 
 
                                                        
498 Paragraph 98 of the Judgment reads as follows: “The patients of a dentist visit a dental practice 
with the sole objective of receiving treatment, as the broadcasting of phonograms is in no way a part 
of dental treatment. They have access to certain phonograms by chance and without any active choice 
on their part, according to the time of their arrival at the practice and the length of time they wait 
and the nature of the treatment they undergo. Accordingly, it cannot be presumed that the usual 
customers of a dentist are receptive as regards the broadcast in question.” 
499 European Court of Justice Case C-351/12 - Ochranný svaz autorský pro práva k dílům hudebním 
o.s. v Léčebné lázně Mariánské Lázně a.s; Judgement decided on 27 February 2014 
500  European Court of Justice Case C-117/15 - Reha Training Gesellschaft für Sport- und 
Unfallrehabilitation mbH v Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische 
Vervielfältigungsrechte eV (GEMA); Judgement decided on 31 May 2016 
501 European Court of Justice Case C-607/11 - ITV Broadcasting Ltd, ITV 2 Ltd, ITV Digital Channels 
Ltd, Channel 4 Television Corporation, 4 Ventures Ltd, Channel 5 Broadcasting Ltd, ITV Studios Ltd 
v TVCatchup Ltd; Judgement decided on 7 March 2013 
 285
– even though those subscribers are within the area of reception of that 
terrestrial television broadcast and may lawfully receive the broadcast on 
a television receiver. 
 
2.      The answer to Question 1 is not influenced by the fact that a retransmission, such as 
that at issue in the main proceedings, is funded by advertising and is therefore of a profit-
making nature. 
 
3.      The answer to Question 1 is not influenced by the fact that a retransmission, such as 
that at issue in the main proceedings, is made by an organisation which is acting in direct 
competition with the original broadcaster. 
 
This ruling is extremely interesting for various reasons. Besides confirming that a 
retransmission is indeed a sub-set of the broader right to public communication, 
the ECJ ruled that a retransmission occurs even if the audience of the 
retransmission is the same as that of the initial broadcast. This hence seems to 
divert away from the concept of determining the notion of ‘a new public’.  
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the business model of the original broadcaster 
and the retransmitter – and their competitive relationship – was inconsequential. 
Hence the Court did not find any relevance in the argument that an advertising-
funded broadcaster would have some commercial gain from retransmissions to a 
new public, or that the retransmitter themselves also stands to commercial 
benefit.  Unlike the previous cases discussed above, commercial context here 
seemed irrelevant to the Court’s findings. 
 
Interestingly, the ruling of the court seemed to be based on the logic that following 
from the non-exhaustion of the public communication right, a retransmission by 
a technical means different from that of an initial broadcast is automatically a 
retransmission.502 Furthermore, this logic is not undermined by claims that the 
retransmission is made merely to improve technical reception.503 Essentially, the 
tradition of the Court has always been to interpret the issue in two steps: (i) the 
existence of a ‘communication’, and (ii) the existence of a ‘public’. In this case, the 
Court ruled that transmissions of a different technical means constitute a 
communication (as opposed to merely aiding technical reception of a pre-existing 
signal) 504 . Since this communication is of a different technical means and 
represents a new transmission, authorisation from copyright owners is required 
as the communication right is not exhausted. 505 The court also found that the 
audience of an internet broadcast does constitute a public. However, the most  
significant aspect of the Court’s judgement is that upon establishing that both a 
‘communication’ and a ‘public’ exists, it was irrelevant to determine whether this 
public is indeed a ‘new public’.506  
 
It is difficult to draw lessons from this case in terms of broadcasters’ related rights 
alone, as retransmission conflicts such as this involve both the copyright of 
                                                        
502 ECJ TV-Catch-Up I Judgement; Paragraphs 23-26 
503 ECJ TV-Catch-Up I Judgement; Paragraph 27 
504 ECJ TV-Catch-Up I Judgement; Paragraph 29 
505 ECJ TV-Catch-Up I Judgement; Paragraph 26 
506 ECJ TV-Catch-Up I Judgement; Paragraph 39 
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content owners and the related rights of broadcasting organisations. While the 
courts did recognize that broadcasters’ retransmission rights do come into play507, 
the questions posed to the ECJ by the referring court focused on copyright rather 
than related rights.  
 
Nevertheless, the implications of this case on understanding the relationship 
between the two sets of retransmission rights (i.e. authors and broadcasters) are 
significant. Unlike other forms of public communication, a retransmission 
necessarily involves the transmission of a new signal – albeit one derived from 
some initial signal. There is hence generally always communication via a new 
technical means. In such cases, the Court suggests that considering contextual 
factors – including the existence of a ‘new public’ is irrelevant to a determination 
on public communication. This is a totally different approach for other (non-
retransmission) forms of communication, even those that are based on ‘secondary 
uses’ such as airing broadcasts in public places. Consequently, this implies that in 
the eyes of the Court, the ‘retransmission’ aspect of the public communication 
right is stronger than the ‘public communication of a pre-existing broadcast’ 
aspect, as the legal benchmark for determining a communication to the public is 
lower for the former (i.e. it does not require the determination of ‘a new public’).  
 
This is troubling, as such acts also necessarily correlate the materialisation of 
certain separate and independent rights – the related rights of broadcastings 
organisations, which also includes a retransmission component. The act of 
broadcasting and subsequent retransmission can hence result in a strengthening 
of the overall level of protection, as compared to other analogous non-
broadcasting acts.  Furthermore, there is the implication that the court’s 
interpretation effectively fragments the right of public communication through 
different legal standards, rather than consolidating it as envisioned by the 
Information Society Directive.  
  
[10]-4.2.5 TV-Catch-Up II and Zürs.net Cases 
 
Further to the TV-Catch-Up I Case discussed above, the same internet 
retransmitter was also involved in the subsequent 2017 TV-Catch-Up II Case.508  
 
In this Case, the internet broadcaster – upon being found liable to copyright 
infringement under the TV-Catch-Up I Judgement – sought to rely on a defence 
under certain exemptions provided by the applicable national legislation of 
England. The exemptions in this case included that there is no copyright liability 
where the immediate cable retransmission is made in the same reception area as 
the initial broadcast. 509  The essence of this exception was that a ‘new public’ 
                                                        
507 ECJ TV-Catch-Up I Judgement; Paragraph 25 
508 European Court of Justice Case C-275/15 - ITV Broadcasting Limited, ITV2 Limited, ITV Digital 
Channels Limited, Channel Four Television Corporation, 4 Ventures Limited, Channel 5 
Broadcasting Limited, ITV Studios Limited v TVCatchup Limited (in administration), TVCatchup 
(UK) Limited, Media Resources Limited; Judgement decided on 1 March 2017. 
509 ECJ TV-Catch-Up II Judgement; Paragraph 9 
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would have to exist in order for copyright and related rights provisions on 
retransmission to be triggered. 
 
In its ruling, the ECJ found that not only were the provision of the Satellite-Cable 
Directive irrelevant for the case510 (as the retransmissions were not cross-border 
in nature), but also that such a limitation in national law was outside of the 
permitted limitations and exceptions of the Information Society Directive511.  
 
As such, the fact that the broadcasts in questions were subject to certain public 
service obligations in the national jurisdiction was irrelevant to the finding of 
infringement.512  The ruling of the case hence reinforced the strong interpretation 
of the public communication right – and how it relates to retransmission activities 
– under the TV-Catch-Up I Judgement. 
 
The last case to be discussed is the 2017 Zürs.net Case, 513  involving 
retransmissions using communal antenna installations. In this case, a cable 
installation network relied on an exception under the Austrian national legislation 
that suggested that a transmission by a community installation to less than 500 
subscribers does not constitute a ‘new broadcast’. Additionally, simultaneous and 
unaltered (re)transmissions of the national public broadcaster are understood as 
part of the initial broadcast.514  
 
In the spirit of the ruling in the TV-Catch-Up I Case, the Court found that the facts 
‘permit’ a finding of a communication to the public, as the transmission is made by 
a new technical means.515 However, in diverging from that precedent, the Court 
then went on to consider whether this communication was to a ‘new public’.516 
The Court ultimately found that there was no communication to the public in the 
meaning of copyright law. This finding was based on the fact that “the persons 
concerned have therefore been taken into account by the rightholders when they 
granted the original authorisation for the national broadcaster to broadcast those 
works”, and hence “the public to which Zürs.net distributes those works cannot be 
regarded as a new public”.517 
 
Despite this finding, the Court also ruled that the exception for community 
installation with less than 500 subscribers did not fall with the limitations and 
exceptions permitted by the Information Society Directive. 518  In making this 
                                                        
510 ECJ TV-Catch-Up II Judgement; Paragraph 21 
511 ECJ TV-Catch-Up II Judgement; Paragraph 24 
512 ECJ TV-Catch-Up II Judgement; Paragraph 28 
513 European Court of Justice – Case C-138/16 - Staatlich genehmigte Gesellschaft der Autoren, 
Komponisten und Musikverleger registrierte Genossenschaft mbH (AKM) v Zürs.net Betriebs 
GmbH; Judgement decided on 16 March 2017 
514 ECJ Zürs.net Judgement; Paragraph 9 
515 ECJ Zürs.net Judgement; Paragraph 26 
516 ECJ Zürs.net Judgement; Paragraph 27 
517 ECJ Zürs.net Judgement; Paragraph 29/30 
518 ECJ Zürs.net Judgement; Paragraph 42 
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determination, the Court did not apply the three-step-test for copyright 
exceptions, but rather considered the undesirable economic incentives created. 
The Court believed that such an exception could result in the entire national 
territory being services in parallel by individual installations subject to the ‘under 
500 subscribers’ exception.  
 
It should be noted that both the TV-Catch-Up II and Zürs.net Cases discussed above 
resulted in the invalidation of national limitations and exceptions for copyright. 
However, these exceptions took the form of no liability at all for the retransmitting 
parties. The rulings of the ECJ merely establish that copyright liability does exist, 
and does not negatively impact on the possible application of limitations on how 
those rights are administered (e.g. through compulsory licencing or mandatory 
collective management).  
 
Comparison of the TV-Catch-Up I and The Zürs.net Cases however provides for a 
much more serious implication. These two cases show that in determining 
whether a communication to the public has occurred – particularly in the context 
of broadcast retransmission – the ECJ seems to apply inconstant logic, or at least 
diverging legal tests. In the former case, the existence of a communication to the 
public was assumed based on use of a new technical means, without the need to 
determine whether ‘a new public’ existed. In the latter case however, the Court 
not only reverted back to the question of ‘a new public’, but also introduced a new 
test for this notion – the question of whether rightsholders would have 
internalised the presumption of a given public when making their initial licencing 
decisions.  
 
[10]-4.2.6 Overall Comments on Case-law  
 
The assessment of the case-law above shows that it is not a trivial task to define 
the relationship between the concepts of broadcasting and retransmission as 
different forms of communication to the public.  
 
In fact, it appears that it is difficult to even gain a clear understanding of the legal 
tests used – at least in the case of the EU – for determining when a communication 
to the public exists, and hence when retransmission rights come into play. In 
different cases, the courts have considered different factors including commercial 
context, technical means, the existence of a new public, geographical 
considerations, and the initial licencing assumption of rightsholders.  
  
It is therefore very difficult to draw strict boundaries between the acts of 
broadcasting and retransmission in legal application. It is consequently difficult to 
implement a predictable and coherent system to regulate retransmissions – even 
through a technologically neutral system – where there is legal uncertainty over 
whether a communication to the public (and hence a retransmission) exists in the 
first place. If retransmission rules are meant to create legal certainty, this can only 
be achieved if there is also certainty in interpretation of the fundamental public 
communication right. 
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In commenting on the history of the evolution of the retransmission right, 
Gendreau (1990) noted that “An unchecked growth of multiple interpretations on 
the notion of public performance represented a risk of confusion as articled policies 
were in the process of elaboration”. 519  This comment was made almost three 
decades ago, and of course, the landscape of broadcasting and retransmission has 
gotten considerably more complex since then, particularly in technical terms as 
discussed later in this chapter. The patchwork of ECJ case law in this area (which 
incidentally co-exists with an apparent overall policy patchwork as discussed in 
Chapter 8) might hence represent a re-emergence of the interpretive confusion 
that existed in the early stages of the evolution of retransmission activities.  
 
 
[10]-4.3 Implications for Broadcasters’ Rights 
 
The above discussion is useful for analysing the composition of the related rights 
of broadcasting organisation themselves. In particular, the opposing forces of 
unification and fragmentation at play in interpreting the public communication 
right, has implications for understanding broadcasters’ rights.  
 
Firstly, while the broadcasting and retransmission rights of copyright holders are 
components of a broader public communication right, the retransmission right of 
the broadcaster is a more discrete and compartmentalized right. However, the 
application of different legal tests to determine public communication can 
effectively fragment the public communication right into discrete components 
with different scopes. In particular, application of the ‘new technical means’ 
criterion results in a retransmission right which is stronger in scope of protection 
than other components of the public communication right.  
 
This fragmentation affects the scope of protection for the broadcaster. If public 
communication via technical means is assumed to trigger the copyright owner’s 
retransmission fragment (and hence also the broadcasters’ retransmission right), 
then lowering the standard for public communication via retransmission 
increases the scope and domain of the broadcaster’s related right.  
 
Additionally, review of the case law shows that there are certainly situations 
where the public communication right is triggered for a secondary use without 
trigging the retransmission right. This is an outcome of the broadness of public 
communication rights, and is a factor in favour of that rights’ unification (as 
opposed to its fragmentation). For example, in the Osa and Reha Training Cases, 
there was a finding of a new public communication although the context was not 
one of retransmission.  
 
This however, is not to say that in such cases, the rights of the broadcaster are not 
triggered. Indeed, under the Rome Convention (and the EU Rental Directive), the 
broadcaster has a right regarding communication of their broadcast. Again, this is 
a discrete and compartmentalized right as it only applies, where the 
                                                        
519 Gendreau (1990); at page 57 
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communication ‘is made in places accessible to the public against payments of an 
entrance fee’. It can thus be seen that there is potential tension between 
unification (on the copyright side) and compartmentalisation (on the related 
rights side), in terms of public communication via broadcast. 
 
To represent this conceptually, consider that among the range of possible uses of 
a broadcast, there is some distribution of the value created by users. For 
simplicity, consider three loose categories of users: (i) personal users, (ii) 
commercial users, and (iii) retransmitters.  Personal users are users who create a 
value too low to justify contracting into voluntary agreements with rightsholders. 
From a transaction cost perspective, such uses would qualify for limitations and 
exemptions. In terms of defining the boundaries between communications, these 
uses are considered to be within the scope of the initial public communication. 520 
 
Commercial users generate enough value-added from the use of a broadcast to 
justify possible contracting. Copyright owners would wish to capture this value, 
and hence in these cases, the boundaries of the initial communication would be 
contested. However, these uses do not necessarily trigger the broadcasters’ 
related right.521 
 
The third category is retransmitters whose activities trigger both the 
broadcaster’s related right, and the public communication right of the copyright 
owner. Any value captured would have to be shared between the broadcaster and 
the copyright owners. Additionally, because of the triggering of the retransmission 
process, the special case limitations on the rightsholders would apply.  
 
A major issue here is that applying a ‘new technical means’ criterion to determine 
retransmissions disrupts this categorisation. For example, there might be high-
value commercial uses which resemble retransmission activities in all but 
technical terms.522 In such cases, neither would the broadcaster have a means to 
capture value along with copyright holders, nor would the market correcting 
limitations on retransmission rights be triggered. In other cases, there might be 
low-value retransmission activities which resemble low-scale commercial 
activities, particularly where the services are not offered to a new public. In such 
cases, there would be liability for both copyright and broadcasters’ rights, even 
though value-added is low.523  
 
                                                        
520 The Del Corso Case discussed above would be an example. 
521 The Osa and Reha Training Cases discussed above would be examples.  
522 The Hoteles Case discussed above would be an example. 
523 The zürs.net Case is an example of this. However, it is noted that in that case, the court did use 
the ‘new public’ creation in addition to the ‘new technical means’ criterion is making a 
determination on communication to the public. 
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Figure 10.1: The Boundaries of Public Communication 
 
Between the boundaries of the initial communication and activities of 
retransmission, there is a grey area of commercial use. These uses may require 
authorisation from copyright holders but not necessarily broadcasters. Copyright 
owners would wish to curtail the boundaries of the initial communication so as to 
increase their ability to capture value from these secondary uses. Broadcasters 
might want to expand the definition of retransmission so as to also expand the 
scope of their rights and capture more value. This can also be done through 
expanding other components of the broadcasters’ related rights – for example by 
removing the ‘made in places accessible to the public against payments of an 
entrance fee’ limitation on the right of public use of transmissions.  
 
What is clear is that there is a gap between the rights of the two beneficiaries, 
created by the specificity of the broadcaster’s related rights and the broadness of 
the copyright holder’s public communication right.  
 
However, it is critical to note that this gap does not necessarily raise any welfare 
issue. If the use is deemed as a new communication, authorisation is needed from 
the copyright holders who are able to capture the entire value-added of the user. 
Furthermore, if these uses can be predicted, then they can be accounted for a 
priori during negotiations between the broadcaster and the copyright owners. Any 
value generated for the broadcaster (from increased audience penetration) can 
hence be internalised by the licensors, meaning that the copyright owners can end 
up capturing the full value-added from the activity. The issue is therefore purely 
one of distribution.  
 
If the gap was closed by expanding the broadcasters’ rights, then the situation is 
more complex. Both the broadcaster and the copyright own would wish to capture 
the value from the user. In theory, a holdout problem can arise, especially since 
there is no legal guarantee for a special case limitation (as would be the case if the 
activity were deemed a retransmission). If the licensor had already internalised 
the value-added from the broadcaster, then the broadcaster can actually come out 
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with a net loss.  This might also arise if for some reason, the use generates a high 
value for the broadcaster, but a low potential value for the copyright owners not 
justified by transaction costs. In practice, such problems are very unlikely to occur, 
and the scale of transactions for public communication of signals are generally 
much smaller than for traditional retransmission. Furthermore, even though 
limitations to retransmission rights are not guaranteed, in practice CMOs often 
manage public communication rights analogously. However, the point remains 
that the situation theoretically looks a lot like a retransmission – expanding the 
rights of the broadcaster is only viable with a corresponding limitation of the 
freedom of the copyright holder.  
 
In any case, concurrent rights would still just mean that the value of the use is 
captured, but just distributed differently. The gap in the scope of rights is therefore 
a purely distributional issue. However, given the social costs associated with 
property rights, and the positive externalities associated with broadcast signal 
distribution, the optimal solution might be to have a very wide boundary for 
interpreting the initial communication to the public.  In such a case, the value is 
still created, but just not captured by rightsholders. The only way a welfare issue 
arises is if a public good problem arises, which is almost uncertain given the 
relative insignificance of such uses in terms of overall revenue-generation from 
broadcast works.  
 
The true problem is that the gap itself is hard to justify and seems arbitrary in 
doctrinal terms. There seems to be no basis for permitting different welfare 
distributions based on a technical definition alone, especially for a term like 
‘retransmission’ whose interpretation is becoming more opaque. The ‘new 
technical means’ criterion thus seems to bear little grounding in economic 
rationale.  
 
The traditional rationale might have been that broadcasters’ retransmission 
rights are necessary because of the commercial scale of such activities, and hence 
the possibility of public good problems. From an efficiency perspective, rights 
regarding other activities may not have been necessary as they are purely 
distributional concerns.  
 
However, with the dilution of the concept of retransmission – from legal, technical 
and commercial points of view – it would appear that an argument can be made 
that it is necessary to move towards a ‘unified’ broadcasters’ right (akin to the 
broad public communication right). However, this would imply a massive 
expansion of the scope of those related rights, with high corresponding social 
costs which are unlikely to be necessary as the public good problem which once 
justified them itself erodes.  
 
To support this argument, the following section discusses some of the issues in 
interpreting retransmission activities as a technical and commercial concept, and 
hence underscores the arbitrariness of delineating between different activities.  
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[10]-4.4  Convergence and Subordination of Communications 
 
The above sub-sections discussed the practical legal uncertainty surrounding 
communication to the public, and hence the very notion of broadcast 
retransmissions. To add to this, there might also be some uncertainty in terms of 
the technical and commercial relationships between initial broadcasts and 
retransmissions. The following sub-section makes some brief comments on these 
relationships. The purpose of this is to stress the risks associated with maintaining 
discretely defined broadcasters’ rights, and the inevitably futility of defining the 
concept of retransmission itself.   
 
[10]-4.4.1 Convergence and Innovation 
 
The ECJ Ruling on TV Catch-Up I case was based on the idea that retransmission 
activities are copyright liable by virtue of the technical means of transmission. If 
this legal standard is applied without consideration of the conception of a ‘public’, 
this can have negative effects on innovation and consumer choice. 
 
Through the phenomenon of convergence, the lines between traditional forms of 
communication become more blurred. This technological change is also 
associated with a corresponding cultural change where consumers expect the 
ability to be able to easily and costlessly move between different technological 
platforms (e.g. by watching traditional broadcasts on the internet or a mobile 
device, rather than on a traditional television set).  
 
Strong interpretations of public communication rights that restrict limitations and 
exceptions and trigger retransmission rights on the basis of technical means (even 
where there is no ‘new public’) are hence antagonistic to convergence and its 
effects on broadcasting markets. Such interpretations stifle new innovative 
distribution technologies, which ultimately undermines consumer choice, 
facilitates technological lock-in, and favours incumbent distributors operating 
through old technologies.  
 
This notion of encouraging inter-platform competition and innovation was one of 
the arguments raised on Chapter 9 in favour of a technologically neutral approach 
to regulating retransmission activities.  
 
What is even more concerning however, is that such interpretations are not 
limited to the EU. In the US, the Aereo Case provides another good example of the 
trend in judicial interpretations of copyright retransmission provisions that 
undermine enabling environments for innovation and cultural change. 524  The 
dissenting opinion that accompanied the opinion of the SCOTUS in that case even 
made comments that the Court should not serve a role that amounts to that of a 
technology regulator, and that “a decision in the Networks’ favor will stifle 
technological innovation”. The essence of that dissenting opinion was that the 
copyright legislation should be interpreted as applied as is, rather than being 
                                                        
524 American Broadcasting Cos. v Aereo Inc, was a 2014 ruling by the Supreme Court of the United 
States (SCOTUS) regarding an innovative service which ‘retransmitted’ broadcasting signals. 
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‘twisted’ to accommodate new developments, as the court cannot ‘foresee the path 
of future technological development’; the role of updating legal rules for new 
technologies is that of the legislator.525  
 
[10]-4.4.2 Technical Definitions of Broadcasting 
  
Before even considering the technical relationship between a broadcast and a 
retransmission, it should be understood the technology specific definition of an 
initial broadcast itself might be quite problematic. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, central to the concept and definition of broadcasting 
are certain concepts such as a ‘point-to-multi-point’ communication. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 2, the traditional legal definitions make an 
explicit distinction between ‘wireless’ and ‘wired’ transmissions. The introduction 
of satellite broadcasting and more recently internet broadcasting has made such 
definitions more difficult. Before the WIPO Internet Treaties, there were debates 
as to whether satellite broadcasts should be considered ‘wireless’ and as seen in 
debates over the Proposed WIPO Broadcasting Treaty, internet broadcasting 
(‘webcasting’) is largely considered as a category of its own.  
 
Internet transmissions, while in principle simultaneously available to several 
dispersed users, are not a point-to-multipoint communication in the same that 
that traditional broadcasts are. In the technical sense, internet communications 
are multiple parallel point-to-point communications. 526 
 
Furthermore, central to the concept of traditional broadcasting is the one-
directional nature of communication. Modern broadcasting services now 
increasingly have elements of ‘interactivity’, where the consumer is not a purely 
passive recipient of content, but also transmits some information back to the 
broadcaster (e.g. in accessing ‘value-added’ services such as replaying content or 
accessing programme guides). In the case of the internet, streaming is also bi-
directional in nature as the user initiates a request for content to a host. 
Furthermore, the use of servers between hosts and users is also a factor that might 
complicate how internet streaming fits into the legal definition of broadcasting.527  
                                                        
525 For a detailed analysis of this case, see Bridy (2015) or Fraser (2014). 
526  “Internet originated streaming is a “point to point” technical process. Even though the same 
program is transmitted to multiple recipients, it is transmitted via a point to point bi-directional 
communication, instigated by the user. In other words, there is an individual connection between each 
user and the source of the streamed content (a host) and such point to point streaming to multiple 
individual users takes place in parallel.” - WIPO - SCCR/8/INF/1, Paragraph 17 
527 The role of servers in this regard is well described by WIPO SCCR 7/8 (paragraphs 49-52), 
which state the following:  
“Another scenario that might develop in the future is the involvement of a multitude of servers in 
order to reduce the distance between the source and the recipient. This may either be managed by 
the sender or by the network infrastructure through a process called “multicasting,” where Internet 
routers receive single streams and then serve them individually to one or more recipients. Though the 
signal has to be sent from the initial source to the multitude of intermediate servers or routers it will 
not generally be present, but be issued from a source only upon individual demand. Once demanded, 
the transmission occurs in a one-to-one communication channel to the specific IP address, but from 
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Even in terms of currently well-defined technologies, it is misleading to assume 
that the act of broadcasting can easily be described in individual technical terms. 
For example, while copyright law acknowledges the differences between 
traditional wireless broadcasting, satellite communication, and cable 
transmission, all of these technologies might be involved in a single broadcast.  
 
As a broadcast is the act of transmitting a communication across some 
geographical distance, the most efficient means of communication would depend 
on several factors. One example, can be found in the debates over protection of 
pre-broadcasting signals (discussed in Chapter 2), which might be sent to a 
broadcaster via microwave transmissions, before being sent to an affiliate via 
wired cable, and then communicated to users via direct satellite broadcasting. The 
substitutability and complementarity between different technical 
transmissions 528  at different points of the communication chain implies that 
defining a broadcast based on one specific point on that chain might be quite 
arbitrary, and also distort incentives to seek the most efficient technical solution.  
 
In addition to difficulties in adopting technology-specific definitions of 
broadcasting, the complexity of communication chains also has possible 
implications for defining retransmission activities. For example, if a given chain of 
technical communication is long and complicated enough, it might be conceptually 
possible to delineate some point at which after which an initial broadcast becomes 
a retransmission. The debate over the treatment of ‘direct injection’ is an example 
of this concept.   
 
Direct injection broadcasting refers to the act in which a broadcasting 
organisation transmits its signals to signal distributors directly, without those 
signals being available to the public. In the SBS Case, the ECJ ruled that this act is 
not a ‘communication to the public’, and hence the broadcasting organisation in 
question is not liable for paying remuneration to copyright holders.529 The Court 
in this case considered that the limited number of distributors (who are effectively 
technical intermediaries between the broadcaster and the public) themselves did 
                                                        
an intermediary source rather than the originator. As the user terminates his demand, the provider 
(or intermediate server) stops the transmission.  
In this respect, webcasting is a “point to point” technical process. Even though the same program is 
transmitted to multiple recipients, it is transmitted via a point to point bi-directional communication, 
instigated by the user. In other words, there is an individual virtual connection per user, over which 
parallel point to point streaming to each of the individual subscribers take place.  
At least one national copyright law distinguishes traditional broadcasting from webcasting, based on 
whether or not the consumer needs access to a server. In the case of broadcasting, people can simply 
access the broadcast by switching on the receiver as the signal transmitted by the broadcasting 
station is direct and present, whereas, in webcasting, people must access a server and incite its 
facilities to transmit back the information.” 
528  This substitutability and complementarity is even somewhat recognized in existing legal 
frameworks. For example, the Satellite-Cable Directive, while designed to have a technology-
specific focus (i.e. satellite broadcasts and cable retransmissions), also included provisions to 
cover transmissions made via microwaves.  
529 European Court of Justice Case C-325/14 - SBS Belgium NV v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, 
Componisten en Uitgevers (SABAM); Judgement decided on 19 November 2015 
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not constitute a public. The implication is therefore that the distributors are the 
sole party with copyright liability in this case. The inference can hence be drawn 
that in the eyes of the Court, the entire distribution chain (including the 
broadcaster and the distributors) is cumulatively seen as the act of broadcasting. 
 
However, the Court did note that it might be possible for the distributors to be 
considered as ‘a public’ if it is that the distributors undertake some intervention 
(which amounts to an autonomous service) rather than just passively facilitating 
the technical means of reception to end-users. In such a case, the broadcaster 
would in fact be undertaking a communication to the public. The implication here 
is that copyright liability would exist for both the broadcaster and the distributor, 
indicating that the broadcaster undertakes a ‘broadcast’ while the distributor 
undertakes a ‘retransmission’ in the meaning of copyright and related rights law.  
 
While in the SBS Case the ECJ did adopt an approach generally sensitive to the 
complexities of distribution technologies, there mere existence of such a debate is 
cause for concern. As new forms of communication technology evolve and 
networks used mixed modes of communication that involve multiple parties in the 
distribution chain, new uncertainties regarding application of copyright law are 
sure to arise. In particular, technical interventions along the communication chain 
by parties such as distributors might provide for more efficient engineering 
solutions, and it would be undesirable for copyright law to create arbitrary 
disincentives for such innovation. 
 
In summary, the points in this sub-section are presented to show that in practical 
terms, it very difficult to construct a coherent technical relationship between 
retransmissions and broadcasts. This is especially true when the definition of 
broadcasting itself in copyright law is based on notions that are becoming 
obsolete, as the concept of modern broadcasting becomes more technologically 
fluid. Furthermore, over-reliance on technical definitions by courts can create 
market distortions and disincentives for innovation. 
 
[10]-4.4.3 Service Innovation 
 
Consider the hypothetical situation that follows. A cable network acquires 
retransmission licences from several different broadcasters, and pays other 
rightsholders through the applicable regime (i.e. through collective management 
organisations or a compulsory licence). The network then develops a ‘hybrid 
channel’, which is essentially a bundle of content from other broadcasting 
channels for which authorisation has been achieved; this is done without any 
time-shifting (i.e. fixation of broadcasts for deferred retransmission).  What this 
channel represents is therefore an algorithm that automatically switches between 
different channels at different points in time. This might be similar to a user who 
uses an interactive programming guide to pre-programme switching between 
different broadcasts at different time; however, the important distinction is that 
the process and selection of content is initiated by the cable network and not the 
user. 
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The above situation, while very specific and hypothetical is interesting as it totally 
pushes to boundaries of interpreting the act of retransmission. While a 
retransmission is a secondary exploitation (i.e. secondary transmission of 
content), the hybrid channel is essentially a retransmission of a retransmission 
(i.e. a tertiary transmission of content). Whether this act would constitute a 
retransmission in itself – separate from the standard authorised retransmission – 
is a very interesting question. Presumably, such would depend on the 
interpretation of the right of public communication. If this interpretation based on 
the notion of a new public, then the act is likely not an additional retransmission 
as it is made to the same subscriber base as the standard retransmission. 
However, if communication to the public is judged on technical intervention, then 
this would indeed likely constitute a ‘secondary retransmission’, and hence an 
additional layer of copyright liability would be incurred.  
 
In addition to the above, the broadcaster’s retransmission right might also be 
violated (even though authorisation has been attained), as the retransmission 
right is understood as relating to ‘simultaneous and unaltered retransmissions’. 
Dissecting multiple broadcasts into their individual programming elements and 
then re-assembling a new content bundle schedule is certainly a significant form 
of alteration. Furthermore, if such an activity is deemed as retransmission, then 
the cable network is able to bypass the exclusive rights of copyright holders 
though the applicable limitations to their retransmission rights. In reality however 
this would obviously not be a practical way to create a new cablecast. 
Nevertheless, it raises the point that content distribution can – at least in theory – 
undergo multiple iterations of broadcasts, retransmission, and further 
subsequent broadcast or retransmission. As with technological progress, there is 
no way to predict future service innovation. Hence it is possible that such 
innovation might even further put pressure on defining the very concept of the 
activity of signal retransmission and hence the notion of retransmission rights. 
 
While Part IV of this manuscript did give much attention to the topic of 
retransmission rights, this discussion was admittedly limited to ‘simultaneous, 
unaltered’ retransmissions. While the above example on creating a hybrid channel 
is an extreme hypothetical case, alterations can also come in the form of more 
minor activities. The most minor activity might be simple technical alterations to 
facilitate communication. A more significant activity might be ‘ad-insertion’, i.e. 
the act of replacing the advertising segments in a broadcast with different 
advertising space sold by the retransmitter. In both cases, discussions on the 
general concept of public communication might be relevant. If public 
communication is interpreted as occurring when any technical intervention takes 
place, then retransmission rights are much stronger in scope. If however, the court 
takes into account the commercial effects of retransmission – particularly in terms 
of the distribution of the gains associated with advertising – then acts such as ad-
insertion might be considered differently.  
 
The overall point is that retransmission itself can refer to a vast range of activities 
with different characteristics. Not only is strain on this definition created by 
technological innovation, but also service innovation even under current 
technology.  
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[10]-4.4.4 The Boundaries of Deferred Retransmission 
 
As discussed in Chapter 9, modern approaches to broadcasting recognise a role 
for online services, even if online broadcasters and retransmitters do not benefit 
from the policy tools applied to their traditional counterparts. One such example 
is that of ‘ancillary services’ – online services that are construed as value-added 
compliments to offline broadcasts (e.g. such as access to short clips and replays).  
 
In the Proposed EU Regulation on Online Transmissions, ancillary services are 
subject to the benefits of the country-of-origin principle (just as their associated 
offline broadcasts are), even though online-only broadcasts do not enjoy the same 
treatment. The result is that offline broadcasters have a clear regulatory 
competitive advantage in the online market, by virtue of their offline operations. 
An online media service provider who does not operate an offline broadcasting 
service would have to clear the rights for the hosted content in multiple-
jurisdictions, unlike the consolidated service provider who benefits from the 
country-of-origin principle in providing both an offline and online service.  
 
Similar issues have arisen in the context of debates over the scope of the Proposed 
WIPO Broadcasting Treaty discussed in Chapter 2. Specifically, one proposal 
provides for special broadcasters’ rights concerning the treatment of deferred 
online retransmission.530 In the online environment, retransmission is not just 
simply simultaneous or deferred using a fixation of an initial broadcast. New 
services like ancillary services not only provide for a secondary broadcast of 
content that was already broadcast, but for access to some sub-set of that content 
(e.g. highlights for sports shows), or some new (but related) set of content (e.g. 
extra content such as additional footage, or different camera angles, etc.). 
 
                                                        
530 SCCR/36/5/CORR. – Note on the Draft Treaty to Protect Broadcasting Organizations - Document 
submitted by the Delegation of Argentina; Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights 
Thirty-Sixth Session Geneva, May 28 to June 1, 2018. 
The proposal considers a new taxonomy of deferred retransmission as follows: (i) Equivalent 
deferred transmission - the deferred transmission that corresponds to the live linear broadcasts 
of the broadcasting organization and is available for up to a limited number of weeks or months 
after such linear broadcasts, such as online repeats, on-demand catch-up services and highlights 
of sport events; (ii) Closely-related deferred transmission - the deferred transmission that is 
broadcast only online, ancillary to the live linear broadcasts of the broadcasting organization and 
available for up to a limited number of weeks or months, such as parallel sport events, extra 
footage on news or programs, previews, additional interviews and behind-the-scenes programs; 
(iii) Unrelated deferred transmission - means a deferred transmission that is broadcast only 
online, but which is not ancillary to the live linear broadcasts of the broadcasting organization, 
such as pure on-demand streaming channels, or which may be accessed by members of the public 
without limitation as to time, such as on-demand catalogues that are available after the expiration 
of the term for online repeats and on-demand catch-up services. 
The proposal covers broadcasters’ rights protection for ‘simultaneous transmissions, near 
simultaneous transmissions, and equivalent deferred transmissions’. For ‘closely-related deferred 
transmissions’, the proposed protection is limited to ‘adequate and effective protection’, which is 
understood as more flexible than an actual broadcaster’s right in terms of implementation.  
Protection for ‘unrelated deferred transmissions’ is optional, and contracting parties are given the 
option of limiting such protection for foreign broadcasters only where that broadcasters’ 
jurisdiction offers comparable protection.  
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This proposal is very concerning for several reasons. Firstly, it clearly goes beyond 
the signal-based approach that the Treaty is to be supposedly based on. It also 
creates a new taxonomy of activities that stretches way beyond the current 
understanding of ‘retransmission’, and encroaches on the space currently covered 
by the ‘making available to the public right’ (as opposed to the ‘public 
communication via broadcast’ right). By blurring the boundaries of what 
constitutes a ‘retransmission’, such a proposal would also dilute the strong basis 
for limitations and exceptions to copyright due to the unique characteristics of 
retransmission activities. 
 
Most problematically however, such a proposal gives a significant advantage to 
entities that operate both in traditional broadcasting and online content markets. 
Essentially, by virtue of operating a single offline broadcasting channel, the media 
service provider is granted very broad and significant rights, that it otherwise 
would not have. Unlike the EU Regulation however, there is no necessarily 
‘subordinate’ relationship between the online ancillary service and the offline 
broadcast. Therefore, this proposal comes with major risks of creating market 
distortions the favour incumbent service providers, and of facilitating the 
consolidation of market power.  
 
On this issue, NGO stakeholders have noted that while the Treaty is perceived as 
a tool to support local broadcasters, the proposal above on online content would 
likely mainly benefit large technology companies based in the US that already have 
significant market power in the communications sector, and control major online 
content platforms. Such companies would gain new rights over online content by 
operating just a single traditional broadcasting station.531 
 
 
[10]-4.5 The Special Case of Must-Carry 
 
The above sub-section aimed at outlining the conceptual difficulties – both legal 
and technical – in constructing a relationship between broadcasting and 
retransmission activities. This section will briefly discuss a special case of this 
relationship – where so-called ‘must-carry obligations’ exist, which are obligations 
on a communications network to carry the signal of certain broadcasters.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, broadcasting services are associated with a very wide 
range of positive externalities. Hence, for certain public policy reasons such as 
promoting pluralism, democratic participation, and cultural diversity, it may be 
important for regulators to ensure that certain broadcast channels are always 
available to the public. Such availability can be ensured through an obligation for 
communication networks to retransmit these broadcasts – particularly the 
transmissions of public service broadcasters.  
 
In the case of the US, this obligation relates to the carriage of local broadcasting 
networks that choose between must-carry status and a market-based quasi-
                                                        
531 Joint NGO letter on the proposed WIPO treaty on broadcasting (May 28th 2018); Item 7 
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property right under the retransmission consent regime previously discussed in 
this chapter.  
 
In the case of the EU, must-carry obligations are provided for by Article 31 of the 
Universal Service Directive. 532  Under this Article, Member States can impose 
must-carry obligations on networks “where a significant number of end-users of 
such networks use them as their principal means to receive radio and television 
broadcasts.” Furthermore, the obligations must be imposed only where ‘they are 
necessary to meet clearly defined general interest objectives’ and must be 
proportionate and transparent.  
 
Such provisions are interesting as they represent a situation in which 
retransmission is deemed as obligatory. In the normal case of a retransmission, 
mechanisms such as a compulsory licence or mandatory collective management 
might be in place in order to administer the communication to the public 
(retransmission) rights of copyright and related rights holders; however, market-
based negotiations would still exist between the retransmitter and the initial 
broadcaster in terms of exploitation of the broadcaster’s related right. If a must-
carry obligation makes retransmission obligatory, it hence essentially acts akin to 
a compulsory licence for the broadcaster’s related rights in their signal.  
 
Once a signal is retransmitted pursuant to must-carry obligations, rightsholders 
in the embedded works might presumably be compensated just as they would be 
for a market-based retransmission, i.e. through a mechanism such as mandatory 
collective management. This is however not necessarily the case, as that 
retransmission might not necessarily constitute a public communication in the 
first place. Indeed, this was the situation in the Zürs.net Case discussed above 
where the ECJ found that retransmissions of the national public broadcaster did 
not amount to communication to a new public.   
 
Following the logic of the ECJ in that case, copyright liability might not exist in 
retransmissions pursuant to must-carry obligations, as unlike other forms of 
retransmission, must-carry carriage is predictable and known a priori, and it can 
be internalised by rightsholders when negotiating their licences with initial 
broadcasters.  
 
The matter of compensation to the initial broadcaster is however more complex. 
On one hand, broadcasters might be seen as entitled to some form of 
compensation for retransmission of their signals, even if such was done according 
to a regulatory obligation. This line of thinking might follow from the idea that a 
must-carry obligation is partially a compulsory licence on the broadcaster’s 
retransmission right, and as such a limitation to that right – under the principles 
of copyright and related right law – should still entitle the broadcaster to equitable 
remuneration. 
                                                        
532  Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on 
universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services 
(Universal Service Directive); Official Journal of the European Communities L 108/51 
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On the other hand, information capacity on communication networks is a scarce 
resource, and must-carry obligations place a burden on carrying networks. This 
burden is the opportunity cost of retransmitting the must-carry signal instead of 
some other possibly more profitable commercial broadcast signal, or in the case 
of converged telecommunications networks, allocating data capacity to some 
other service. From this perspective, the must-carry rule is an inalienable 
entitlement enjoyed by the broadcaster, and one that is particularly significant if 
the broadcast is advertising-based. Hence, it is possible to consider that 
remuneration should be given to the communication network from the 
broadcaster for this carriage, as exercise of this entitlement should be balanced by 
compensation for the obligation placed on the network operator.  
 
It appears however that in the case of Europe, the general trend is that no 
compensation is made either way for retransmissions pursuant to must-carry 
obligations.533 
 
Compensation rules are a regulatory matter for the domestic regulators, those it 
seems that in most instances, the terms of retransmission are determined through 
market negotiations between broadcasters and networks.534 Nevertheless, there 
is the general requirement under the Universal Service Directive that 
compensation is to be determined in a transparent and proportional manner, and 
hence where disputes arise, there might be jurisdiction for the regulator to 
determine carriage terms (as is often done in interconnection disputes in 
telecommunications). However, there are cases in which disputes do arise, and 
retransmission arrangements are stalled due to negotiating failures.535  
 
As a general note, market-based negotiations for compensation are not 
compatible with must-carry obligations, as price dynamics require an ability of 
the buyer to refuse to buy. By threatening to disallow carriage (and hence putting 
the network in breach of its must-carry obligations), a broadcaster can in theory 
attempt to extract excessive compensation, especially if it is a popular station. In 
this regard, some jurisdictions also have so-called ‘must-offer obligations’, which 
require broadcasters to at least offer their carriage to retransmitting networks. 
Such an obligation is essentially a ‘duty to deal’, which prevents an individual 
broadcaster with significant market power from abusing a presumed dominant 
position.  
 
Once again, the special case of must-carry provisions demonstrate that the overall 
public policy goals of the broadcasting sector provide the critical boundaries for 
how intellectual property rights in this sector are exploited, not only for copyright 
holders, but even for the related rights of broadcasting organisations.  
                                                        
533 EAO (2015) – Access to TV platforms: must-carry rules, and access to free-DTT, Report by the 
European Audiovisual Observatory for the European Commission - December 2015; page 30 
534 Cullen International (2006): CI Broadcasting Study: Database of regulatory information for the 
broadcasting sector. Data collection by country December 22, 2006. 
535 For a discussion on such tensions in retransmission agreements in the EU and the US, including 
discussions on the notable German case, see Evans and Donders (2018) 
302 
[10]-4.6 The Tapering Principle  
 
The above sub-sections aimed at analysing the relationship between initial 
broadcasts and retransmissions. It was noted that that there are various doctrinal 
difficulties in determining whether a specific secondary use qualifies as a 
retransmission in terms of the public communication right, as well as the technical 
difficulties in defining different transmissions in the first place. However, despite 
these challenges, there still exist a fundamental relationship between 
retransmission and broadcasting in which the former is necessarily subsequent to 
the latter. Furthermore, as discussed earlier in this chapter through different 
theoretical perspectives, the nature of retransmission is defined by certain 
inherent transaction costs.  
 
Against this background of all of the above discussions, this section concludes this 
chapter with a very basic theoretical contribution, hereby referred to as the 
‘tapering principle’.  
 
Traditional conceptions of copyright and related rights view exclusive rights as 
bundles with different elements controlling different activities and uses. Within a 
given use, these rights might be considered as horizontally consistent – i.e. 
applying in the same manner for comparable uses. In the case of distribution 
rights, there is some chain of possible activity where at some discrete point, the 
right is considered as exhausted. 
 
However, broadcasting markets provide for an interesting case in which 
comparable uses at different distribution point justify a need to have rights which 
gradually reduce in scope. The level of control a copyright holder has over their 
content is – and should be – be less for a retransmission as it is for an initial 
broadcast. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 9, broadcasts tend to appear in the later stages of the cycle 
of exploitation of an audiovisual work, and a retransmission – by definition – 
appears even later. At each successive stage of exploitation, the value generated 
by the work activity diminishes, and hence the role of exclusive rights in capturing 
and internalising this value diminishes.  
 
Additionally, as exploitation moves further down the distribution chain (e.g. from 
a broadcast to a retransmission), the ‘distance’ between the rightsholder and the 
user increases, meaning that transaction costs to conclude a market-based 
authorisation increases. This concurrent decrease in value-added and increase in 
transactions costs means that many activities at the end of value and distribution 
chains – such as retransmissions – might not even happen if left up to a system of 
market exchange based on exclusive rights.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 6 as well as previously in this chapter, one of the 
theoretical ‘tests’ for limitations and exemptions is to consider whether a given 
activity would be authorised on a voluntary basis in an environment devoid of 
transaction costs. As transaction costs increase, the justification for limiting rights 
increases. Furthermore, given that broadcasting is associated with such wide 
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positive externalities, there is an even greater justification for limiting 
broadcasting and retransmission rights. In particular, since retransmission is 
closer to the ‘end’ of the distribution and value chain, the social cost of increasing 
these positive externalities through promoting increased distribution (through 
reducing the ability of rightsholders to internalise private value-added) is lower 
than at any other point.  
 
As such, activities further down value and distribution chains more and more 
constitute ‘special cases’ in the context of limitations to intellectual property 
rights. In other words, the further down these chains a work progresses, the 
greater the basis for limiting exclusive rights; in more direct language, the optimal 
scope of rights reduces as one progresses down the value and distribution chain – 
i.e. the rights should become ‘tapered’. This concept of ‘tapering’ is conceptually 
different from exhaustion, as it is a continuous function rather than a discrete 
discontinuity.   
 
In reality, we find that indeed public communication rights do reduce in scope as 
value and communication chains progress. Various policy tools – through 
mechanisms akin to exhaustion, default contractual rules, and converting 
property rules to liability rules – are indeed used to ‘taper’ exclusive copyright and 
related rights as they move from initial broadcast distribution to retransmission. 
 
However, while these rights are ‘tapered’, a new right is created – the exclusive 
retransmission right of the broadcasting organisation. The creation of the 
broadcasters’ right therefore correlates to a tapering of underlying content 
copyright. One doctrinal example of this is the principle of ephemeral fixation – a 
firmly established limitation and exception to the reproduction right element of 
copyright, which enables broadcasting activities, and hence permits the creation 
of broadcasters’ rights.  
 
Pursuant to the logic of the tapering principle articulated above, the creation of 
such broadcasters’ related right seems counter-productive. At the least, this right 
undoes the effect of reducing the scope of the rights in the broadcast content, and 
redistributes some of the value-added that might have otherwise been captured 
by authors, performers, and producers in the form of equitable remuneration. At 
the worst, it actually increases the total level of protection at the end of the 
distribution chain, and attempts to capture even more value-added than that 
which would otherwise be captured, and hence reduces overall distribution and 
accessibility. An example of such a failure to the rights to ‘taper’ might be 
interpreting that an act of public communication has occurred even if there is no 
notion of a ‘new public’. In any case, the coming into existence of the broadcaster’s 
retransmission right actually increases transaction costs, and even creates 
possible anti-commons problems. 
 
From this perspective, if broadcast signals are to be given protection in 
retransmission markets, it seems counter-productive to do so using exclusive 
rights. Following the conclusions of Chapter 5, the scope of rights for broadcasters 
should optimally set lower than that for copyright holders. Such logic is consistent 
with the principle of equivalency for limitations and exceptions to related rights – 
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including the related rights of broadcasting organisations. Therefore, if mandatory 
collective management or compulsory licencing is used for administering 
copyright for broadcast retransmissions, statutory or compulsory licences should 
most certainly be permitted for broadcasters’ retransmission rights.  
 
Furthermore, this perspective of the ‘tapering principle’ also casts doubt on the 
concept of ‘post-fixation’ rights. When a work is broadcast, then that broadcast is 
fixed, then some use of that fixation made by a user, each of these steps moves 
further and further down the distribution and value-chain. However, at the point 
of fixation of the broadcast, both the copyright owner’s reproduction right, and 
the broadcaster’s fixation right is triggered. Subsequent use of that fixation then 
possibly involves the rights of the copyright holder in addition to potential post-
fixation rights of the broadcaster. Hence, later down the chain, there is actually 
cumulatively stronger protection than at the earlier stages of the chain – the exact 
opposite of what the tapering principle suggests should be the case.  
 
In rebuttal to this perspective, it can be said that once a fixation of a broadcast is 
made, the right involved in subsequent distributions of fixations is the right of 
reproduction. Therefore, this is the beginning of a new value chain rather than 
continuation of the ‘public communication via broadcast’ value chain. In this case, 
the start of this new value chain is still a subset of the wider value-chain; i.e. 
‘reproduction of a work via distribution of a fixation of broadcast containing that 
work’ is a subset of the ‘reproduction of a work’ distribution and value chain. 
However, that subset still exhibits a greater scope of protection (through authors’ 
copyright and broadcasters’ post-fixation rights) than the parent set (which is 
only protected by authors’ copyright). Proposals for broadcasters’ post-fixation 
can hence still be seen as inconsistent with the ‘tapering principle’. 
 
 
[10]-5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter aimed at building a theoretical understanding of retransmissions 
rights, in terms of authors’ copyright, broadcasters’ related rights, and their 
relationship. In order to do this, a discussion was first presented on limitation and 
exceptions to copyright and related rights, and how the case of retransmission 
may qualify as a special case for application of limitations to exclusive rights. 
 
Next, based on case studies of the EU and the US, the chapter then presented a 
taxonomy of policy options for implementing limitations and exceptions to the 
retransmission elements of copyright and related rights. This taxonomy showed 
that in choosing a policy option, there is a trade-off between the freedom of 
contract of rightsholders, and the resulting legal certainty and reduction of 
transaction costs in retransmission markets.  
 
This taxonomy was then analysed in terms of various theoretical perspectives, 
namely the concepts of default rules, property rules and liability rules, and 
copyright exhaustion. At the centre of this taxonomy was the recurrent theme of 
transaction costs, and mechanisms to solve the issues created by transaction costs 
and legal uncertainty. However, in practical terms, limitations to copyright at most 
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require at least some concept of a right to equitable remuneration, as opposed to 
a complete abdication of the right of public communication itself. For this reason, 
one can understand why the policy options for dealing with online 
retransmissions considered by the EU in Chapter 9 were limited to cases where 
audience measurement was possible, and hence equitable remuneration could be 
facilitated.  
 
The last section of this chapter aimed at contextualising the relationship between 
the retransmission components of copyright and broadcasters’ rights. It was 
shown that there are various challenges in understanding how the right of public 
communication should be construed and applied for retransmissions, and that the 
prevailing case law in this regard does not offer a coherent line of thought. 
Difference in the scope of protection also arise from the unitary nature of the 
author’s public communication right (of which their retransmission right is a 
fragment), and the compartmentalised retransmission right of the broadcaster. 
This different in scope has implications for how the gains from secondary uses of 
work (including but not limited to retransmissions) are distributed. Furthermore, 
due to convergence and technological change, constructing definitions of 
broadcasts and retransmissions themselves are a difficult task.  
 
The chapter also discussed must-carry obligations, as an example of how the 
public policy dimensions of broadcasting are critical in contextualising how 
intellectual property rights in this sector are administered. Lastly, the chapter 
concluded with a basic idea of a ‘Tapering Principle’, where rights should narrow 
in scope as activities progress down the value and distribution chain. In this 
regard, the existence of strong rights for broadcasting organisations appears to be 
counter-intuitive at the least.  
 
To give a conclusive answer to the core research question of this chapter, the 
theoretical basis of the author’s retransmission right is that it is a fragment of the 
‘broadcasting right’, which itself is a subset of the broad ‘communication to the 
public’ right. Given the transaction cost intensive environment of exploiting the 
retransmission right, such activities constitute a special case for limitations and 
exceptions to exclusive rights. Such limitations can be implemented through 
various means, such as compulsory licencing or mandatory collective 
management, or more generally through conversion of the property rule into a 
liability rule. However, ambiguities in legal doctrines for interpreting the public 
communication right make it difficult to ascertain with certainty when the 
retransmission right is indeed being exploited. More generally, the concept of a 
unified public communication right also creates tension with the 
compartmentalised nature of the retransmission right. Furthermore, when it is 
exploited, definitions based on changing technological landscape may pose 
challenges to defining and administering these rights. In any case, it should be 
understood that retransmission activities are a subset of the broadcasting sector, 
and hence are subject to a wide range of public policy goals. Lastly and generally 
speaking, retransmission rights should be administered in such a way that the 
overall level of protection decreases (or ‘tapers’) as the exploitation chain 
progresses, which raises concerns with the very notion of exclusive broadcasters’ 
related rights.    
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PART V: CONCLUSION 
 
CHAPTER 11: FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter is the last substantive chapter of this manuscript. It summarises the 
main conclusions of this manuscript, and makes some final comments on the topic 
of the intellectual property rights of broadcasting organisations.  
 
 
[11]-1 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
The title of this dissertation manuscript is “An Economic Analysis of the Intellectual 
Property Rights of Broadcasting Organisations”. The main research question in this 
regard was “What are the theoretical bases and economic mechanisms of the related 
rights of broadcasting organisations?” 
 
Each chapter in this manuscript made some contribution to answering this 
overarching question. Part I largely provides contextual and introductory 
discussions. Chapter 1 provided a general introduction as to why this question is 
of academic relevance, and sets out the general context and motivation for its 
study. Chapter 2 then provided a background as to why this question is of policy 
relevance, particularly in terms of the network of existing international 
agreements on intellectual property law.  
 
Part II, rather than directly analysing at the ‘Law and Economics’ of the topic (i.e. 
the economic analysis of the legal concept of broadcasters’ rights), separately 
considered how various aspects of legal and economic theories apply to the topic 
in two separate chapters. This part contributes to answering the overall research 
question as Chapter 3 concludes that understanding the theoretical bases of 
broadcasters’ rights cannot be accomplished by deference to existing analyses of 
other branches of intellectual property; Chapter 4 builds on this conclusion by 
noting the unique context of broadcasting markets, and hence why broadcasters’ 
rights are indeed a specific case for the intellectual property system. 
 
Chapter 3 found that while there are various theories that underpin the 
intellectual property rights system, none of these theories provides an adequate 
justification for the existence of exclusive related rights for broadcasting 
organisations. The best explanation is that such rights are awarded in order to 
incentivise distribution of works, while the production of works is a matter for the 
‘primary’ copyright system.  
 
Chapter 4 then sets out to analyse the key features of broadcasting markets. The 
conclusion of this analysis is that there is a very wide range of public policy 
objectives that characterises the broadcasting sector, and hence traditional 
concerns about ‘economic efficiency’ must be contextualised by these broader 
policy goals. Not only is the broadcasting sector a mechanism to facilitate the 
distribution of works produced (in part) through the copyright system, but it is 
also an important tool for democratic participation, cultural diversity, education, 
and various other social dimensions associated with the positive externalities of 
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information goods. Intellectual property rights for broadcasting organisations 
must hence be understood as one aspect of a larger set of policy tools in this sector. 
However, it is necessary to be critical of these rights as their associated social costs 
are considerable, and the public good problems that they seek to solve are likely 
overstated. 
 
 
Part III then sought to use a modelling approach to answer questions about the 
scope of broadcasters’ rights, and was the main part of this manuscript in terms 
of Law and Economics methodology. This part contributes to answering the 
overall research question by concluding that even though broadcasters’ rights are 
a legally and theoretically independent concept from copyright, understanding the 
theoretical relationship between the two is necessary to understand the 
theoretical bases of broadcaster’s rights. More specifically, in addressing the 
question of scope of protection, the process of designing optimal protection for 
broadcasting organisations requires some consideration of the scope of 
protection given to authors of copyright protected works.  
 
Chapter 5 undertook a Law and Economics approach by analysing how existing 
literature on modelling the ‘optimal scope’ of intellectual property (both for 
patents and copyrights) can be adapted to analyse broadcaster’s rights. This 
chapter adapted an ‘Incentive-Access’ model of copyright protection to the case of 
broadcasters’ related rights. The main conclusion of this chapter was that the 
socially optimal level of protection for broadcasting signals is a level that is lower 
than that set for copyright owners. An important interpretation of this result is in 
its application to technological protection measures and the application of anti-
circumvention provisions. In this regard, it was argued that regulators should 
avoid implementing digital broadcasting standards with strong technical 
protection abilities, as this can result is a significant reduction in the consumer 
freedoms that might otherwise be permissible under ‘standard’ copyright law. 
 
In essence, the principle of ‘scope of protection’ is understood as having two 
components – length of protection and breadth of protection. However, the 
concept of length of protection has little relevance to broadcasters’ rights, as 
broadcasting signals are transient in nature. Hence, manipulating the ‘scope’ of 
protection in abstract terms means focussing on the breadth of protection.  In this 
regard, Chapter 6 discusses the various policy aspects of intellectual property 
policy – namely for patents and copyright – and how they apply in the case of 
broadcast signals. This chapter finds that the most effective breadth element for 
manipulating the scope of broadcasters’ rights is the application of limitation and 
exemptions. This theme of limitations and exceptions again arises in a significant 
way later in Chapter 10, although in that case the focus is on limitations to the 
rights of copyright owners.  
 
Chapter 6 also noted that reframing positive rights as negative rights might also 
be a useful policy level. However, this might increase legal uncertainty about the 
permissible activity and hence focus should remain on limitations and exceptions. 
Furthermore, it was also noted that strategic considerations of the potential 
beneficiaries of broadcasters’ rights are also a useful mechanism to affect the 
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overall scope of protection. Later in this Conclusion Chapter it is argued that 
indeed beneficiaries of protection should be limited.  
 
Chapter 7 continues the modelling theme of Chapter 5, but focuses specifically on 
the issue of enforcement. This chapter aims at understanding enforcement 
dynamics in broadcasting markets. The central concept is that certain 
unauthorised uses, such as retransmissions or distribution of fixations, can 
amount to infringements of both the rights of the copyright owner and of the 
broadcaster. Hence, enforcement can be modelled as a ‘game’ where both parties 
make an enforcement decision, and the outcomes depend on prevailing market 
characteristics. This chapter argues that one possible novel policy approach is to 
give broadcasters the standing to enforce on behalf of their copyright licensors. 
This result is a particularly attractive policy alternative to fixation (and post-
fixation) rights, as it mitigates the social costs of anti-commons problems and 
public domain enclosure associate with such rights. Furthermore, this indirectly 
corresponds to the conclusion of Chapter 5; the notion of giving the broadcaster 
enforcement standing on behalf of copyright holders results in constructing a 
scope of protection from the broadcaster that is less than that for the copyright 
holder.   
 
Part IV of this manuscript moved away from general discussions on broadcasters’ 
rights, and focuses specifically on retransmission rights. It contributes to 
answering the overall research question by building some theoretical 
understanding of the retransmission rights of broadcasters, and how these relate 
to the retransmission rights of copyright-holders.  
 
Chapters 8 and 9 are interconnected, as they both specifically analyse the 
European Union legal framework as a case study. Chapter 8 concludes that the EU 
regime for retransmission regulation is one based on mandatory collective 
management, although analysing the system cumulatively shows various 
incongruities such as diverging bases for application of the country-of-origin 
principle. Chapter 9 specifically focuses on analysing a recent EU Proposal for a 
Regulation on Online Transmissions, and how the arguments that underpin this 
proposal are possibly misplaced. While the conclusions of Chapter 8 show that 
there are various gaps in the existing framework, which are supposedly addressed 
by the Proposal, Chapter 9 argues that the recent EU Proposal is insufficient to 
update the regulatory framework for retransmissions. The fundamental 
conclusion of Chapter 9 is that a technologically neutral approach to 
retransmission should ideally be adopted.  
 
Building on the EU case study in Chapters 8 and 9, Chapter 10 also focuses on 
retransmission rights, but in more general terms. Specifically, it analyses how 
various policy approaches to limit retransmission rights can be explained as 
mechanisms to reduce transaction costs and legal uncertainty. Building on this 
analysis, Chapter 10 also analyses the relationship between the retransmission 
rights of copyright owners, and that of broadcasters themselves. It concludes that 
there are various doctrinal and technical complexities in deriving a deterministic 
relationship between the activities of broadcasting and retransmission. 
Furthermore, these complexities are likely to become more pronounced as 
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technology progresses. Hence, what is important is to adopt doctrinal 
interpretations that create a favourable environment for consumer choice, access 
to services, and innovation. 
 
Part V of this manuscript is simply the concluding Part, including this Conclusion 
Chapter. Also included in this part are a Bibliography and Reference List for the 
entire research project, as well as four Annexes to the substantive chapters. 
 
Cumulatively, the entire manuscript provides for a very broad answer into the 
overarching research question. The theoretical bases and economic mechanisms 
of the intellectual property rights of broadcasting organisations are murky at best. 
While these rights attempt to create unique and independent legal entitlements, 
their mechanisms are inseparable from that of underlying copyright in 
audiovisual and musical works, which makes their understanding even more 
complex. Their supposed purpose in solving public good problems in content 
distribution are likely overstated, especially in the modern technological 
environment of decentralised low-cost distribution. Furthermore, they risk 
creating various social costs such as anti-commons problems, increases in 
transaction costs, consolidation of market power, reduced consumer choice, 
disincentives for innovation, and possible enclosure of the public domain. Hence, 
despite the niche nature of this field, policymakers should be careful not to 
underestimate the implications of broadcasters’ rights.  
 
 
[11]-2 SHIFTING GLOBAL CONTEXT  
 
It is useful to take a step back and understand the scepticism expressed above 
about broadcasters’ rights from a wider view of the overall intellectual property 
system.  
 
Intellectual property has always been – and continues to be – one of the central 
areas for debate in modern global economic and legal policy. Globalised trade and 
harmonisation of rules applicable to goods and services are relatively well-
established realms. However, in an environment of accelerated technological 
progress, the future of global trade and economic growth is strongly linked to 
trade in information goods. While there is a large degree of international 
harmonisation in intellectual property through the TRIPs Agreement, the effects 
of this Agreement still remain controversial. Increasingly, more attention is being 
paid in international policy circles on development issues such as public health, 
access to information, and technology transfer.   
 
This increased attention can be seen as part of a larger reaction of the global 
community to multilateral approaches to global trade rules and economic policy, 
including intellectual property policy. The failure of the Doha Round of World 
Trade Organisation negotiations can be seen as evidence of this shifting attitude.  
 
This shift at the international level has also manifested in ways more directly 
related to the issue of intellectual property rights and broadcasting. One example 
is the adoption of 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
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Diversity of Cultural Expressions. This Convention represents a major landmark in 
global cultural policy as it acknowledges the importance of the social and cultural 
aspects of information goods, rather than viewing them through purely economic 
lenses. The mere fact that as discussed in Chapter 2, the Working Document for 
the Proposed WIPO Broadcasting Treaty contains an Article explicitly 
acknowledging the importance of this Convention is very significant. If that Article 
were included in an eventual international legal instrument on broadcasters’ 
rights, it would hence represent a dramatic shift in how international intellectual 
property law is framed.  
 
At the specific level of intellectual property policy, the global shift can also be seen 
at the World Intellectual Property Organisation itself. Most certainly, there does 
indeed appear to be a trend of expansion of intellectual property rights in the 
national legislation of more developed jurisdictions, which is largely exported 
through bilateral agreements. However, review of the agenda of the WIPO 
Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights shows strong attention 
being paid at the international level to movements in the other direction; i.e. 
restriction of intellectual property rights. More specifically, the Committee 
continues to dedicate a lot of attention to the matter of limitations and exceptions 
to copyright for various contexts, including access for disabled-persons, libraries 
and archiving, and education and research purposes. This is however not to say 
the WIPO itself is not part of the mechanism of expanding intellectual property 
rights; the debates over the Proposed Broadcasting Treaty, and its apparent shift 
away from its intended signals-based approach is evidence of this. 
 
The purpose of these comments is to stress that the context in which intellectual 
property policy is now made is changing. In the case of broadcasting, this context 
is particularly important, given the social and cultural dimensions of the sector. 
Broadcasting is not just an economic mechanism for content distribution; it is also 
cultural, social, democratic, and educational in nature. 
 
 
[11]-3 CHALLENGES OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
 
Throughout this manuscript, particularly in Part IV on retransmission, there has 
been a recurrent theme of technological change. Indeed, if new legal rules on 
broadcasters’ related rights are asserted as a response to changing technology, 
then it must be understood how changes in technology feed into their fundamental 
bases in the first place.  
 
It would appear that the main justification of broadcaster’s rights is to preserve 
incentives for the large capital investments needed to deploy broadcasting 
networks. However, in the era of digital technology, information is increasingly 
democratised, and distribution is decentralised. 
 
While operation of a point-to-multipoint communication service (such as a 
broadcasting network) once involved massive capital expenditures, use of scarce 
spectrum resources, and large-scale logistical and commercial coordination, now 
anyone with a home computer and the enabling technical knowledge can 
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essentially do this very same task. The concept of internet broadcasting hence 
represents a complete erosion of the ‘investment’ rationale for even having 
broadcasters’ related rights. Even in traditional terms, broadcasting has typically 
been funded through commercial advertising, providing a mechanism to solve 
public good problems without exclusive property rights. Furthermore, it seems 
that models of advertising-funded services are not fading away anytime soon, as 
this model has been well adapted to digital communication and media services.  
 
In the modern decentralised environment, content creators are more easily and 
directly able to internalise the incentives of the copyright framework, without the 
need for intermediaries. This even changes the incentives for the types of content 
produced, as there is no longer the need to appeal to the ‘lowest common 
denominator’ in terms of consumer preferences, which is an issue typically 
associated with traditional broadcast programming. In this environment, content 
producers can better align their output with actual consumer preferences. 
 
It would therefore seem more critical to focus on ensuring that the digital 
distribution environment remains open and consumer-oriented, rather than 
captured by large data monopolies. The importance of net neutrality in this regard 
cannot be overstated. Furthermore, more attention needs to be placed on 
competition controls over large technology companies who hold dominant 
positions over both sides of the double-sided content distribution-advertising 
market, through the commercialisation of user data.  Nevertheless, it seems that 
industry stakeholders still maintain a strong focus on implementing exclusive 
property rights for market failures – market failures which seem to be overstated, 
have non-property rights market-based solutions, and are naturally being eroded 
by technological progress.  
 
This technological progress will only continue, and all evidence suggests that the 
rate of progress will only accelerate in the near future. In this regard, it would 
seem more productive to focus attention on facilitating technological progress 
rather than on preserving the commercial viability of outmoded technologies such 
as traditional broadcasting.  
 
Chapter 10 discussed some of the difficulties in using technical means to define 
broadcasting, and even differentiate between broadcasting and retransmission 
activities. In this regard, the broad consolidated conception of the right to public 
communication does indeed seem like a logical doctrinal approach to copyright 
law. On an even broader level however current copyright law still differentiates 
between this ‘communication to the public’ right (triggered in acts of 
broadcasting) and the ‘making available to the public’ right (triggered in the 
provision of ‘on-demand’ services). However, even this seemingly well-defined 
distinction between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ services is being increasingly eroded by 
innovation in service provision.  
 
For example, digital music streaming services allow a user to select certain works 
from a large repertoire. As the user engages with this service, data is collected on 
the user’s preferences. When preference data is collected across a larger number 
of users, this data can be analysed for correlations in order to predict which works 
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an individual user is likely to select next. An individual user’s usage and 
preferences can hence be said to have externalities and network effects on other 
users. A common example of this is the existence of user-specific ‘recommended 
list’ in audio and video streaming platforms, and after a selected work is finished, 
these recommendations are often played automatically. The result is essentially a 
user-specific broadcasting channel, curated by preference analysis algorithms. 
Such a channel necessarily blurs the boundaries between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ services, 
and hence the distinction between exploitation of the public communication and 
making available rights.  
 
The very commercial basis of broadcasting services is therefore under threat, as 
the technical restrictions which necessitated large scale simultaneous audience 
reach no longer apply. Point-to-multipoint communications are being replaced by 
correlated point-to-point communications. The result is that soon enough, 
traditional broadcasting services may simply cease to be relevant in modern 
media and communications markets.  
 
 
[11]-4 DECONSTRUCTING BROADCASTERS’ RIGHTS 
 
Notwithstanding the above, comments on the changing policy and technological 
context, the fact remains that broadcasters still enjoy related rights protection 
under the current international intellectual property system. The main elements 
of this protection are the right of fixation, the right of communication in public 
places, and the right of retransmission. The right of fixation is also generally 
accompanied by the right of distribution of fixations.  
 
In terms of the rights of fixation the research in this manuscript stresses that these 
rights generally seem problematic. Post-fixation rights in particular, increase 
transaction costs, cause possible anti-commons problems, and restrict access to 
information. Following from the conclusions of Chapter 5 regarding the optimal 
scope of protection, such rights should be subject to strong limitations and 
exceptions pursuant to Chapter 6, or even be limited to a transfer of enforcement 
standing pursuant to Chapter 7. 
 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3, the central concept of related (or 
neighbouring) rights is captured in their very name. Their significance is derived 
from how they relate (or are ‘neighbouring’ to) copyright protection – in the case 
of broadcasting, this significance is as an incentive to encourage distribution of 
works. Neighbouring rights should not be construed as a mechanism to incentivise 
the production of works, as this is the role of the ‘primary’ copyright system itself.  
 
However, as discussed in Chapter 4, there are some types of audiovisual content 
that are not generally protected by copyright, and hence broadcasters’ rights step 
in to fill these incentive gaps. The primary examples of this are news and sports 
broadcasts. Therefore, while broadcasters’ rights are framed as an incentive 
system for distribution, the strongest arguments for their existence might actually 
be an incentive for production of these specific copyright-ineligible content types. 
Such protection is however a contortion of the fundamental premise of related 
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rights, which are supposedly designed to give expression to works that have 
already been produced. This function is therefore based on a conflation of the 
dichotomy between content production and distribution. 
 
In a scenario without broadcasters’ related rights, the most significant loss is 
therefore likely to be a lack of incentives for such content. However as discussed 
in Chapter 4, there are mechanisms used by some jurisdictions to solve this issue, 
namely sui generis intellectual property rights for sports performances. Such a 
system could be specifically tailored to solve the unique market characteristics of 
this field, without applying overbroad broadcasters’ rights which apply to all 
broadcast content, and hence might result in various social costs due to multiple 
layers of property rights.  
 
These comments should however not be interpreted as advocating for such rights. 
Such would require an in depth analysis of its own as a totally separate and unique 
subject matter for the intellectual property system, a task which is outside of the 
scope of this manuscript.  
 
The main point however is that more nuanced incentives for sports and news 
broadcasts can be created without the need for strong broadcasters’ related 
rights. For example, this may take the form of a compensatory liability rule, 
accompanied by communications regulations relating to signal importation and 
substitution. 
  
As a general note, it should again be underscored that related rights are to be – 
almost counter-intuitively – understood as simultaneously subordinate but 
independent to copyright.  In fact, the necessarily subordinate role of 
broadcasters’ rights to that of copyright is well acknowledged. For example, in the 
TRIPs Agreement provisions on protection of broadcasting, which allows for 
adequate copyright protection to serve as a substitute for explicit broadcaster’s 
rights. In terms of independence, the key is to understand that related rights 
should facilitate the expression and distribution of works, rather than the 
production of creative output per se. Just as a consumer product may be protected 
independently by a patent and by a trademark, a distributed work may be 
separately protected by copyright and related rights, where these different forms 
of protection address different perceived market failures and policy goals.  
 
From a totally different perspective, broadcasters’ rights can also be seen as 
having other possible unintended benefits. For example, such rights might give 
broadcasters an incentive to digitize and distribute archived content that might 
otherwise be lost.  
 
Consider that somewhere in the world, old 8mm film reels of early twentieth 
century wartime footage exist, and if this material is not soon digitised and 
archived, the physical film will continue to deteriorate and this important 
historical content might be lost. Given that any copyright in this content is also 
presumably expired, no individual has the commercial incentive to incur the costs 
of searching for the film, processing and digitising the content, and archiving it 
accordingly. Permitting entities such as broadcasters to assume some rights over 
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distributing this content (such as allowing for control over fixation and 
reproductions thereof) would give the broadcaster a mechanism to be 
remunerated for the costs associated with digitising the content.  
 
However, such rights would create a market-based mechanism for these activities, 
and hence incentives would be effective only where the content distribution is 
commercially viable. This would hence be inconsistent with the general purpose 
of archiving, which is to preserve and document aspects of culture, heritage, and 
history that might otherwise be lost if left solely up the market. Furthermore, such 
a justification for broadcasters’ rights would seem diametrically opposed to the 
increased attention being paid to limitations and exceptions to copyright for 
libraries and archives. 
 
Notwithstanding these comments on fixation and post-fixation rights, the policy 
core of broadcasters’ related rights largely remains the retransmission right. 
Indeed, this manuscript gave a substantial amount of attention to issues relating 
to retransmission. 
 
Once again, the significance of innovation – both in terms of technology and 
service provision – cannot be understated. Chapter 10 discussed the difficulties in 
clearly delineating between broadcasting and retransmission, and discussed the 
process of ‘direct injection’ as an example of this. However, the concept of 
retransmission is challenged not only by technical innovation, but also by the 
provision of new services.  
 
Just as innovation in online streaming services blurs the boundaries between 
broadcasting and on-demand services (and hence the public communication and 
making available rights), the traditional boundaries between broadcasting and 
retransmission can also become opaque. In this regard, it becomes even more 
difficult to create a coherent property rights system to cover such activities.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 10, the concept of ‘retransmission’ is losing its meaning 
and significance in of legal doctrine, technical, and commercial terms. As a result, 
a revival of this right would mean greatly expanding its scope by subsuming it into 
a broader ‘unified’ right. This however, would be a major deviation away from the 
idea that the broadcasters’ related right is merely a technical solution to a 
technical problem, and would involve an extensive amplification of the social costs 
associated with such property rights. The logical alternative would therefore seem 
to allow the right to wilt away as it has outlived its purpose of solving public good 
problems. 
 
 
[11]-5 INFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE  
 
A final natural question is to consider how the research findings in this manuscript 
might inform the international debates discussed in Chapter 2. In this regard, as 
noted above, this manuscript takes a sceptical view of post-fixation rights, and 
suggests that any protection should be limited to a signals-based approach, if 
protection is to be extended at all. Furthermore, it is critical for any proposed 
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international legal instrument to take a very wide permissive approach to 
limitations and exceptions to the rights of broadcasting organisations. Specifically, 
under the principle of equivalency and keeping the scope of protection of related 
rights under that of copyright, compulsory licencing schemes should be expressly 
permitted for broadcasters’ rights. 
 
To take an even more narrow approach, it might be noted that if the copyright 
system itself is properly calibrated, there might not even be a need for intellectual 
property rights of broadcasting organisations at all. As noted by Balganesh (2007), 
a system of liability based on the principles of unfair competition and unjust 
enrichment may be a preferable solution to avoiding the social costs of property 
rights in broadcast signals.  
 
Even within the intellectual property system, there are examples of non-rights 
based solutions to facilitate the problems of related rights activities. One obvious 
example is the flexibilities in the Rome Convention for the protection of 
performers, which does not necessarily have to take the form of property rights. 
Similarly, the approach used in the Brussels Satellite Convention is that property 
rights are just one possible option to achieve protection objectives. Furthermore, 
specific regulatory rules in the communications sector can be more finely attuned 
to achieve the public policy objectives of the broadcasting sector, including 
provisions on the use of signals.  
 
In terms of the beneficiaries of protection, the discussions earlier in this chapter 
noted that there is no need for major incentives for online content distribution. 
Hence, it is not necessary, nor desirable to extend any related rights protection 
offered to traditional broadcasters to online webcasters. Such protection would 
likely only create the social costs and deadweight losses associated with property 
rights without any corresponding real change in incentive structures.  
 
The avid reader might observe at this point that the summation of ideas in this 
manuscript proposes a technologically neutral approach to retransmission 
activities, but not one to broadcasters’ rights themselves. Such an observation is 
indeed a valid concern, though one that is easily addressed.  
 
In essence, a technological neutral approach to retransmission proposes an 
expansion of limitations and exceptions to the rights of rightsholders – both 
copyright and related rights holders. This is to say that if limitations in the form of 
compulsory licencing or mandatory collective management are permitted in 
offline markets, then they should also be permitted in online markets. The result 
is therefore a contraction of the intellectual property system. In terms of granting 
related rights to broadcasters however, the situation is quite different. If property 
rights are granted to traditional offline broadcasters and such rights are then 
extended to online broadcasters, this represents an expansion of the intellectual 
property system.  
 
As such, advocating for a technologically neutral approach to retransmission 
provisions, but not for broadcasters’ intellectual property rights, is logically 
consistent as the two approaches can be seen as complimentary policy positions.  
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[11]-6 FINAL THOUGHTS  
 
As stressed above, technological change may be making the issues associated with 
traditional broadcasting obsolete. It may therefore seem odd to dedicate so much 
effort into analysing a topic such as broadcasters’ rights. However, evolution of 
intellectual property law shows that the legal system often tends to have 
significant path dependencies, and hence developing legal rules in the future is 
limited by the ability to understand the legal rules of the past. Furthermore, even 
as traditional broadcasting slowly fades away in more developed jurisdictions, it 
is still a critical means of access to information in much of the less technologically 
and economically developed parts of the world. 
 
In this regard it is hoped that this dissertation manuscript made some modest 
contribution to the discourse on the intellectual property rights of broadcasting 
organisations. Even if its practical lessons and policy relevance are limited, at least 
this analysis demonstrates why issues of the related rights system should not be 
relegated to mere footnotes, or dismissed through the use of the term ‘copyright’ 
as a synecdoche in discussion on intellectual property law.   
 
As a concluding point, even if the premise is accepted that broadcasters need 
incentives to invest in content distribution, and that the least costly way to do this 
is through related rights, the fact remains that empirically, there is no proof that 
the absence of such incentives has even resulted in an under-provision of such 
services. Nothing about the history of broadcasting itself suggests that a lack of 
strong intellectual property rights was a major hindrance to the economic and 
technological development of the sector. This is now even more convincing as 
distribution becomes less costly and more decentralised, and hence the need for 
market intermediaries diminishes.  
 
Central to the arguments put forward by proponents of broadcasters’ rights is that 
a lack of protection leads to significant income losses. However, the reality is that 
loss of revenue should never be assumed to mean a loss of social welfare. This is 
especially true for information goods that have zero marginal cost, and where 
these losses do not amount to a public good problem due to a complete failure of 
the market to provide these services.  
 
Simply put, there are indeed welfare-enhancing effects of ‘piracy’ – a modest 
observation that would seem obvious to a Law and Economics scholar, but a 
reality that most intellectual property maximalists refuse to admit.  
 
For this reason, it is critical to continuously study the theoretical bases of the 
intellectual property system, and ensure that academic analysis is able to 
objectively inform policy debates.  
 
 
 
 
--- 
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ANNEX 3: Competition between Fragmented and Non-
Fragmented Rights 
 
The following section provides a simple analysis for the pricing behaviour of the related 
rights holder. However, it certainly deviates from the standard models of fragmented 
rights (anti-commons effects) in two ways. Firstly, for simplicity analysis is carried out 
regarding the pricing behaviour of only one rights holder (the broadcaster who owns the 
related right). Therefore, it is implicitly assumed that the royalty rate charged by the other 
rights holder (the copyright holder) is fixed (exogenously determined). Secondly, the 
typical mechanics of anti-commons may not even necessarily arise, since the consumer 
(user) must choose between two scenarios: (i) go directly to the copyright holder to 
obtain authorisation, or (ii) obtain authorisation from both the copyright holder and the 
broadcaster (related rights holder). In the second case, it is assumed that the user 
approaches the broadcasting organisation first. Furthermore, given that the property 
right under consideration is over an audiovisual work, cost functions are negligible under 
the premise of zero marginal costs for information goods.  
 
Scenario 1: The user goes directly to the copyright owner to obtain authorisation to use 
the work. The cost incurred by the user is a sum of (i) the transaction and search costs to 
find and negotiate with the copyright holder (TC), and (ii) the actual licence fee or royalty 
rate paid (RC).   
 
Hence, P1 = TC + RC 
 
Scenario 2: The user wishes to obtain the work through the broadcaster’s transmission, 
and must hence attain authorisation from both partied. The user must therefore still incur 
the transaction and search costs, and licencing cost to the copyright holder (TC and RC 
respectively, as per Scenario 1). Additionally, the user incurs the transaction and search 
costs for negotiating with the broadcaster (TB) and a licencing fee to the broadcaster (RB).   
 
However, while total transaction costs are higher in this Scenario 2, the transaction cost 
component for negotiations with the copyright owner are smaller than in Scenario 1, by 
a scalar factor (0 ≤α ≤1). This is because the consumer has already overcome the inertia 
of initial transaction costs by paying TB, and hence only the search cost component of TC 
remains. This is to say, that there exist increasing returns to scale to the consumer from 
engaging in transaction and search activities (or that there are decreasing marginal 
transaction costs). Furthermore, search costs arise due to difficulties in identifying and 
finding the relevant rightsholder. Since the copyright owner is known by the broadcaster, 
the broadcaster may in some circumstances have an incentive to assist the user in locating 
the copyright-holder (hence reducing the search costs associated with TC). This may be 
the case because the broadcaster wants the consumer to opt for Scenario 2, in order to 
obtain a positive revenue (RB), and hence the user needs to simultaneously execute a 
licence with both rightsholders.  
 
Additionally, since the broadcaster is known with certainty to the user, transaction and 
search costs to negotiate with the broadcaster are intuitively lower than those associated 
with the copyright holder; i.e. TB < TC. Therefore, let TB/TC = β (where 0 <β ≤1; and TB = 
βTC).  
 
Hence, P2 = αTC + RC + βTC + RB 
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Pricing Strategy 
 
For the Broadcaster to earn a positive income (RB), it must set P2 < P1 
 
                                P2 < P1 
αTC + RC + βTC + RB < TC + RC 
                                RB < (1 -α -β)(TC) 
 
 Since (α + β) > 0,  
         (1 -α -β) < 1 
                   and hence: (1 -α -β)(TC) < (TC) 
 
Therefore, TC is a strict upper boundary when setting RB. 
 
In other words, the broadcasting organisation must always set the royalty rate for the 
related right lower than the transaction cost incurred by the consumer to locate and 
negotiate with the original copyright holder, even if only marginally. 
 
Furthermore, if (α + β) >1, then RB < 0. Hence, if the values of α and β are sufficiently high, 
the broadcaster cannot earn positive revenue at all, and the user will be forced to opt for 
Scenario 1 (i.e. bypassing the broadcaster, and going directly to the original copyright 
holder to obtain authorization for use of the work).   
 
If we consider the special case where transaction costs for the broadcaster and copyright 
holder are the same (i.e. TB = TC and hence β = 1), and the parameter α = 0, then P2 = P1, 
and the user is indifferent between Scenarios 1 and 2. When β = 1, α hence needs to only 
be marginally positive in order for the consumer to opt for Scenario 1, where the 
broadcaster will not earn any royalty revenue.  Conversely, as (α +β) tends to zero, the 
rate the broadcaster is able to charge tends to TC. 
 
It is interesting to further investigate the incentives of the broadcaster. Since the upper 
limit for RB is (1 -α -β)(TC), the broadcaster has the incentive to minimise the values of α 
and β, of course only to the extent that these parameters are endogenous at all. Firstly, 
the broadcaster may wish to reduce the value of TB (and hence the ratio TB/TC = β). This 
means that broadcasting organizations would have the incentive to make it as easy as 
possible for users to negotiate and execute licensing agreements. The broadcaster will 
also have the incentive to reduce the value of α by providing strong assistance to the user 
to identify, negotiate and execute a licence with copyright holders (with whom the 
broadcaster already has an established relationship). In fact, this suggests that there are 
natural market incentives for copyright holders and related rights holders to work 
together, perhaps by ‘licensing through’ agreements between the parties, which allow the 
broadcaster to execute a licensing agreement on the copyright holder’s behalf. However, 
to determine whether an anti-commons effect prevails, it is necessary to compare social 
welfare under the two scenarios.  
 
Welfare Effects 
 
Let V represent the value to the user of licensing property, and U represent the Utility 
Function of user. Additionally, let ΠC and ΠB represent the profit functions of the copyright 
owner and the broadcaster respectively. W represents the total welfare function. 
 
For completeness, it is duly noted here, that the market transaction only takes place at all 
if the value of V is greater than either P1 or P2. 
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
 
U1 = V -TC -RC 
ΠC1 = RC 
ΠB1 = 0 
 
W1 = U1 +ΠC1 +ΠB1 
       = V -TC  -RC + RC 
                     = V -TC 
 
U2 = V - αTC –TB -RC –RB 
       = V –(α+β)(TC) -(RC +RB) 
ΠC2 = RC 
ΠB2 = RB 
 
W2 = U2 +ΠC2 +ΠB2 
       = V –(α+β)(TC) -(RC +RB) +RC +RB 
                     = V –(α+β)(TC) 
 
 
Difference in Welfare between Scenarios 1 and 2: 
 
ΔW = W1 – W2 
        = [V -TC] – [V -(α +β)(TC)] 
        = (α +β -1)(TC) 
         
Therefore, social welfare is higher under Scenario 1, only when (α +β) > 1.  However, 
when (α +β) > 1, RB < 0 meaning that the broadcaster makes a loss, and does not 
participate in the market transaction, leaving the user to opt for Scenario 1. 
 
When (α +β) < 1, Scenario 2 is more socially desirable. Furthermore, RB > 0 and the 
broadcaster is able to charge a rate marginally below the threshold (1 -α -β)(TC), causing 
the user to opt for Scenario 2.  
 
 
Interpretation of Results 
 
This analysis is rudimentary certainly does not yield any surprising results. However, it 
does confirm an important fact – that competition between a ‘fragmented rights’ 
authorization scheme, and traditional ‘single owner’ scheme will facilitate and efficient 
market outcome. Any claims that multiple rights may lead to anti-commons effects must 
be limited to cases where there is no possible alternative to obtain rights directly from 
the primary copyright holder. However, it is noted that these results may only hold under 
the over-simplifying assumptions that the licencing rate for the primary copyright is fixed, 
and that there is hence no sequential pricing.   
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ANNEX 4: Legal Basis for Limitations and Exceptions 
 
This Annex give an analysis of the international legal basis for limitations and exceptions to 
copyright and related rights. It is an input into the analysis in Chapter 10. 
  
Copyright: Berne Convention and WCT 
 
As usual, the natural starting point for any discussion on the international framework for copyright 
law is the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (‘Berne Convention’). 
In terms of exploiting protected works via the broadcast media, the relevant provision of the Berne 
Convention is Article 11bis, which states as follows: 
 
(1) Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorising: 
 
(i) the broadcasting of their works or the communication thereof to the 
public by any other means of wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or 
images; 
 
(ii) any communication to the public by wire or by rebroadcasting of the 
broadcast of the work, when this communication is made by an 
organisation other than the original one; 
 
Article 11bis(1)(i) hence establishes that an exclusive broadcasting right exists, and (1)(ii) 
establishes that an exclusive retransmission right exists.536 However, it is noted that scope of the 
broadcast right is limited to ‘wireless diffusion’, while the retransmission right explicitly includes 
wire transmission. As discussed in Chapter 2, this is a reflection of the prevailing technological 
realities at the time when this Convention was concluded.   
 
These provisions are subsequently further integrated into international law via the WTO TRIPs 
Agreement Article 9, which incorporates certain provisions from the Berne Convention. 
 
As technology evolved and new forms of exploiting works emerged, the provisions of the Berne 
Convention were largely updated to cover possible loopholes created by new technologies through 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty (‘WCT’). In this regard, the provision of the WCT relevant to 
broadcasting is Article 8 (‘Right of Communication to the Public’), which states as follows: 
 
“Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1)(i) and (ii), 11ter(1)(ii), 
14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1) of the Berne Convention, authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy 
the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by wire or 
wireless means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a way that 
members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by 
them.” 
 
Notably, Article 6 of the WCT consolidates several separate rights such that of public performance 
and broadcasting, into a single right covering ‘communication to the public’. As such, it does not 
explicitly reference a retransmission right, but is understood as providing for such. Furthermore, 
this right explicitly covers communication by both wired and wireless means, and making available 
via on-demand type services.  
 
The discussions will hence generally refer to the concept of a ‘broadcasting right’ and a 
‘retransmission right’, acknowledging that both are understood as fragments of the wider right of 
                                                        
536 It is noted that Article 11 states that “Authors of dramatic, dramatico-musical and musical works 
shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorising: (i) the public performance of their works, including such 
public performance by any means or process; (ii) any communication to the public of the performance 
of their works.” Article 11 hence provides for a wider scope than Article 11bis as it covers any 
means of public performance or communication, but is however limited to certain classes of works 
(while Article 11bis applies to all literary and artistic works). 
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public communication.  Furthermore, it is acknowledged here that a retransmission right is really 
a fragment of the broadcasting right. A retransmission rights asserts that a rightsholder still has 
some rights in relation to the secondary re-broadcast of an initial broadcast. Therefore, its 
existence assumes that the broadcast right is not exhausted after the initial broadcast. 
 
 
Related Rights: Rome Convention and WPPT 
 
As usual, the starting point for discussions on related rights is the Rome Convention. For 
performers (which includes performers of both musical and audiovisual works), Article 7 of the 
Rome Convention provides for protections which includes the possibility of preventing “the 
broadcasting and the communication to the public, without their consent, of their performance,…”. 
Article 7(2)(1) states that “If broadcasting was consented to by the performers, it shall be a matter 
for the domestic law of the Contracting State where protection is claimed to regulate the protection 
against rebroadcasting, fixation for broadcasting purposes and the reproduction of such fixation for 
broadcasting purposes”. This implies that the existence of a retransmission right is not assumed, 
but where it does exist, it regulation is deferred to a matter of national policy. 
 
In terms of the use of musical works in broadcasts, Article 12 states that “If a phonogram published 
for commercial purposes, or a reproduction of such phonogram, is used directly for broadcasting or 
for any communication to the public, a single equitable remuneration shall be paid by the user to the 
performers, or to the producers of the phonograms, or to both….”. Therefore, a producer of a 
phonogram does not necessarily have an exclusive broadcasting right, but rather a right to 
equitable remuneration. Furthermore, in administering this right to remuneration, the producer’s 
right is mingled with the rights of performers. Furthermore, the existence of a retransmission right 
is not explicitly asserted.  
 
Lastly, Article 13 of the Rome Convention establishes that broadcasting organisations have a 
retransmission right. This is an explicit property right, as it is the right to ‘authorize or prohibit the 
rebroadcasting of their broadcasts’.  
 
Unlike the major copyright provisions of the Berne Convention, the related rights provisions of the 
Rome Convention are not explicitly incorporated in to the TRIPs Agreement. Hence, the framework 
for related rights has a much lower degree of international harmonisation as compared to that for 
copyright. The related rights provisions of the TRIPs Agreement are set out in Article 14.  
 
TRIPs Article 14(1) provides that performers have the possibility of preventing unauthorised 
broadcasts of their live performances. However, this is limited to broadcasting by wireless means. 
Article 14(2) asserts that phonogram producers have a reproduction right, but is silent on a 
possible broadcasting right. Article 14(3) asserts the possible existence of a broadcaster’s 
retransmission right, though this is limited to retransmission via wireless means.   
 
In terms of modernising the international framework for related rights, the WCT is complemented 
by the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (‘WPPT’). Article 6 of the WPPT asserts the 
economic rights of performers; it provides for an exclusive right of authorising the broadcast or 
communication of an unfixed performance (except where the performance is already a broadcast 
performance), and the fixation of unfixed performances.  
 
Article 10 of the WPPT provides that performers have an exclusive right over the ‘making available 
of their fixed performances’, which explicitly covers on-demand type services – both provided 
through wired and wireless means. However, the scope of this Article is restricted to performers 
whose works are fixed in phonograms, and hence only relates to musical works and not 
audiovisual works. Article 14 provides that producers of phonograms also have such a similar 
‘making available’ right. Article 15, then sets out a provision to Article 12 of the Rome Convention, 
which provides for a right to equitable remuneration for both performers and producers 
(administered together) for uses in broadcasts or communications to the public. 
 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, the WPPT does not cover the rights of broadcasting 
organisations. As mentioned above, the WPPT covers rights for performers whose performances 
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are fixed in phonograms. In practical terms, this limits the provisions to musical works. A separate 
later international agreement was concluded to address the rights of performers in audiovisual 
works – the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances (‘Beijing treaty’).  
 
Article 10 of the Beijing Treaty provides for a ‘making available right’ similar to Article 10 of the 
WPPT. Article 11 then deals with rights related to broadcasting and making available to the public. 
Article 11(1) provides for an exclusive right of authorising broadcasting and communication to the 
public of performances fixed in audiovisual works. However, Article 11(2) provides that as an 
alternative, Contracting Parties can deposit a declaration that they will alternatively provide for a 
right to equitable remuneration, instead of the exclusive authorisation right.  
 
The key conclusions from analysis of the above provisions is that the retransmission right of 
copyright holders is stronger than that for performers and producers. In fact, in many cases, 
performers and produces may not actually have a retransmission right, but a mere right to 
equitable remuneration.  
 
 
Limitations and Exceptions  
  
As noted above, both the broadcasting right and the retransmission right are embodiments of the 
more general right to control public communication. However, the retransmission right – by virtue 
of the context in which it is exploited – may be restricted in the way in which it is exercised. 
Restriction on the exercise of exclusive rights are dealt with under the concept of ‘limitations and 
exemptions’ in copyright and related rights law. By default, a copyright owner has certain exclusive 
rights; however, international agreements on copyright law set out certain criteria under which 
limitations may be placed on these rights.  
 
Limitations: Berne Convention, TRIPs and WCT 
 
While Berne Article 11bis(1) provides the basis for broadcasting and retransmission rights, Article 
11bis(2) provides for possible limitations to these rights, stating as follows: 
 
“It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the conditions 
under which the rights mentioned in the preceding paragraph may be exercised, but these 
conditions shall apply only in the countries where they have been prescribed. They shall not 
in any circumstances be prejudicial to the moral rights of the author, nor to his right to 
obtain equitable remuneration which, in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by 
competent authority.” 
 
This provision has often been used as the basis for implementing limitations to copyright 
applicable to broadcast retransmissions. The language “determine the conditions under which the 
rights mentioned in the preceding paragraph may be exercised” implies a possibility to mandate that 
rights be exercised for example, only through collective management, as discussed in Chapter 8. 
Furthermore, the requirement that these conditions not prejudice the author’s right to obtain 
equitable remuneration implies that the exclusive property right can possibly be reduced to a right 
to remuneration. The language “in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority” 
further implies that this right of remuneration can take the form of a statutory or compulsory 
licence, where the relevant royalty rate is determined through a legal instrument (statute or 
regulation), or by some adjudicating body (court or royalty tribunal). 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, the so called ‘three-step-test’ is the established standard for evaluating 
limitations and exceptions. While this test does originate in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, 
its application is limited to the reproduction right (as opposed to public communication or 
broadcasting rights). Nevertheless, the three-step-test is more generally codified in TRIPs 
Agreement Article 13, which states that “Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive 
rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.” 
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The three-step-test is also reproduced in Article 10 of the WCT. However, this Article goes even 
further by constructing a relationship between the test and application of limitations permitted by 
the Berne Convention. It states as follows: 
 
“(1) Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation, provide for limitations of or 
exceptions to the rights granted to authors of literary and artistic works under this Treaty 
in certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.  
 
(2) Contracting Parties shall, when applying the Berne Convention, confine any limitations 
of or exceptions to rights provided for therein to certain special cases that do not conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the author.” 
 
This Article is further contextualised by the ‘Agreed Statement Concerning Article 10’, which is also 
contained in the Treaty itself. The Statement states as follows: 
 
It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 permit Contracting Parties to carry forward and 
appropriately extend into the digital environment limitations and exceptions in their national 
laws which have been considered acceptable under the Berne Convention. Similarly, these 
provisions should be understood to permit Contracting Parties to devise new exceptions and 
limitations that are appropriate in the digital network environment. It is also understood that 
Article 10(2) neither reduces nor extends the scope of applicability of the limitations and 
exceptions permitted by the Berne Convention. 
 
This language is significant as it explicitly confirms that the limitations implied by Berne Article 
11bis(2) are indeed compliant with the three-step-test, and can be similarly applied for new 
technologies.  
 
Limitations: Rome Convention, WPPT and Beijing Treaty 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, there are three possible approaches to constructing provisions on 
limitations and exceptions for related rights in international legal instruments: (i) enumerated 
lists, (ii) the-three-step test, and (iii) the equivalency principle. The equivalency principle is where 
exceptions and limitations to relate rights are permitted for the same scenarios that are subject to 
exceptions and limitations under copyright.  
 
Rome Conventions Article 15(1) sets out an enumerated list of permitted limitations. While 
"ephemeral fixation by a broadcasting organisation by means of its own facilities and for its own 
broadcasts” is one such permitted use, this is a limitation to the reproduction right; there is no 
explicitly listed limitation to broadcasting or retransmission rights. Article 15(1) does however 
provide for the equivalency principle, with the caveat that “compulsory licences may be provided 
for only to the extent to which they are compatible with this Convention.” An overall assessment of 
the Rome Convention suggests that there is nothing in the Convention that would disallow 
compulsory licencing for related rights holders’ broadcasting and retransmission rights.   
 
Limitations and exceptions in the WPPT are provided for by Article 16. Article 16(1) sets out the 
equivalency principle, while Article 16(2) sets out the three-step-test. Furthermore, there is an 
‘Agreed Statement Concerning Article 16’, which states that the ‘Agreed Statement Concerning 
Article 10’ of the WCT also applies to Article 16 of the WPPT. As such, there is again a positive 
affirmation that the limitations to broadcasting and retransmission rights under the Berne 
Convention pass the three-step-test and can be extended to the digital environment.  
 
Article 13 of the Beijing Treaty (on the related rights of audiovisual performers) follows the same 
structure as WPPT Article 16. It contains both the equivalency principle and the three-step-test, 
along with an ‘Agreed Statement’ paralleling that in WCT Article 10.   
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ANNEX 5: The US Retransmission Consent Regime 
 
This Annex provides a brief analysis of the ‘Retransmission Consent’ system of the United States 
of America.537 It complements the EU case study in Chapters 8 and 9 as an input into the analysis 
in Chapter 10. As noted in Chapter 2, the US system is a particularly unique case that is difficult to 
generalise to other jurisdictions. In order to fully understand this system however, it necessary to 
understand the various phases through which the system evolved and was implemented. 
 
 
Advent of Retransmission and SCOTUS Cases 
 
When cable television was introduced in the US market, various disputes regarding the application 
of copyright law to retransmission arose. On this matter, two important cases were decided by the 
US Supreme Court (SCOTUS), as to how the 1906 Copyright Act should apply to the issue. 
  
In the first case, United Artists Television vs. Fortnightly Corporation (1968), SCOTUS overturned 
the decision of the lower courts, and found that the transmitting cable company was not engaging 
in a ‘performance’ as construed under then current copyright law.538 As an important note, the 
cable company in this case was retransmitting the programming from a nearby station, and their 
actions allowed for some consumers in that local area to receive better reception of that station, 
which was previously encumbered due to geographic topology.  
 
At that point, it would have hence not been clear as to whether copyright liability would be 
incurred where the retransmission is over a significant geographical distance, or in the language 
of US copyright law, where the retransmission is of a ‘distant signal’. This was the exact issue under 
contention in the second case, Columbia Broadcasting Systems Inc. vs. Teleprompter Corp. (1974). 
In this case, SCOTUS again ruled that the cable service provider was not engaged in a performance 
under applicable copyright law. An interesting note on this case is that the Court considered the 
economics of content distribution in its judgement; it noted that retransmitting activities would 
not diminish the copyright owner’s means of extracting recompense for their creative labour, as 
economic value was created through advertising revenues, and that since cable retransmission 
expanded the audience, the initial broadcaster would receive greater advertising revenue and 
hence have a greater willingness to pay for copyright licences to programme suppliers. Despite 
this ruling for the Court, the general perception existed within the industry that more refined rules 
on copyright liability for retransmissions were needed.   
 
 
The Compulsory Licensing System 
 
The next major phase of retransmission regulation came with the major reforms under the 1976 
Copyright Act. The new system introduced a regime of compulsory licensing for some cases of 
retransmitted signals, but differentiated between the applicable rules in different possible 
retransmission scenarios. The first scenario was a reiteration of the precedent of the Fortnightly 
                                                        
537 The US System was chosen as it has a several unique features while no other system has. Unlike 
the EU which uses mandatory collective management for transmissions as discussed in Chapter 8, 
the US uses a compulsory licencing system. However, it is not the only jurisdiction to use such a 
system. For example, Canada also uses a compulsory licensing system. In fact, the judicial evolution 
of retransmission rights in the US did have an influence in Canada; for an overview of this historical 
relationship, see Gendreau (1990). What is unique about the use system is that it also provides for 
an interesting must-carry regime, which sets the stage for the discussion on such provisions in a 
later section of this chapter. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 2, the US is not a contracting party 
to the Rome Convention, and does not provide for explicit broadcasters’ related rights.  
538  According to Eisenach (2009), central to this dispute was a 1959 interpretation of the 
Communications Act by the FCC that Section 325 banned wireless, but not wired retransmission 
of broadcast signals, and the FCC ruled that cable systems did not need broadcasters’ consent to 
retransmit their signals. 
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Case; where a retransmission takes place within the same market (within the limits of the area 
normally encompassed by the primary transmission), there would be no copyright liability.539 
Secondly, where retransmission takes place in a new market (outside of the original signal 
transmission area), copyright liability depends on whether there is an existing local broadcaster 
in that area who carries some of the same programmes as the distant signal to be retransmitted. 
Whether there are no such competing local stations (i.e. there is no ‘programme duplication’), the 
retransmitter incurs full copyright liability. However, where there is a local station carrying some 
of the same programming (i.e. there is some level of ‘programme duplication’), a compulsory 
licence would apply. Furthermore, the compulsory licence would also apply when the 
retransmission is bringing services into an area in which there otherwise would be no local 
transmitting stations. Here, it is clear that the applicable rules are inextricably linked to the wider 
goals of communications policy, such as promoting service accessibility and coverage. 
 
Where the compulsory licence applies, the cable operator was to pay ‘a reasonable licence fee’ for 
the programming contained within retransmitted signals. At this point, various institutional 
players would facilitate administration of the system. The fees would be collected and distributed 
by the Registrar of Copyright to copyright owners whose content was retransmitted, and where 
there is some dispute regarding fee collection or distribution, the copyright royalty tribunal would 
adjudicate.   
 
Most importantly, the entire system would exist subject to the Federal Communication 
Commission’s (FCC) administrative rules on various related matters, including signal 
retransmission authorisation. These rules would define the number and type of distant signals 
which could be imported for retransmission, and the applicable rules for situations where one 
party (such as a local broadcaster in the secondary transmission area) has exclusive rights for 
certain programming content.  
 
As a result, the compulsory licensing regime operated in practice not as a high level legal 
framework, but rather as a very specific regulatory tool. This is an interesting observation, as it 
demonstrates a shift from the forum of intellectual property law towards media regulation, as 
public policy objectives regarding media and communications were the guidance force of 
administrative guidelines of the FCC (whose mandate is derived from the body of Communications 
law).540  
 
The compulsory licencing rule is however not universally accepted in policy circles and academic 
literature. Beson and Manning (1978) argue against the compulsory licensing system, and find that 
“where contracting costs are unimportant, the liability of cable systems for copyright will have no 
                                                        
539 In is important to consider that under FCC carriage rules, cable service providers were required 
to carry all local stations on their networks (i.e. local stations automatically had ‘must-carry’ status 
on subscription networks in their area). It is also useful to note that the concept of ‘service areas’ 
are also specifically defined through the FCC’s licensing schemes, particularly as it relates to 
spectrum allocation.  
According to Eisenach (2009), the advent of distant signal retransmissions raised concerned about 
the impact on local broadcasters. As such in 1963 the FCC made carriage of all local broadcasting 
stations a condition of the microwave licence necessary for offering cable services, and extended 
this obligation to all cable operators in 1966. However, these must-carry rules were invalided by 
the courts in 1985. Hence between 1985 and 1992, must-carry obligations did not exist, until they 
were reinstated by the Cable Act of 1992 (and upheld by the Supreme Court in 1997 in Turner 
Broadcasting System Inc., et al vs FCC et al).   
540 Another particular driving element in this regard are issues of competition regulation in media 
markets, which concerns not only the promotion of competitive markets, but also the prevention 
of socially harmful media consolidation. This is made more complex by the specific market 
structure of broadcasting markets in the US, where local broadcasters may either be independent 
or local affiliates of one of the large national networks, and where operations are also tied into the 
syndication market. However, while this is important to note, it is not critical for the discourse in 
this chapter. For an economic analysis of affiliation agreements in US broadcasting, as it existed at 
the time, see Besen and Soligo (1973). 
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effect on either the importation of a program or the nature of the program that is produced”. This is 
essentially an application of Coase Theorem, as an allocative efficient outcome is reached 
irrespective of the initial allocation of rights/liability. As such, in simple cases, full copyright 
liability and zero liability for retransmissions will result in the same outcomes, although the 
distribution of welfare would be different. However, in more complex cases, free rider problems 
and public good market failures may arise. Building on this, the authors argue that implementing 
a compulsory licensing system rather than a system of full liability will aggravate the problems of 
distant signal importation. The authors go on to state that full liability is preferred to compulsory 
licencing for the following reasons: (i) the fixed fees do not reflect prices negotiated in a free 
market, (ii) the formula for fee re-assessments is inflexible as economic conditions change, (iii) the 
system needs a mechanism for distributing royalties based on agreement between all copyright 
owners, and (iv) the long run effect will be detrimental to the supply of programming.  
 
 
The Birth of Retransmission Consent 
 
The next major reforms in retransmission regulation in the US came with the 1992 Cable Act. 
Before this legislation, cable systems were allowed to carry signals of broadcasters without 
compensating those broadcasters, although individual broadcast stations were not allowed to 
retransmit another broadcast station without consent. Furthermore, up until that time, although 
the compulsory licence system would regulate liability for the programming within retransmitted 
systems, there was no requirement to negotiate or compensate with the original broadcaster 
themselves for the use of the signal.541  
 
Against this background, and the growing perception amongst policy-makers that the competitive 
playing field was disproportionately favouring the cable operators over broadcasters, the 1992 
Cable Act was passed, introducing the Retransmission Consent regime. 542  Under the 
Retransmission Consent regime, broadcasters are faced with a choice every three years. They can 
either choose to opt for: 
 
(i) ‘Must-carry Status’ – meaning that they are guaranteed carriage on all cable systems 
within their original broadcast footprint. However, such carriage would be without 
any form of compensation; or 
 
(ii) ‘Retransmission Consent’ – meaning that they have the right to negotiate in good faith 
with cable operators, over the terms of carriage of their signals.543 However, such 
carriage would not be guaranteed.  
                                                        
541 Note that due to the invalidation of must-carry rules in 1985, not only were cable operators 
allowed to retransmit local broadcasts (where programming was subject to the compulsory 
licence, and no authorization was needed from the broadcaster), but they were also free to choose 
which local broadcasts to carry.  
542  According to Eisenach (2009), “In passing the Cable Act, Congress recognized that satellite 
operators were treated differently from cable operators in the 1976 Copyright Act, and thus did not 
impose retransmission consent on DBS (direct broadcasting satellite). It extended retransmission 
consent to DBS operators in 1999 in the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act (SHVIA), while at 
the same time permitting DBS operators to carry local broadcast signals even to households that were 
not “unserved.”  DBS operators are not subject to the must carry requirement. However, if they choose 
to carry any local broadcast stations, they are required to carry all stations that have elected must 
carry (the “carry one, carry all” rule).” 
543 Eisenach (2009) notes that in practice, retransmission consent has been typically granted in 
exchange for ‘in-kind’ compensation. This means that instead of being given cash compensation, 
broadcasters are given ‘free’ advertising on cable networks, or an agreement that the network 
would also carry some other non-broadcasting networks affiliated with the retransmitted 
broadcaster. On this point, it becomes clear how retransmission rules are closely linked with 
prevailing market structures in the US media sector, where there are complex relationships 
between local broadcasters, national networks, non-broadcast affiliates, subscription networks, 
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Since the introduction of the retransmission consent regime, there has been heated debate over 
the policy’s effectiveness and efficiency. On one side, the regime is generally welcome by 
broadcasters who are put in a more preferable situation by having more bargaining power and 
control over retransmissions. However, the regime is generally opposed by MPVDs (Multi-
Programme Video Distributors, such as cable networks), who see the regime as giving too much 
market power to broadcasters. The main contention of MPVDs is that the regime results in an 
increase in programming costs, which is ultimately passed on to consumers. A common criticism 
of the regime is also that it can result in periodical impasses due to stalled negotiations, which 
results in consumers not having access to certain broadcast transmissions.544  
 
In terms of theoretical modelling, Chae (1998) sets out a bargaining model of the retransmission 
consent regime. The author concludes that a broadcaster’s choice of retransmission status 
depends on the additional benefits of network carriage; broadcasters with higher additional 
benefits from carriage on cable system networks will tend to opt for retransmission consent – a 
finding that appears to be consistent with the available empirical data.  In terms of the welfare 
impact of the regime, the author notes that broadcasters tend to be financed through advertising 
revenues, which is in itself imperfect (from a market mechanism perspective), and so it is often 
assumed that the broadcasters’ programming quality is sub-optimal. As such, redefining property 
rights over the signal, and allowing the broadcaster to bargain over compensation for the carriage 
of their signals, will give broadcasters an incentive to improve their programming. However, the 
actual extent of this incentive would depend on market structure, and in any case, any benefits 
would of course be net of the deadweight losses of bargaining costs.  
 
In terms of the must-carry aspect of the regime, it was noted that that rule essentially serves as a 
subsidy to local broadcasters. While this may be economically inefficient from a pure market 
perspective (and also in terms of the allocation of network capacity and spectrum resources), it 
reflects the historical policy goal of promoting local programming.  
  
 
Concluding Comments on US System 
 
The general purpose of this chapter is to take a more theoretical perspective on the nature of 
retransmission rights, and how they might be subject to certain limitations and exceptions. The 
above section on the US retransmission system may hence seem misplaced; however, this 
discussion does provide for a very different case study than the case of the European framework 
discussed in Chapter 8.  
 
The essence of the US system is that the retransmission rights of copyright and related rights 
holders are limited via a compulsory licence. This is in comparison to the case of the European 
system in which mandatory collective management is used. 
 
For broadcasters themselves, an explicit related right does not exist. What exists is a special regime 
that provides for a choice between two differently structured entitlements.  On one hand, there is 
a ‘must-carry’ status, which is an entitlement for carriage on retransmitting networks; such 
provisions are discussed later on in this chapter. The alternative is an entitlement to a quasi-
property right, which can then be the basis of market negotiations for retransmission. This system 
however only applies for ‘local’ retransmissions. For retransmissions of distant signals, a separate 
set of regulatory rules on signal importation applies. 
 
                                                        
and advertisers. For an overview of the economic structure of the US broadcasting industry, see 
Caves (2005). 
544 While this claim is widely put forward by service providers, the effects on consumer welfare 
are not necessarily so clear. Elsenach (2009) finds that the regime is not responsible for any 
significant increase in monthly subscription fees, and that concerns about negotiation impasses 
are likely misplaced.  
xxx 
As noted in Chapter 2, the US does not actually provide for a broadcaster’s related right. The quasi-
property right facilitate by the retransmission consent rule hence provides only for authorisation 
for retransmission. The issues of authorisation for fixations of broadcasts, and reproductions 
thereof, are relegated to the copyright system. 
 
In any case, what is interesting is that the system – particularly for broadcasters – is constructed 
as a regime under communications law, rather than intellectual property law.  As such, this entire 
system is strongly linked to the broad public policy goals of the communications sector, and its 
unique market structure.  
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ANNEX 6: The Bundled Compliments Holdout Problem 
 
Assume a bundle of N goods, where the utility of these goods exhibits increasing returns 
due to strong complimentary effects. In reality, there may be increasing returns at first, 
and then decreasing returns afterwards, but the existence of increasing returns for at 
least the first units is what is relevant. 
 
Each good (Xn) has an associated market value if it were subject to a transaction on its 
basis alone. However, with each successive good, there is a complimentary effect whereby 
the good’s market value is scaled upward at a decreasing rate(α1).  
 
Work Individual Value Complimentary Value 
Average 
Value 
X1 P1 α1P1 (1/1) n=1∑n=1(αnPn) 
X2 P2 α2P2 (1/2) n=1∑n=2(αnPn) 
… … … … 
Xa Pa αaPa (1/a) n=1∑n=a(αnPn) 
… … … … 
XN PN αNPN (1/N) n=1∑n=N(αnPn) 
 
In order to create a bundle of goods, it is necessary to achieve authorisation from all of 
the individual rightsholders whose works are contained in that bundle. As, each 
rightsholder is a profit-maximiser, they seek to extract the maximum possible rent in 
exchange for their authorisation. However, the maximum extractable rent is determined 
by the position in the negotiation (i.e. the second rightsholder is able to extract more rent 
due to the positive effect on individual value from complementarity.  Therefore, every 
rightsholder will be hesitant to negotiate, as they hold out for a later spot in the 
negotiating process. Sequential negotiation would therefore not be possible due to hold-
out effects.  
 
To work around this problem, the user may seek to offer one single equitable payment to 
the entire group of rightsholders in order to gain authorisations simultaneously. If this 
payment offer were the individual market values (Pn), then only the first work would be 
authorised, as each successive work would again hold-out in an attempt to extract a 
greater payment of (αnPn). 
 
The user may then have to offer a payment based on the total collection works’ actual 
cumulative market value (n=1∑n=N(αnPn)), meaning that rightsholders as a group extract 
the full value-added in the form of rent. The offer would be average value of works [(1/N) 
n=1∑n=N(αnPn)], and would the same to each rightsholder. 
 
In principle this should work if all negotiations are simultaneous. With a single offer and 
a single decision to accept or reject the offer, each rightsholder would not know a priori 
their position in the bundle. Furthermore, in a non-sequentially (instantaneously) 
assembled bundle, that position is necessarily arbitrary. There is a uniform probability of 
appearing anywhere in the bundle (1/N), and the rights holder might-appear either below 
the threshold ‘a’ with a probability (a/N), or above that threshold (with the associated 
incentive to hold-out) with a probability of ((N-a)/N). If the rightsholders are all risk 
neutral, then they choose to accept the payment based on the expected value of their work 
(given the probability distribution of bundle positions and the associated value-added); 
this expected value is the same as the average value, which was the basis of the offer made 
[(1/N) n=1∑n=N(αnPn)].  
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Furthermore, since ‘complimentary value’ is an increasing function, there are more 
observations below the average (i.e. at ‘a’) rather than above it. There is therefore a higher 
probability that a given work which is randomly assigned a position in the bundle appears 
below ‘a’ (and is ‘overpaid’ for its value-added contribution), rather than above it (where 
it is ‘underpaid’). Hence, under risk-neutrality and the possibility of truly simultaneous 
(and one-shot) negotiations, no single rightsholder would hold-out on authorisation.  
 
However, in practice such simultaneous negotiations are nearly impossible. There would 
be different transaction costs associated with negotiating with each rightsholder meaning 
that some authorisations would be concluded earlier than others (for example, content 
acquired through the network affiliate system).  Only if the user is able to maintain 
information symmetries with the rightsholder, whereby the rightsholder does not know 
their potential position in the bundle, can the simultaneous offer work. It is therefore very 
much possible for the scenario to revert to one of sequential negotiations, especially 
where rightsholder are risk-seeking.  
 
Once negotiations are sequential, there will be incentives for rightsholders to holdout. 
Again, if the offer is based on average value [(1/N) n=1∑n=N(αnPn)], in the first instance, 
not all rightsholders will accept this offer. Since complimentary value is an increasing 
function, and the average value is a fixed quantum, there will obviously be two sets of 
rightsholders: (i) those whose work’s added value is less than the average, and (ii) those 
whose work’s value added is more than the average. The result is that only those 
rightsholders for whom the offer is greater than their average value would accept [where 
αnPn ≤ (1/N) n=1∑n=N(αnPn)]. 
 
This will only be the case for a certain number of rights holders (a rightsholders, where 
1<a<N). Once payment is made to ‘a’ number of rightsholders, each further rightsholder 
notes that their actual value added would be greater than the offer made; these 
rightsholders would then have an incentive to hold-out in an attempt to extract greater 
rent.  
 
Based on this incentive structure, through backward induction, the user would then 
realise that such an offer would result in the bundle being limited to ‘a’ authorised works. 
Hence, a new offer would have to be made based on this smaller bundle and associated 
average cumulative value. The new offer becomes [(1/a) n=1 ∑ n=a(αnPn)], and 
rightsholders only accept where [αnPn ≤ (1/a) n=1∑n=a(αnPn)]. Again, only some sub-set of 
rightsholders accept, and those whose actual value-added are above the average hold out.  
 
This expectation is again internalised by the user, and through iterative backward 
induction, the process continues until the expectation is that only the first rightsholder 
accepts the offer (a → 1), and every other holds-out.  
 
Hence, hold-out problems persist, even if negotiations are not necessarily sequential, 
once authorisation regarding an exclusive right is required. On this basis, compensatory 
liability rules would be a preferable system to exclusive rights, as such would ensure that 
the welfare-enhancing act of bundling is able to occur, while rightsholders do not engage 
in welfare-reducing holdout actions, while still being afforded equitable remuneration.  
 
The following simple numerical example provides further illustration. There are 10 works 
for which authorisation is needed, each with an individual market value of $10, but when 
bundled the complimentary value increases.  
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Work Individual Value Complimentary Value 
Average 
Value 
1 10 10 10.00 
2 10 12 11.00 
3 10 13 11.67 
4 10 15 12.50 
5 10 17 13.40 
6 10 18 14.17 
7 10 20 15.00 
8 10 22 15.88 
9 10 23 16.67 
10 10 25 17.50 
 
If the user were to offer rightsholders $10, only the first work would be authorised. The 
user therefore offers all rightsholders the average value of the entire bundle of ten works 
- $17.50. However, only the first five rightsholders accept this offer; rightsholder number 
six knows that their value added is greater than the prevailing offer, and hence holdout in 
an attempt to extract more rent. Anticipating this, the user realises that only five works 
may be authorised, and instead makes an offer of $13.40 based on a bundle of five works; 
only the first three works are authorised and others again hold out. A bundle of three 
works then results in an offer of $11.67 – an offer that only the first rightsholder would 
accept; however, one work by itself without any complimentary works is only associated 
with the individual value of $10, and hence the user would make a loss. The end result is 
that the user only makes an offer of $10 for which one work might be licenced.  
 
 
 
 
 
--- 
 
 
Summary 
Intellectual Property (IP) is one of the most contentious areas in international economic law, and an area 
naturally conducive to the methodologies of Law and Economics. This thesis analyses the niche IP area of 
‘Broadcasters’ Rights’ - a form of ‘Related Rights’. The relevance of this analysis to wider field of Law 
and Economics is its treatment of property rights in media distribution, particularly where the result is an 
overlapping system of different rights.  
Part I of the thesis outlines the motivation for this research project, and the fact that the topic has attracted 
little attention from academia compared to the attention given at the international policy level (particularly 
at the World Intellectual Property Organisation). It argues that the very notion of ‘related rights’ is often 
erroneously subsumed into wider discussions on copyright, making meaningful debate difficult.  
Part II goes on to find that the concept of broadcasters’ rights – a mechanism to incentivise content 
distribution rather than content production – has a generally uneasy fit within the wider framework of the 
theoretical foundations of the intellectual property system. This part argues that the public good problems 
of broadcast content distribution are likely overstated. Furthermore, given the unique socio-cultural 
characteristics of broadcasting markets, such rights must be understood as one element of a dynamic set of 
policy tools for regulating the sector.  
Much of the thesis analyses the relationship between ‘primary’ copyright and broadcasters’ rights. In this 
regard, Part III attempts at modelling the ‘optimal scope’ of protection, and finds that broadcasting 
organisations should be offered a scope of protection below that which is offered for authors of copyright-
protected works. However, due to the specific nature of the protected subject matter, there is a more 
restricted range of policy levers to affect the scope of protection for broadcast transmissions, as compared 
to other areas of intellectual property. In this regard, the thesis argues that liberal limitations and exceptions 
are critical in constructing an appropriate scope of protection for signal transmissions. This Part also models 
the relationship between the enforcement actions of copyright holders and broadcasters. It argues that the 
existence of broadcasters’ rights can create social costs such as anti-commons effects and public domain 
enclosure. Hence, a possible alternative policy strategy might be to grant broadcasters the standing to 
enforce against infringement on behalf of their copyright licensees.  
Part IV, dedicates a large portion of the thesis to analysing the notion of ‘retransmission rights’. These are 
the intellectual property rights invoked when a broadcast signal is re-broadcast by a second broadcaster. 
During this activity, the rights of both copyright holders and initial broadcasters are invoked. This Part 
analyses the framework of the European Union for regulating retransmission activities, and finds that it is 
characterised by a patchwork of various legal instruments. As a response to the deficiencies of existing 
policies, a new EU Regulation has been proposed for online transmissions. However, the thesis argues that 
this Proposal still fails to bring overall coherence to the broader framework. In this regard, the thesis argues 
that the regulation of broadcast transmission should be based on a technologically-neutral policy approach. 
The final substantive chapter then attempts to draw lessons from the European case study and formulate a 
basic understanding of the theoretical relationship between the related rights of broadcasters, and that of 
copyright holders. The main finding is that limitations to retransmission rights are justified due to the 
transaction cost-intensive nature of such activities. 
The thesis concludes with Part V, which attempts to generalise the discussions and findings of the entire 
research project, and considers how they can inform the current international policy debate on the topic.  
 
Samenvatting 
Intellectuele Eigendom (IE) is een van de meest controversiële terreinen van het internationaal economisch recht en 
een terrein dat van nature bijdraagt aan de methodologieën van Law and Economics. In dit onderzoek wordt het niche 
IE-terrein van de rechten van omroeporganisaties die behoren tot de ‘naburige rechten’ geanalyseerd. De relevantie 
van deze analyse voor het bredere terrein van Law and Economics ligt in de behandeling van eigendomsrechten in 
media distributie, met name waar dit resulteert in een overlappend system van verschillende rechten. 
Deel I beschrijft de motivatie voor dit onderzoeksproject en het feit dat het onderwerp weinig aandacht heeft gekregen 
van de academische wereld vergeleken met de aandacht op het internationale beleidsniveau (met name bij de 
Wereldorganisatie voor de Intellectuele Eigendom). Gesteld wordt dat het begrip ‘naburige rechten’ vaak ten onrechte 
wordt ondergebracht bij de bredere discussies over auteursrecht, wat een zinvol debat bemoeilijkt.  
Deel II vervolgt met de bevinding dat het concept van exclusieve rechten van omroeporganisaties – een mechanisme 
dat eerder de distributie van inhoud dan de productie van inhoud stimuleert – doorgaans niet goed aansluit bij het 
bredere kader van de theoretische basis van het intellectuele eigendomssysteem. Dit deel betoogt dat de 
collectiefgoedproblemen bij distributie van omroepinhoud waarschijnlijk overdreven worden. Gelet op de unieke 
sociaal-culturele kenmerken van omroepmarkten moeten die rechten bovendien worden gezien als één element van 
een dynamische set beleidsinstrumenten om de sector te reguleren.  
Een groot deel van de dissertatie analyseert de relatie tussen ‘primair’ auteursrecht en de rechten van 
omroeporganisaties. In dit verband probeert deel III vorm te geven aan de ‘optimale omvang’ van bescherming en 
concludeert dat omroeporganisaties een beschermingsomvang moet worden geboden die lager is dan die geboden 
wordt aan auteurs van auteursrechtelijk beschermde werken. Vanwege de specifieke aard van de beschermde inhoud 
is er echter een beperkter scala aan beleidsinstrumenten beschikbaar om de beschermingsomvang van uitzendingen te 
beïnvloeden, vergeleken met andere terreinen van intellectuele eigendom. In dit verband wordt gesteld dat relatief 
ruime beperkingen en uitzonderingen cruciaal zijn voor het tot stand brengen van een toepasselijke 
beschermingsomvang voor signaaloverdracht. Dit deel geeft ook vorm aan de relatie tussen de handhavingsacties van 
auteursrechthebbenden en omroeporganisaties. Gesteld wordt dat het bestaan van rechten van omroeporganisaties 
maatschappelijke kosten kan creëren zoals anti-commons effecten en afsluiting van het publiek domein. Een mogelijke 
alternatieve beleidsstrategie zou daarom kunnen zijn om omroeporganisaties het recht te verlenen om namens hun 
licentiegevers op te treden tegen inbreuken. 
Deel IV is grotendeels gericht op het analyseren van het begrip ‘heruitzendingsrechten’. Dit zijn de intellectuele 
eigendomsrechten die van toepassing zijn wanneer een uitzendsignaal wordt doorgegeven door een tweede 
omroeporganisatie. Tijdens deze activiteit zijn de rechten van zowel de auteursrechthebbenden als die van de 
oorspronkelijke omroeporganisaties in het geding. Dit deel analyseert het kader van de Europese Unie voor het 
reguleren van heruitzendingsactiviteiten en concludeert dat het wordt gekenmerkt door een lappendeken van 
verschillende juridische instrumenten. Als reactie op de tekortkomingen van het bestaande beleid is een nieuwe EU-
Verordening voorgesteld voor online-uitzendingen. Gesteld wordt echter dat dit voorstel er nog steeds niet in slaagt 
om een allesomvattende samenhang te brengen in het bredere kader. De regulering van uitzendingen zou gebaseerd 
moeten zijn op een technologie-neutrale beleidsaanpak. Het laatste inhoudelijke hoofdstuk probeert vervolgens lessen 
te trekken uit de Europese casestudy en een basisbegrip te formuleren van de theoretische relatie tussen de naburige 
rechten van omroeporganisaties en de rechten van de auteursrechthebbenden. De belangrijkste bevinding is dat 
restricties op heruitzendingsrechten gerechtvaardigd zijn vanwege de transactiekosten-intensieve aard van zulke 
activiteiten. 
Ten slotte wordt in deel V getracht om de discussies en bevindingen van het gehele onderzoeksproject te 
veralgemeniseren en na te gaan hoe deze een bijdrage kunnen leveren aan de actuele internationale beleidsdiscussie 
over het onderwerp.  
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